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ABSTRACT 
INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE PROVISION OF SUPPORT AND 
CARE TO OLDER PERSONS 
 
Ethel Denise Malherbe 
Doctor Legum (LLD) thesis, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape 
 
This thesis deals with a very important issue in South African society, i.e. the 
provision of financial and non-cash support to older persons.   
 
Older persons in South Africa can be described as a sizeable but vulnerable group 
requiring specific protection.  Section 27 of the South African Constitution of 1996 
obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures within available 
resources to progressively realise the right of access to social security.  Hence, the 
steps taken by the state to promote older persons’ right of access to social security 
and to protect their right to dignity need to be evaluated.   
 
The legislative framework for the provision of financial and non-cash support to older 
persons currently is fragmented into various statutes dealing with retirement income, 
state grants to older persons and care and support services for older persons.  
Therefore, the current legislation lacks an integrated approach to the provision of 
support and care to older persons, as well as a central principle on which to base 
future legislation concerning older persons.  One such principle that could potentially 
be adopted is intergenerational solidarity, which can be described as the solidarity  
 
between the active working-age population, as one generation, from which benefits 
flow to older persons as the other.   
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This thesis evaluates whether intergenerational solidarity should form the basis of 
South African legislation on the provision of retirement income and the provision of 
care and support to older persons, and if so, whether it in fact does.  If the answer to 
the latter is in the negative, the thesis further examines whether the current process 
to reform the retirement income system and related legislation in South Africa would 
be a suitable platform to introduce the concept of intergenerational solidarity to 
legislation concerning older persons. 
 
A second theme of this thesis will be the question to which extent the duty to take 
care of and support older persons rests with the state, with the older person’s family, 
or, to a lesser extent, with the community. 
 
First, an overview of the current legal provisions in South Africa regarding retirement 
income and care and support for older persons is provided.  The focus then shifts to 
those aspects of South African legislation and policy on social security for older 
persons that may affect intergenerational solidarity directly or indirectly.  The role of 
families and communities in providing care and support to older persons is also 
discussed.  International standards relevant to older persons and their rights are 
examined to determine the extent to which intergenerational solidarity plays a role in 
international law.  A comparative overview of legislation concerning older persons is 
undertaken to determine whether it is in fact possible to incorporate intergenerational 
solidarity in legislation. 
 
It is argued that although intergenerational solidarity currently only has a limited role, 
it is the most appropriate basis for legislation relating to older persons and that the 
current reforms of the social security system offer the ideal opportunity to incorporate 
intergenerational solidarity in South African legislation. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
One of the most significant global phenomena of the late 20th century has been 
the ageing of the population, also referred to as the “graying” of the population.  
This demographic transition has continued during the first decade of the 21st 
century, and is illustrated by statistics stating that the portion of the global 
population aged 60 and over will more than triple by 2050.1  It is estimated that 
four fifths of the world’s older population will be living in the less developed 
countries by 2050.2  The fastest growth of the older population is found in Africa 
and it is estimated that by 2050 older persons will constitute an “increasingly 
significant share” of the population in Africa.3  In addition, the very old (80+) 
population is growing fast, so that by 2025 the world’s very old will number about 
155 million (88 million in developing countries).4 
 
Despite the slightly lower projected growth rate of the older population in South 
Africa, attributed to the high mortality rate due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic,5  the 
South African population is gradually ageing.6   
                                                 
1 From 600 million in 2000 to nearly 2 billion in 2050 (Ben-Israel and Ben-Israel “Senior citizens: 
Social dignity, status and the right to representative freedom of organization” (2002) 141 (3) 
International Labour Review 253). 
2 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2002) World Population 
Ageing 1950-2050 13.  
3 UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Centre for Gender and Social Development (2007) 
The state of older people in Africa – 2007: Regional review and appraisal of the Madrid 
International Plan of Action on Ageing 22. 
4 560 000 in South Africa (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
“World population prospects: The 2008 revision database” http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp 
accessed 11/04/2009).  It is estimated that the global population of very old persons will grow to 
about 350 million in 2050 (Ben-Israel and Ben-Israel (2002) “Senior citizens: Social dignity, status 
and the right to representative freedom of organization” 141(3) International Labour Review 254). 
5 UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Centre for Gender and Social Development (2007) 
The state of older people in Africa – 2007: Regional review and appraisal of the Madrid 
International Plan of Action on Ageing 24. 
6 Olivier “Old age and retirement” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 270. 
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Providing financial and non-cash support to older persons therefore is also matter 
of concern in South Africa.  Currently, more than two thirds of South Africans who 
reach retirement age have to rely on the older person’s grant7 and have no, or 
hopelessly inadequate, funded pension benefits.8 
 
The proper provision for a country’s elderly population is an expensive exercise, if 
one adds the rising cost of medical care and accommodation for the elderly to the 
volume of expenditure on pensions. 
 
Older persons in South Africa, therefore, can be described as a sizeable but 
vulnerable group requiring specific protection.  Section 27 of the Constitution 
obliges the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures within 
available resources to progressively realise the right of access to social security.  
The steps taken by the state to promote older persons’ right to access to social 
security and to protect their right to dignity9 need to be evaluated.  This evaluation 
should not only focus on the payment of pensions, but also on the impact of 
current law and policy on the care and support provided to older persons. 
 
1.2 INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
In an ideal world, society would be made up of three generations: children, the 
working-age generation, and older persons; with all three generations of equal 
                                                 
7 A non-contributory social assistance measure targeted at persons aged 60 years and older.  See 
below at 3.3.1.1 for a detailed discussion of the older person’s grant. 
8 National Treasury (2007) Social security and retirement reform: Second discussion paper 
(hereafter “2nd discussion paper”) 3. 
9 S 10 of the Constitution, 1996. 
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size.  The working-age population would raise the children and support the older 
generation in return for the older generation having raised them when they were 
children.  The children will grow up and become the new working-age population 
and once again provide for their children and the older generation (who used to be 
the working-age group).  Reciprocal benefits would flow from this arrangement 
and each generation would be certain that they will receive the support they 
require at their specific stage of life.  The working-age population would, therefore, 
be prepared to support the older generation who had supported them when they 
were children, knowing that their children will support them when they become old.  
There would not be much law required to enforce this reciprocal flow of support 
and resources.  It would just be the way things are done. 
 
Unfortunately this Utopian world where the flow of resources and services occurs 
willingly does not exist and in reality laws are required to ensure the flow of 
resources and services between generations, otherwise known as 
intergenerational solidarity.  Intergenerational solidarity can be described as the 
solidarity between the active working-age population, as one generation, from 
which benefits flow to older persons as the other.10  Therefore, most laws relating 
to retirement income are merely ways to ensure that older persons will receive 
adequate benefits when they retire, for example, legislation requiring the working-
age population to pay taxes that are then used to pay grants to older persons.  
The primary goal of retirement fund legislation is to safeguard the interests of 
members so that they will receive the benefits they are entitled to upon 
                                                 
10 See below at 2.3 for a detailed explanation of the concepts “solidarity” and “intergenerational 
solidarity”. 
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retirement.11  More importantly, laws, and particularly legislation, are required to 
step in when the balance between the generations is disrupted and regulate the 
flow of resources between the generations.   
 
Factors that affect the balance between the generations include demographic 
factors such as the ageing of the population, which leads to an imbalance in the 
generational bargain, as the working-age generation may become relatively small 
to ensure sufficient benefits for the retired generation.  Laws are therefore needed 
to ensure that the working-age group is not overburdened, while the retired 
generation can still receive the expected benefits. 
 
Other factors that could impact negatively on intergenerational solidarity are 
factors that affect the number of the working-age population paying the taxes or 
contributions needed to make the system work.  Factors such as unemployment 
and the HIV/AIDS pandemic play a major role in reducing the number of the 
working age group from which resources flow to other generations.  Laws are 
therefore required to ensure that the reduced working-age group is still prepared 
to, and capable of, providing the benefits and services required by the older 
population. 
 
All sectors of society may not necessarily support the introduction of legislative 
measures to prioritise intergenerational solidarity.12  Older persons have to 
compete against the benefit expectations of other marginalised groups such as 
                                                 
11 See 3.3.2.1.1 below. 
12 Johnston “The effects of inflation and currency instability on pension schemes in the United 
Kingdom” in ILO (1977) Pensions and inflation 103. 
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children and people with disabilities, with the result that reforms in social security 
have only partially focused on older persons.13 
 
There is a clear link between social security benefits for older persons and the 
level of financial assistance to elderly parents expected of adult children.  
Adequate old-age pensions can contribute more to the financial security and 
independence of older persons than any other income transfer programme and 
shift the burden of financial responsibility for elderly parents away from adult 
children to the social security system.14  But what if the amounts payable are so 
low that adult children still find it necessary to assist their elderly parents? 
 
Not only must benefits paid to older persons and provisions to care for older 
persons compete with provisions to assist families with children,15 but providing for 
older persons is a more long-term concern than childcare.  With childcare there is 
always the expectation that the child will grow up and become independent, 
whereas older persons will most probably become increasingly dependent.16 
 
All of this would not be such a major concern in developing countries, had the 
traditional forms of family support not started to break down, leaving the elderly 
family members, who have always taken support by their family for granted, at 
                                                 
13 However, since 1999, which was designated “International Year of the Older Person”, there has 
been an increase in interest in the plight of older persons from both researchers and policy makers. 
14 Hoskins “Combining work and care for the elderly: An overview of the issues” (1993) 132 
International Labour Review 360. 
15 Families are in a manner of speaking being “squeezed between two generations” as both child 
care and elder care demands are on the increase (Wisensale “Generational equity and 
intergenerational policies” (1988) 28 (6) The Gerontologist 775).  Binney and Estes “The retreat of 
the state and its transfer of responsibility: the intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) International 
Journal of Health Services 85 and 92 refer to the “sandwich generation” made up of middle-aged 
(mainly) female caregivers whose labour is stretched between their parents and children. 
16 Hoskins “Combining work and care for the elderly: An overview of the issues” (1993) 132 
International Labour Review 358. 
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risk.  Factors that contribute to the breakdown of traditional family support are: 
rural-urban migration by younger family members; changing family patterns; and 
the shift from a mainly agricultural economy to an industrialised one.17 
 
As older women tend to outlive older men,18 very old and dependent men can 
most often depend on the support of their spouses, whereas older women must 
depend on their children, the state, the community, or in many cases, themselves, 
for care.19 
 
The issues mentioned above have a negative impact on intergenerational 
solidarity.  The aim of this thesis is to address these and other problematic issues 
undermining intergenerational solidarity.  Among other points, this research will 
consider -  
• the economic and social implications of demographic trends, focusing on 
the changing ratios between populations of working-age and older persons, 
particularly from a comparative point of view; 
• the different theories about the distribution of income among generations 
and the competing needs of different generations; that is, intergenerational 
solidarity focusing on the reciprocal flow of resources between generations, 
                                                 
17 Hoskins “Combining work and care for the elderly: An overview of the issues” (1993) 132 
International Labour Review 351. 
18 Central Statistics (CSS) Women and men in South Africa (1998) Fig 30 indicates that women of 
each population group can expect to live six to seven years longer than their male counterparts. 
See also Woolard (2003) Impact of government programmes using administrative data sets: Social 
assistance grants 4.  Women surviving into old age in greater numbers and for more years than 
men is a world-wide occurrence (see UN Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (2002), 
para 8).   
19 Hoskins “Combining work and care for the elderly: An overview of the issues” (1993) 132 
International Labour Review  349.  Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 157 states 
that “[t]he typical fate is for men to die earlier and for women to survive with chronic diseases”. 
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as opposed to the ‘intergenerational equity’ view,20 in terms of which public 
spending on older persons should not outweigh expenditure on the younger 
generations; 
• which of the abovementioned theories is more compatible with the 
provisions of the South African Bill of Rights applicable to older persons; 
• with whom the responsibility lies to ensure an equitable distribution of 
income between the generations;21 and 
• International precedents on the role of the state in providing financial and 
non-cash support to older persons. 
 
1.3 PURPOSES OF SOCIAL SECURITY FOR OLDER PERSONS 
 
Pieters22 describes social security as “the body of arrangements shaping the 
solidarity with people facing (the threat of) a lack of earnings or particular costs”.  
The lack of earnings or particular costs that people could potentially face are seen 
as “social risks”. 
 
One part of the risk of old age consists of a person, as a result of old age, not 
being able to earn his or her own living.  It is for this reason that social security, 
and particularly older person’s grants, aim to compensate older persons for loss of 
income owing to old age.  In the same way, occupational pension and provident 
                                                 
20 The ‘intergenerational equity’ view is briefly described at 2.3 below and analysed at 6.4.4 below. 
21 A similar framework was followed in the deliberations of the United Nations Committee for 
Development Planning in drawing up the report Old-age security in a changing global context 
(1998). 
22 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 2. 
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fund benefits attempt to replace income for people who retire from their occupation 
due to reaching a particular age.23 
 
The United Nations Committee for Development Planning24 sees the three main 
functions of old-age financial security schemes as: 
• insurance (pooling savings and risks in an effort to protect those who would 
 otherwise outlive their savings); 
• redistribution (transferring income to alleviate poverty among older people); 
and 
• saving (encouraging people of economically active age to save for their 
retirement years). 
 
The other “risk” attached to old age is the additional cost involved in becoming 
older.  Social insurance against old age and state grants are, however, not 
designed to compensate for the special costs incurred by being old.  Therefore, in 
addition to the recognised risk of not being able to earn money due to old age, the 
costs of the need for assistance and increased medical expenses that arise as a 
result of ageing, also need to be recognised as a social risk.25  Hence, measures 
taken to address this additional social risk should also be regarded as social 
security measures. 
 
                                                 
23 Pieters (1993) 48. 
24 UN Committee for Development Planning (1998) Old-age security in a changing global context 
3. 
25 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 48. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
1.4 INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AS AN ELEMENT OF 
LEGISLATION CONCERNING OLDER PERSONS: THE RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
 
The main research question of this thesis is whether intergenerational solidarity 
should form the basis of South African legislation on the provision of retirement 
income and the provision of care and support to older persons, and if so, whether 
it in fact does.  If the answer to the latter is in the negative, the further question is 
whether the current process to reform the retirement income system and related 
legislation in South Africa would be a suitable platform to be used to introduce the 
concept of intergenerational solidarity to legislation concerning older persons. 
 
A second theme of this thesis will be the question to which extent the duty to take 
care of and support older persons rests with the state, with the older person’s 
family, or, to a lesser extent, with the community. 
 
Although the concept of intergenerational solidarity is central to a number of 
international standards,26 there is a scarcity of literature on the incorporation of 
intergenerational solidarity into South African legislation concerning older persons.  
The significance of the current research, therefore, is premised on the fact that 
South African legislation on older persons currently is at a crossroads.  The 
current retirement income reform process is a valuable opportunity to formally 
introduce intergenerational solidarity as an element of retirement income 
legislation and the aim of this thesis is to present convincing arguments for its 
inclusion. 
 
                                                 
26 It is also central to a number of international “plans of action” on ageing.  See below at 7.2.3. 
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1.5 METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THESIS 
 
Although ample literature on the financial and personal effects of ageing and on 
related concepts such as intergenerational solidarity exists in the fields of 
economics, gerontology and social work, there is a need for increased legal 
research on this area.  The research undertaken for this thesis takes the form of a 
literature review of current law and government policy on retirement income and 
the provision of care and support services to older persons.  The law is stated as 
far as possible as at 30 June 2009. 
 
The main focus of this thesis is the current legislative framework for the provision 
of retirement income and the provision of care and support services to older 
persons.  The legislation examined includes, but is not limited to, the Social 
Assistance Act,27 the Pension Funds Act,28 and the Older Persons Act.29 
 
As the vast majority of disputes related to social security are considered by 
administrative tribunals, that are not required to publish their findings, case law on 
social security-related matters is in short supply.  Hence, the discussion of case 
law in this thesis is limited to judgments related to constitutional interpretation, 
selected judgments on the interpretation of the legislation examined, and a 
number of determinations of the Pension Funds Adjudicator.30 
 
In addition, this thesis includes an analysis of the relevant international human 
rights instruments and international social security standards. 
                                                 
27 Act 13 of 2004, and the regulations i.t.o. the Act. 
28 Act 24 of 1956 (as amended), as well as selected practice notices issued with regard to the Act. 
29 Act 13 of 2006. 
30 Due to length constraints, the case law generally will not be examined extensively. 
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Four countries – Chile, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
Sweden – were selected for a comparative overview of the issues considered in 
this thesis.  Although a number of other countries could potentially be regarded as 
candidates for a comparative overview of social security legislation, the 
abovementioned countries were selected for the following reasons:   
 
First, the discussion documents published with regard to the pension reform 
process in South Africa recognised the systems in the abovementioned countries 
as points of reference for South African reforms.31  Secondly, each of the 
countries has features in its social security system and legislation that may (or 
may not) offer answers to the questions posed in this thesis. 
 
Chile is a good candidate for a comparative overview, as the levels of 
development and of inequality in Chile and South Africa are comparable.  In 
addition, the pension reforms in Chile in the 1980s that privatised pension fund 
management and created a “multi-pillar” system have become a point of reference 
for pension reforms in a number of other countries.  The fact that the outcome of 
the reforms was a system similar in many respects to the current South African 
occupational fund system, contributes to the value of the Chilean system from a 
comparative perspective. 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) has a well-established national insurance system that 
has recently been reformed in order to address the effects of demographic ageing 
                                                 
31 See Department of Social Development (2007) Reform of retirement provisions; National 
Treasury (2004) Retirement fund reform: A discussion paper; National Treasury (2007) Social 
security and retirement reforms:Second discussion paper. 
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of the population in the UK.  The UK retirement income legislation shares much of 
the same background as the South African legislation, making it a good candidate 
for comparison.  However, the real value of the UK system from a comparative 
point of view is found in the interrelatedness of the retirement income system and 
care and support services. 
 
The “Social Security” system in the United States of America (USA) is one of the 
largest scale retirement income schemes in the world.  The attempts in the USA to 
address the effects of demographic ageing and the (perceived) imbalance 
between generations, and views in the USA on intergenerational solidarity 
reflected in these attempted reforms, are of particular interest for this thesis.  As 
far as the law and policy on the provision of care and support services to older 
persons is concerned, the USA offers a mixture of large scale public programmes 
on the one hand and, on the other, filial support legislation. 
 
The Swedish system is interesting from a comparative point of view due to the 
major role the state plays in the provision of retirement income and of care and 
support services to older persons.   
 
The reason for the inclusion of the social security systems of these four countries 
in this thesis is not to find elements that can be directly adopted in South Africa, 
but rather as part of an indication of the available options. 
 
The multi-disciplinary nature of the provision of social security programmes means 
that much of the terminology utilised in social security law has its origins in 
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disciplines such as economics, gerontology and sociology.  For this reason, many 
of the journal articles and reports referred to in this thesis were not authored by 
legal experts, but are, nonetheless, valuable for the background and context they 
provide for the law involved. 
 
Finally, the literature review includes recent discussion documents published with 
regard to the current process to reform the retirement funding system in South 
Africa.  The discussion documents are analysed to determine the current policy 
stance on intergenerational solidarity. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters.  Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter.  In 
chapter 2 the terminology and concepts used throughout the thesis are explained.  
Much of the terminology used in social security law has been adopted from other 
disciplines, such as economics and social work and, therefore, the terms and the 
different contexts in which they apply need to be clarified.   Particular attention will 
be given to the concepts of intergenerational solidarity and intergenerational 
equity, as well as to a description of the different types of retirement funds. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the current legal provisions in South Africa 
concerning older persons.  The aim of this chapter is to give a broad overview of 
the current legal position as a context for the analysis in the following chapters, 
where the provisions outlined in chapter 3 will be examined to determine whether 
they meet the constitutional demand for legal protection of older persons.  In this 
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context, chapters 4 to 6 will be devoted to identifying and examining the key 
issues regarding state grants for older persons, occupational pensions and the 
provision of care and support for older persons. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with intergenerational solidarity as the basis of state policy on the 
provision of social security to older persons and the extent to which the state has 
taken steps to promote intergenerational solidarity in South Africa.  The first part of 
the chapter examines the development of the state’s policy approach to meeting 
older persons’ financial and care needs and, hence, the level of importance 
attached to intergenerational solidarity by the state in South Africa.  The key 
issues discussed in chapter 4 were selected in the light of their potential impact on 
intergenerational solidarity in the context of the state’s duty to provide older 
persons with access to social assistance.  With regard to older person’s grants,32 
the mismanagement of grants could lead to potential beneficiaries not receiving 
grants, whereas the abuse of grants could potentially lead to resistance from 
taxpayers against the continued payment of these grants; both with potentially 
negative consequences for intergenerational solidarity.  Although the means test 
for social grants has been criticised as being unjust and eliminating some people 
as potential recipients, it has to be evaluated in the context of the financial burden 
on the State to provide social grants for older persons.  Alternatives to the current 
older person’s grant will be discussed.  The reasons why so many older persons 
rely on the State, such as limited access to private insurance and savings and the 
fact that participation in occupational retirement funds is not compulsory, will also 
be considered. 
                                                 
32 The state old age pension.  See below at 3.3.1.1 for a detailed discussion of this grant. 
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Moving on to the individual’s responsibility to provide financially for his or her own 
retirement, the discussion in Chapter 5 will focus on the regulation of the pension 
industry by the state, to ensure that expected funds will in fact be available on 
retirement.  Intergenerational solidarity does not merely entail creating vehicles for 
retirement provision, but also measures to ensure that, should an individual take 
responsibility for providing for his or her retirement, the promised benefits would 
not have dwindled by the time he or she retires.  The issues to be considered in 
this context are the effect of the voluntary nature of the occupational fund system 
on individuals’ retirement income, the adequacy of measures intended to deal with 
leakage from the retirement income system, the role of fund governance in 
securing members’ benefits and the effect of inflation on retirement income.  
Particular attention is given to the plight of persons currently excluded from the 
occupational retirement fund system, such as workers outside the formal 
economy, low-income workers and the unemployed.  The proposed pension 
reforms and their potential effect on the distribution of responsibilities between the 
state, citizens in general and individual insured persons will also be examined.  In 
particular, the impact of fund choices for individuals under the current system, and 
more importantly, for the proposed reformed retirement system, will be highlighted. 
 
Chapter 6 deals with the duty to provide care and support to older persons, and 
with the various groups that potentially bear the burden to provide care for older 
persons.  It will be seen that the state’s focus on frail older persons shifts the 
responsibility for taking care of “non-frail” older persons to family members, 
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welfare organisations and the community.33  An important issue to explore in this 
context is whether some form of financial assistance from the state for such 
caregivers is viable.  This research will also study the impact on the active working 
caregivers of this obligation to care for older family members.  Particular attention 
will be given to the dilemma faced by working women in this regard and the need 
for legislative intervention to make it possible for women to both work and take 
care of elderly family members.   
 
Chapter 6 includes an investigation of measures to ensure that older persons are 
treated with the dignity they deserve, with specific attention to the recognition of 
the role of older persons and the protection of older persons against abuse and 
neglect.  In this context, the role of the notion of ‘intergenerational equity’ and its 
impact on intergenerational solidarity and policy on older persons will be 
discussed. 
 
Due attention has to be given to international human rights instruments and social 
security standards in the design of any new legislation dealing with retirement 
provision and caring for older persons.  Chapter 7 therefore, commences with an 
examination of the existing international standards and highlights areas where 
statutory reform is required to bring South African law in line with these standards. 
 
Further, to determine whether solutions to the problems identified in this thesis 
have been found in other jurisdictions, Chapter 7 will examine the legal protection 
                                                 
33 In many instances the person providing care for an older person may be an elderly spouse or an 
older member of the community.  The type of solidarity expressed here is intragenerational, i.e. 
solidarity amongst people of the same generation.  The focus of this thesis is on intergenerational 
solidarity and instances of intragenerational solidarity are not dealt with as a separate topic, but in 
the contexts where they occur, such as family care and community care. 
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afforded to older persons in Chile, the UK, the USA and Sweden.  In particular, the 
extent to which the law regulates intergenerational solidarity in the selected 
countries will be studied to obtain answers to the question of who could, and 
should, be held legally responsible for the welfare of older persons. 
 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter.  It is argued that intergenerational solidarity 
should form the basis of future legislation and policy on older persons.  In addition, 
it is argued that the current law and policy placing the responsibility of the 
provision of care and support of older persons on their families and communities is 
not providing sufficient protection to older persons.  Hence, increased state 
assistance to family caregivers and community organisations is required.  The lack 
of coherence between legislation regarding retirement income on the one hand, 
and on the other, legislation on the provision of care and support to older persons’ 
is highlighted as a major shortcoming of the current system. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The multidisciplinary nature of research concerning social security law was 
explained in Chapter 1.  Much of the recognised social security law terminology 
originated in other disciplines such as economics, sociology and social work, and 
was subsequently adopted in legislation, in many cases without sufficient 
explanation of the terms used. 
 
One of the stated aims of this thesis is to examine the potential effect of pension 
reforms on the distribution of responsibilities between the state, citizens in 
general and individual employees or fund members.  In addition, the provision of 
assistance with regard to the additional and special costs incurred by ageing is to 
be scrutinised.  Existing social security programmes and social security reforms 
are based on choices between different fund and funding options, or between 
different policy choices on the part of the state regarding the provision of social 
security.  The aim of this chapter is to describe the different concepts, options 
and views, and thereby to facilitate the analysis of these concepts in the 
subsequent chapters.1 
 
                                                 
1 The various reform options are discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5.  However, it is 
important that the related terminology and issues are clearly defined and outlined from the outset, 
as Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) Retirement-income reforms in the context of OECD 
work on ageing 14 warn that “public debate on reform is often confused since different issues are 
being addressed, often without being sufficiently disentangled”. 
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2.2 SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE  
 
The legal protection afforded to older persons has traditionally been classified 
under what is known in South Africa as “social security law”.  It is therefore 
necessary to attempt to give a explanation of “social security”, as well as of its 
two main branches: social insurance and social assistance.  The analysis of 
these concepts will also serve to illustrate the conceptual framework within which 
any reforms in providing for older persons must take place. 
 
As “social security” as a concept differs across different countries, the following 
are merely attempts at describing it. 
 
Pieters perceives social security as “the body of arrangements shaping the 
solidarity with people facing (the threat of) a lack of earnings (i.e. income from 
paid labour) or particular costs”.2 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) views 
social security as - 
the provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, and financial 
contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support 
during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare…  Such benefits can 
be cash transfers, or can be direct (in-kind) provision of goods and services.  
Since only benefits provided by institutions are included, transfers between 
households – albeit of a social nature – are not.3 
 
                                                 
2 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 2.  This definition features 
prominently in this thesis because of the express reference to “solidarity”. 
3 Adema and Einerhand (1998) The growing role of private social benefits 6. 
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While the International Labour Organisation (ILO) admits that the concept of 
social security has acquired a wider interpretation in some countries than in 
others, it describes social security as - 
the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public 
measures, against the economic and social distress that otherwise would be 
caused by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from 
sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and 
death, the provision of medical care, and the provision of subsidies from families 
with children.4 (my emphasis) 
 
In South Africa’s White Paper for Social Welfare5 social security is described as 
including -  
a wide variety of public and private measures that provide cash or in-kind 
benefits or both, first, in the event of an individual’s earning power permanently 
ceasing, being interrupted, never developing, or being exercised only at 
unacceptable social cost and such person being unable to avoid poverty and 
secondly, in order to maintain children.  The domains of social security are: 
poverty prevention, poverty alleviation, social compensation and income 
distribution.6 
 
The White Paper for Social Welfare defines social security as -  
policies which ensure that all people have adequate economic and social 
protection during unemployment, ill health, maternity, child rearing, widowhood, 
disability and old age, by means of contributory and noncontributory schemes for 
providing for their basic needs.  State social assistance (grants) includes the 
following four categories of benefits: those associated with old age, disability, 
child and family care, and poor relief.7 (my emphasis) 
 
The social security system in South Africa is (generally) said to have the 
following four elements: 
a) Private savings, with people voluntarily saving for contingencies, such 
as, retirement and chronic diseases; 
                                                 
4 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 3. 
5 GN 1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997 (hereafter “White Paper for Social Welfare (1997)”). 
6 At 48. 
7 At 97.  For further definitions see Olivier “The concept of social security” in Olivier et al (eds) 
(2004) Introduction to social security 13-32. 
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b) Social insurance; 
c) Social assistance; 
d) Social relief, providing short-term assistance to tide people over a 
particular individual or community crisis.8 
 
Of these elements of social security, the two that are currently of the greatest 
importance to older persons are social insurance and social assistance.9 
 
Social insurance is portrayed in the White Paper for Social Welfare as joint 
contributions by employers and employees to pension or provident funds, or 
social insurance covering other events.10  Social insurance as a concept was 
created to give expression to social solidarity amongst workers – the willingness 
to contribute to a scheme regularly to support colleagues and workmates in time 
of need. 
 
The following characteristics are common to social insurance schemes:11 
• Social insurance is financed by contributions from employers and 
employees.  The state’s involvement is limited to occasional 
supplementary contributions and the regulation of social insurance 
schemes. 
• Participation in social insurance schemes is as a rule compulsory.12 
                                                 
8 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 48. 
9 Not many South Africans can afford private retirement savings.  Social relief is made available 
on an ad hoc basis only. 
10 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 48. 
11 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 4.  See also Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic 
principles of social security 5; Moore et al “The concept of social security” in Olivier et al (eds) 
(1999) Social security law – general principles 13-15. 
12 South African occupational retirement schemes being an exception to this rule, as participation 
in a retirement scheme is presently not compulsory.  See below at 5.5 for the problems created 
by the voluntary nature of South African retirement funds. 
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• Contributions are accumulated in special funds out of which benefits are 
paid. 
• Surplus funds not needed to pay current benefits are invested to earn 
further income. 
• No means test is applied to determine a person’s right to benefit. 
• Contribution and benefit rates are often linked to the employee’s earnings. 
 
The White Paper describes social assistance as non-contributory and income-
tested benefits provided by the state to groups who are unable to provide for their 
own minimum needs, such as people with disabilities, older persons, 
unsupported parents and children.  Social assistance to older persons is paid out 
as an older person’s grant.13 
 
Social assistance is financed from the general revenue of the state with statutory 
scales of benefits adjusted to a person’s needs.  The goal of social assistance is 
to serve as a guard against deprivation14 and is paid out only to those who are 
perceived to be in need of assistance.15 
 
The ILO has set out the following as the principal elements of social assistance:16 
• The state meets the whole cost of the programme; 
• Benefits are paid out in prescribed categories of need; 
• A means test, which will take a person’s other income and resources into 
account, is applied to assess need; 
                                                 
13 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 48; s 10 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
14 Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law – general principles 15. 
15 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 6. 
16 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 5. 
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• Grants are not related to previous earnings, but are designed to bring a 
person’s income up to a predetermined minimum. 
 
In South Africa the grants paid by the state17 are social assistance measures, 
whereas the occupational retirement schemes18 and some of the private vehicles 
for retirement saving19 can be classified as social insurance.  In addition, the 
state provides means-tested benefits in kind, such as, health care and social 
services to those in need.20 
 
2.3 SOLIDARITY AND NEO-LIBERALISM 
 
As was stated in Chapter 1, one of the objectives of this research is to determine 
with whom the responsibility to provide and care for older persons rests.  Of 
particular importance is the issue of the level of state involvement: whether the 
state should have the ultimate responsibility for the needy elderly or whether the 
state should only assist individuals in providing for their own old age,21 as well as 
supporting other groups that voluntarily assist older persons.  The choice 
between these two rather different perspectives on the role of the state will 
underlie any future social planning in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
17 See 3.3.1 below. 
18 See 3.3.2 below for an overview of the legislation regulating occupational retirement schemes. 
19 See 3.3.3 below. 
20 The statutory provision for care and support services is discussed at 3.3.4.5 below and health 
care for older persons at 6.3.4 below. 
21 Whether through occupational retirement funds or commercial retirement savings vehicles. 
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Social security programmes, i.e. social insurance and assistance, are usually 
based on the principle of solidarity,22 meaning, the shared responsibility of those 
who contribute, towards each other and towards those who benefit.23  The 
significance of solidarity for successful social security programmes is described 
as follows by the ILO:24 
That social security should extend protection to the whole community is a truism.  
That its protection should be uniform for each section of the community is simple 
social justice.  And that the whole community should stand together, non-national 
residents equally with national residents, to provide this protection is an 
expression of the solidarity which underlies the whole concept. 
 
Solidarity can be likened to the ubuntu principle25 in that the principle of caring for 
each other’s well-being is promoted and a spirit of mutual support fostered.  Like 
the concept of solidarity, ubuntu acknowledges both the rights and the 
responsibilities of every person in promoting individual and societal well-being.26 
 
Solidarity needs to be reinforced by public policy and, as Iyer remarks, “extension 
of social security to the underprivileged sectors of the population could not take 
place without the necessary political commitment to social solidarity”.27 
 
                                                 
22 With the exception of fully-funded retirement funding schemes where an individual’s retirement 
benefits are based on investment returns on contributions made by, or on behalf of, him or her. 
23 Liffmann et al “Scope of application” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law – general 
principles 50. 
24 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 11. 
25 The concept of ubuntu is derived from the Zulu maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, which 
means that “a person is a person through other persons” and as a philosophy focuses on 
“people’s allegiances and relations with each other” (Ulwazi “Ubuntu” http://wiki.ulwazi.org/ 
index.php5? title=Ubuntu (accessed 10/11/2009). 
26 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 17. 
27 Iyer (1993) 132 International Labour Review 198. 
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Two types of solidarity can be distinguished: 
• Intragenerational solidarity, which is solidarity practiced within the same 
generation, for example, between the unemployed and employed of that 
generation; and 
• Intergenerational solidarity, which is solidarity between different 
generations, for example, between the active working population and 
either older persons or children.28 
 
The focus of this research is on the intergenerational solidarity between the 
active working population (contributors and taxpayers) and older persons.  At the 
root of intergenerational solidarity rests a long-term contract between the active 
working population and those who are too old to work.29 
 
Intergenerational solidarity implies that the younger, more active sectors of the 
population are prepared to meet the pension claims of the older generation.  It is 
based on an understanding that, if the active working population chooses to 
dismantle social programmes for older persons, it would be dismantling social 
protection for itself.  Intergenerational solidarity also entails that the present 
generation of pension beneficiaries should be prepared to abstain from 
unnecessary claims that would impose an unreasonable burden on the 
generations to come.30 
 
                                                 
28 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 28. 
29 Iyer (1993) “Pension reform in developing countries” International Labour Review (132) 187. 
30 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 29. 
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On the other side of the spectrum are those who believe that there should be the 
minimum interference by the state and civil society in an individual’s social and 
economic circumstances.  Some of the main principles that they rely on are: 
• Markets are to be liberated from government involvement and should be 
open to international trade and investment; 
• Cutting public expenditure for social services and reducing the safety-net 
for the poor; 
• Reduction of government regulation of the economy; 
• Privatisation, with emphasis on the advantages of service delivery by the 
private sector compared with that by the state; and 
• Moving from the concept of “community” to “individual responsibility”.31 
 
Those who hold this view, which been labeled ‘neo-liberalism’,32 therefore see 
the provision of health and social care as the responsibility of the individual.  
Instead of being dependent on the state, people should be free to make choices 
about social benefits.33 
 
                                                 
31 Martinez and Garcia (1996) “What is Neoliberalism? A brief definition for activists” 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376  (accessed 30/09/2008). They criticise ‘neo-
liberalism’ for “pressuring the poorest people in a society to find solutions to their lack of health 
care, education and social security all by themselves – then blaming them, if they fail, as ‘lazy’”. 
32 ‘Neo-liberalism’ has evolved into a semi-political label currently used by critics of a variety of 
economic policies.  It does not necessarily reflect the original meaning of the term as used by 
Alexander Rustow in the 1930s to warn against excessive market regulation, as proposed by 
supporters of the national socialist regime.  See Hartwich “Neoliberalism’s early history” 
http://www.cis.org.au/temp/OP114_extract.html (accessed 22/10/2009) for a description of the 
origins of ‘neo-liberalism’. 
33 Hill (1993) Understanding social policy 205.  ‘Neo-liberalism’ has been under attack from 
activists criticising the aggressive global free-market capitalism, privatisation and retrenchment of 
the welfare state that go together with neo-liberalism and blaming it for the fact that the rich grow 
richer and the poor grow poorer.  Financial institutions, such as, the World Bank and the IMF, 
have been singled out for criticism as they are perceived as imposing neo-liberal policies on 
poorer countries.  See Livingstone “Resisting neo-liberalism” http://www.llb.labournet.org.uk/ 
1997/october/int3.html (accessed 02/07/2009); Martinez and Garcia (1996) “What is 
Neoliberalism? A brief definition for activists” http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376  
(accessed 30/09/2008).   
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Increasingly, governments are turning towards the ‘neo-liberal’ approach that “it 
is better to teach a person how to catch a fish than to feed him a fish”.  According 
to this approach, the role of the state in the provision of social welfare should 
ideally be limited to setting the framework for service delivery, monitoring the 
standards of delivery and providing some funding support but not directly 
delivering the services.  The actual delivery of services is seen as the task of the 
market, the community and the family, who will take up the slack created by less 
government involvement.  The government should through national policies and 
practices foster self-reliance and independence, rather than provide welfare 
services.34 
 
Any plans to reform social security will always trigger the age old debate between 
those demanding extensions and improvements to social security and those who 
are reluctant to finance additional social security schemes.35  The latter have a 
propensity to view older persons as societal burdens, who divert much-needed 
resources away from other age groups.36  This brings an additional aspect of the 
debate on intergenerational solidarity, “intergenerational equity”, to the fore. 
 
                                                 
34 De Vaus and Qu “Intergenerational family transfers: Dimensions of inequality” (1998) 50 Family 
Matters 27 http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm/fm50dd.pdf (accessed 10/07/2009). 
35 E.g. employers and taxpayers (see Moore et al “The concept of social security” in Olivier et al 
(eds) (1999) Social security law – general principles 14). 
36 The group responsible for this shift in attitude towards individual responsibility consists of those 
who have been financially successful and, therefore, believe that they would fare better investing 
in their own accounts and do not see the need to take part in any collective agreement (Munnell 
(2000) Achieving social goals: the case for defined benefit versus defined contribution plans 7). 
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Discussions of intergenerational equity focus on four major issues: 
• The fairness of the allocation of resources between children and older 
persons; 
• Concern over large national deficits created in order to make provision for 
older persons; 
• The competition among age groups for health care resources; and 
• The fairness of expecting younger generations to finance retirement 
benefits.37 
 
Social security policy in South Africa has incorporated certain neo-liberal 
features.  According to the White Paper for Social Welfare,38 the state cannot 
accept sole responsibility for meeting basic socio-economic needs, and civil 
society will have to meet some of the social service needs.  Families are 
regarded as the basic unit of society and are required to carry some of the 
burden of providing social support.39  Social welfare programmes are to be 
designed so as to enhance people’s independence,40 and state assistance is to 
be reserved for those unable to support themselves and their dependents.41 
 
This approach that includes elements of both solidarity and neo-liberalism is 
present in current South African social security legislation.  In reality social 
security in South Africa is currently restricted to limited solidarity within particular 
                                                 
37 Wisensale “World population ageing: the coming intergenerational equity debate” 1997 (2/3) 
Bulletin on Ageing  http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/agb97231.htm (accessed 2007/09/10).  See  
below at 6.4.4 for further discussion of the debate on intergenerational equity. 
38 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 19. 
39 At 20. 
40 At 17. 
41 At 16.  See also s 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1996. 
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programmes and there currently exists no coordinated system wherein solidarity 
plays an integral role.42   
 
2.4 NATIONAL RETIREMENT SCHEMES AND PRIVATE AND 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS 
 
When looking at the levels at which provision for retirement funding is usually 
made, three diverse levels appear: national or public retirement schemes, 
occupational retirement schemes and private retirement schemes.  As a key 
focus of this study is to establish which form(s) of retirement provision is/are 
suitable in the South African context, a brief overview of what is included under 
each of these levels of retirement provision will follow. 
 
National or public retirement schemes have to be distinguished from state social 
welfare.  The latter is in the form of social grants for older persons, and can be 
described as social assistance to the elderly.  Public retirement schemes, 
although they are run by the state, are intended as a type of social insurance and 
are, therefore, targeted at the working population only. 
 
National retirement schemes as a rule cover all the workers in a country, 
although there are some exceptions.  In many countries the scope of application 
                                                 
42 See below in Chapter 3 where the fragmented legislative framework for the provision of 
financial and non-cash support to older persons is discussed. 
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of national retirement schemes is limited to formal sector employees.43  
Membership of such national schemes is often compulsory. 
 
The basic objectives of a national system of protection to provide for the income 
needs of old age are: 
• Protecting the population against poverty in old age; 
• Providing an income to replace the earnings lost due to retirement; 
• Adjusting retirement income to take account of inflation; 
• Encouraging the development of additional voluntary provisions for 
retirement income;44 
• Through universal coverage, ensuring that employees’ retirement 
protection will follow them when they change jobs;45 and 
• Pooling risks that all workers share, such as market downturns.46 
 
In countries with public retirement schemes, the two main categories of 
retirement provision are public and private retirement schemes.47  In certain 
countries, such as South Africa, there may as yet be no national retirement 
scheme for all workers, and the government’s role in providing occupational 
pensions is limited to civil servants only.  This means that in these countries all 
                                                 
43 Ogunrobi et al “Old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law – general principles 
116.  Workers in the informal economy are therefore excluded.  See below at 5.6.1 for the 
meaning of the term “informal economy” and proposed measures to extend the scope of 
retirement funding schemes to workers in the informal economy. 
44 Iyer “Pension reform in developing countries” (1993) 132 International Labour Review  200. 
45 Horlick “The relationship between public and private pension schemes: an introductory 
overview” in ISSA (1987) Conjugating public and private: the case of pensions 18. 
46 Leone “Stick with public pensions” (1997) 76 (4) Foreign Affairs 49. 
47 Adema and Einerhand (1998) The growing role of private social benefits 7 categorise social 
benefits as public when the relevant financial flows are controlled by government, including 
benefits provided by governments to government employees.  They regard all other social 
benefits not provided by governments as private benefits.  On the other hand, Hemming (1998) 
Should public pensions be funded? 4 regards “public pensions” as social insurance pensions, 
excluding pensions for civil servants. 
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retirement vehicles can be regarded as “private” as opposed to public schemes.  
This has led to the situation that what is regarded as two separate categories in 
South Africa, viz occupational retirement funds and private retirement savings 
vehicles, are in the international context bracketed together as “private”.  This 
distinction between what is regarded as “private” in South Africa and 
elsewhere,48 is of particular importance when international sources are used as 
references in the debate on whether public or private schemes are the way of the 
future for retirement provision. 
 
Occupational retirement funds are linked specifically to employment, and can be 
either defined benefit or defined contribution funds.49  It is usually employers that 
take the decision to establish an occupational pension scheme, as a rule as a 
benefit to attract and retain employees.50 
 
                                                 
48 The meaning attached to “private pensions” differs within the context of each country, leading 
to a diversity of terminology, e.g. what is known as an “occupational retirement fund” in South 
Africa, can be called a “complementary pension”, “parastate benefit” or “company old-age 
provision” in another jurisdiction.  See Horlick “The relationship between public and private 
pension schemes: an introductory overview” in ISSA (1987) Conjugating public and private: the 
case of pensions 15; Tamburi and Mouton “The uncertain frontier between private and public 
pension schemes” in ISSA (1987) Conjugating public and private: the case of pensions 29 and 
31. 
49 See below at 2.6 for the distinction between these two types of funds. 
50 Adema and Einerhand (1998) The growing role of private social benefits 11; Iyer “Pension 
reform in developing countries” (1993) 132 International Labour Review 192; Tamburi and 
Mouton (1987) “The uncertain frontier between private and public pension schemes” in ISSA 
(1987) Conjugating public and private: the case of pensions 30. 
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Occupational retirement funds are usually contributory funds to which both the 
employer and employees contribute.  The member’s contribution is usually 
deducted from his or her salary.51 
 
There is limited state involvement in occupational retirement funds.  This 
commonly takes the form of the regulation of the retirement fund industry and the 
provision of a complaints procedure for aggrieved members and ex-members of 
retirement funds.52  For this reason it has been argued that there are no purely 
“private” systems, and that the government will always play a role in retirement 
schemes, the only question being whether its influence is direct or indirect.  Even 
with regard to “private” schemes the state must be the overall regulator and 
guarantor of the integrity of the private system.53 
 
The benefits usually associated with occupational funds are retirement benefits, 
although additional benefits, such as, withdrawal benefits, death benefits (usually 
payable to the dependants of the beneficiary) and insured benefits (additional 
benefits that can be purchased for fund members, with a portion  of the 
contributions, through an insurance company) may also be payable.54  The 
                                                 
51 Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds: Legal and policy considerations ix; 
Department of Social Development (2007) Reform of retirement provisions 56. 
52 South African occupational retirement funds are discussed below at 3.3.2. 
53 Ross “Public versus private pensions: dimensions of a world-wide debate” in ISSA (1996) 
Protecting retirement incomes: Options for reform 53.  The nature of state supervision and 
regulation of the “private” pension industry will of course vary from one country to another 
(Tamburi and Mouton “The uncertain frontier between private and public pension schemes” in 
ISSA (1987) Conjugating public and private: the case of pensions 38).  See also Adema and 
Eiderhand (1998) The growing role of private social benefits 7-8.  
54 In this thesis all references to “benefits” in the context of occupational retirement funds are 
meant to indicate retirement benefits, unless the contrary is indicated. 
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employees or retired employees of the organisation for which the fund was set up 
are the members of the fund.55  Hence, the main purpose of a retirement fund is 
to provide a form of benefit for its members on retirement or to their dependants 
when the members die.  Other types of benefits may only be paid out of fund 
resources once this primary goal has been satisfied.56 
 
A number of relative advantages and disadvantages of occupational retirement 
funds as opposed to public schemes have been identified.57  The advantages of 
occupational retirement funds are: 
• They are flexible and can be adapted to the special needs of employees in 
a specific sector or geographic area. 
• Members of occupational retirement funds usually have some input in 
investment policy. 
• The element of competition amongst occupational funds could lead to 
improved benefits. 
• Occupational funds are deemed to be less exposed to demographic risks 
than national schemes as they usually only deal with specific groups or 
sectors of employment.  This factor makes occupational fund membership 
attractive for people who might be pessimistic about the state’s ability to 
meet its future pension liabilities.58 
 
                                                 
55 Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 1. 
56 See definitions of “pension fund” and “provident fund” in s 1 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
57 Ogunronbi et al “Old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law –general principles 
117-119. 
58 See Palmer “Public and private pensions and saving in Sweden” in ISSA (1987) Conjugating 
public and private: the case of pensions 252-253. 
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The relative disadvantages of occupational retirement schemes are: 
• As each fund has to bear its own administrative costs and there is no 
cross-subsidisation of such costs, as is the case with national schemes, 
administrative expenditure is higher than for public schemes.59 
• Having a fund for a particular sector of the workforce reduces national 
solidarity amongst workers, with more emphasis on sectoral solidarity. 
• Indexation methods may vary across different funds.60 
• In a public state-run scheme there is more built-in protection against 
discriminatory provisions and inadequate benefits.  The regulatory 
framework under which occupational retirement funds operate is not 
always capable of eliminating serious abuses of fiduciary responsibilities.61 
• One of the major disadvantages of occupational retirement funds is the 
general lack of transferability and portability of retirement provisions 
should members have to withdraw from funds before retirement.62 
 
Private provision for retirement funding is usually the only alternative available to 
self-employed persons and those employees who are not covered by 
occupational retirement schemes.  The lower the level of benefits offered by 
other types of schemes, the greater the likelihood that those that can afford it will 
opt for private retirement vehicles.  For this reason private retirement funding is 
by its nature voluntary.  Examples of private retirement funding options are 
                                                 
59 See Willmore (1999) Public versus private provision of pensions 6. 
60 Ogunronbi et al “Old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law – general principles 
118.  “Indexation” refers to the process of adjusting retirement benefits after their award in order 
to keep up with inflation. 
61 See Tanzi “The fiscal dimensions of public pension systems” in ISSA (1996) Protecting 
retirement incomes: Options for reform 28.  See also below at 3.3.2 for the regulation of 
occupational retirement funds and at 5.7 for issues related to fund governance in South Africa. 
62 Ogunronbi et al “Old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law – general principles 
119. 
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retirement annuity funds, deferred compensation schemes, unit trusts and 
insurance policies.63 
 
The line between public and “private” retirement systems is becoming 
increasingly blurred as both types offer a broad range of options, leading 
Tamburi and Mouton64 to question whether the “traditional criteria used to 
distinguish between the two types and the conventional terminology have not 
been rendered somewhat obsolete by a rapidly changing system”. 
 
Public and private systems are also not completely independent of each other as 
the magnitude of the one can affect the other.  The more comprehensive the 
public system, the less need there will be for private coverage, but the converse 
is also true, in that the absence of an efficient public scheme will cause more 
individuals to take up private retirement provision.65 
 
Midway between public retirement schemes and private and occupational 
pension funds is the integrated system in which the benefit paid out by the 
private fund is the difference between a basic amount and the state benefit.  This 
system ensures that beneficiaries do not receive less in retirement benefits than 
the specified gross amount. 
 
                                                 
63 See below at 3.3.3. 
64 Tamburi and Mouton “The uncertain frontier between private and public pension schemes” in 
ISSA (1987) Conjugating public and private: the case of pensions 40. 
65 Adema and Einerhand (1998) The growing role of private social benefits 24. 
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An example of such an integrated (also called “pillared” or “tiered”) approach is 
one whereby a combination of systems could exist together, for instance, a public 
basic pension for all employees, together with earnings-related occupational 
retirement schemes, topped up with private retirement savings.66 
 
In an integrated system the contributions to, and benefits from, occupational 
retirement schemes usually apply to that portion of earnings above the ceiling for 
the public scheme.  It therefore holds the advantage for employers that it reins in 
pension costs, as part of the pension liabilities is carried by the public scheme.67   
 
2.5 PENSION FUNDS AND PROVIDENT FUNDS 
 
The existing trend in the South African retirement system has for some time been 
a movement towards providing lump sums at retirement and a conversion from 
pension funds to provident funds.68  Although most provident funds are also 
defined contribution funds,69 the difference between a pension and a provident 
fund does not depend on whether it is a defined contribution or defined benefit 
fund.  The misconception that all provident funds are necessarily defined 
contribution funds, and that all pension funds are, therefore, necessarily defined 
benefit funds, is one of the reasons why many employees opt to become 
                                                 
66 Horlick “The relationship between public and private pension schemes: an introductory 
overview” in ISSA (1987) Conjugating public and private: the case of pensions 23.  See below at 
7.3.2 for an analysis of the World Bank’s “multi-pillared” approach to retirement funding. 
67 Cooper “Actuarial techniques and funding of pension plans in a period of inflation” in ILO (1997) 
Pensions and inflation 71-72. 
68 See Smith Committee (1995) Report of the Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of 
Retirement Provision in South Africa (hereafter “Smith Committee Report (1995)”) 45. 
69 See below at 2.6 for the distinction between defined contribution and defined benefit funds. 
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members of provident funds.  Another misconception leading to a preference for 
provident funds is that pension and provident funds are fundamentally different 
types of schemes.70   
 
Due to the abovementioned incorrect assumptions regarding the distinction 
between pension and provident funds, it is necessary to outline the actual 
differences between pension and provident funds, as well as their relative 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Pension funds are retirement funds established for the purpose of providing 
annuities71 for employees on their retirement from employment.  A pension fund 
in South Africa is a fund where the member is entitled to a maximum of one-third 
of the retirement benefit as a lump sum cash payment, with the balance paid out 
as a life-long pension.72  Hence, the main advantage of a pension fund is the 
periodic payments that are made throughout the retired life of the member, even 
if the pensioner outlives the average lifespan on the basis of which the pension is 
calculated. 73 
                                                 
70 Smith Committee Report (1995) 25. 
71.See below at fn 73. 
72 Definition of a “pension fund” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (see below at 3.3.2.1.2); 
Smith Committee Report (1995) 25; Olivier “Old age and retirement provision” in Olivier et al 
(eds) Introduction to social security (2004) 285. 
73 The pension fund is obliged by the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 to make provision for the 
payment of annuities when members retire (see below at 3.3.2.1.2).  Based on the amount of 
money left over once the lump sum payment is made, an actuarial assumption is made as to the 
expected return if that sum of money is invested safely.  The other factor that is considered in 
calculating the amount payable as annuity is the average life expectancy of the retired person 
according to standard mortality tables.  The annuity payable would therefore be “the amount 
which, paid every month, will reduce the capital sum plus the expected investment return to zero 
over the expected lifespan of the pensioner” (Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident 
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Pension fund members are assured of a secure flow of income and are, 
therefore, freed from post-retirement investment gambles.74   
 
In the case of a provident fund the member may receive the full amount of the 
retirement benefit as a lump sum.75   
 
Pensioners therefore exist only in the context of pension funds.  Once the lump 
sum has been paid out to the beneficiary of a provident fund, he or she is 
sometimes referred to as a “retiree”, although there is normally no contact 
between the provident fund and retiree after retirement.76 
 
The payment of the lump sum retirement benefit is one of the perceived 
advantages of a provident fund, as it allows the beneficiary greater flexibility in 
deciding how he or she is to invest (or spend) it.77  The lump sum pay-out may 
also be perceived to have other advantages for the less well-to-do older person.  
A lump sum benefit may be utilised to purchase a house to be occupied by the 
beneficiary.  In that case the lump sum benefit is not regarded as income in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
funds 10).  The term “pension” as used in this thesis therefore refers to all periodical payments.  
State grants and pension fund benefits are all “pensions”.   
74Iyer “Pension reform in developing countries” (1993) 132 International Labour Review 191. 
75 Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social security: a legal 
analysis 234; Olivier “Old age and retirement provision” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to 
social security 285. 
76 Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa chapter 5, para 
1.F.   
77 Although, as is argued below, the “flexibility” involved in receiving a lump sum rather than 
periodical payments in reality only holds an advantage for those beneficiaries who are financially 
sophisticated enough to invest the lump sum wisely. 
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hands of the beneficiary (as it would be in the case of a monthly pension 
payment) and consequently not included in the means test to determine whether 
the older person would be entitled to an older person’s grant.78   
 
However, the lump sum benefit may prove to be a disadvantage rather than an 
advantage.  It has been argued that, particularly in developing countries where 
beneficiaries are on average not as sophisticated regarding the financial markets 
and the investment of their lump sum payout,79 beneficiaries might be tempted to 
squander their benefits on consumer goods and in the long run be dependent on 
the state again.80  It is, therefore, argued that they would be better off with a 
pension which can be “rationed” out over the lifespan of the beneficiary.81  
                                                 
78See below at 3.3.1.1. 
79 See National Treasury (2004) Retirement fund reform: a discussion paper (hereafter 
“Discussion Paper”) 34 fn 32.  The Treasury Task Team referred to particular assistance that 
should be provided to“low income workers 
(i) who have little financial education and therefore may purchase 
inappropriate financial products, 
(ii) who have, in their individual capacity, little negotiating power with 
financial institutions, 
(iii) who are likely, in their individual capacity, to make investment and 
other choices that are inappropriate (most likely because they are 
too conservative) and who would do better to have these decisions 
made on their behalf by management boards who can access 
appropriate expertise, and 
(iv) who need the bulking of transactions, such as insurance, to obtain 
economies of scale and cross-subsidies.”  
Although the Treasury Task Team’s comments on assistance to low income employees were 
made in the context of the debate whether funds should provide early withdrawal, death and 
disability benefits as well as retirement benefits, their observations regarding many fund 
members’ (lack of) individual capacity to make prudent investments ring true in the context of 
lump sum retirement benefits. 
80 George (2006) Analysis of South African pension fund conversions PhD thesis (University of 
South Africa) 106 and 122; Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 95 and 
179. 
81Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 48.  The National Treasury (2007) 
Social security and retirement reform: second discussion paper (hereafter “2nd discussion 
paper”) 24 expresses the concern that many people who retire in good health “tend to 
underestimate their longevity”, and that a lump sum benefit does not suffice to produce a 
sufficient income during retirement for them. 
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Recipients of lump sum retirement benefits may also be the targets of vendors of 
unscrupulous schemes, making provident funds a bad choice for financially 
unsophisticated individuals.82   
 
Pension funds and provident funds in South Africa currently offer different tax 
concessions.  In the case of pension funds a portion of members’ contributions is 
deductible from taxable income, whereas the same does not apply in the case of 
provident funds.83  This means that the tax benefit for provident funds does not 
occur at the contribution stage, but rather at retirement when an increased tax-
free portion is paid out as a lump sum. 
 
2.6 DEFINED CONTRIBUTION FUNDS AND DEFINED BENEFIT FUNDS 
 
The distinction between defined contribution and defined benefit funds is critical 
because each scheme gives rise to different legal rights and obligations.84  The 
main difference between these types of funds lies in the manner in which the 
retirement benefit is determined.85 
 
                                                 
82 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 36 fn 35. 
83 See below at 3.3.2.1.2(b). 
84 See Klein “Retirement fund investments – international perspective” Pension Lawyers 
Association Conference 2000 http://www.icon.co.za/~pla/2000%20PLA%20Conference/ 
Jim%20Klein.htm (accessed 24/08/2008). 
85 The South African experience of defined benefit funds has been limited to defined benefit 
occupational funds.  In other countries defined benefit funds usually also include the national pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) retirement fund.  See above at 2.4 for the distinction between national and 
occupational funds and below at 5.3.4 (for the choice between PAYG and fully funded systems). 
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A defined benefit scheme specifies the retirement benefit to be paid in detail,86 
and leaves the contributions to be determined as required.  The payout formula is 
based on the average annual wage or salary of the member before he or she 
retires (final earnings) and on the number of years of membership of the fund.87  
Final earnings may be calculated over the average earnings for the last year, the 
last three years, or the last five years, before retirement, depending on the 
fund.88  The benefit paid to the retired employee will therefore be a percentage89 
of final earnings multiplied by the number of years of membership of the fund.  
The formula used to calculate the guaranteed benefit payable to members 
applies irrespective of contributions made or the success of the fund’s 
investments.90 
 
As the eventual liabilities of this type of fund cannot be known because the 
earnings near to retirement are not known until the member actually retires, the 
contributions paid to the fund will therefore have to be adjusted from time to time 
                                                 
86 Therefore it is also known as a “fixed benefit”, “final salary” or “promised benefit” fund.  See 
Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 6; Downie (1999) The essentials of 
retirement fund management in South Africa chapter 1, par 2.C.1(b); Masingi v Pick ‘n Pay 
Provident Fund PFA//305/98/LS 3. 
87 James “New models for old-age security: experiments, evidence, and unanswered questions” 
(1998) 13(2) The World Bank Research Observer 274; Hemming (1998) Should public pensions 
be funded? 5. 
88 World Bank (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis 84, Nobles (1993) Pension, employment and 
the law 8; Willmore (1999) Public versus private provision of pensions 2; Munnell (2000) 
Achieving social goals: the case for defined benefit versus defined contribution plans 2. 
89 Called the “accrual” or “pension” factor, or “accrual rate”.  The accrual factor is the fraction of 
salary which a member accrues for every year of service.  Although the accrual rate will depend 
on the rules of the fund, the usual percentage is 2% (Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and 
provident funds 6; Reineck (1999) A specie of promise and its effect on the pension fund surplus 
7). 
90Adams v African Oxygen Limited Pension Fund and Others PFA/WE/897/2000/NJ 10; Olivier 
“Old age and retirement provision” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 285; 
Milburn-Pyle “Surplus – from the FSB’s perspective” http://www.icon.co.za/~pla/con_98/Feedback 
(accessed 10/03/2008). 
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to ensure that the fund can meet its obligations.  For administrative purposes, the 
employees’ contributions are usually fixed as a percentage of their earnings.  The 
employer’s contribution is normally calculated by the fund’s actuary at regular 
intervals, based on the amount required to meet the fund’s liabilities after taking 
members’ contributions and investment income into consideration.91  When the 
fund is newly established, the employer’s contributions will have to compensate 
for the shortfall when the employee contributions paid are not sufficient to meet 
promised benefits.  If the fund experiences “worse than expected” investment 
returns or higher costs, it could also be possible that the employer will be 
required to pay increased contributions once again to ensure that benefit 
promises will be met, particularly in times when inflation is high and salaries and 
benefits are rising sharply.92  The employer acts as the guarantor of the financial 
soundness of the retirement scheme.93 and a defined benefit fund, therefore 
guarantees defined benefits to members.94  The funding risk is shifted to the 
employer (or in the case of a public defined benefit fund, the state). 
 
The fact that the employer’s contributions can sometimes mean the difference 
between benefit promises being met or not, means that the employer’s 
                                                 
91 Kransdorff v Sentrachem Pension Fund PFA/GA/3/98JM 8.  The employer therefore pays a 
“balance of cost” contribution that will vary over time depending on factors, such as, salary 
increases or the success of investment returns on the fund’s assets (Milburn-Pyle “Surplus – from 
the FSB’s perspective” http://www.icon.co.za/~pla/con_98/Feedback (accessed 10/03/2008)). 
92 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 6; Gouws “The Tek case: aspects of retirement 
fund surpluses” PLA Conference 1998 http://www.icon.co.za/~pla/con_98/Feedback/ 
PLA%20B%20Gouws%20Surplus.htm (accessed 10/03/2008). 
93 Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) 895, para 17; 
Adams v African Oxygen Limited Pension Fund and Others PFA/WE/897/2000/NJ 10. 
94 According to the World Bank (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis xxi, the term “defined benefit” 
implies a guarantee that a benefit based on a prescribed formula will be paid. 
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insolvency could create severe problems for a fund.  The Insolvency Act95  
contends with this problem by providing that the fund will be regarded as a 
preferred creditor of the employer with regard to contributions payable on behalf 
of the employees.96 
 
The principle of cross-subsidisation is central to defined benefit funds,97 as 
members are entitled to a guaranteed earnings-related benefit.  The link between 
earnings and benefit paid in a defined benefit fund means that higher earning 
fund members are paid correspondingly higher benefits than lower paid fund 
members employed by the same employer, with the result that the perception 
can exist that “the poor and unlucky subsidise the rich and lucky”.98 
 
A defined contribution fund can be likened to a savings fund.99  Although defined 
contribution funds are often mistakenly called provident funds, these two 
concepts are not synonymous.100 
 
In a defined contribution scheme101 the contribution rate is specified by the rules 
of the fund, but the level of retirement benefits is determined by the accumulated 
value of contributions by both employer and employee, plus the accrued interest 
                                                 
95 Act 24 of 1936. 
96 Section 98A(1)(b). 
97 Page v Cape Municipal Pension Fund [2001] 3 BPLR 1759 (PFA) 1762. 
98 Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 257. 
99 World Bank (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis 83. 
100 Ogunronbi et al “Old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security law – general principles 
113. 
101 Also called a “fixed contribution”, “equishare” or “money purchase” fund (Downie (1999) The 
essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa chapter 1, para 2.C.1(a); Nobles (1993)  
Pension, employment and the law 8). 
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and other investment income credited to a specific account on behalf of the 
member.102  The higher the return on investments, the higher the benefit paid to 
the member.  Various factors can therefore impact on benefits, such as, 
individual investment decisions, performance of the markets and fees charged by 
investment account managers.  Hence, members are provided with no 
guarantees as to the amount they will receive on the date of retirement or 
withdrawal from the fund, and each individual member of the fund bears the risk 
of bad investments made on his or her behalf.103  The administrator of the fund 
will keep and update an individual record for each member and the contributions 
made by, and on behalf of, him or her.  This account will grow by the interest or 
investment return earned.104 Private retirement annuities are always defined 
contribution funds. 
 
The main difference between a defined benefit and a defined contribution fund is 
the party taking the risk for the investment performance of the fund: with a 
                                                 
102 Definition of “defined contribution category of a fund” in s 1 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 
1956; World Bank (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis xxi; Smith Commission Report (1995) 25; 
OECD (1998) Maintaining prosperity in an ageing society 128; Heller (1998) Rethinking public 
pension reform initiatives 6; Nobles (1993) Pension, employment and the law 8; Willmore (1999) 
Public versus private provision of pensions 2; Munnell (2000) Achieving social goals: the case for 
defined benefit versus defined contribution plans 2; Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and 
provident funds 10; Olivier “Old age and retirement provision” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) 
Introduction to social security 285; Department of Social Development (2007) Reform of 
retirement provisions 56.  The determining factor that makes a fund a defined contribution fund is, 
therefore, the fact that the benefit is based on the income generated from contributions, and not 
the fact that the rules of the fund define the contributions payable by the parties.  As soon as the 
rules of the fund provide a formula for the calculation of retirement benefits, even if the 
contributions payable are also defined in the rules (e.g. in “target benefit” pension funds), the fund 
would be a defined benefit fund (Reineck (1999) A specie of promise and its effect on the pension 
fund surplus 2 fn 7). 
103 As well as an increase in expenses. 
104 Klein “Retirement fund investments – international perspective” 2000 Pension Lawyers’ 
Association Conference 7. 
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defined benefit fund the employer takes the risk, but with a defined contribution 
fund the risk lies with the member, with the promise of better benefits attached. 
 
Defined contribution funds have gained popularity in the last few decades.  The 
current shift from defined benefit to defined contribution funds105 can in part be 
explained by outlining the historical development of pension funds.  Defined 
benefit funds first emerged in the UK at the behest of employers wanting to 
bestow discretionary long service awards on employees, with the object of 
fulfilling the social needs of those employees and their dependants.106  
Governments soon realised that such schemes were socially desirable, and 
extended tax incentives and regulation to such funds.107  As the role of trade 
unions and wage-setting by collective bargaining increased, pension benefits and 
contributions to the scheme have come to be regarded as part of remuneration 
and employers’ exclusive control over funds questioned.108  For employers the 
attraction of defined benefit funds was fading, and thus they came to prefer the 
full control over the fund which defined benefit funds offered for the shift of the 
                                                 
105 See George (2006) Analysis of South African pension fund conversions: 1980-2006 PhD 
thesis (University of South Africa); Klein “Retirement fund investments – international perspective” 
2000 PLA Conference. 
106 The nature of the defined benefit fund makes it a perfect vehicle to ensure long-term loyalty of 
employees to their employer, as their benefits are certain to increase with the number of years 
that they are employed (George (2006) Analysis of South African pension fund conversions: 
1980-2006 5). 
107 Kransdorff v Sentrachem Pension Fund PFA/GA/3/98JM 8; World Bank (1994) Averting the 
Old Age Crisis 166. 
108 The perception that defined benefit funds were tools of employers to bind employees to them 
was one of the reasons for the trade union driven exodus of employees to defined contribution 
funds in the 1980s to 1990s.  National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 6 points to a worldwide 
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution funds during this period. 
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risk of poor investment performance to members that defined contribution funds 
offered.109 
 
In South Africa a major exodus from defined benefit funds to defined contribution 
funds led mainly by trade unions (in particular the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU)) occurred in the 1980s to 1990s as employees sought 
to share in the perceived advantages of the stock market.110 As a result of the 
large-scale switch to defined contribution funds, most of the remaining defined 
benefit funds were closed to new members.111 Although the public sector funds 
are still currently for the most part defined benefit funds, most private sector 
employees belong to defined contribution funds.112 
 
Other factors leading to the large-scale conversion from defined benefit to 
defined contribution funds included: 
• High levels of unemployment and lack of job security; 
• Employee mobility;113 
                                                 
109 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 10. 
110 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 10; Department of Social Development (2007) 
Reform of Retirement Provisions 56.  Unions representing employees negotiated with employers 
for the implementation of defined contribution funds for union members (Reineck (1999) A Specie 
of Promise and its effect on the pension fund surplus 5 fn 17). See also George (2006) Analysis 
of South African pension fund conversions 24. 
111Shrinking membership numbers led to a decline in the financial viability of many of these 
defined benefit funds.  The solution was to collapse them into new defined contribution funds, 
whilst still preserving the defined benefits to which the members were entitled.  A hybrid fund, 
which is defined contribution in nature, but with some members being entitled to defined benefits, 
has become a common arrangement (National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 10). 
112 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 10. 
113 Strasheim “Determining ‘fair retirement fund practices’ in relation to fair withdrawal benefits”  
PLA Conference 2008 summarises the ‘changing world of work’ as follows: “The modern 
workplace is increasingly characterized by fluidity, uncertainty and constant change: industry-
wide layoffs, downsizing, rightsizing, as well as initiatives to promote representative workplaces, 
such as reconfigurations to achieve affirmative action and employment equity objectives.” 
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• More generous and transparent withdrawal benefits; 
• The absence of (perceived) control over funds by employers; and 
• The perception that fund members find it easier to understand how their 
benefits from a defined contribution fund are calculated.114 
 
On the other hand, the main drawback of defined contribution funds is that the 
level of income generated by fund members will vary considerably among funds, 
as well as over time. 
 
The level of income differs among beneficiaries from different funds, as those 
who are members of funds that are lucky or wise in their investments profit from 
a greater return than others, who are members of funds that are less careful in 
their investments, or just unlucky.  The risk of a downturn in the market always 
exists115 or, even if the market as a whole does well, unwise investments could 
lead to poor performance by the fund.  Unlike the defined benefit fund, there is no 
clear relationship between the member’s salary close to retirement and the actual 
benefit received.  As the retirement benefit depends largely on the investment 
performance of the fund, members bear the risk of governance failures, 
increasing expenses and inadequate benefit protection.116   
 
The variation of the retirement benefit over time depends on the overall 
performance of the market at the time of retirement.  One retiree may retire when 
                                                 
114 George (2006) Analysis of South African pension fund conversions 5 – 6; Pension Fund 
Adjudicator (2005) Pension fund manual  58. 
115 See Basil Kransdorff v Sentrachem Pension Fund PFA/GA/3/98/JM 8. 
116 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 21 and 26; Masingi v Pick ‘n Pay Provident 
Fund [2002] 1 BPLR 2985 (PFA) 2987.   
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returns are high and another may retire during a downturn in the markets.117  
Unfortunately, the full effect of stock market volatility is only felt when the 
member retires.  Should the beneficiary on retirement wish to convert the 
retirement benefit into an annuity, the monthly annuity would depend on the state 
of the stock market in the year the individual retired.  An individual who has the 
misfortune to retire and annuitise when the market is down could be faced with a 
meager income for the rest of his or her life.118 
 
The risk to members of defined contribution funds is increased, as they do not 
necessarily have the required investment expertise, and are exposed to the 
possibility of poor advice and the vagaries of the market.119 It has been 
questioned whether it is appropriate “to leave members of the public, with varying 
levels of knowledge and experience of investment and finance, vulnerable to 
poor advice from, and possibly exploitation by, service and product providers”.120  
It has been suggested that steps be taken to provide members of defined 
contribution funds with education on investment and finance.121 
                                                 
117 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 7. 
118 Kijakazi and Greenstein (1998) How would various Social Security reform plans affect Social 
Security benefits? An analysis of the Congressional Research Service Report 13.  According to 
Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 257, benefits can fluctuate up to 30% over a year, with the 
result that fund members with a similar number of years of service can receive substantially 
different benefits depending on when they retire. 
119 In the Department of Social Development discussion paper Reform of Retirement Provisions 
(2007) 88 it was stated that very few members of defined benefit funds who chose to convert to 
defined contribution funds on the advice of unscrupulous advisors would have understood “the 
implications of the arrangements being made”, particularly where the conversions involved 
“significant and hidden reductions in benefits”. 
120 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 7. 
121 Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 253; Masingi v Pick ‘n Pay Provident Fund [2002] 1 
BPLR 2985 (PFA) 2087.  Members of defined contribution funds must be educated in the 
calculation of their benefits to enable them to dispute incorrect calculations (Department of Social 
Development (2007) Reform of Retirement Provisions 88). 
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2.7 PAY-AS-YOU-GO AND FULLY-FUNDED SCHEMES 
 
In a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) programme122 the contributions (or taxes) paid by 
today’s workers are not saved to pay for their future benefits,123 but are instead 
paid out immediately to finance the benefits of present-day retirees.  In turn, the 
future retirement benefits of today’s workers will be paid out of the contributions 
of the next generation of workers.124  Consequently, a sustainable PAYG 
programme has as its base a “social contract between successive generations 
according to which each generation of workers pays for the pensions of the 
preceding generation on the understanding that its pensions will be paid for by 
the next generation of workers”.125 
 
The initial contributions to PAYG systems are on average lower than in the case 
of fully funded schemes, as the risk is spread,126 which makes it the ideal system 
for a country starting out with a national system of social protection for older 
persons.127  An important aspect of a PAYG system is the implied reliance by 
                                                 
122 Also named “repartition” schemes.  See Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of 
social security 97. 
123 As is the case with fully-funded schemes. 
124 Ferrara (1999) Social security is still a hopelessly bad deal for today’s workers 3; OECD 
(1998) Maintaining prosperity in an ageing society 133; Nobles (1993) Pension, employment and 
the law 9; James “New models for old-age security: experiments, evidence and unanswered 
questions” (1998) 13 (2) The World Bank Research Observer 272; Willmore (1999) Public versus 
private provision of pensions 2; Cameron “SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal 
Finance 20 January 2008 http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 05/02/2009). 
125 Hemming (1998) Should public pensions be funded? 11. 
126 Contributions are also only required to cover that particular year’s liabilities (Pieters (1993) 
Introduction into the basic principles of social security 97). 
127 In a PAYG system, those who retire in the early years of the programme will receive high 
returns on the relatively small amount of the contributions paid by them and their employers.  The 
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beneficiaries on the solidarity of the younger generation to ensure that funds are 
available for their pensions,128 as well as having to rely on the state to intervene 
should the fund run into financial trouble. 
 
The risk that PAYG public funds may not be able to meet their liabilities falls on 
government.  Government, therefore, has to have measures in place to deal with 
demographic changes, such as, the ageing of the population or any other factors 
that may create a generational imbalance.  In effect, government129 becomes an 
alternative source of funds for pension payments in the case of failed PAYG 
funds. For this reason fully-funded schemes are more common in private pension 
systems, whereas PAYG schemes are generally restricted to public retirement 
funding.130 
 
In a fully-funded system the contributions paid over an employee’s career are 
saved and invested to provide benefits in retirement.131  Assets are therefore 
always sufficient to cover future liabilities.132 
                                                                                                                                                 
same advantage does not apply in the case of employees retiring when the system has matured, 
as they would have contributed for most of their working years.  See Ferrara (1999) Social 
security is still a hopelessly bad deal for today’s workers 3.  The difficulties of sustaining a PAYG 
system are discussed in more detail below at 5.3.4. 
128 Willmore (1999) Public versus private provision of pensions 4 is of the view that “there is no 
way for today’s workers to bargain and contract effectively with unborn generations, so there is 
always a fear that tomorrow’s workers might revolt”.  For more views on the issues of 
“intergenerational equity” and whether the law in fact can protect intergenerational solidarity, see 
6.4.4 below. 
129 It is not uncommon for governments to create semi-independent “guarantors” for PAYG 
defined benefit pension schemes, e.g. the US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 
created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.  
130 Kalisch and Aman (1998) Retirement income systems: the reform process across OECD 
countries 13. 
131 Ferrara (1999) Social security is still a hopelessly bad deal for today’s workers 4; Nobles 
(1993) Pension, employment and the law 9.  In OECD (1998) Maintaining prosperity in an ageing 
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The perceived133  advantages of a fully-funded scheme are: 
 
• A clear link exists between contributions and retirement payments. 
• Less likelihood exists that imbalances between contributions paid and 
pension payouts may occur, as the member’s benefits are determined by 
how much he or she saves.134 
• Employee security exists against events such as employer insolvency or 
mergers, since with a fully-funded scheme benefits are segregated from 
the rise and fall of the employer’s fortunes,135 in that contributions are paid 
into an individual account. 
• A PAYG system merely redistributes funds from one segment of the 
population to the other, “making retirees better off only by making workers 
worse off”.136  In the case of funded systems the benefits are provided 
from the income produced by investments on behalf of the employee, and 
therefore benefits can be paid without burdening others.137  
• If workers decide to ‘escape’ to the informal sector in order to evade 
having to contribute to a retirement fund, and then later attempt to join a 
fully-funded fund after realising their mistake, additional costs to the 
programme are borne by these workers themselves rather than being 
                                                                                                                                                 
society 126 the term “advance-funding” is used and it is defines as “the provision in advance for 
future liabilities by the accumulation of assets”.  Benefits paid from a fully-funded scheme are 
therefore always defined contribution benefits (see above at 2.6 for a description of defined 
contribution funds). 
132 James “New models of old-age security” (1998) 13 (2) The World Bank Research Observer 
275. 
133 Many of these “advantages” of fully-funded systems have been stated by detractors of PAYG 
systems, without any empirical evidence that fully-funded systems are on the whole more 
advantageous retirement fund options.   
134 Cameron “SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 January 2008 
http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 05/02/2009). 
135 See Cooper “Actuarial techniques and funding of pension plans in a period of inflation” in ILO 
(1977) Pensions and inflation 76. 
136 Ferrara (1999) Social security is still a hopelessly bad deal for today’s workers 5.  See below 
at 6.4.4 for more on the notion of ‘intergenerational equity’ and its effect on pension policies. 
137 For this reason, Ferrara (1999) Social security is still a hopelessly bad deal for today’s workers 
5 regards the essential difference between the two systems as being that the funded systems rely 
on wealth creation, while PAYG programmes rely on income redistribution. 
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passed on to others, as would have been the case in PAYG systems.138 
• The financial implications of future pension provision are immediately 
made obvious with funded schemes, whereas with PAYG the cost 
implications of pension promises are not immediately clear.  This 
“signalling” function of funded systems enables fund managers to use the 
information about future pension costs to avoid fiscally irresponsible 
behaviour.139 
 
2.8 RESIDENTIAL CARE AND COMMUNITY-BASED CARE 
 
Most of the terms discussed above relate to financial provision for old age.  In 
this section some of the expressions used in discussions of the non-financial 
care of older persons will be briefly explained. 
 
The difference between residential care140 and community-based care141 lies in 
the location where the care is received and the degree of care that is received.  
Long-term care in an old age home, a nursing home or other type of institution is 
regarded as residential care, as older persons are provided with care as well as 
accommodation. 
 
                                                 
138 James “New models for old-age security: experiments, evidence and unanswered questions” 
(1998) 13(2) The World Bank Research Observer 288. 
139 Hemming (1998) Should public pensions be funded? 14-15. 
140 “Residential care” and “institutional care“ are interchangeable and both terms are used 
throughout this thesis. 
141 “Care” is defined in the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 as “physical, psychological, social or 
material assistance to an older person, and includes services aimed at promoting the quality of 
life and general well-being of an older person”, with “caregiver” having a related meaning.  
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A residential facility is defined in the Older Persons Act142 as “a building or other 
structure used primarily for the purposes of providing accommodation and of 
providing a 24-hour service to older persons”.143 
 
Domiciliary care is the care afforded to older persons not residing in residential 
facilities.  This includes community-based care and support, such as, service 
centres, day care programmes and recreational facilities.  Community-based 
programmes are defined as - 
• “prevention and promotion programmes, which ensure the independent living 
of an older person in the community in which the older person resides; and 
• home-based care, which ensures that a frail older person receives maximum 
care within the community through a comprehensive range of integrated 
services”.144 
 
An older person for the purposes of this Act is defined as a male of 65 years and 
older or a female of sixty years and older. The same definition for an “older 
person” was used in the Social Assistance Act.145  The age differentiation in 
terms of which men and women qualify for the older person’s grant led to a 
challenge in 2005 in the Pretoria High Court that this constituted a case of unfair 
                                                 
142 Act 13 of 2006, s 1. 
143 The Older Persons Act does not distinguish between state-run and state-subsidised homes as 
s 2 of the Aged Persons Act 81 of 1967, but its provisions are clearly aimed at regulating and 
monitoring the management of state-subsidised homes.  Residents of state-run homes are fully 
financed by the state and, therefore, do not qualify for any other assistance such as older 
person’s grants.  State-subsidised homes are usually funded by non-governmental organisations 
and are as a rule not established as profit-making concerns.  See below at 3.3.4.5 for a 
discussion of the sections of the Older Persons Act in terms of which state-subsidised homes are 
monitored. 
144 Section 11 Older Persons Act. 
145 Act 13 of 2004, s 10. 
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discrimination on the basis of gender.146  The Court was asked to grant an order 
that steps must be taken to equalise the qualifying age for both men and women 
at 60.  The judgment is still pending, but the Social Assistance Act was 
subsequently amended,147 and the qualifying age for men is progressively being 
reduced, so that men would also be entitled to receive the grant from age 60 as 
from 2010.  No mention was made in the court application of the age 
differentiation in terms of which men and women qualify for assistance in terms 
of the Older Persons Act, nor has the Older Persons Act been amended to 
eliminate the differentiation.  This oversight means that 60 year old men may 
apply for the older person’s grant, but cannot rely on the protection against abuse 
and discrimination provided to them by the Older Persons Act before they turn 
65. 
 
                                                 
146 Roberts and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others Case No 32838/05 (TPD). 
147 Social Assistance Amendment Act 6 of 2008. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One of the stated aims of this thesis is to determine who should bear the 
responsibility to provide and care for older persons and to examine the degree of 
protection against poverty, neglect and abuse in old age.  The chosen approach 
to produce a solution to the problems of caring for older persons is to first 
examine the current situation, followed by a critical evaluation of the 
shortcomings and limitations of the existing structures.  This chapter therefore 
serves as a summary of the current South African law on providing financial 
security for and caring for older persons.1   
 
This chapter is divided into three parts.  Firstly, the constitutional rights of older 
persons that entitle them to protection are outlined and their right of access to 
social security is discussed.  This part of the chapter explains the need for the 
statutory provisions that are discussed in the rest of the chapter. 
 
The second section of the chapter deals with current law (mainly legislation) that 
provides income security in old age.  The focus in the final part of the chapter is 
on the measures that are currently in place to provide care and support services 
for older persons, as well as recent legislative developments.  Although the latter 
                                                 
1 It is by no means intended to be an exhaustive study on retirement benefits or social grants for 
older persons.  When a matter is dealt with in detail it is done so in order to stress the importance 
of the relevant legislation to the central topic of this thesis and to lay the foundation for further 
discussion in other chapters.  Chapters 4 to 6 will elaborate on key issues identified in this 
chapter affecting the ability of the different role players (the state, families; the community; 
individuals making provision for their own retirement) to provide income security, care and 
support to older persons.  
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sections of the chapter examine legislation aimed at providing for and protecting 
older persons in general, it is also attempted to state upon whom the relevant 
legislation places the burden of providing for older persons.   
 
3.2 THE CONSTITUTION AND OLDER PERSONS 
 
 
The South African Constitution2 contains the rights of all South Africans in its Bill 
of Rights, many of the provisions of which are applicable to older persons.  These 
include: 
• Section 9 prohibits unfair discrimination against anyone on the basis of 
age. 
• Older persons have the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.3 
• The rights to bodily and psychological integrity4 and to freedom from all 
forms of violence5 are of special importance to older persons. 
• Section 26 provides for the right of access to adequate housing. 
• All South Africans have the right to have access to food, water and 
social security.6   
 
The grants and benefits for older persons that are covered in this chapter are 
based on the state’s duty to protect and promote the right of older persons to 
access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and 
                                                 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3 Section 10. 
4 Section 12(2). 
5 Section 12(1)(c). 
6 Section 27. 
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their dependants, appropriate social assistance.  At the very least, the state 
should not deprive older persons of benefits that they are already receiving. 7   
 
3.2.1 The right to access to social security as a socio-economic right 
 
 
The Preamble to the Constitution states that it aims to establish a society based 
on democratic values and to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the 
potential of each person.  This cannot be achieved without the State creating a 
comprehensive and integrated social security system.8 
 
The constitutional commitment9 to addressing conditions such as poverty and 
deprivation and the South African legacy of inequality has been interpreted as 
follows: 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth.  Millions of people 
are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty.  There is a high level of 
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean 
water or to adequate health services.  These conditions already existed when the 
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our 
society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at 
the heart of our new constitutional order.  For as long as these conditions continue 
to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.10 
 
When interpreting any of the fundamental rights in the Constitution and, 
therefore, the right to access to social security, the courts must promote the 
                                                 
7 As the Bill of Rights has horizontal as well as vertical application (s 8 of the Constitution), some 
rights may be enforced against private parties such as retirement funds, employers and non-
governmental organisations providing care and support services.  See below at 3.2.4 for more on 
the horizontal application of social security rights. 
8 De Wet “Can the Social State principle in Germany guide state action in South Africa in the field 
of social and economic rights?” (1995) SAJHR 36; White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) GN 
1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997 para 45. 
9 Found in the Preamble and the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. 
10 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 1700, para 8. 
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values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.11  The values of human dignity and equality are of special 
importance to the right of access to social security and the recognition of the 
state as a social state12 and underlie all measures to protect and improve the 
lives of older persons. 
 
Although the South African constitution is regarded as one of the most 
progressive in the world due to the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of 
Rights, the writers of the Constitution took great care to frame these rights “in 
such a way as not to place an absolute and unambiguous obligation on the 
government to fulfil them”.13  Socio-economic rights such as social security rights 
are formulated in such a manner as to place a higher premium on “access to” the 
relevant benefits, as opposed to the actual benefits themselves.14 
 
Section 27 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right of access to 
social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance.  The state is required to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of these rights.15  The social security 
measures dealt with in this chapter - that is, social assistance in the form of 
                                                 
11 Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
12 Olivier et al “Constitutional framework” in Olivier et al.(eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 
121. 
13 Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) ESR Review 6. 
14 Martin “Just Administrative Action: The Key to Accessing Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) 
ESR Review 9. 
15 Section 27(2). 
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grants to older persons, social insurance through retirement funds and the 
provision of care and support services to older persons - all fall within the scope 
of section 27.16 
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution deals with the realisation of the right of access to 
social security and to social assistance by placing an obligation on the state to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  The duty on the 
state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right of access to social security is, 
however, qualified by the wording of section 27(2).  The qualifications include: 
• the state is required to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
• within its available resources 
• to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.17  
 
Section 27(2) does not merely qualify the right of access to social security, but 
also compels the state to devise a “comprehensive and workable plan” to meet 
its obligations.18   
 
There are qualifications attached to the right to social assistance as well: it is to 
be means tested19 and only “appropriate” social assistance is guaranteed, which 
                                                 
16 In addition to other rights of older persons, such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property (s 25), the right to have their dignity respected and protected(s 10) and equality rights (s 
9). 
17 My emphasis. 
18Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1189 para 38. 
19 Section 27(1)(c) refers to access to social assistance “if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants…”. 
 
 
 
 
 64
means that one has to meet the requirements imposed at the state’s discretion.20  
Only those who meet these requirements can lay claim to social assistance. 
 
In addition, section 7(3) refers to external limitations by stating that the rights in 
the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained in section 36.21  Although 
section 36(1) makes provision for the limitation of rights such as the right of 
access to social security, such a limitation will only pass constitutional muster if 
the limitation is effected by “law of general application”, that is, not by 
administrative action, and all relevant factors referred to in the subsection are 
taken into consideration.  Social security rights should therefore only be limited 
when the limitation serves a sufficiently important purpose.  Having regard to the 
nature and extent of the limitation and the relations between the limitation and its 
purpose, the limitation should not restrict the social security right more than is 
necessary. A court should set aside a limitation on a social security right where 
there are other reasonable alternatives available through which the objectives of 
the limitation can be achieved.22 
 
                                                 
20 Eg the requirements for state grants for older persons discussed below at 3.3.1.1.1. 
21 Section 36(1), the general limitations clause, reads as follows: 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
22 Olivier et al “Constitutional framework” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 
142. 
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3.2.2 Limitations on social security rights 
 
 
Does the right to access to social security mean that the government merely has 
to ensure that there are no legal impediments on people wishing to make use of 
the benefits available, or is it actually required to take action and use available 
resources to realise this right?  Should the government be allowed to provide 
only the most basic and minimum grants, and justify this by claiming that it is 
taking reasonable measures, within the limited resources available, to 
progressively realise the right as best it can?  According to Barberton,23 the 
answer to this question lies in the interpretation given by the courts to clauses 
such as “access to”, “reasonable measures”, “within its available resources” and 
“progressive realisation”.  At the very least, it is clear that the intention of this 
formulation was not that the State would be obliged to make social security 
benefits available to all who apply for such benefits.24 
 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others 25 it was held that the interpretation of a right requires understanding of 
both its textual setting (both the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole) 
and the social and historical context.  There is a close relationship between the 
various socio-economic rights and they must be read as a whole.  The state is 
obliged to “take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme 
                                                 
23 Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) ESR Review 7. 
24 See De Vos “Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and Economic 
Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution” (1997) 13 SAJHR 87. 
25 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 1184 para 22. 
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conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing”.26  The right of 
access to social security should therefore also be interpreted in the context of the 
socio-economic circumstances prevailing in South Africa. 
 
The significant link between social security rights and the other socio-economic 
rights was described by Yacoob J in the Grootboom27 case as follows: 
The poor are particularly vulnerable and their needs require special attention.  It is in 
this context that the relationship between sections 26 and 27 and the other socio-
economic rights is most apparent.  If under section 27 the state has in place 
programmes to provide adequate social assistance to those who are otherwise 
unable to support themselves and their dependants, that would be relevant to the 
state’s obligations in respect of other socio-economic rights. 
 
3.2.2.1 “Access to” 
 
Section 27(1)(c) guarantees everyone access to social security, including social 
assistance.  This has been interpreted as creating the opportunity for everyone to 
apply for social security, but not providing any guarantee of social security or, 
more importantly, of social assistance.  The government is still entitled to set the 
conditions to be met before the benefits are awarded, but should not act in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory manner when doing so.28 
 
 “Access to” social security can also be linked to the beneficiaries’ ability to 
access the relevant programmes, which in turn relies on the right to just 
                                                 
26 At 1184 para 24. 
27 At 1189, para 36.  This landmark case mainly concerned the state’s constitutional obligations in 
relation to housing (i.t.o. s 26), but the judgement dealt extensively with socio-economic rights in 
general. 
28 Van der Merwe (1998) Social transformation in South Africa by means of social assistance: A 
legal perspective 4; Olivier (1998) Some trends and critical issues in South African social security 
6. 
 
 
 
 
 67
administrative action.  Achieving the right of access to social security will depend 
on “whether or not the State administration conducts its affairs in a socially just 
and appropriate way”.29 
 
At very least the specific formulation in the Constitution creates the negative duty 
on the State not to do anything to encroach on the enjoyment of social security 
rights.  Existing rights can therefore not be unjustly removed. 
 
A case dealing with this particular violation of social security rights is Ngxuza and 
Others. v The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape.30 
The applicants were recipients of social grants for the disabled under the Social 
Assistance Act.31  They claimed that their grants were cancelled and suspended 
in an unlawful manner and without them being afforded the opportunity to make 
representations to the department of Welfare in the Eastern Cape. 
 
In his judgment, Froneman J stated that: 
The case is in a sense an “easy” one as far as the enforcement of socio-economic rights 
are concerned, at least at this stage of the proceedings.  The court is not concerned with 
the nature of these rights and to what extent it should force the State to give effect to the 
rights (this might become an issue later, when the possible retrospective reinstatement of 
the rights of thousands of people needs to be decided upon).  It is also not a case where 
the courts intrude upon the terrain of a democratically elected legislature where the 
electorate can, by voting, give better expression to the demands of democracy than the 
courts.  What is at stake is the accountability of the unelected administrative bureaucracy 
of the State, not the actions of a democratically elected legislature.  It is, of course within 
the competence of the government to pass legislation to regularise what appears on the 
papers to be a large-scale unlawful deprivation of social grants, but then it may face 
                                                 
29 Martin “Just Administrative Action: The Key to Accessing Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) 
ESR Review 9. 
30 2001 2 SA 609 (E). 
31 A grant similar to the older person’s grant.  See below at 3.3.1 for a detailed description of the 
grants for older persons paid under the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
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accountability in two different forms, namely the ultimate judgment of the electorate, or 
justification of that limitation of rights under section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
What cannot be allowed, however, is the unlawful deprivation of these rights by way of 
administrative stealth.  The Constitution forbids that and has made the courts the 
democratic guardians to prevent that from happening…  The facts disclosed in the papers 
indicate that the welfare department of this province has been sadly lacking in that 
regard.32 
 
He held that the decision taken by the Department of Welfare to cancel or 
suspend the applicants’ disability grants was unlawful and invalid.  The applicants 
were held to be entitled to retrospective reinstatement of grants.33 
 
3.2.2.2 “Reasonable measures” 
 
One of the more problematic internal limitations of the right to access to social 
security is that the state is only required to take “reasonable” legislative and other 
measures to achieve the realisation of this right. 
 
As far as “reasonable measures” are concerned, a court considering the 
reasonableness of social security measures  
will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have 
been adopted or whether public money could have been better spent.  The 
question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are 
reasonable.  It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures 
could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations.  Many of these would meet 
the requirement of reasonableness.  Once it is shown that the measures do this, 
the requirement is met.34   
                                                 
32 2001 2 SA 609 (E) 626. 
33 See also Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [2004] 1 BPLR 
5357 (EC).  Similarly, the court in Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare 
and Another [2004] 1 BPLR 5362 (SE) held that the unreasonable delay in the approval of an 
applicant’s application was an infringement of her right to fair and just administrative action. 
34 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) 1190-1 para 41.  At para 43 it was stated that “a programme that excludes a 
significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable”.  A similar interpretation of the 
reasonableness of measures taken by the state was applied by Mokgoro J in Khosa v Minister of 
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According to the Grootboom case, it would not be sufficient for the state to 
provide statistics to back up claims of the steps taken to advance the right in 
question.  The test is whether the measures are reasonable and effective in their 
conception and implementation35 and whether they have responded to the needs 
of particularly vulnerable and marginalised people.36  Other factors taken into 
consideration to determine the reasonableness of measures taken by the state to 
provide access to social security include the institutional capacity to implement 
the social security programme and the flexibility of the programme.  
 
3.2.2.3 “Within available resources” 
 
 
One of the major “keys to escape” provided by section 27(2) is the qualification 
added to the right of access to social security that the measures to be taken by 
the state to provide social security are to be taken “within its available 
resources”.37  The capacity of the state to deliver the services in question will 
have to be taken into account when courts have to decide whether there have 
                                                                                                                                                 
Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 590-
591, para 48.   
35 In the Grootboom case (para 42) it was stated that “an otherwise reasonable programme that is 
not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state’s obligations”. 
36 At 1191, para 44. 
37 See the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
(1997) clause 10, where reference is made to the importance of the availability of adequate 
financial and material resources for the full realisation of socio-economic rights.  It is, however, 
also stated that resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations in 
respect of the implementation of socio-economic rights.  For more on the Maastricht Guidelines 
and other principles relevant for the interpretation and application of the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and other norms of international and domestic law in the 
field of socio-economic rights, see 7.2 below. 
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been violations of social security rights.38  If the state can prove that it does not 
have the necessary resources available to meet its social security obligations, 
there has been no violation of section 27(2).  Only where the state is unable to 
prove a lack of resources as the justification for not complying with its 
constitutional obligations will a court proceed to the test for the reasonableness 
and justifiability of an infringement of social security rights in terms of section 
36.39 
 
The realisation of social security rights will always be dependent on sufficient 
financial resources and on the economic priorities of the state.  It is inherent to 
the nature of social security that it implies an outflow of state funds on a regular 
basis, whether for cash benefits (like the majority of social security benefits) or 
benefits in kind.40  For this reason, critics of the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights in general in the bill of rights, because of doubts regarding their justiciability 
                                                 
38 In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 11 it was 
held in the context of the right of access to health care that “the obligations imposed on the state 
by sections 26 and 27 in regard to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security 
are dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights 
themselves are limited by reason of the lack of resources.  Given this lack of resources and the 
significant demands on them that have already been referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet 
these needs would not presently be capable of being fulfilled.” 
39 See e.g. the majority view in Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of 
Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) paras 60-62 for the impact that the lack of evidence 
presented by the respondents on the additional cost of extending social grants to permanent 
residents had on the court’s finding that the provision in the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 that 
excluded all non-citizens, including permanent residents, from social assistance benefits is 
unconstitutional. 
40 Unless private parties are responsible for the payment of benefits, e.g. pension funds paying 
retirement benefits, in which case there is generally no outflow of state funds involved.  See 
below at 3.2.4 for the horizontal application of social security rights. 
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and enforcement, are even more vociferous when it comes to social security 
rights.41   
 
Were “available resources” interpreted to mean only the amount available 
according to the national budget, the state could easily defend its spending on 
social security by arguing that it could only spend what it raises as revenue.  This 
argument ignores the fact that government’s own fiscal and monetary policy 
determines the size of this “resource envelope”.42 
 
The measures undertaken to realise social security rights must be calculated to 
attain the goal of access to social security by all expeditiously and effectively, but 
the availability of resources will always remain an important factor.43  However, 
the availability of resources must be considered in the context of the right 
concerned and the Bill of Rights, as stated by Mokgoro J in Khosa v Minister of 
Social Development:44 
It is also important to realise that even where the State may be able to justify not 
paying benefits to everyone who is entitled to those benefits under section 27 on 
the grounds that to do so would be unaffordable, the criteria upon which they 
choose to limit the payment of those benefits … must be consistent with the Bill of 
Rights as a whole. 
 
                                                 
41 See Ben-Israel (1994) Social Security in the Year 2000: Potentialities and Problems 11-12. 
42 Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) ESR Review 7. 
43 Grootboom case 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 1193 para 46.  In Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) Mokgoro J accepted that “the concern that non-citizens 
may become a financial burden on the country is a legitimate one” (para 58).  However, she 
found that there was no evidence in casu showing that the inclusion of permanent residents in 
grants would entail huge costs (para 62).  See 4.3.1 below for a discussion for the effect of limited 
funds on the state’s ability to provide social security. 
44 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 589 para 45. 
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This interpretation of the phrase “within available resources” is particularly 
important in the context of intergenerational solidarity.  The whole debate on 
whether intergenerational solidarity or ‘intergenerational equity’ is the correct 
approach to social security legislation would not arise if the state had unlimited 
resources at its disposal.  In fact, the central argument by the proponents of the 
‘intergenerational equity’ view internationally is that the state is squandering 
limited resources on older persons to the detriment of younger generations.  The 
economic priorities of the state will therefore determine whether it follows the 
intergenerational solidarity or the ‘intergenerational equity’ point of view.  The 
interpretation of “within available resources” in the Khosa case requires the state 
to ensure that its economic priorities are consistent with constitutional values and 
the Bill of Rights as a whole and, hence, the state cannot ignore older persons’ 
social security rights, their right to the protection of their dignity and equality 
rights.  As will be argued below,45 this interpretation of “within available 
resources” allows the state to adopt measures to advance intergenerational 
solidarity in retirement funding.46 
 
3.2.2.4 “Progressive realisation” 
 
 
The inclusion of the term “progressive realisation” makes it clear that the idea of 
including the right of access to social security was not that this right should be 
                                                 
45 At 6.4.1. 
46 As long as these measures are also “reasonable” and provide for the “progressive realisation” 
of social security rights. 
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realised immediately.  The state is, however, obliged to take visible and 
immediate steps to achieve the goal of access to social security for all. 
 
The term “progressive realisation” also appears in the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  According to the Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
“progressive realisation” clause may not be used as a pretext for non-compliance 
with the ICESCR.47  Although states are only required to realise socio-economic 
rights progressively, this “does not alter the nature of the legal obligation of 
States which requires that certain steps be taken immediately and other as soon 
as possible.”  The state must therefore prove that it is making “measurable 
progress toward the full realisation of the rights in question”.48 
 
The UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights, in its General Comment No 
3,49 has analysed the term “progressive realisation” contained in the ICESCR as 
meaning that the State has the obligation to move as effectively and 
expeditiously as possible to securing its ultimate goal.  In the Grootboom case50 
this approach was found to be helpful in determining the meaning of “progressive 
realisation” in the South African constitution and it was held that “there is no 
reason not to accept that it bears the same meaning in the constitution as in the 
document from which is was so clearly derived”. 
                                                 
47 See below at 7.2.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of the ICESCR. 
48 Maastricht Guidelines (1997) clause 8. 
49 UN Doc E/1991/23, para 9. 
50 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 1192 para 45. 
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Barberton,51 on the other hand, finds the interpretation of progressive realisation 
in the General Comment most unhelpful, as its practical implications are unclear.  
He criticises an approach to the interpretation of “progressive realisation” which 
focuses on the input side of the equation by merely requiring government to 
progressively increase the amount of resources it allocates to socio-economic 
programmes.  He finds this approach financially and economically unsustainable, 
as the money for increased spending on socio-economic programmes will have 
to be found by either cutting expenditure in other areas or increasing the level of 
taxation.  Continuously pumping additional resources into inefficient government 
delivery systems is also criticised, as Barberton feels that service levels could 
also be improved in ways that would not necessarily require additional resources. 
 
According to Barberton the preferred approach to interpreting “progressive 
realisation” is to focus on programme outputs and policy outcomes.  The various 
advantages of this approach are: 
• It requires far more transparency from government over its steps to realise 
socio-economic rights, placing a positive obligation on government to 
measure and report on its performance in social service delivery. 
• Managers of government service delivery systems will be held more 
accountable as they would not be able to excuse inefficient service 
delivery by pointing out that all the correct administrative procedures were 
followed. 
                                                 
51 Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) ESR Review 2. 
 
 
 
 
 75
• Government will be required to put systems in place to enable civil society 
to monitor and measure the performance of programmes. 
• The outcome approach places the focus on delivery efficiency and 
programme effectiveness. 
 
Adapting this outcome-based focus to the realisation of the right of access to 
social security, three questions can be asked in order to evaluate the results of 
government social security programmes: 
a) How many more people have improved standards of living as a result 
of the grants paid by government? 
b) What is the cost of each additional person receiving social security? 
c) How could the scope and level of grants be improved, given the 
existing socio-economic circumstances?52 
 
It is submitted that this approach is more helpful in establishing whether the state 
has achieved progressive realisation of social security rights than merely gauging 
whether it has made “measurable progress” towards the realisation of these 
rights. 
 
3.2.3 The South African Human Rights Commission 
 
 
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) is responsible for 
“promoting respect for human rights; promoting the protection, development and 
attainment of human rights; and monitoring observance of human rights.”53 The 
SAHRC is obliged to request information from relevant organs of State on an 
                                                 
52 See Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) ESR Review 
3. 
53 National Report on the Status of Older Persons (2002) 17. 
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annual basis on measures taken by them to bring about the realisation of socio-
economic rights.54  It can report on what it perceives to be wrong spending 
priorities and can even support a court application based on violations of socio-
economic rights.  In Ngxuza and Others v The Permanent Secretary, Department 
of Welfare, Eastern Cape55 the chairperson of the SAHRC was quoted as saying: 
The Commission has fulfilled, as best as it is presently able, its role to educate, inform 
and persuade the officials of the Department to implement a fair procedure when 
canceling disability grants, or any welfare grant for that matter.  Regrettably these 
measures have not had the desired effect.  The Commission therefore supports this 
application. 
 
The SAHRC’s first annual Economic and Social Rights Report56 commented on 
various issues relating to social security, in particular, criticising the narrow 
definition of social assistance in the Social Assistance Act57 and the exclusionary 
nature of the current social security system. The 5th Economic and Social Rights 
Report58 made specific reference to the coverage problems associated with 
voluntary retirement fund membership.59  The emphasis in the 6th Economic and 
Social Rights Report 2003-200660  was on the service delivery challenges in the 
Eastern Cape.61  On the positive side, it indicated that significant progress had 
been made in realising social security rights and the establishment of the South 
African Social Security Agency was highlighted.62 
                                                 
54 Section 184(3) of the Constitution. 
55 2001 2 SA 609 (E) 618. 
56 1997-1998 Vol IV “Researcher’s Evaluation of Government Responses” 34 - 40.  See also the 
2nd Economic & Social Rights Report1998-1999 211-228; 3rd Economic & Social Rights Report 
1999-2000 10-57; 4th Economic & Social Rights Report 171-234.  
57 Act 59 of 1992. 
58 2002-2003, “Social Security” 38. 
59 The problems associated with voluntary fund membership are outlined at 5.5 below. 
60 At 64. 
61 The impact of mismanagement of state grants on intergenerational solidarity is discussed at 
4.3.4 below. 
62 6th Economic and Social Rights Report, 65.  
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The SAHRC has assigned the advancement of the rights of older persons as a 
focus area to one Commissioner and also established a committee to advise the 
SAHRC on its work in promoting and protecting the rights of older persons.63  
One of the major outcomes of these measures was the workshops held on the 
Older Persons Bill to seek input from communities and organisations on 
legislation for older persons.64 
 
3.2.4 Horizontal application of social security rights 
 
The paragraphs above focused on the constitutional right to social assistance 
and the limitations to enforcing this right against the state.  The discussion of the 
legislation related to older persons below will show that private actors such as 
pension funds and their trustees, or organisations responsible for running 
residential facilities for older persons can wield great power over older persons.  
For this reason, the horizontal application of human rights, which means that 
private actors are also bound by constitutional rights to the extent set out in 
section 8 of the Constitution, is of great significance to the protection of older 
persons’ rights.  The horizontal application of rights could potentially affect 
families of older persons, non-governmental and community organisations 
providing services to older persons, individuals dealing with older persons, 
                                                 
63 National Report on the Status of Older Persons (2002) 52. 
64 SA Govt Information “South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) Workshops hear 
about plight of elderly from Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West” 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05020915451001.htm (accessed 12/04/2009). 
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retirement funds and their trustees, contractors for the payment of grants to older 
persons and banks providing services to older persons. 
 
In terms of the current policy framework,65 the state is not expected to carry the 
burden of providing for vulnerable groups such as older persons on its own, but 
shares this responsibility with older persons’ families and communities.  The 
fundamental question is whether the legal duties placed on private actors also 
enjoy constitutional protection, and cannot be taken away without violating the 
beneficiaries’ basic rights.  A secondary question is whether horizontal 
application of rights provides leeway for the state to further dilute its 
responsibilities towards older persons in terms of the Constitution.  An answer to 
this question is to be found in the means test, which allows the state to ‘dilute’ its 
responsibilities by, in effect, implying that private actors66 are performing a duty 
that would otherwise have rested on the state. 
 
Section 8 of the Constitution provides: 
 
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in 
terms of subsection (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1). 
                                                 
65 See below at 4.2 for a summary of past and current government policy on the provision of 
social security and social services to older persons. 
66 E,g, the income paid to a beneficiary i.t.o. occupational retirement funds or retirement annuity 
funds paying benefit currently taken into account in the means test for the older person’s grant. 
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The question is whether the right of access to social security is the type of right 
and creates the duties envisaged by section 8(2) and whether older persons can, 
for instance, claim that contractors providing inferior services at pension pay-
points are infringing their social security rights.  Whether non-state actors would 
be bound would depend on the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right.67   In addition, whether or not socio-economic rights such 
as the right of access to social security are “applicable” for the purposes of 
section 8(2) has been the subject of some debate.  A full examination of the 
different views on the horizontal application of socio-economic rights falls outside 
the scope of this thesis.  However, it can be concluded that there is sufficient 
authority that the duties created by section 27 of the Constitution may make the 
right of access to social security relevant in relations between non-state parties.68 
In the case of an alleged breach of an older person’s right of access to social 
security by another person, the factors to determine whether this is one of the 
circumstances where the Bill of Rights would be applicable to private 
                                                 
67 S 8(2).  See e.g. Rautenbach (2008) “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights 
Compendium 1A41 where the rights to citizenship and a fair trial in criminal cases are cited as 
examples of rights where infringement by other private persons is unlikely. 
68 Rautenbach (2008) “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights Compendium 1A41) states: 
“It cannot, for example, be argued categorically that the nature of the social rights in respect of, 
for example, access to housing, food, water and social security is such that such rights can never 
be relevant in private relations.  It is not inconceivable that, in the absence of appropriate 
common-law and statutory measures, they may indeed be relevant in private relations involving 
housing, food, water, medical services and social security.  The context in which the alleged 
breach of rights occurs, will often be an important factor, in particular, the nature of the 
relationship in which the parties are involved.  Because a Bill of Rights is primarily intended to 
regulate unequal relations, the Bill of Rights is capable of being applied to unequal “private” 
relationships.”  See also Chirwa “The horizontal application of constitutional rights” (2006) 2 LDD 
42-45; Du Toit “The transfer of enterprises and the protection of employment benefits” (2004) 1 
LDD 88-90; Rautenbach and Malherbe (2009) Constitutional law 340-341.  Contra see Cheadle, 
Davis and Haysom (2009) South African constitutional law: The Bill of Rights 3-17, para 3.4.1. 
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relationships69 are therefore the context in which the breach of rights occurs and 
the nature of the relationship between the older person and the other person.  
Due to the vulnerable position of older persons in general, and older person’s 
grant recipients specifically, it can be said that the relationship between older 
grant recipients and other persons are sufficiently unequal so as to deserve 
regulation by the Bill of Rights.  It is therefore submitted that circumstances can 
arise where private actors would be bound by section 27(1)(c).70 
 
Du Toit71 submits that as all socio-economic rights do not carry the same costs, 
all socio-economic rights are not necessarily unsuitable for horizontal application 
as between all parties.72  Where a particular prior legal nexus exists in terms of 
which one party is liable to perform then the socio-economic right that is infringed 
by non-performance is suitable for horizontal application.73  It will be shown 
below74 that the relationship between a retirement fund and its members has 
contractual and trust aspects, both creating the required “prior legal nexus” and 
therefore the affected fund members can claim that unfair fund rules or actions of 
                                                 
69 In the context of the right of access to adequate housing, the court in Modder East Squatters 
and another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the RSA and others v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) para 31 stated: “Circumstances can indeed be 
envisaged where the right would be enforceable horizontally…”. 
70Olivier et al “Constitutional issues” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 
120 states other examples of private providers and deliverers of social security that may be found 
to be bound by s 27, such as insurance companies, employers, medical aid schemes and 
pension schemes. 
71 Du Toit “The transfer of enterprises and the protection of employment benefits” (2004) 1 LDD 
89. 
72 A different view was expressed by Cheadle, Davis and Haysom (2009) South African 
constitutional law: The Bill of Rights 3-17, para 3.4.1 where the state’s duty to take reasonable 
measures in respect of the right of access to social security (s 27(2)) is cited as an example of a 
provision that clearly binds the state only. 
73 Du Toit “The transfer of enterprises and the protection of employment benefits” (2004) 1 LDD 
88. 
74 At 3.3.2.3.1. 
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the board of trustees infringed their right of access to social security.  The 
Pension Fund Adjudicator has on more than one occasion determined that the 
Bill of Rights is binding on pension funds and that members of funds can enforce 
their constitutional rights vis-à-vis the funds and their trustees.75 
 
A claimant wishing to enforce a constitutional right against a non-state actor has 
to bring a common law or statutory action.76  Once a court finds that a private 
actor, for example, a pension payment contractor is bound by the right of access 
to social security, statutory or common law remedies may be used to give effect 
to that right.77 
 
It will, of course, be possible in some instances for older persons to rely on rights 
other than the right of access to social security that clearly do apply to private 
conduct.  Actions in terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (“the Equality Act”)78 and the Older Persons Act79 are available 
to older persons who claim that their rights have been infringed by residential 
facilities.   
 
                                                 
75 Manzini v Metro Group Retirement Fund and Another (1) [2001] 12 BPLR 2808 (PFA); Fourie  
v Free State Municipal Pension Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 4131 (PFA). 
76 Chirwa “The horizontal application of constitutional rights in a comparative perspective” (2006) 
2 LDD 43. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Act 4 of 2000.  The right in question here is the right to equality i.t.o. s 9(4) of the Constitution 
which specifically applies to non-state action. 
79 The Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 provides protection for older persons against abuse in 
residential homes.  The right in question here is the right to dignity i.t.o. s 10 of the Constitution.  
S 4(3) of the Older Persons Act mirrors s 8(2) of the Constitution and provides that the Act “binds 
both natural or juristic persons to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right”. 
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Section 7 of the Constitution obliges the state to “protect”, in addition to respect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights and therefore also the right to 
access to social security. The positive constitutional duty on the state to protect 
constitutional rights includes the duty to take measures to prevent third parties 
from infringing on the individual’s rights.80  The option may also exist to enforce 
social security obligations of non-state actors indirectly by suing the state for not 
providing appropriate protection against violation of social security rights.81 
 
Section 27(2) obliges the state to ensure access to social security.  When the 
state delegates its duties to private actors, it still has the duty in terms of section 
7(2) to “protect” social security rights against violations and it “retains ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring that the package of measures adopted is sufficient”.82  
Even though the state may rely on private actors to fulfil some social security 
                                                 
80 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 397, paras 14-15; The City 
of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C) 1266-7; Jaftha v Schoeman and 
others 2003 (10) BCLR 1149 (C) paras 31 and 39. 
81 Chirwa “The horizontal application of constitutional rights in a comparative perspective” (2006) 
2 LDD 44.  The Constitutional Court for instance held that the state has the duty under 
international law to take reasonable and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of 
women’s fundamental rights and freedoms and that it will be liable for an infringement of a 
constitutional right by a non-state actor if it fails to take “reasonable and appropriate measures” to 
prevent such infringement (Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 4 SA 
938 (CC) 957-958, para 45 and 965-965, para 62).   In Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 446-447, para 21 it was held that where the state fails in its 
duty to protect fundamental rights in circumstances that offer no effective remedy other than an 
action for damages, it could be held liable unless there are other considerations affecting the 
public interest that outweigh the norm of accountability. See also Van Eeden v Minister of Safety 
and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) para 19; Minister of Safety and Security and Another v 
Carmichele 2004 (2) BCLR 133 paras 38 and 44. 
82 Olivier et al “Constitutional issues” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 
82. I.t.o. the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 40, national government has to ensure that laws, policies, 
programmes and strategies are adequate to meet the state’s obligation i.t.o. socio-economic 
rights.  This corresponds with the call by the UNDAW Expert Group Meeting to “consider effective 
forms of holding non-state actors accountable for violations of economic and social rights” 
(UNDAW (1997) “Promoting women’s enjoyment of their economic and social rights” Expert 
Group Meeting Report para 24). 
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functions, the state must put measures such as legislation and administrative 
structures in place to regulate the actions of powerful non-state actors and 
thereby prevent violations of social security rights.83 
 
3.2.5 Relevance for older persons 
 
According to the Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others,84 steps taken by government to better the lives of South 
Africans will only be regarded as “reasonable” if they provide for the needs of 
particularly vulnerable people.  Even if one could discount the horrific accounts of 
abuse and neglect that are given in the Report of the Ministerial Committee on 
Abuse, Neglect and Ill-Treatment of Older Persons,85 older persons as a group 
must be regarded as a vulnerable group as a result of their earning capacity 
ending at retirement age and failing health.86  Measures to provide access to 
social security in South Africa could therefore not be regarded as “reasonable” if 
they do not make specific provision for older persons. 
 
In many cases loss of dignity is part of the ageing process.  This is generally as a 
result of failing health and the resultant loss of independence.87  What is much 
worse is cases of indignity that is inflicted on the elderly by younger persons, in 
many cases family members.  As a society we cannot talk of upholding values 
                                                 
83 UNDAW (1997) Expert Group Meeting Report para 29. 
84 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 1191 para 44. 
85 The title of the report is Mothers and Fathers of the Nation: The Forgotten People? (2001). 
86 Kinsella and Ferreira (1997) Aging trends: South Africa International Brief 92-2, 4. 
87 Kinsella and Ferreira (1997) 4 and 6. 
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such as human dignity when older persons live in poverty end neglect.  Whereas 
the law cannot protect older persons against ageing per se, it can protect their 
right to have their dignity respected.  In order to uphold the constitutional value of 
dignity in respect of older persons, laws to protect them against poverty, neglect 
and abuse are required.88  All legislation dealing with older persons should 
therefore be measured against the criterion of whether it upholds the dignity of 
older persons. 
 
The State’s duty to progressively realise older persons’ right of access to social 
security does not merely entail a steady increase in the level of grants payable, 
but also means that older persons may not be deprived of benefits that they are 
already receiving.  They should therefore be protected against actions by the 
state or other parties that arbitrarily deprive them of their grants89 or that could 
place at risk their retirement savings.90   
 
3.3 LAWS PROVIDING FOR AND PROTECTING OLDER PERSONS 
 
This section of the chapter serves to outline the laws regulating retirement 
benefits, state support to older persons with little or no other income, protecting 
older persons against abuse and providing a secure environment for older 
persons to stay.  The legislation outlined in this chapter gives effect to the 
                                                 
88 The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 currently provides for the payment of grants to older 
persons to alleviate poverty (see below at 3.3.1.1) and the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 provides 
protection against abuse and neglect (see below at 3.3.4.5.1). 
89 See below at 4.3.4.2. 
90 See below at 5.3 to 5.7 for all the key issues and concerns relating to the individual providing 
for his or her own retirement. 
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constitutional rights discussed above and have to be interpreted in that light.  As 
three whole chapters of this thesis91 are dedicated to the in-depth discussion of 
key and problem issues arising from the provision for retirement income and 
protection of older persons, the aim of this section is merely to give an overview 
of the protection currently provided.92 
 
The framework for retirement funding in South Africa can be described as a 
three-pillared or three-tiered approach.93  The first tier, offering the most basic 
protection, is the non-contributory social assistance benefits payable to older 
persons.94  In the absence of a national retirement fund, the next tier of funding 
for retirement is occupied by the occupational retirement funds providing 
employees with retirement funding.95 The third tier consists of private retirement 
savings vehicles that provide protection to self-employed persons, as well as 
employees who wish to top up the retirement savings provided by occupational 
retirement funds.96 
 
                                                 
91 Chapters 4 to 6. 
92 With cross referencing to the relevant paragraphs in Chapters 4 to 6. 
93 The “three-pillar” approach is followed in most countries in the world, each giving its own 
content to the three types of financial support to the elderly.  See below in Chapter 7 for a 
comparative study of retirement funding and for international organisations’ views on the various 
“pillars”. 
94 Discussed below at 3.3.1. 
95 See below at 3.3.2. 
96 Private retirement savings vehicles are outlined below at 3.3.3.  This aspect will not be dealt 
with in detail as this research is concerned with intergenerational solidarity, and there is little or no 
solidarity involved in private retirement savings. 
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3.3.1 Social assistance for older persons 
 
The constitution obliges the state to create a social assistance system that all 
persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependants have 
access to.97  The legislative framework for social assistance is formed by the 
Social Assistance Act (SAA).98  The focus of the paragraphs below will be the 
social assistance currently rendered to older persons. 
 
3.3.1.1 Older person’s grant 
 
The older person’s grant99 is a means-tested tax-financed flat rate pension,  
currently providing benefits to roughly 72% of the elderly population of South 
Africa. 
 
The grants were previously administered by the provincial departments tasked 
with Social Development, but in terms of the South African Social Security 
Agency Act100 this task has shifted to the South African Social Security Agency 
(“SASSA” or “the Agency”101).  The main objective of the Agency is to act as the 
sole agent that will ensure the efficient and effective management, administration 
and payment of social assistance.102   
 
                                                 
97 Section 27(1)(c). 
98 Act 13 of 2004, which has replaced the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992.   
99 The 1992 Act referred to the social grant for the aged.  These grants are sometimes also called 
“social pensions”, “social old age pension” or “social allowances for the aged”. 
100 Act 9 of 2004. 
101 The SAA and the regulations refer to “the Agency”, whereas government departments and the 
organisation itself refers to it as “SASSA”. 
102 Section 3 South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004. 
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3.3.1.1.1 Requirements 
 
In order to qualify for an older person’s grant, the applicant: 
• must be a South African citizen;103 
• must be resident in the Republic at the time of the application;104 
• if a female, must be 60 years of age;105 
• if a male, must be 61 years of age;106 
• as well as his or her spouse, must comply with the means test;107 
• must not be maintained or cared for in a state institution;108 and 
• must not be in receipt of another social grant in respect of him- or 
herself.109 
                                                 
103 Section 5 SAA.  The citizenship requirement is broadened by the definition of “South African 
citizen” in the SAA.  It includes non-citizens who prior to 1 March 1996 were in receipt of social 
assistance benefits.  The definition also opens the door to the possibility that the Minister may 
include categories of persons under the definition of citizen who were previously excluded.  In 
addition, s 2 includes citizens of countries that have concluded equality of treatment of citizen 
agreements with South Africa under the scope of application of the Act, as long as they reside in 
South Africa.  Reg 2 GN R898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008 (hereafter “GN R898”) makes no 
reference of the citizenship requirement and merely requires an applicant to be a permanent 
resident to be eligible. 
104 Section 5(b).  S 16 makes provision for the discontinuation of payments to beneficiaries that 
are absent from South Africa for a period exceeding 90 days. See reg 31 GN R898 for the 
circumstances under which the Agency may continue payment of a grant to a beneficiary or 
procurator who is absent from South Africa.  
105 The 2004 Act makes provision for the age requirement in the primary legislation itself – s 10, 
whereas the age requirements were previously stated in reg 2(2) GN R418 in GG 18771 of 31 
March 1998.  
106 The age requirement of 61 years of age applies only to 2009.  Section 1 of the Social 
Assistance Amendment Act 6 of 2008 reduces the qualifying age for men gradually from 65 to 60 
years of age in 2010.  The amendment was made in response to litigation by a group of men 
aggrieved by the disparity between the age requirements for men and women.  See above at 2.8. 
107 As set out in Annexure A of GN R898.  The value of the applicant’s grant is determined by 
taking into account the maximum social grant per annum as approved and either the annual 
income of the applicant or half the annual income of the applicant and his or her spouse.  An 
applicant who owns assets worth 40 times the maximum social grant payable per annum is 
disqualified from receiving the grant (in the case of an applicant in a spousal relationship the cut-
off point is 80 times the maximum annual grant). 
108 Such as a prison, a psychiatric hospital, a home for older persons; a care treatment center or a 
treatment center for drug dependants which is wholly funded by the state (reg 2(d) read with reg 1 
of GN R898).  If the grant is already being paid, the grant will lapse when the beneficiary is 
admitted to any of the listed institutions (reg 28(1)(b)).  A reduced grant is payable to a 
beneficiary who is admitted at an institution that has a contract with the state to care for and 
maintain such beneficiary (as opposed to state-run institutions).  The level of the reduced grant is 
an amount equal to 25% of the maximum amount payable for such grant (reg 22(1)). 
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With regard to the citizenship requirement referred to above, the majority 
judgement in Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; 
Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development and Others110 broadened 
the scope of application of the Social Assistance Act even further by declaring 
that the exclusion of permanent residents by section 3(c) of the 1992 Social 
Assistance Act111 did not constitute a “reasonable legislative measure as 
contemplated by section 27(2) of the Constitution” and, therefore, was 
unconstitutional.112  The majority of the court concluded that the word “everyone” 
in section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution cannot be read to refer only to citizens.113  
They also came to the conclusion that such exclusion from state grants 
constituted unfair discrimination against permanent residents and that the 
unfairness would not be justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution.114  The 
court ordered that the words “or permanent residents” be read into the section 
containing the citizenship requirement.115 
 
A beneficiary of a disability grant will be entitled to an older person’s grant as 
soon as he or she reaches the prescribed age.116 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
109 Reg 2(c) GN R898. 
110 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
111 The same citizenship requirement as in s 5 of the 2004 Act. 
112 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 601, para 82. 
113 At 590, para 47. 
114 At 600, para 80.  See 607 – 617 for Ngcobo J‘s dissenting judgment. 
115 At 603, para 88. 
116 Reg 23 (1) GN R898.  The age requirement for the older person’s grant is stated above. 
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3.3.1.1.2 Applying for an older person’s grant 
 
The regulations to the Social Assistance Act (SAA) stipulate the manner in which 
an application for the older person’s grant is to be made.  An applicant must 
provide a valid identity document117 which will support the information supplied 
regarding the age and citizenship requirements.  The Agency will also require 
proof of marital status.118  To determine whether the applicant qualifies in terms 
of the means test, proof of assets as well as income of the applicant must 
accompany the application for the older person’s grant.119  The Agency may 
conduct an investigation into the information supplied if such an investigation is 
deemed necessary.120   
 
Regulation 10(1) requires the applicant or his or her procurator121 to present him- 
or herself at either an Agency office or another designated place for the initial 
application.122   
 
If the Agency staff is of the opinion that the person is entitled to the grant applied 
for, they must grant it.123  The applicant must be informed of approval or rejection 
                                                 
117 As well as that of his or her spouse where applicable (reg 11(1)(a)). 
118 Reg 11(1)(c). 
119 Reg 11(2)(a).   
120 Section 14(2) SAA. 
121 A procurator is the person appointed by the beneficiary or the Agency to apply for and receive 
grants on the older person’s behalf (s 1 SAA). 
122 If an elderly applicant is not able to complete the application form by him- or herself, someone 
at the Agency must assist him or her (or his or her procurator) with the application (reg 10(2) GN 
R898). 
123 Section 14(3)(a) SAA.   
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of the application124 and, in the case of rejection, the reasons why he or she does 
not qualify as well as the procedures the applicant may follow thereafter.125   
 
3.3.1.1.3 Right to appeal  
 
An applicant who disagrees with a decision of the Agency must be informed of 
his or her right to appeal to the Minister of Social Development in writing within 
90 days from finding out about the decision.126  The appeal must state the 
grounds on which the appeal is based.127  
 
 Upon receipt of the applicant’s written appeal and the reasons furnished by the 
Agency for the rejection of the application, the Minister may decide to consider 
the appeal and vary, set aside or confirm the decision.  Alternatively, the Minister 
may appoint an independent tribunal to consider the appeal.128  The Minister 
remains liable for procedural failures related to an appeal and a resultant claim 
for administrative review should lie against the Minister.129 
 
                                                 
124 Reg 13(1) GN R898. 
125 Section 14(3)(b) SAA; reg 13(4) GN R898. 
126 I.t.o. reg 13(4) R898 the Agency must inform the applicant of his or her right to lodge an 
appeal at the same time when notifying him or her of the refusal of the grant application.  Failure 
to lodge an appeal within the stated 90-day period does not mean that the applicant loses the 
right to approach a court for appropriate relief in terms of other legislation such as  the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), but merely eliminates the possibility of utilising the 
internal remedy provided by the Social Assistance Act (Vumazonke and others v MEC for Social 
Development, Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 229 (SE) 243; Ntame v MEC, Dept of Social 
Development, Eastern Cape [2005] 2 All SA 535 (SE) 546 para 32. 
127 Section 18 SAA.  See below at 4.3.4.4.2 for the difficulties applicants face in lodging an appeal 
when they have not been provided with sufficient reasons for the rejection of their applications. 
128 Section 18(2) as amended by s 2 Social Assistance Amendment Act 6 of 2008. 
129 Cele v SASSA Unreported case no. 7940/07 D&CLD para 32. 
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 3.3.1.1.4 Payment of grant 
 
Once a grant is approved, it must be paid from the date on which the application 
is deemed to have been made.130  Grants are paid in monthly payments by the 
Agency, or by any other party contracted by the Agency for payment of grants.131 
 
An older person’s grant will lapse on the last day of the month in which the older 
person dies132 or when the older person is admitted to a state-run institution.133  
The grant will also lapse if the older person has not claimed the grant for a 
consecutive period of three months.134 
 
To avoid erroneous payments, beneficiaries of manual payments have to identify 
themselves by means of identity documents.  They also have to personally take 
receipt of the grant and sign for receipt of the amount of the grant received.135 
 
If an elderly beneficiary is unable to collect his or her grant money due to illness 
or other reasons beyond his or her control, the beneficiary may appoint and 
                                                 
130 Reg 12(3) R898.  The application is deemed to be made on the date that it is signed (reg 
12(1)).  The grant can be either be paid into the beneficiary’s account at a financial institution via 
electronic transfers or paid manually to the beneficiary at a designated pay-point (reg 21(1)). 
131 Reg 21 (2). 
132 Reg 28(1)(a). 
133 Reg 28(1)(b). 
134 Reg 28(5).   
135 Reg 21(3).   
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authorise a procurator by a power of attorney to draw the grant on his or her 
behalf.136 
 
The regulations make provision for interim arrangements should a beneficiary not 
be able to personally collect payment of his or her grant due to illness of 
temporary incapacity.  A grant could be paid to someone authorised by the 
beneficiary to receive the grant, if the Agency is provided with written authority 
signed by the beneficiary.  This interim arrangement may only last for three 
months,137 after which a permanent procurator needs to be appointed. 
 
In the past there were many reports of “ghost beneficiaries’, i.e. grants being paid 
out in the name of older persons that have died.  In practice that means that the 
persons receiving grants on their behalf were able to receive the grants long after 
the beneficiary’s death.138  The regulations include measures to prevent payment 
to such “ghost beneficiaries” by requiring the persons receiving the grant to 
furnish proof of identification, as well as a life certificate139 in respect of the 
                                                 
136 Section 15 SAA.  Reg 24(1)(a) R898 allows for a beneficiary to apply for someone else to 
receive grant on his- or her behalf when it can be proved to the Agency’s satisfaction that he or 
she cannot personally receive the grant or that it would create undue hardship for the beneficiary 
to receive it in person.  If the person is unable to appoint a procurator, the Agency can nominate a 
person or welfare organisation to draw the grant on the beneficiary’s behalf (reg 24(1)(b)). 
137 Reg 21(3)(c). 
138 See e.g. the report in ANC Today (2005) 5 (30) http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/ 
anctoday/2005/text/at30.txt (accessed 02/07/2009) of an employee of the Department of Social 
Development who had inserted ID numbers, names and addresses of deceased or non-existent 
people into the grant payment system and diverted the grant payments to herself. 
139 According to the definition clause of GN R898 a “life certificate” is an affidavit made and 
signed under oath or affirmation by a beneficiary before a commissioner of oaths or a designated 
officer of the Agency to prove that he or she is alive. 
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beneficiary.  They are also required to provide an affidavit stating that the grant 
will in fact be handed over to the beneficiary.140 
 
The requirements for a procurator limit this position to persons permanently 
resident in South Africa with identification documents141 who are 18 years of age 
or older.142  Unrehabilitated insolvents are disqualified from being appointed as 
procurators, as are persons to whom the beneficiary is indebted.143  Potential 
procurators must express their willingness to serve as procurators.144 
 
In some instances the procurator appointed by the Agency is a welfare 
organisation, particularly where the organisation runs the residential home where 
the beneficiary resides.  In order to protect the beneficiary against abuse of this 
power by the welfare organisation, the Agency must ensure: 
• that the welfare organisation is registered and has the financial and 
administrative capacity to act as a procurator;145 
• that the welfare organisation does not charge older persons any fees or 
charges or require them to make any contribution to repay the 
organisation for acting as procurator;146 
• that the organisation has a bank account into which the grant money can 
be paid;147 
• that the organisation’s actions as procurator will be in the best interests of 
the older person applying for or receiving the grant.148 
                                                 
140 Reg 24(4). 
141 Reg 24(3)(a) read with 24(3)(c). 
142 Reg 24(3)(b). 
143 Reg 24(3)(d) and (f). 
144 Reg 24(3)(e). 
145 Reg 25(a) and (b). 
146 Reg 25(c). 
147 Reg 25(d). 
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Should the beneficiary decide to terminate the power of attorney appointing a 
procurator, he or she must notify the Agency of such termination and from when 
it is effective.149  When the procurator finds out that his or her power of attorney 
has been terminated, he or she must transfer any money of the beneficiary still in 
his or her possession to the beneficiary within ten days of the termination.150 
 
3.3.1.1.5 Preventing abuse of grants 
 
To ensure the efficient operation of the older person’s grant system, the Agency 
needs to have access to the relevant information.  Notwithstanding anything to 
the contrary in any law, any organ of state or financial institution151 must at the 
request of the Agency furnish it with information relating to an elderly applicant.152 
Any grant applicant will be deemed to have agreed that any information held by 
him or her may be released to the Agency, without requesting his or her prior 
permission.153 
 
If an elderly applicant furnishes information that to his or her knowledge is untrue 
or misleading in any material respect or makes a false representation, in order 
that he or she or another person 
                                                                                                                                                 
148 Reg 25(e). 
149 Reg 24(5).   
150 Reg 24(6). 
151 Reg 30.  Financial institutions include banks, long-term insurers and short-term insurers 
(defined in reg 1). 
152 Section 22 SAA. 
153 Section 22(4). 
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• may obtain social assistance to which they are not entitled; 
• may obtain more social assistance than to which they are entitled 
such a person will be guilty of an offence.154  The same goes for receiving social 
assistance knowing that he or she is not entitled to it and failing to inform the 
Agency of the error.155 
 
A beneficiary can spend the money in any way he or she wishes, but the Agency 
will have the power to investigate suspected abuse of grants.156  This can only be 
done where the Agency has reasonable grounds to suspect abuse of the grant.  
Once the investigation shows on objective grounds that the grant had indeed 
been abused, the Agency must appoint a person to receive and administer the 
grant on the beneficiary’s behalf.157  The Agency must ensure that the person 
appointed to receive the beneficiary’s grant acts in the best interests of the 
beneficiary.158 
 
A beneficiary must inform the Agency as soon as reasonably possible after any 
material changes in his or her circumstances,159 e.g. when the beneficiary 
marries, is widowed, is divorced, receives an inheritance, accepts an offer of 
                                                 
154 Section 21(1). 
155 Section 21(2).  Unless specified otherwise, the penalties provided for in s 31(1) of the Act 
make a person convicted of an offence under the amended legislation liable to a fine or 
imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.  These penalties are harsher than the previous maximum 
term of imprisonment of 12 months or a fine i.t.o. s 18 Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992. 
156 “Abuse of grants” is not defined in the Act or the regulations.  Under the previous system the 
Department of Social Development could appoint an administrator to administer the grant on 
behalf of a beneficiary in the case of misspending, mental disability or alcohol abuse on the part 
of the beneficiary. 
157 Section 19 SAA. 
158 Reg 26(1). 
159 Section 14(5) SAA. 
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employment or sells property.  This requirement is included to ensure that the 
Agency is notified of any increase in the income of the beneficiary.160  The 
change in financial circumstances may lead to a decrease of the grant from the 
month following the change in circumstances.  The beneficiary must be informed 
in writing of the decrease and the right to appeal the decrease.161   
 
Reviews of grants are also required to take place, specifically where “there is 
reason to believe that changes in the beneficiary’s financial circumstances may 
occur”.162 
 
In terms of regulation 29(1) a grant may be suspended or cancelled 
(a) where the grant was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation; 
or 
(b) where it is shown that the grant had been approved and paid in 
error.163 
 
Although the grant is means tested and all reasonable measures are taken to 
avoid overpayment or payment to beneficiaries that are not entitled to the grant, 
such overpayments do occur from time to time.  Should an older person’s grant 
                                                 
160 Knowingly failing to inform the Agency of material changes in circumstances constitutes a 
criminal offence (s 21(3)). 
161 Reg 27(7) GN R898. 
162 Reg 27(2)(a). 
163 Reg 29 (2)-(5) provide for an elaborate procedure to be followed by the Agency before it can 
suspend a grant.  The only exception to this procedure is the case of beneficiaries who have 
been found guilty of fraud (reg 29(2)).  These measures will hopefully preclude further litigation in 
the vein of Ngxuza e.a. v The Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 
2 SA 609 (E) and Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [2004] 1 
BPLR 5357 (EC).  See below at 4.3.4.2. 
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be paid to a person in the belief that that person is entitled to the grant, while he 
or she is not, that amount must be repaid to the State by the beneficiary, or his or 
her estate in the case of a deceased beneficiary.164  The Agency is tasked with 
recovering the amounts overpaid.165   
 
3.3.1.1.6 Protection of beneficiaries 
 
Any right to an older person’s grant may not be transferred, ceded or pledged 
without written consent by the Minister of Social Development.  If a beneficiary 
attempts to transfer or cede or pledge such a right, payment of the amount in 
question may by order of the Minister be suspended or stopped.166 
 
In terms of the 1992 Social Assistance Act, if the estate of a beneficiary of a 
social grant was sequestrated, or if the beneficiary died, an amount payable to 
such beneficiary as social assistance was not regarded as part of the insolvent or 
deceased estate.167  This situation changed with the 2004 Act, which makes 
provision for the benefits to form part of the beneficiary’s estate168 and only 
excludes it from an insolvent estate.169 
 
                                                 
164 Unless the beneficiary can satisfy the Minister that he or she received the grant without 
knowledge that he or she is not entitled thereto (s 17(1) and (3) SAA). 
165 Section 17(2). 
166 Section 20.  The 1992 Social Assistance Act made no provision for permission by the Minister. 
167 Section 11(2) Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992. 
168 “An amount that accrues or has accrued to a beneficiary or his or her estate in terms of 
this Act…” (my emphasis). 
169 Section 20(5) SAA. 
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In addition, the regulations also contain the rules and procedure applicable at 
pay-points to protect beneficiaries against creditors and moneylenders who try to 
enforce debts or conduct business within the pay-point area.170 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Grant-in-aid 
 
A grant-in-aid is paid to an older person in receipt of an older person’s grant, if 
that older person is in such a physical or mental condition that he or she requires 
regular attendance by another person.171  If the State already provides care in an 
institution, or pays a subsidy for the older person’s care and housing, then a 
grant-in-aid is not payable.172  This arrangement aims to encourage older 
persons to stay in their homes as long as possible. 
 
3.3.1.3 War veteran’s grant  
 
Veterans of certain wars173 who are over 60 years old can apply for a war 
veteran’s grant. 
 
3.3.2 Occupational retirement funds 
 
The benefits payable from retirement funds are analogous to social insurance 
benefits, as they are contributory benefits that are paid out when the social risk, 
                                                 
170 Regs 32 - 35 GN R898. 
171 Section 12 SAA.  A medical officer or medical practitioner (defined in reg 1) must certify that 
the older person needs regular care (regs 5(1) and 11(6) GN R898). 
172 Reg 5(2). 
173 Listed in s 11 (b) SAA. The last war listed in the definition of “war veteran” is the Korean War 
of 1950-1953. 
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retirement, occurs.  The South African retirement fund system differs from social 
insurance arrangements for older persons found in most other countries, in that it 
consists of various independent funds.174  The absence of a central social 
insurance scheme for retirement is one of the definitive defects of the retirement 
fund system in South Africa. 
 
The chief object of a retirement fund (whether a pension or provident fund) is to 
provide retirement benefits to members.  Occupational retirement funds will 
therefore be studied against the criterion of ensuring that the expected benefits 
will be available at retirement for those who rely upon them.  Firstly the legislative 
framework for protecting retirement benefits will be outlined, followed by a 
description of the benefits payable by retirement funds.  Next, the statutory 
provisions related to the administration of funds will be discussed.  As disputes 
regarding benefits and management will inevitably occur, the dispute resolution 
measures available will be outlined. 
                                                 
174 According to National Treasury (2007) Social security and retirement reform: second 
discussion paper 5 there are more than 13 500 funds in South Africa.  See below at 5.5 for a 
discussion of the problems resulting from the absence of a national social insurance programme 
offering retirement benefits and at 7.3 for the descriptions of national public social insurance 
schemes found in other countries. 
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3.3.2.1 Retirement fund legislation 
 
3.3.2.1.1 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
 
The main role of the Pension Funds Act is to safeguard the interests of retirement 
fund beneficiaries and to prevent the abuse of retirement funds by unscrupulous 
employers and other persons dealing with the funds.175 The stated objects of the 
Act are to provide for the registration, incorporation, regulation and dissolution of 
pension funds. 
 
South Africa was the first country in the world to regulate retirement funds in one 
piece of legislation, such as the Pension Funds Act, instead of a variety of laws 
and legal principles.  The reason for formalising the pension fund industry 
through legislation was twofold: 
a) protecting the interests of contributing fund members who have an 
expectation of retirement benefits; 
b) the state’s interest in the solvency of retirement funds.176 
However, there are also historical reasons for the unique pension fund legislation 
in South Africa.  The pension fund system was created during the apartheid era 
when there was “strong emphasis on the social security needs of the white 
                                                 
175 Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa) Ltd [2001] 8 BPLR 2307 (A) 
2311 para 13. 
176Downie (1999) The Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in South Africa Chapter1-A2. 
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population” and their need for high benefit levels.177  Therefore, the interests that 
the legislation initially intended to protect were those of white fund members.178  
The occupational fund system has since become more inclusive, but the bias 
toward the protection of employees in the formal economy remains. 
 
The second of the abovementioned reasons for the comparatively strict 
regulation of the pension fund industry, reflects the reality that the state cannot 
avoid the responsibility of caring for older persons completely.  Even in cases 
where individuals make provision for their own old age, the state still has to 
protect their interests. 
 
The Pension Funds Act does not distinguish between pension and provident 
funds,179 and the segment of the definition of a “pension fund organisation” that 
deals with occupational funds180 applies to both types of retirement funds: 
 
“(a) any association of persons established with the object of providing annuities or 
lump sum payments for members or former members of such association upon their 
reaching retirement dates, or for the dependants of such members or former 
members upon the death of such members or former members;”181 or 
“(b) any business carried on under a scheme or arrangement established with the 
object of providing annuities or lump sum payments for persons who belong or 
belonged to the class of persons for whose benefit that scheme or arrangement has 
been established, when they reach their retirement dates or for dependants of such 
persons upon the death of those persons.”182 
 
                                                 
177 Van der Berg (2002) Issues in South African social security 39. 
178 See Liebenberg and Tilley (1998) Poverty and inequality hearings: Social security theme 5. 
179 The distinction between pension and provident funds is explained above at 2.5. 
180 Part (a) of the definition also covers retirement annuity funds.  Retirement annuity funds are 
discussed below at 3.3.3.1.  The Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008 
added beneficiary funds as paragraph (c) funds.  Beneficiary funds fall outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
181 A paragraph (a) fund. 
182 A paragraph (b) fund. 
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a) The Registrar of Pension Funds 
 
The main tasks of the Registrar of Pension Funds are to register and supervise 
retirement funds and to protect fund members’ interests.  The office of the  
Registrar of Pension Funds is established by the Pension Funds Act.183  This 
position is filled ex officio by the Executive Officer of the Financial Services Board 
(FSB).184   
 
Even though there is a range of retirement funds, they all need to conform to the 
abovementioned definition of a retirement fund organisation in order to be 
registered and recognised by the Registrar of Pension Funds.185 
 
Section 4 requires all retirement funds to be registered.  This fact offers important 
protection to fund members, as the Registrar can refuse to register a fund until he 
or she is satisfied that the fund’s rules are consistent with the Act and the 
regulations and based on financially sound principles.186  Each fund must also 
regularly report to the Registrar.187  The Registrar has the power to inspect any 
fund’s operations.188  The only funds that are exempt from registering under the 
                                                 
183 Section 3. 
184 The Executive Officer of the FSB is appointed by the Minister of Finance i.t.o. s 13 Financial 
Services Board Act 97 of 1990. 
185 Downie (1999) The Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in South Africa Chapter 1, 
2.A. 
186 Reg 8(2) GN R 98 in GG 162 of 26 January 1962 read with s 4(4) and (5) Pension Funds Act 
24 of 1956. 
187 Reg 12 requires all administrating insurers and pension funds to send financial returns to the 
Registrar on an annual basis in the format detailed in the regulations.  
188Section 25 Pension Funds Act confers on the Registrar all the powers in terms of the 
Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 80 of 1998 (see below at 3.3.2.1.4. ). 
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Pension Funds Act are: 
· State funds;189 and 
· foreign funds.190 
 
In order to ensure compliance with the Pension Funds Act, the Registrar is 
entitled to apply to court for the cancellation or suspension of the registration of a 
fund if the fund has willfully violated any provision of the Act or if the Registrar, 
upon inspection of the fund, is of the opinion that the fund’s registration should be 
cancelled or suspended.191 
 
b) Protection of rights of members 
 
One of the main objectives of the Pension Funds Act is to protect members’ 
interests and, consequently, most of the provisions of the Act deal with the 
protection of rights of members.   
 
To ensure that the persons controlling a pension fund do not lose sight of the 
main object of the fund, which is to provide retirement benefits to members, the 
Act prohibits a fund from carrying on any business other than the business of a 
                                                 
189 Although the management board of a fund “to which the State contributes financially” may, 
with the consent of the Minister of Finance, apply for registration (s 4A).  Unless state retirement 
funds are registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act, they are governed by the legislation in 
terms of which they were created. 
190Section 2 Pension Funds Act requires foreign funds to apply for registration, but if they comply 
with the provisions ensuring protection for South African residents and the soundness of the fund, 
they are exempted from the rest of the provisions of the Pension Funds Act. 
191Section 27(2). 
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pension fund, unless it is to safeguard an investment made by the fund.192 
 
In case of a voluntary dissolution of a fund, the interests of members are 
protected by the provisions of section 28 of the Pension Funds Act.  A fund may 
be dissolved and its assets distributed as provided for in its rules.193  A liquidator 
must be appointed to realise the assets and discharge the liabilities of the fund, 
keeping in mind the rights and reasonable benefit expectations of the members, 
as well as additional benefits, the payment of which by the fund has become an 
established practice.194 
 
The Pension Funds Act also provides protection to fund members by regulating 
the internal administration of funds.  It lays down requirements relating inter alia 
to the boards of management, appointment and duties of a principal officer.  The 
aim of these requirements is to prevent losses to members due to 
maladministration of the funds.195  
 
It is submitted that the most important practical protection afforded to fund 
members by the Act is the creation of the office of the Pension Fund Adjudicator.  
Since the establishment of this office, members with complaints against 
                                                 
192Section 10. 
193Section 28(1). 
194Section 28(4).  A notice, stating when and where the preliminary account (detailing the assets 
and liabilities of the fund and how the liquidator plans to distribute and discharge them) would be 
available for inspection by interested parties, and calling upon such interested parties to report 
any objections to the Registrar, is to be published in the Government Gazette and two other 
newspapers by the liquidator (s 28(7)).  After considering any objections, the Registrar may direct 
the liquidator to amend the preliminary account (s 28(9)). 
195 See below at 3.3.2.3 for more discussion of the statutory regulation of the administration of 
retirement funds. 
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retirement funds do not have to endure cumbersome court proceedings, but have 
the opportunity to be heard in a procedurally fair, economical and expeditious 
manner.196 
 
3.3.2.1.2 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
 
The Pension Funds Act is not the only legislation providing protection to fund 
members.  Many of the rules regarding the structure of retirement funds are 
found in the Income Tax Act.  No retirement fund will, for instance, be approved 
by the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SARS) unless the 
fund and its rules comply with the provisions of the definitions in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act.  The Income Tax Act is also an important tool in encouraging 
employees to make provision for their retirement, so that they do not have to rely 
on the state in old age, in that the Act provides for tax concessions in respect of 
contributions or benefits, depending on the type of fund.197   
 
Tax relief is also offered to occupational retirement funds, but funds that do not 
conform to the requirements set out in the Act may forfeit the tax relief.  By 
requiring the Commissioner to approve the rules of all funds, the Income Tax Act 
ensures that funds are not abused to evade taxation.198 
 
                                                 
196See ss 30A-30W of the Pension Funds Act and also below at 3.3.2.3.4 for a discussion of the 
functions of, and procedures followed by, the Pension Funds Adjudicator.  
197 See below at 3.3.2.1.2 (b) – (d). 
198Downie (1999) The Essentials of Retirement Fund Management in South Africa Chapter 5, 1.P. 
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a) Definitions 
 
The requirements before a pension fund199 can be approved as such under the 
Income Tax Act are: 
“(i)  that the fund is a permanent fund bona fide established for the purpose of providing 
annuities for employees on retirement from employment or for the dependants or nominees 
of deceased employees, or mainly for the said purpose and also for the purpose of providing 
benefits other than annuities for the persons aforesaid or for the purpose of providing any benefit 
contemplated in paragraph 2C of the Second Schedule or section 15A or 15E of the Pension 
Funds Act, 1956 (Act No. 24 of 1956); and 
(ii) that the rules of the fund provide- 
(aa) that all annual contributions of a recurrent nature to the fund shall be in 
accordance with specified scales; 
(bb) that membership of the fund throughout the period of employment shall be a 
condition of the employment by the employer of all persons of the class or 
classes specified therein who enter his employment on or after the date upon 
which the fund comes into operation; 
(cc) that persons who immediately prior to the said date were employed by the 
employer and who on the said date fall within the said class or classes may, on 
application made within a period of not more than 12 months as from the said 
date, be permitted to become members of the fund on such conditions as may 
be specified in the rules; 
(dd) that not more than one-third of the total value of the retirement interest may be 
commuted for a single payment, and that the remainder must be paid in the form 
of an annuity (including a living annuity) except where two-thirds of the total 
value does not exceed R50 000 or where the employee is deceased; 
(ee) that a partner of a partnership is regarded as an employee of the partnership; and  
(ff) that the Commissioner shall be notified of all amendments of the rules; and 
(gg) ……200 
(iii) that the rules of the fund have been complied with: 
 
Provided further that a fund contemplated in subparagraph (i) of the further proviso to the 
definition of “pension preservation fund” which is deemed to be approved or which is 
approved in terms of that definition or which fails to submit its rules as required by that 
paragraph is deemed with effect from the earlier of the date of the deemed approval or 30 
September 2009 to be a fund which is not approved in terms of this definition;…”201 
 
In terms of paragraph (i) of the requirements the pension fund has to be a fund 
                                                 
199 Para (c) of the definition.  Pension funds for employees in the public sector are included under 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of pension funds.  Paragraphs (a) and (b) funds include 
funds established by law, funds established for the employees of any local authority or control 
board (as defined in the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 of 1996) or of the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa.  
200 Subparagraph (dd) was amended by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 3 of 2008 and the  
Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008.  Sub-paragraph (ee) was amended, and sub-
paragraph (gg) deleted by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 3 of 2008.   
201 My emphasis.  For more on the role of the rules of a pension fund, see below at 3.3.2.3.2. 
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“bona fide established for the purposes of providing annuities for employees on 
retirement from employment”.202  The South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
Commissioner would therefore not approve, or would even withdraw tax 
approval, of a pension fund that allows members an option of receiving either a 
lump sum withdrawal benefit or a retirement benefit at retirement.203 
 
In terms of sub-paragraph (dd) no more than one-third of the total value of the 
annuities to which a pension fund member may become entitled upon retirement 
may be paid as a lump sum, unless two-thirds of the total value does not exceed 
R50 000.204  Hence retirement benefits of R75 000 or less may be commuted in 
full as a lump sum. 
 
The requirements for a provident fund are similar to those for a pension fund, 
except for the absence of the requirement that no more than one-third of the total 
value should be paid out in a lump sum and the rest as a pension over the rest of 
the member’s life.  The essential difference between a pension fund and a 
provident fund is therefore that the former provides annuities for employees on 
retirement (with only a limited lump sum payment) and the latter’s benefits may 
be paid out as a lump sum.  In addition, the Commissioner will also have to be 
satisfied that the provident fund is  
“a permanent fund bona fide established solely for the purpose of providing 
benefits for employees on retirement from employment, or solely for the purpose 
of providing benefits for dependants or nominees of deceased employees or a 
deceased former employee or solely for a combination of such purposes and also 
                                                 
202 Annuities are periodic payments throughout the retired life of the member (see above at 2.5). 
203 General Note 4/95. 
204 Sub-para (dd) as amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008. 
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for the purpose of providing any benefit contemplated in paragraph 2C of the 
Second Schedule or section 15A or 15E of the Pension Funds Act, 1956 (Act No. 
24 of 1956).”205 
 
b) Contributions can be deducted   
 
Apart from the difference in how pension and provident funds treat members 
upon retirement, the other main distinction between these types of funds lies in 
the tax concessions available to members.  Employees can, depending on their 
choice of membership of pension or provident funds, either receive tax 
deductions while contributing to a fund or receive tax-free portions of their 
benefits at retirement. 
 
Employees who are members of pension funds are allowed a maximum 
deduction206 in respect of their contributions as calculated in terms of 
section11(k)(i).  The tax deductible amount is calculated as the greater of R1 750 
or 7,5% of pensionable earnings.207  No employee deduction is allowed in the 
case of provident funds.208 
 
                                                 
205 Section 1 Income Tax Act definition of “provident fund” as amended by the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act 60 of 2008.  Ss 15A to 15E of the Pension Funds Act provide for apportionment 
and utilisation of surplus. 
206 This basically means that the tax on their contributions is deferred until their retirement, when 
their average income rate will be lower than when they were still employed (Cameron “Secure 
good line of defence for your retirement” Personal Finance (Jan 28, 2006) 
http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 09/06/2006)). 
207 In practice, this means that this amount will be deducted from his or her remuneration before 
his or her employee’s tax is calculated. 
208 For this reason some employers and employees have come to “salary sacrifice agreements” 
that compensate for the lack of tax benefits while still employed.  A detailed examination of salary 
sacrifice agreements and the SARS Commissioner’s reaction to their existence falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
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c) Taxation of lump sum benefits  
 
Pension fund members are allowed a lump sum withdrawal to the maximum of 
one-third of their fund value at retirement.209  A portion of this lump sum payable 
upon retirement will be tax free,210 the balance being taxed at rates set in annual 
income tax legislation.  The same rule applies in the case of commutation of 
annuities.  In the case of provident funds, the whole benefit can be paid out as a 
lump sum, with a tax-free portion calculated in a similar manner as for pension 
funds.   
 
The Fourth Schedule determines the procedure to be followed in the case of 
payment of lump sum benefits.  Employers and fund administrators are required 
to apply for a tax directive from the Commissioner to determine the amount of tax 
to be withheld before the lump sum is paid out.211 
  
d) Taxation of pensions or annuities  
 
A pension fund is defined as one in terms of which members may commute a 
maximum of one-third of their benefits by way of a lump sum, the remaining two-
thirds to be used to purchase a compulsory annuity.212  The net remuneration 
                                                 
209 The only exception being if two-thirds of the total value does not exceed R50 000 where the 
full amount can be taken as a lump sum.  See above at 3.3.2.1.2 (a). 
210 I.t.o. formula B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act (as amended) the first R300 
000 is tax free.   
211 Para 9(3) Fourth Schedule. 
212 See Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other 
employee benefits (Vol 1) 671-672 where they explain the types of annuities that qualify as 
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received as an annuity from a pension fund is regarded as income and is subject 
to the Standard Income Tax on Employees (SITE).213 
  
e) Taxation of retirement funds  
 
In terms of section 10(1)(d), pension funds, provident funds and retirement 
annuity funds are exempt from income tax.  They are, however, subject to tax in 
terms of the Tax on Retirement Funds Act.214  The formula to determine the 
taxable amount of a retirement fund is based on the gross interest and net rental 
income received by the fund.215  The principal officer of the fund will be the 
person responsible for performing the duties imposed by this Act.216 
 
f) Summary 
 
It is in the Income Tax Act that the true distinctions between pension funds and 
provident funds are crystallised.  Where an employer offers employees the 
choice of joining a pension or provident fund, the tax implications of their 
decisions should be made clear to them from the outset.  With pension funds, a 
tax saving while contributing is an obvious advantage, as long as the member is 
aware that the annuitised portion of their retirement benefit would be fully taxable.  
                                                                                                                                                 
compulsory annuities.  They can range from guaranteed and with-profit annuities to flexible 
annuities. 
213 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 674-675 provide a detailed description of the application of the SITE system to 
pensioners. 
214 Act 38 of 1996. 
215 Section 5 read with s 3.  I.t.o. s 2 the current tax rate for retirement funds is 9%. 
216 Section 8(2)(a). 
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Conversely, with provident funds, although there is no tax deduction of 
contributions available, a portion of the lump sum paid at retirement is tax-free. 
 
3.3.2.1.3 The Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 
 
The Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act replaced the Financial 
Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act 39 of 1984.  It deals with the investment, 
safe custody and administration by defined financial institutions of fund and trust 
property.217  Pension, provident and retirement annuity funds are included under 
“financial institutions”.218 
 
The Act provides that all persons entrusted with the administration of funds and 
trust property should, with regard to such funds, observe the utmost good faith 
and exercise proper care and diligence in the making of an investment or in the 
control or administration of the funds.219  They should also not make use of the 
funds in a manner calculated to gain direct or indirect improper advantage for 
themselves or any other person to the prejudice of the fund and its 
beneficiaries.220 
 
A director, member, partner, official, employee or agent of a financial institution 
                                                 
217 Defined in as s 1 as any asset “invested, held, kept in safe custody, controlled, administered or 
alienated by any person, partnership, company or trust for, or on behalf of, another person, 
partnership, company or trust”. 
218 The definition clause refers to the definition of “financial institution” in the Financial Services 
Board Act 97 of 1990, which includes any pension fund organisation registered i.t.o. the Pension 
Funds Act under financial institutions. 
219 Section 2(a) Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001. 
220 Section 2(c). 
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who takes part in any decision to make an investment out of the funds of the 
institution or trust property in a company or other undertaking in which he or she 
has a direct or indirect financial interest, must declare such interest in writing to 
the board of management or other governing body, before that investment is 
made.  A record of every declaration of interest must be made in the minutes of 
board or governing body meetings.221  The duty to disclose interest will affect 
trustees of privately administered or non-exempt funds more than those of funds 
where investment decisions are delegated to insurers or asset managers.222 
 
In relation to retirement funds, these provisions effectively codify the common law 
fiduciary duties of trustees and correspond to the provisions in the Pension 
Funds Act with regard to trustees’ fiduciary duties of good faith and the duty to 
disclose.223 
 
It is an offence to contravene any provision of the Act or to fail to comply with any 
provision thereof.  Conviction of this offence could lead to a fine or imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding 15 years or both.  In addition, any person contravening 
or failing to comply with the provisions of the Act is liable to the pension or 
provident fund or beneficiary concerned for any profit made by him and for any 
damage suffered by the retirement fund or beneficiary as a result of the 
                                                 
221 Section 3. 
222 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 480. 
223 See below at 3.3.2.3.1. 
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contravention or failure.224 
 
In terms of section 5 the Registrar may, on good cause shown, apply to the High 
Court for the appointment of a curator to take control of, and to manage the 
whole or any part of, the business of a fund.  The curator acts under the control 
of the Registrar and must provide him or her with information required.225 
 
The Registrar has the power to apply to the High Court to compel any fund to 
comply with any law or to cease contravening a law.  He or she may also apply 
for a court order to compel a fund to comply with a lawful request, directive, or 
instruction made, issued or given by him or her.226 
 
Finally, the Registrar may declare a specific practice or method of conducting 
business irregular or undesirable after he has invited interested persons to make 
representations and has consulted with the board of trustees of the fund.227  The 
fund may not continue an “irregular or undesirable” practice or method of 
conducting business after the registrar’s declaration. 
 
                                                 
224 Section 10. 
225 Section 5(6) and (7). 
226 Section 6. 
227 Section 7. 
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3.3.2.1.4 Other relevant legislation 
 
Apart from the abovementioned key statutes providing a framework for 
retirement provision, additional protection to pension and provident fund 
members is also provided by other legislation.  
 
The Inspection of Financial Institutions Act228 provides for the inspection of the 
affairs of financial institutions, including pension fund organisations registered in 
terms of the Pension Funds Act.229 
 
The Long-term Insurance Act230 replaced the Insurance Act 27 of 1943.  The Act 
aims to provide for the registration of long-term insurers and to regulate the 
activities of long-term insurers and intermediaries. Many of the core 
administrative and asset management functions of funds are fulfilled by 
insurance companies, but it is particularly in the area of disability and death 
benefits where the role of insurance companies is most important. 
 
Retirement funds make use of intermediaries such as investment managers on a 
regular basis.  Members also make use of financial advisors for guidance on 
investments of lump sums.  To protect retirement funds and members against 
                                                 
228 Act 80 of 1998. 
229 Section 1 of the Inspection of Financial Institutions Act defines a “financial institution” as any 
institution referred to in the definition of “financial institution” in section 1 of the Financial Services 
Board Act 97 of 1990, which in turn lists a pension fund as a financial institution (sub-section (a)(i) 
of the definition). 
230 Act 52 of 1998, as amended by the Insurance Amendment Act 17 of 2003. 
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abuses by financial services providers, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act231 together with subordinate legislation regulates financial service 
providers.  “Financial service providers” means any person who gives advice 
and/or an “intermediary service”232 regarding a financial product.  Financial 
products are defined in section 1 of the Act and include long-term or short-term 
insurance contracts, as well as retirement fund benefits.233   
 
3.3.2.2 Benefits payable under retirement funds 
 
Before the benefits usually paid by retirement funds are outlined, it must be 
pointed out that the combination of benefits that are paid out would depend on 
the rules of the particular fund.  The law does not dictate which benefits must be 
paid;234 its role is limited to ensuring that the rules listing the benefits paid under 
a particular fund are made available to prospective members.   
 
                                                 
231 Act 37 of 2002. 
232 “Intermediate service” is defined as  
“any act other than the furnishing of advice, performed by a person for or on behalf of a 
client or product supplier- 
(a) the result of which is that a client may enter into, offers to enter into or enters into any 
transaction in respect of a financial product with a product supplier; or 
(b) with a view to – 
(i) buying, selling or otherwise dealing in (whether or a discretionary or non-
discretionary bases), managing, administering, keeping in safe 
custody, maintaining or servicing a financial product purchased by a 
client from a product supplier or in which the client has invested; 
(ii) collecting or accounting for premiums or other moneys payable by the 
client to a product supplier in respect of a financial product; or 
(iii) receiving, submitting or processing the claims of a client against a 
product supplier.” 
233 Paras (c) and (d) of the definition of “financial product”. 
234 With the exeption of minimum benefits payable i.t.o. the Pension Funds Second Amendment 
Act 39 of 2001. 
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In terms of the definition of pension and provident funds in the Income Tax Act,235 
the benefits payable in terms of these funds are limited to retirement benefits, 
death benefits and withdrawal benefits. 
 
This thesis will focus mainly on retirement benefits; other benefits such as 
withdrawal benefits will only be discussed in so far they affect the member’s 
ability to provide for his or her own old age.236 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Retirement benefits 
 
Retirement benefits are paid to employees belonging to an occupational 
retirement fund when they retire. 
 
There are two types of payment of retirement benefits: 
a) A lump sum is paid to provident fund members and in the case of 
pension fund members, up to one third of the benefit is payable as a 
lump sum on retirement. 
b) The other portion of the pension fund benefit is annuitised and is paid 
as a regular pension to retired members.237 
 
The benefit payable on retirement depends on whether the fund is a defined 
                                                 
235 See above at 3.3.2.1.2. 
236 Other benefits such as disability benefits, insured benefits, divorce benefits and benefits paid 
to the dependants of a deceased member fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
237 See above at 2.5 for a more detailed discussion of the distinction between provident and 
pension funds. 
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benefit or defined contribution fund.238 
 
The fund rules will determine the normal retirement age for members of that 
fund.239  In some cases a member may qualify for retirement benefits even 
though he or she has not reached the normal retirement age for that fund as 
stated in the rules.240  Benefits from defined benefit funds are calculated keeping 
number of years of membership in mind.  The nearer a member is to retirement, 
the closer the early retirement benefit would be to the full retirement benefit.  A 
member retiring early from a defined contribution fund should receive a benefit 
close to his or her full retirement benefit, as he or she would receive his or her 
pro rata share of the fund. 
 
In Stols v SA Timber & Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd and Another241 the Adjudicator 
had to determine whether the employer had acted unreasonably in withholding its 
consent to the complainant’s early retirement.  In terms of the rules of the 
pension fund, a member who had completed ten years continuous service, was 
within five years of the normal retirement date and had obtained the employer’s 
consent thereto, was eligible for early retirement.  The complainant was eligible 
for early retirement but, when she applied, the employer refused to grant its 
consent and she had to settle for the lesser resignation benefit. 
 
                                                 
238 The distinction between defined contribution and defined benefit fund is covered in detail at 2.6 
above. 
239 Harilall v Maxirand Provident Fund [2002] 1 BPLR 2933 (PFA) 2935. 
240 Maharaj “Retirement benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to pensions lawl 26. 
241 [2003] 8 BPLR 5077 (PFA). 
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Although the rules conferred a discretion on the employer to grant early 
retirement, the question here was whether the employer had exercised this 
discretion reasonably, that is, whether it had taken all relevant considerations into 
account and ignored irrelevant considerations.242  The Adjudicator found that the 
employer had ignored factors such as the complainant’s length of service, that 
there were no apparent negative factors surrounding her employment and 
resignation and that the complainant qualified in terms of the early retirement rule 
with regard to age and service.  The employer had also stated that it had not 
agreed to the early retirement as granting the complainant’s application would 
have set a precedent and the company could not afford to lose so many 
employees in such a short period of time.  In response, the Adjudicator found that 
one payment would not set a precedent, as the employer is expected to exercise 
its discretion each time based on the specific circumstances of each case.  With 
the employer’s decision in this case being based on its fear of setting a 
precedent, it had fettered its discretion.243 
 
Events such as dismissal related to operation requirements might lead to early 
retirement from a fund.  This would generally be the case where the employee to 
be dismissed is within a few years of normal retirement age. 
 
In Wilson v South African Mutual Life Assurance Society Pension Fund and 
                                                 
242 At 5079 para 8. 
243 At 5079 para 10-12. 
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Another244 the complainant belonged to a defined benefit fund.  He was given the 
option to retire early245 in terms of a rule which allowed for early retirement “at 
any time within the five-year period immediately preceding the Officer’s Normal 
Retirement date”.246  This, however, took place when the complainant was 
dismissed for operational requirements.  The fund rules made no provision for 
retrenchment benefits.  In terms of the rules, early retirement benefits were 
subject to reductions247 of the pension.  The complainant argued that his pension 
should not have been reduced as early retirement was imposed upon him since 
he was retrenched.  It was through no fault of his own that he could not complete 
service to normal retirement age.  He therefore claimed that the fund should have 
calculated his benefit as if he had retired at his normal retirement age.  He 
specifically asked that the rules should be interpreted so that where a member 
retires early due to retrenchment, no reductions are applicable. 
 
The Adjudicator held that the complainant was not entitled to more than the 
reduced benefits.  In the absence of special retrenchment benefits, he had opted 
for the early retirement benefit and was therefore subject to the rules governing it.  
The rules include the reduction factors applied to early retirement benefits “to 
account for the fact that the pension is being purchased at a younger age and 
thus payable over a longer period of time and also the fact that the benefit has 
                                                 
244 [2000] 6 BPLR 693 (PFA). 
245 Or withdraw from the fund, but early retirement offered more generous benefits and enabled 
him to remain on the fund’s medical aid scheme. 
246 At 694. 
247 Section 2(e) of rule XVI provided for a reduction factor of 2,5% to be applied in relation to  
early retirement. 
 
 
 
 
 120
had less time to accumulate to ensure the defined benefit at retirement”.248  The 
rules do not take the reason for early retirement into consideration and apply the 
reduction factors in all cases.  The Adjudicator therefore dismissed the complaint 
and held that the complainant was not entitled to more than the early retirement 
benefit calculated in terms of the rules of the fund, including the applicable 
reduction factors. 
 
Even though the rules of the pension fund may provide for early retirement at the 
employer’s instance, this measure may not be abused to permit employers to 
dismiss employees for operational reasons without having to comply with the 
relevant rules of labour law.249  A test to determine whether an employer was 
legitimately and genuinely exercising a right to retire some employees or was in 
fact retrenching them was laid down in Mutare Board & Paper Mills (Pvt) Ltd v 
Kodzenai.250  According to Gubbay CJ it would depend on the circumstances of 
each case, but “[i]f large numbers of employees of the same class by age or type 
of occupation were suddenly and simultaneously required to proceed on early 
retirement then, in the absence of a convincing explanation, their retrenchment 
would be inferred”.251  In casu, the thirty-eight employees who were “retired” early 
were advised that their early retirement was required in order to reduce the 
strength of the workforce.  This was therefore clearly a case of a dismissal 
related to operational requirements disguised as early retirement. 
                                                 
248 Wilson v South African Mutual Life Assurance Society Pension Fund and Another [2000] 6 
BPLR 693 (PFA) 697. 
249 Section 189 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
250 [2002] 2 BPLR 3041 (ZS). 
251 At 3044. 
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In some instances the fund rules may make provision for the fund and/or the 
employer to exercise their discretion to increase the early retirement benefit.  In 
Harilall v Maxirand Provident Fund252 the complainant was a member of a 
defined contribution fund and upon retiring early from the fund he was entitled to 
a lump sum benefit representing his member share.253  The Adjudicator was 
satisfied that the complainant’s early retirement benefits were calculated 
correctly, but noted that the rules allowed for the fund and the employer to 
exercise their discretion to increase any benefit.  The particular rule that allowed 
for greater benefits, however, only allowed the fund to exercise its discretion 
upon receiving notice from the employer to do so, as the increased portion would 
have to be paid by the employer.  In casu, the employer was experiencing grave 
financial difficulties and was therefore unable to request the fund to exercise its 
discretion to increase the benefit.  As a result, the Adjudicator dismissed the 
complaint and found that the complainant had received the benefits that he was 
entitled to in terms of the rules of the fund. 
 
Cassette v Sage Group Pension Fund and Another254 also dealt with a complaint 
about the employer and the fund refusing to enhance an early retirement benefit.  
The complainant was retrenched and her pension benefit was first calculated in 
terms of the early retirement rule, which made provision for a reduction of one-
third of 1% for each complete month by which her date of retirement preceded 
                                                 
252 [2002] 1 BPLR 2933 (PFA). 
253 I.t.o. master rule 5 of the fund. 
254 [2002] 11 BPLR 4026 (PFA). 
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the normal retiring date.  However, the rules also made provision for a waiver of 
the reduction factor255 as long as the employer paid the additional amounts 
representing the value of the reduction to the fund.256  The employer decided not 
to exercise its discretion to waive the reduction, which made the fund unable to 
enhance the early retirement benefit.  The complainant was dissatisfied with this 
situation and opted for the early withdrawal benefit instead.  She contended that 
she would have elected to receive the early retirement benefit, had it not been for 
the reduction of benefits. 
 
The complainant lodged a complaint with the Adjudicator based on her argument 
that, owing to the fact that she was retrenched, the employer should have 
exercised its discretion to waive the early retirement reduction.  The Adjudicator 
held that the employer’s discretion to enhance a benefit has to be exercised “in a 
judicious manner by considering relevant factors and discarding irrelevant 
considerations”.257  In the Adjudicator’s opinion, the employer in this case had 
properly exercised its discretion and had gone beyond its duty to accommodate 
the complainant.258 
 
It can be concluded from the survey of case law above that where the fund rules 
make provision for early retirement upon the employer’s discretion, the employer 
                                                 
255 Rule 4.2; Cassette v Sage Group Pension Fund and Another [2002] 11 BPLR 4026 (PFA) 
4027, para 6. 
256 Rule 4.4. 
257 Cassette v Sage Group Pension Fund and Another [2002] 11 BPLR 4026 (PFA) 4032, para 7. 
258 A meeting had been held to discuss the available options i.t.o. the pension fund rule; the 
generous severance package; two different positions were offered to the complainant, both which 
she refused. 
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should take all relevant factors into consideration in deciding whether to grant 
early retirement or not.  Employers may not disguise dismissal for operational 
requirements as early retirement.  Where the rules allow early retirement, but 
with a reduced benefit, employees who opt for early retirement are bound by the 
rules and the resultant reduced benefit. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Withdrawal benefits 
 
The motivation for the examination of withdrawal benefits in a work that focuses 
mainly on financial security in old age is that, in a labour market where so many 
people are dismissed for operations requirements, withdrawal benefits have 
become more the norm than the exception.  In an insecure labour market, “fair 
withdrawal benefits become the primary means of ensuring fulfillment of the 
legislative policy of encouraging the preservation of retirement assets for use in 
old age.”259 
 
As membership of an occupational retirement fund is linked to employment, 
membership of such a fund ends when an employee is dismissed, retrenched or 
resigns prior to retirement age,260 in which case withdrawal benefits are payable.  
The circumstances of the termination of the employment relationship may 
determine the mode of exit from the fund and consequently the amount payable 
                                                 
259 Adjudicator Murphy, quoted in Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African 
retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 214. 
260 As opposed to early retirement discussed above at 3.3.2.2.1. 
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to the member.261   
 
With defined benefit funds the normal benefit upon retirement equals a 
percentage of final salary multiplied by the years of service.  Only retiring 
employees are entitled to the full benefit.  Employees who leave service prior to 
retirement age will therefore forfeit a portion of their benefit.   
 
Most defined benefit funds’ rules offer members who leave before retirement age 
only their own contributions plus nominal interest thereon.  On rare occasions, 
employer contributions are added to this amount.262 
 
Another option that is offered to longer serving members upon the occasion of 
their withdrawal from the fund is that they can elect to preserve the actuarial 
reserve value263 of their retirement benefit by transferring that amount to an 
approved fund.264 
 
In the case of defined contribution fund members retiring, length of service is 
irrelevant as their benefit is based on their “accumulated credit” or “member’s 
                                                 
261 MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to pensions law 56. 
262 The inclusion of employer contributions is rare in defined benefit funds, as many employers do 
not contribute in a direct manner, but are instead liable to “contribute” if there is a shortfall in the 
fund.  Identifiying the employer’s contributions is therefore problematic (MacKenzie “Withdrawal 
benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to pensions law 59). 
263 Actuarial reserve value is “the amount (capital discounted to present day value) that the fund 
deems necessary to hold in asset value on behalf of the member in order to pay him the benefit 
promised on retirement” (MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction 
to pensions law 59). 
264 MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to pensions law 59.  
The fund must give the withdrawing member a reasonable opportunity to exercise his or her 
options.  See Maepa v Sanlam Retirement Fund (Office Staff) [2002] 2 BPLR 3093 (PFA). 
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share”.265  The member’s share is made up of the employee contributions plus 
that portion of the employer contributions which has not been deducted for risks 
benefits266 and fund costs.  This method of calculating benefits does not totally 
exclude penalties for leaving service before retirement, as some fund rules make 
provision for a “vesting scale”,267 in terms of which the employer’s contributions 
will only vest as part of the member’s credit after a period of years.268  Many 
funds have, however, removed penalty provisions such as vesting scales from 
their rules regarding withdrawal benefits.269 
 
The rules of a fund often provide for the possibility of the board of management, 
or the employer in consultation with the board of management to exercise the 
discretion to enhance a benefit payable upon withdrawal from the fund,270 
particularly when the employee concerned is dismissed for operational 
                                                 
265 The portion of employee and employer contributions credited directly to the member’s 
individual account (MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (2005) An introduction to pensions 
law 62). 
266 Including group life insurance and disability premiums. 
267 A defined contribution fund member does not “own” his member’s share before retirement or 
withdrawal.  Employee contributions, employer contributions and a portion of investment returns 
become part of the member’s share to which he or she is entitled upon withdrawal from the fund – 
these amounts “vest” in the member over a period of years.  The amount payable on the date of 
accrual, i.e. date of retirement or withdrawal, may therefore differ from the amounts that have 
vested in the member (MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to 
pensions law 61 and 62). 
268 E.g. 20% of the employer’s contributions vesting for each year of service until 100% is reached 
at the end of year five.  See also Fourie v Free State Municipal Pension Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 
4131 (PFA) 4132 para 4 for rule 39(1) of the fund, which is a good example of how a vesting 
scale works. 
269 MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to pensions law 58. 
270 In Joffe v Lenco Holdings Ltd and Another [2000] 4 BPLR 395 (PFA), the Adjudicator found 
that an employer that decided not to exercise its discretion to enhance withdrawal benefits based 
on a fairly rigid policy not to award an enhancement, unless in recognition for good performance, 
had effectively abdicated its power and responsibility by rigidly applying its policy and not taking 
into account relevant factors, such as, the complainant’s length of service or that he was relatively 
close to retirement age. 
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reasons.271 
 
The above-mentioned arrangements for withdrawal benefits all reflect the 
position prior to the introduction of minimum benefit requirements in terms of the 
Pension Funds Second Amendment Act.272  As more funds comply with the 
requirements of the Second Amendment Act, there will be less scope for 
enhancement of benefits on an ad hoc basis as the reserves from which these 
discretionary benefits are to be paid will be diminished.273 
 
The minimum withdrawal benefit payable to a member leaving the fund before 
retirement may not be less than the minimum individual reserve determined in 
terms of section 14B(2).274  The “minimum individual reserve” of a member of a 
defined benefit fund will be the greater of the present value of the benefit payable 
from the member’s retirement age based on certain prescribed assumptions,275 
and the member’s contributions and “such share of the employer contributions 
paid in respect of the members as has vested in the employee in terms of the 
                                                 
271 See Harris v AECI Pension Fund and Another [2000] 7 BPLR 737 (PFA); Lezar v Braitex 
Pension Fund and Another [2001] 8 BPLR 2380 (PFA). 
272 Act 39 of 2001.  The minimum benefits requirements became applicable to most funds a year 
from their surplus apportionment dates (S 14A(2)(b) Pension Funds Act, as amended).  S 15B(1)  
requires fund boards to submit a scheme for the proposed apportionment of any actuarial surplus 
“as at the effective date of the statutory actuarial valuation of the fund coincident with, or next 
following” the commencement date of the Second Amendment Act (7 December 2001).  Such 
scheme must be submitted within 18 months from the “effective date”.  It is submitted that most 
funds should have already implemented the minimum benefits requirements by 2006 taking into 
account the three-year actuarial valuation cycle (see below at 3.3.2.3.3) as well as the 12 months 
opportunity from the surplus apportionment date for stakeholders to renegotiate the benefit 
structure. 
273 MacKenzie “Withdrawal benefits” in Jeram (ed) (2005) An introduction to pensions law 67. 
274 Section14A(1)(a). 
275 Published under Board Notice No. 35 in GG 24809 of 25 April 2003. 
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rules of the fund” plus returns earned.276  In the case of defined contribution fund 
members, their minimum individual reserve will be made up of the member’s 
individual account277 plus a proportional share of the investment reserve account, 
the member surplus account and such contingency reserve accounts as are 
deemed appropriate by the board.278 
 
The minimum benefit requirements imposed by the Pension Funds Second 
Amendment Act have improved the fortune of many members who were left at 
the mercy of trustees and employers before.279  There are still some issues of 
concern, such as: 
• Members withdrawing from defined benefit funds are only entitled to 
their employers’ vested contributions, as opposed to their defined 
contribution fund counterparts who are entitled to full employer 
contributions. 
• Boards of management will still have discretionary powers, e.g. over 
                                                 
276 Section 14B(2)(a).  Note that only employer contributions that have already “vested” are 
included. 
277 Which in terms of s 14B(1) includes the fixed-rate contributions paid by the employer on behalf 
of the member. 
278 S 14B(2)(b). 
279 A survey of case law on the position before the minimum benefit requirements becoming 
applicable illustrates that the following issues were of particular concern to fund members upon 
withdrawal from the fund: the nature of the actuary’s duty to rely on estimates and assumptions 
when determining amounts to be transferred to an approved fund (Associated Institutions 
Pension Fund v Le Roux and Others [2001] 8 BPLR 2285 (A); Associated Institutions Pension 
Fund and Others v Van Zyl and Others [2004] 10 BPLR 6107 (SCA)); instances where individual 
members were disqualified from receiving the full withdrawal benefit provided for in the fund rules 
(Allie v Southern Staff Pension Fund [2002] 5 BPLR 3402 (PFA)); discriminatory arrangements, 
where one group of withdrawing members stand to receive substantially less than another for a 
purely arbitrary reason (Fourie v Free State Municipal Pension Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 4131 
(PFA)); amendment of defined contribution fund rules according to which members’ shares are 
calculated in order to protect the fund against unforeseen falls in the investment market (Armellini 
v Southern Field Staff Defined Contribution Fund [2001] 3 BPLR 1693 (PFA)); penalties in fund 
rules for cases where a member’s employment is terminated by dismissal on grounds of 
misconduct, or where members resign to avoid such dismissal (Manzini v Metro Group 
Retirement Fund and Another (1) [2001] 12 BPLR 2808 (PFA); Sebola v Johnson Tiles (Pty) Ltd 
and Others [2002] 3 BPLR 3242 (PFA)). 
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the proportionate share of the contingency reserve accounts payable to 
a member withdrawing from a defined contribution fund. 
• It remains to be seen what effect the “renegotiating” of benefit 
structures in preparation for the minimum benefit requirements will 
have on overall benefits.  The language used creates the impression 
that the savings that will have to be affected to implement the minimum 
benefit requirements might be at the cost of other benefits. 
• As was stated above, there will be less scope for discretionary 
enhancement of withdrawal benefits due to a decrease in the reserves 
from which such enhanced benefits would have been paid. 
 
3.3.2.3 The administration of retirement funds 
 
 
3.3.2.3.1 Boards of management 
 
The main function of retirement funds is to provide benefits to members on their 
retirement.  It is therefore imperative that the persons in charge of the funds fulfil 
their functions in such a manner that the members could be confident that their 
interests are protected.  It is in this context that the election of boards of 
management and their duties will be discussed. 
 
a) Composition of boards of management: 
 
Every fund must have a board consisting of at least four members280 and 
                                                 
280 The terms “board member”, “member” and “trustee” are used interchangeably.   The Registrar 
may on application allow a fund to have fewer than four board members if he is satisfied that it 
would be impractical and unreasonably expensive to require such number of trustees (provided 
that fund members will still have the right to elect at least 50% of the board members): s 7B(1)(a) 
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members of the fund have the right to elect at least 50% of the board.281  A fund 
without a properly constituted board could find itself in legal difficulty. 
 
The rules of the fund should provide for the following matters regarding the 
establishment of a board of management for the fund:282 
• the constitution of the board; 
• the election procedure for board members who are to be elected by fund 
members; 
• the appointment and terms of office of members of the board; 
• the procedures to be followed at board meetings; 
• the voting rights of members;283 
• the quorum for a meeting; 
• the breaking of deadlocks;284 and 
• the powers of the board. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956.  The Registrar will accept prima facie that it would be impractical 
or unreasonably expensive for the fund to have four or more trustees if the fund has fewer than 
50 members or its assets are less than R2.5 million (Registrar of Pension Funds Circular PF No 
96, para 5.2).  The Registrar will also consider the geographical distribution of employers and/or 
members and whether it is a defined benefit or defined contribution fund (funding method).  The 
Registrar will only allow an exemption from the requirements for the composition of a board when 
he is satisfied that the standard of record-keeping, payment of benefits, general fund 
administration, investment and internal controls of the fund will not be adversely affected thereby.   
281 Section 7A(1).  It is not compulsory for members to elect board members (“at least 50% of 
whom the members of the fund shall have the right to elect”: my emphasis) and as a result a 
fund with a board of management will not be illegal purely because all board members are 
employer-appointees.  Retirement annuity funds, beneficiary funds and preservation funds are 
exempt from the requirement that members of the fund have the right to elect board members (s 
7B(1)(b) as amended by the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008). 
282 Section 7A(2). 
283 Voting rights are not addressed in the Act but have to be specified in the fund rules.  
Employers may well insist on some form of control of investment decisions of defined benefit 
funds before they will be prepared to assume the investment risk (Marx and Hanekom (2004) The 
manual on South African retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 93). 
284 E.g. the election of a chairperson with a casting vote.  See Circular PF No 96, para 4.9 and 
Circular PF No 98, para 3.2.  The PF Circulars serve as guidelines of what is considered to be 
sound practice by pension funds by the Financial Services Board (Van Wezel v Gencor Pension 
Fund and Others [2001] 2 BPLR 1668 (PFA) 1674 para 20). 
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The Registrar of Pension Funds has laid down several additional requirements 
relating to boards of management, including the following: 
• Even though board members need not be fund members, the fund 
rules may require member-elected trustees to be members of the fund, 
if so agreed to by the appropriate employee negotiating fora.285 
• The term of office of a board member should be limited to five years.286 
• Any material change in the composition of fund membership may 
necessitate a change in the composition of the board of management. 
• If the board of trustees consists of more than four trustees, the quorum 
at board meetings should be structured in such a way that both 
member elected trustees and employer appointed trustees are 
included.287 
 
Active members usually get preference when member representatives to the 
board are nominated.  In terms of the definition of “member” in the Pension 
Funds Act this is not the correct approach as the definition only excludes “any 
such member or former member or person who has received all the benefits 
which may be due to him from the fund and whose membership has thereafter 
been terminated in accordance with the rules of the fund.”  Consequently, 
deferred members and pensioners should also be considered as nominees for 
members of the board288 and have a right to vote for members of the board.289 
 
                                                 
285 Circular PF No 96, para 4.2. 
286 Circular PF No 96, para 4.5. 
287 Circular PF no 96, para 4.8. 
288 Although, according to Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement 
funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 96, deferred members and pensioners are likely to 
constitute minorities in the funds and therefore in the context of a board of management. 
289 Circular PF No 98, para 3.1. 
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In Longo v Cape Joint Pension Fund290 the complainant objected to an 
amendment to the rules of the fund that was made without consulting existing 
pensioners or granting them any option to benefit under the amendment.  The 
Adjudicator affirmed that there are no statutory requirements for the appointment 
of a board member specifically for pensioner members.  He also found that on 
the facts there was no proof that, had there been pensioner representatives on 
the board, the rule amendment would have allowed all pensioners a benefit as 
the complainant claimed.  He did, however, concede that it might be a good idea 
in the interests of transparency if provision was made for appointment of board 
members specifically to represent the interests of pensioner members.291 
 
b) Duties of trustees 
 
Boards of management are appointed to manage the dealings of a fund in a 
manner that will further the objectives of the fund as stated in the rules. 
 
Retirement funds are viewed as trust funds292 and are therefore subject to the 
principles of the common law of trusts, which specifies important codes of 
behaviour for people responsible for the management of a trust.  Trustees are in 
a position of trust and have to act in accordance with their fiduciary duties at all 
                                                 
290 [2000] 6 BPLR 623 (PFA). 
291 At 627, para 21.4. 
292 Address by Dr Chris Stals, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at the 1996 Annual 
Conference of the Institute of Retirement Funds. 
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times.293   
 
The common law duties and responsibilities of trustees were summarised in the 
Mouton Committee Report294 as the duty – 
a) to act with due care and diligence;295 
b) to act in good faith;296 
c) to obtain expert advice if the trustees’ own knowledge is found wanting; 
d) to avoid conflicts of interest; 
e) to hold assets for the benefit of the fund and its members; and 
f) to act with impartiality in respect of all beneficiaries.297 
 
Some of the fiduciary and general duties of trustees of retirement funds have also 
been codified in sections 7C and 7D of the Pension Funds Act.  Section 7C 
provides: 
“(1) The object of a board shall be to direct, control and oversee the operations of 
a fund in accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the fund. 
(2) In pursuing its objects the board shall –  
(a) take all reasonable steps to ensure that the interests of members in 
terms of the rules of the fund and the provisions of this Act are protected 
at all times, especially in the event of an amalgamation or transfer of any 
business contemplated in section 14, splitting of a fund, termination or 
reduction of contributions to a fund by an employer, increase of 
contributions of members and withdrawal of an employer who 
participates in a fund; 
(b) act with due care, diligence and good faith; 
                                                 
293 See Du Toit (2007) South African trust law: Principles and practice (2nd ed) 81-82. 
294 The Report of the Committee of Investigation into a Retirement Provision System for South 
Africa (1992) Vol 1 (hereafter “Mouton Committee Report”) 178-180).  The Mouton Committee 
was appointed in 1998 to “review the effectiveness of the retirement provision systems in South 
Africa and propose guidelines for any changes that are deemed necessary to move towards the 
goal of providing all South Africans with adequate income in their old age” (Mouton Committee 
Report (1992) 2). 
295 In terms of this duty all trustees are required to be fully acquainted with all the legal aspects 
pertaining to their positions as trustees. 
296 According to the Mouton Committee, a trustee’s overriding duty is to act with due care and in 
good faith.  All the other common law duties are derived from these two duties (Mouton 
Committee Report 178). 
297 Trustees may in terms of this duty not act against the interests of one member to the benefit of 
others. 
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(c) avoid conflicts of interest; 
(d) act with impartiality in respect of all members and beneficiaries.” 
 
Section 7C(1) ties in with the common law duty to know the content of relevant 
legislation and case law.  This duty requires trustees to obtain expert advice on 
matters on which they are not specialists.298 
 
The instances where a board is specifically required to take all reasonable steps 
to ensure that members’ interests are protected are listed in section 7C(2)(a).299  
The interests of members should be protected particularly in the event of an 
amalgamation or transfer of any business contemplated in section 14.300  The 
complainant in Van Wezel v Gencor Pension Fund and Others301 centered his 
complaint on the transferring fund’s failure to hedge the value of his benefits 
pending his transfer from the one fund to the other, and alleged that had the fund 
done so, the transfer value would have been substantially more favourable.  The 
Adjudicator based his determination on section 7C(2)(a) which “gives primacy to 
the taking of reasonable steps to ensure the protection of member interests 
within the context of the rules of the fund and the provisions of the Act”,302 read 
with section 7C(2)(b) which obliges the board to act with due care, diligence and 
good faith.  Although the transferring fund had the power in terms of its rules to 
                                                 
298 Mouton Committee Report (1992) 179; Downie (1999) [chapter 6, 2.A.]; Financial Services 
Board Circular PF No 98 para 4.2. 
299 PF Circular No 98 provides that, in order for the board of management to meet its obligations 
in terms of section 7C(2)(a), it should “bear in mind that at all times it should act in the best 
interest of all fund members and that timeous, relevant and meaningful communication takes 
place with all members in a comprehensive manner to enable members to make balanced and 
informed decisions.” (para 4.4.1.3). 
300 Amalgamations and transfers i.t.o. s 14 are discussed below at 5.4.4.   
301 [2001] 2 BPLR 1668 (PFA). 
302 At 1673 para 16. 
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conclude an agreement to place funds on call, it was never formally requested to 
do so.  The Adjudicator stressed that board members should not act as 
representatives of a specific interest group but rather act reasonably in the best 
interests of all the beneficiaries of the scheme.  Their duty to act with due care 
requires them to act honestly and prudently, “taking all those precautions which 
an ordinary prudent man of business would take in the managing of similar affairs 
of his own”.303  The Adjudicator summarised the general rule as being that  
pending transfer trustees are obliged to follow a prudent investment strategy 
based on suitable expert advice and that they should give proper and timeous 
consideration to investing transfer values at fixed rates of interest in response to 
a legitimate request to do so from affected members or their authorised 
representative.304   
 
He was satisfied that no such request had been made in casu and that the 
trustees had not breached their duties in any way. 
 
As regards the duty to act with due care, diligence and good faith, the Financial 
Service Board gave some guidance in Circular PF No 98.  The duty to act in 
good faith includes the duty to avoid misleading and deceptive acts or 
representations.  Trustees should not unreasonably rely on any provision that 
enables them to exclude or restrict any duty they have toward a member.305  The 
duty to act with due care and diligence is described as meaning that board 
members should act “as can reasonably be expected from a prudent person in a 
like position and under similar circumstances”.306 
                                                 
303 At 1675 para 23. 
304 At 1677 para 27. 
305 Circular PF No 98 para 4.5.1. 
306 “Prudence” denotes not taking risks without taking due account of the consequence of the 
risks (para 4.5.2). 
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The impartiality required of board members in terms of section 7C(2)(d) obliges 
them to have all members’ interests at heart, including those of pensioners, 
deferred pensioners and beneficiaries.  Impartiality of board members is 
particularly significant in the case of decisions on investments and allocation of 
surplus, as these are occasions where the interests of present and future 
members of the fund may conflict.307 
 
In addition to the duties listed in section 7C, section 7D requires the board of 
trustees308 to  
• ensure proper record keeping;309 
• ensure that proper control systems are employed in the fund;310 
• ensure adequate and appropriate communication of information to 
members of the fund;311 
                                                 
307 Circular PF No 98 para 4.6. 
308 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 99 draw attention to the fact that ss 7C and 7D only apply to boards of trustees 
and not to all officers of the fund.   
309 Particularly in the light of s 33(2) of the Constitution (the right to administrative justice) which 
states that “[e]veryone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has 
the right to be given written reasons.”  Section 33(2) is implemented by means of s 5 the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and judicial review of administrative action 
ordinarily occurs i.t.o. the Act and not the Constitution directly.  See Minister of Health v New 
Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 1 BCLR 1 (CC) 38 para 96; Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
2008 2 BCLR 158 (CC) 185-186 paras 92-93.  Proper minutes of all resolutions passed by the 
board of management should therefore be kept.  See also Circular PF No 98 para 5.1. 
310 Although it is impossible to prevent all instances of theft and fraud, the trustees must ensure 
that control measures are introduced that would make it more difficult to perpetrate fraud (Marx 
and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee benefits 
(Vol 1) 102).  Circular PF No 98 para 5.2 lists the measures that trustees are required to take to 
ensure that proper control systems are in place. 
311 Circular PF No 86 provides for the minimum disclosure requirements to be observed by funds.  
It sets out the minimum requirements for information to be contained in the explanatory 
pamphlets supplied to new members on admission to the fund, as well as the notification to 
members of special events such as restructuring of the fund, withdrawal from service, retirement 
and death.  In addition, Circular PF No 98 para 5.3.3 states that “the board should pay due regard 
to the information needs of the members concerned and communicate relevant meaningful 
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• take all reasonable steps to ensure that contributions are paid 
timeously to the fund;312 
• obtain expert advice on matters where they may lack sufficient 
expertise;313 and 
• ensure that the rules and operation and administration of the fund 
comply with the Pension Funds Act, the Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds) Act and other applicable laws. 
 
Trustees are rarely elected to the board of trustees on account of their knowledge 
of the law applicable to retirement funds.  For this reason the final duty listed in 
section 7D might be quite onerous for many trustees.  They need to have in-
depth knowledge of the fund’s rules and administrative procedures and be 
familiar with diverse laws, ranging from the Constitution to the Pension Funds 
Act.  Lack of legal expertise would not excuse them from compliance with this 
duty, as they are required to obtain expert advice on matters where they may 
lack sufficient expertise.  Hence the duty to ensure compliance with applicable 
law and the duty to obtain expert evidence on matters where trustees may lack 
sufficient expertise have to be read together. 
 
The Act does not prescribe specific penalties for non-compliance with sections 
7C and 7D.  This does not mean that there are no consequences for non-
                                                                                                                                                 
information in a timely and comprehensive manner to enable members to make balanced and 
informed decisions”. 
312 See para 5.4.1. Circular PF No 86. 
313 As more members approach the PFA with complaints about maladministration of the fund, 
trustees and funds are exposed to claims for damages.  Trustees need to obtain expert advice to 
protect themselves against personal liability (Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South 
African retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 103).  They will have to be careful 
before endorsing such advice, however, as they remain responsible for the final decision (para 
5.5.1 Circular PF No 86). 
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compliance,314 as 
• trustees who are in breach of the corresponding common law fiduciary 
duties are still exposed to the penalties imposed under common law;315 
• trustees run the risk of delictual claims against them in their personal 
capacities for damages suffered by the fund as a result of their negligence, 
theft or fraud; 
• conviction of a contravention of the Financial Institutions (Protection of 
Funds) Act could lead to a penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment.316 
 
Both the common and statutory law requires trustees to ensure that existing 
interests of the members of the fund are protected.  In addition, they are required 
to take positive steps to advance the interests of members and should therefore 
exercise their discretionary powers in the best interests of the members.317  They 
are nonetheless required to administer and manage the fund in accordance with 
its rules.318  
 
3.3.2.3.2 Retirement fund rules 
 
Each retirement fund has its own set of rules.319  The fund’s board is bound by its 
                                                 
314 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 104. 
315 E.g. trustees can be ordered to return profits made as a result of improper conduct (Marx and 
Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 
1) 104. 
316 Section 10(1) Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001. 
317 See Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other 
employee benefits (Vol 1) 101..  
318 Mouton Committee Report (1992) Vol 1, 178. 
319 General Note 17 (25 April 1996) allows retirement fund administrators to submit their standard 
rules to the Commissioner of SARS for approval.  Subsequent requests for approval of fund rules 
based on the standard rules (set of model rules) can then be processed more efficiently. 
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rules,320 which regulate the operation and administration of the fund and set out 
the rights and obligations of the various parties to the fund, thereby making the 
rules the most important fund document, equivalent to its constitution.321  
Accordingly, rules can only be amended in the manner prescribed by the rules 
themselves and after approval of such amendments or additions by the 
Registrar.322  It is imperative for trustees to acquaint themselves with the rules, as 
these determine how the trustees are required to administer the fund.323 
What the trustees may do with the fund’s assets is set forth in the rules.  If what 
they propose to do (or have been ordered to do) is not within the powers 
conferred upon them by the rules, they may not do it.  They have no inherent and 
unlimited power as trustees to deal with a surplus as they see fit, notwithstanding 
their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the members and beneficiaries of 
the fund…..[T]heir substantive powers at any given moment are circumscribed by 
the rules as they are at that moment.  The fact that power to change the rules 
exists is irrelevant when assessing whether or not the particular exercise of 
power in question was intra or ultra vires.324 
 
Fund rules may not be inconsistent with the Pension Funds Act.  Regulation 
30(2) of the Pension Funds Act lays down the information required before the 
Registrar of Pension Funds will approve the rules of a fund.325 
 
                                                 
320 Members and officers of the fund are also bound by the rules, as well as any person who 
claims under the rules or a person with a derived claim (s 13 Pension Funds Act).   
321 In Abrahamse v Connock’s Pension Funds 1963 2 SA 76 (W) an employee had failed to apply 
for membership of the pension fund by the date fixed by the fund’s rules.  In an action against the 
pension fund he averred that the fund should be estopped from denying he was a member as 
monthly contributions were deducted from his salary.  Trollip J held that the fund, as a body 
corporate, was bound by its rules which were available for inspection and as the rules made no 
provision for late applications for membership the fund could not be bound by estoppel to do 
anything beyond its legal capacity.  In Levy v Trade and Finance Group Retirement Fund and 
Another [2000] 12 BPLR 1375 (PFA) 1378 the Adjudicator identified the problem that fund 
members as a rule do not challenge the validity of rules that they perceive as harsh or pressurise 
the trustees to amend such rules.  A fund member’s failure to challenge a rule may “in many 
ways” be regarded as an acceptance of the rule. 
322Section 12.  Trustees should keep their fiduciary duties in mind when amending the rules of the 
fund (Circular PF No 98 para 4.3). 
323Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa chapter 4, 1.B. 
324 Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others  v Lorentz 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) 898 para 28. 
325 Reg 30(2) GN R 98 in GG 162 of 26 January 1962 (as amended). 
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What then should trustees’ attitude towards existing discriminatory rules be?  Are 
they bound by these rules or may they repeal them?  Hunter326 refers to section 
7D(f) of the Pension Funds Act, which provides that the duties of a board of 
trustees shall among others be to  
ensure that the rules and the operation and administration of the fund comply 
with this Act, the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 2001, … and all 
other applicable laws. 
 
She argues that this provision means that trustees are obliged to repeal unfair 
rules, e.g. rules that discriminate against members who are transferring out of a 
fund in favour of those who will remain.327   
 
Section 9 of the Constitution obliges all persons not to discriminate unfairly.  The 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act328 gives effect 
to this duty outside the employment context and is one of the “applicable laws” 
referred to in section 7D(f).  Hence, trustees must ensure that discriminatory 
rules are repealed. 
 
In Group of Concerned SAPREF Pensioners v SAPREF Pension Fund and 
Others,329 one of the issues for determination was the validity of the retrospective 
amendment of a rule which made the fund, instead of the employer, responsible 
for all the fund’s expenses.  The Adjudicator referred to his determination in San 
                                                 
326 Hunter “The Tek Judgment: An Appropriate Judicial Response to Pension Fund Surpluses” 
PLA Conference 1998. 
327 See below at 5.4 regarding the position of members transferring out of a fund. 
328 Act 4 of 2000, s 2(a). 
329 [2000] 1 BPLR 44 (PFA). 
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Georgio v Cape Town Municipal Pension Fund330 that, as part of their duty to act 
with care and diligence, trustees of funds are required to exercise their powers 
reasonably and justifiably.  In order to determine whether the trustees had acted 
reasonably, the Adjudicator considered their fiduciary duties, particularly the duty 
to act in the beneficiaries’ best interests and the duty to act in good faith.  In 
terms of section 12 of the Pension Funds Act a fund may amend any rule in the 
manner directed by its rules.  Rule 51 of the fund allows the trustees to amend 
the rules, but requires the concurrence of the employer. The Adjudicator held that 
the trustees had acted unreasonably by giving in to the employer’s dictate that it 
was no longer willing to meet the fund’s administration expenses, without any 
notice to, or input from, the members.  They thereby lost sight of the fund’s object 
which was to provide benefits for past and present employees.331 
 
The Adjudicator expressed some doubt whether section 12 authorises the 
retrospective amendments of rules.  Even if retrospective rule amendments are 
possible, such amendments would still have to be reasonable and constitutional.  
In determining the reasonableness of a retroactive measure, the Adjudicator has 
to establish the public interest served by such measure and “the extent to which 
that end can be implemented only by retrospective action impacting on pre-
existing rights”.332  He held that options other than retrospective amendment of 
the rules, such as negotiations between the employer and member, were 
available and that the essence of the rule amendment was an attempt to provide 
                                                 
330 PFA/WE/8/98. 
331 [2000] 1 BPLR 44 (PFA) 64. 
332 At 65. 
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the employer with unilateral access to the surplus.  In his view the retrospective 
amendment of the rule was both unlawful and unreasonable. 333 
 
Even though the rules are binding on the fund and members in terms of section 
13, the Adjudicator held that where rules are inconsistent or incompatible with 
other provisions of the Act, those other provisions will prevail over section 13 and 
the rule.  According to the Adjudicator “[r]ules consequent upon an abuse of 
power or maladministration do not enjoy binding effect because that effect would 
be incompatible with the provisions of Chapter VA of the Act aimed at 
empowering the Adjudicator to reverse abuses of power and maladministration in 
the affairs of pension funds.”334  It therefore appears that trustees would not be 
bound by unreasonable and unlawful rules. 
 
3.3.2.3.3 Administrative functions 
 
The various types of administrative functions can be classified as follows: 
• general administrative functions, such as the collection of contributions, 
payment of pensions, keeping records of members, production of accounts, 
communication with members; 
• investment functions, including investment of money or payment to an 
insurance company, keeping in mind the needs of the fund; 
• technical functions, such as the actuarial valuation of the fund; 
• the making of policy decisions, such as increases in benefits, changing the 
                                                 
333 Ibid. 
334 At 69. 
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rules and dealing with individual cases.335 
 
These administrative functions are mainly carried out by a fund administrator, 
who may be an employee of the employer, an insurance company or, as the case 
with most large funds, a professional administration company.336  The 
administrator must be approved by the Registrar.337 
 
The trustees may delegate the investment functions to an investment 
manager,338 giving him or her the task of managing the assets of the fund.339  
Downie340 stresses that, while the trustees may delegate the task of asset 
management to an investment manager, they cannot abdicate the responsibility 
attached to the investment function. 
 
According to the Pension Funds Act every registered fund must have a principal 
officer.341  He or she is the fund’s official contact person with the Registrar for the 
purposes of compliance with the Act and regulations.342  In practice, the main 
task of the principal officer is to manage the day-to-day affairs of the fund and 
                                                 
335Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 33; Marx and Hanekom (2004) The 
manual on South African retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 139. 
336Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa, chapter 5, 1.I. 
337Section 13B(1).  The Registrar may set conditions for the approval of the administrator. 
338 Portfolio managers and insurers may also be appointed by the trustees of the fund to  
administer the investments of the fund (Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African 
retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 138). 
339 As opposed to self-administered funds where the board of management itself is responsible 
for investment administration. 
340 Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa chapter 5, 1.L.. 
341 Section 8.  The pension fund regulations define a principal officer as the “principal executive 
officer referred to in section 8 of the Act, who may be a member of the body managing the affairs 
of the fund or controlling the fund” (board of trustees or similar body).    
342 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 113. 
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convene trustee meetings at which he or she reports on progress made on fund 
matters.343  All documents submitted to the Registrar need to be signed by the 
principal officer and at least one other person authorised in terms of the rules of 
the fund.344 
 
The Pension Funds Act also requires all registered funds to appoint an auditor345 
and a valuator (an actuary or a person considered to have actuarial 
knowledge).346 
 
It is the duty of an actuary or valuator347 to perform the technical functions of 
calculating the amount of money the fund will need to meet its obligations to the 
members.  Every fund is required to have the financial condition of the fund 
investigated every three years by a valuator, and has to submit a copy of the 
valuator’s report to the Registrar.348  Should the Registrar suspect that an 
investigation would show that the fund is not in a sound financial condition, he or 
she can at any time require the fund to have its financial situation investigated by 
                                                 
343 Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa, chapter 5, 1.D. 
344 Section 20(1) read with reg 20.  Other duties of the principal officer include notifying the 
Registrar of amendments to rules, providing members with summaries of rule amendments and 
signing annual accounts and statements.  See Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South 
African retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 114-116. 
345Section 9. 
346Section 9A.  The Registrar may exempt a fund from ss 9 and 9A “where practicalities impede 
the strict application of a specific provision” (s 2(5)(a)). 
347The term “valuator” is used in the Act.  A valuator is defined as “an actuary or any other person 
who, in the opinion of the Registrar, has sufficient actuarial knowledge to perform the duties 
required of a valuator in terms of this Act.”  The valuator need not be a natural person, but can be 
a firm of actuaries or an insurer (Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African 
retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 211). 
348Section 16(1).  Unless the Registrar is satisfied that the financial methods adopted by the fund 
are such as to render the periodical investigations by a valuator unnecessary, in which case the 
fund reports its financial situation to the Registrar directly (s 17(1)). 
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a valuator.349 
 
When the Registrar decides in the light of the reports submitted that the fund is 
not in a sound financial situation, he or she can give the fund three months to 
submit a scheme setting out how it intends to rectify the situation within a 
reasonable period.350  A report by a valuator on the scheme must also be 
submitted to the Registrar. 
 
In addition to evaluating the financial soundness of the fund every three years, 
the valuator also has to 
• certify as to the soundness from a financial point of view of the rules of a 
fund that is to be registered; 
• certify as to the impact an amendment of the rules will have on the 
financial position of the fund; 
• submit a scheme for the implementation of a proposed amalgamation or a 
transfer to the Registrar; 
• determine the payments payable upon termination of the fund; 
• affirm the appropriateness of a surplus apportionment in terms of section 
15B.351 
 
The final group of administrative functions, linked to the setting of policy, is 
connected to the fiduciary duties of the trustees and is performed by the trustees.  
They may appoint consultants to assist them in these tasks, e.g. to ensure that 
                                                 
349Section 16(5). 
350 Section 18(1).  The fund has three months from receiving the directive from the Registrar to 
comply.  Similar provision is made in s 18(1A) for the scheme of arrangements to be submitted in 
the case of a deficiency in a fund. 
351 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 213-214. 
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the rules of the fund are competitive and comply with the legal requirements.352  
The trustees, nonetheless, still remain responsible for determining policy in the 
final instance, even though they follow the advice of a consultant. 
 
The most common problems connected with the administration of retirement 
funds include 
• problems with collection of contributions; 
• problems with payment of benefits; 
• evasion by employers; 
• underreporting of earnings of employees by employers; 
• inadequate maintenance of records; 
• high administrative charges; 
• misuse of funds and/or corruption.353 
 
As it would be impossible for trustees of a fund to completely prevent dishonesty, 
fraud and theft, they are required to take out a fidelity insurance policy “to 
indemnify the pension fund against losses owing to the dishonesty or fraud of any 
of its officials or such other indemnification as the Registrar may allow”.354  If the 
Registrar agrees, the employer can guarantee such indemnification instead.355 
 
Another means of avoiding dishonesty in the financial affairs of the fund required 
                                                 
352Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa, chapter 5, 1.P. 
353Iyer “Pension reform in developing countries” (1993) 132 International Labour Review 196-7. 
354Reg 30(2)(u) GN R 98 in GG 162 of 26 January 1962. 
355Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa, chapter 4, 
1.C.3. 
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by law is the appointment of an auditor.356  The auditor’s task is to ensure that 
money has been received and paid as required.  The Act also requires the 
regular submission of accounts from the fund that have been duly audited and 
reported on by an auditor.357 
 
The statutory measures discussed above indicate a concerted endeavor to 
control all the role players in the retirement fund industry in an effort to “regulate 
the industry effectively and protect the interests of members”.358 
 
3.3.2.3.4 Complaints procedure 
 
The measures adopted to protect members of retirement funds against 
maladministration and fraud in the funds that were discussed above are mostly 
preventative in nature.  What then should a pension fund member do if he or she 
feels that he or she has a valid complaint against the fund or employer with 
regard to pension benefits or the manner in which the fund is administered? 
 
The Act provides for a complaints procedure that aims to, as far as possible, 
                                                 
356 Section 9.  The auditor may not be an officer of the fund. Only auditors registered under the 
Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act 80 of 1991 may be appointed. 
357Section 15 requires the fund to submit (unless the fund has been exempted i.t.o. s 2(5)(a)), 
within six months from the expiration of the financial year, the prescribed statements in regard to 
its revenue, expenditure and financial position, as well as any special reports by the auditor, 
annual reports and statements which may have been presented to members or shareholders in 
respect of any of its activities during the financial year. 
358 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 136. 
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dispose of complaints359 outside of the courts of law.  Chapter VA of the Act360 
established the office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator for this purpose.361 
 
Any aggrieved fund member or other interested party has the right to lodge a 
written complaint with the fund or the employer involved.362  The fund or 
employer has 30 days after receipt of the complaint to properly consider the 
complaint and respond to the complainant in writing.  If the complainant is not 
satisfied with the reply or if the fund or employer fails to reply within 30 days, the 
complainant may lodge a complaint with the Pension Fund Adjudicator.363  The 
idea is therefore that the complainant364  should attempt to settle the matter   
internally with the fund or employer365 before a complaint is lodged with the 
Adjudicator. 
                                                 
359”Complaint” is defined in s 1 of the Act as one “relating to the administration of a fund, the 
investment of its funds or the interpretation and application of its rules, and alleging -  
(a) that a decision of the fund or any person purportedly taken in terms of the rules 
was in excess of the powers of that fund or person, or an improper exercise of its 
powers; 
(b) that the complainant has sustained or may sustain prejudice in consequence of 
the maladministration of the fund by the fund or any person, whether by act or 
omission; 
(c) that a dispute of fact or law has arisen in relation to a fund between the fund or 
any person and the complainant; or 
(d) that an employer who participates in a fund has not fulfilled its duties in terms of 
the rules of the fund; 
but shall not include a complaint which does not relate to a specific complainant.”  
360 Sections 30A to 30X. 
361 Section 30B. 
362 In Khambule v CNA Ltd, now CNA (Pty) Ltd and Others (1) [2001] 9 BPLR 2472 (PFA) 2479, 
para 32-33, the Adjudicator held that the fact that the complaint may not have been as precisely 
formulated as the fund and/or the employer would have liked it, does not preclude his jurisdiction.  
363Section 30A.  In Armellini v Southern Field Staff Defined Contribution Fund and Another [2001] 
3 BPLR 1693 (PFA) the complaint was sent to the Adjudicator’s office before it was lodged with 
the fund.  The complaint was subsequently lodged with the fund, which responded to it and the 
complaint was then re-lodged with the Adjudicator.  The Adjudicator accepted the complaint as 
complying with the requirements of s 30A. 
364 A member or former member of a pension fund, a beneficiary or former beneficiary of a fund, 
or an employer who participates in a fund (s 1). 
365 The “respondent” is usually the fund or the employer, but the Adjudicator may join any person 
as respondent that he believes has a sufficient interest in the case to be made a party (s 30G). 
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The main aim of the Adjudicator is to hear complaints in a “procedurally fair, 
economical and expeditious manner”.366  To this purpose the Adjudicator is 
empowered to investigate any complaint and to make any order which a court of 
law may make.367  The Adjudicator may also decide that the complaint must first 
be referred for dispute resolution and, if it is not resolved, once again lodged with 
the Adjudicator.368 
 
If proceedings relating to the complaint have already been instituted in a civil 
court, the complaint falls outside the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator.369  The 
parameters of the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction are also determined by the definition 
of a “complaint” in section 1 of the Act.370   
 
The Adjudicator will also not investigate a complaint if three years have passed 
                                                 
366Section 30D. 
367The Adjudicator has been granted the powers of a Commission of Inquiry.  In terms of s 30J(3), 
ss1-4 and 6 of the Commissions Act applies to the Adjudicator.  See Basil Kransdorff v 
Sentrachem Pension Fund PFA/GA/3/98 JM 2. 
368Section 30E. 
369Section 30H(2). S 30H(4) in addition excludes the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction in the case of 
complaints in connection with a scheme for the apportionment of surplus in terms of s 15B, which 
relate to the decisions taken by the board or any stakeholder in the fund or any specialist tribunal 
convened in terms of s 15K. 
370 The Adjudicator would, for instance, not have jurisdiction to assess the fairness of a dismissal 
(Manzini v Metro Group Retirement Fund and Another (1) [2001] 12 BPLR 2808 (PFA) 2812), or 
of a complaint about the application and interpretation of a document other than the rules, eg 
instructions issued by an employer to a fund as in Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund and 
Another v Sligo and Others [1999] 11 BPLR 235 (C).  The Adjudicator’s jurisdiction may include 
complaints such as allegations that the manner in which the fund operated a scheme utilising  
provident fund monies to provide a housing benefit for fund members entailed maladministration 
of the fund, resulting in prejudice to the complainant (Khambule v CNA Ltd, now CNA (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (1) [2001] 9 BPLR 2472 (PFA)); exercise of a discretion by an employer not to 
increase an early retirement benefit (Harris v AECI Pension Fund and Another [2000] 7 BPLR 
737 (PFA)); or the manner of payment of a retirement benefit by a retirement annuity fund 
(Dempster v South African Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 8 BPLR 696 (PFA)). 
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from the date on which the act or omission that the complaint is based on 
occurred.371  Where the complainant was unaware of the occurrence of the act or 
omission on which the complaint is based, the period of three years commences 
when the complainant becomes aware or ought reasonably to have become 
aware of the happening, whichever occurs first.372   
 
There is no prescribed procedure for conducting an investigation and the 
Adjudicator may follow any procedure which he or she considers appropriate.373   
Any fund or person against whom the allegations contained in the complaint are 
made must be afforded an opportunity to comment on the allegations.374  No 
party to the complaint is entitled to legal representation at the proceedings before 
the Adjudicator.375  This is to ensure that proceedings before the Adjudicator are 
informal, accessible, expeditious and inexpensive.  It is also intended to avoid 
unfair advantage to large pension funds, that can afford extensive legal 
representation, over individual members. 
 
The Adjudicator keeps records of investigation proceedings and any member of 
the public may obtain a copy of such record.376  After completion of an 
                                                 
371Section 30I.  
372 Section 30I(2).  See e.g. Longo v Cape Joint Pension Fund [2000] 6 BPLR 623 (PFA).  S 
30I(3), which gave the Adjudicator the power to condone time-barred claims, was deleted by 
Pension Funds Amendment Act 11 of 2007. 
373Section 30J. 
374Section 30F. 
375Section 30K.  In Henderson v Eskom and Another [1999] 12 BPLR 353 (PFA), the Adjudicator 
interpreted s 30K as meaning that neither of the parties before the Adjudicator can insist on legal 
representation, but that the Adjudicator has the discretion to allow legal representation of the 
parties. 
376Section 30L. 
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investigation, the Adjudicator sends a statement containing his decision and the 
reasons therefore to all the parties concerned.377  A decision by the Adjudicator is 
binding and has the same status as a civil judgment of any court of law.378  An 
aggrieved party has six weeks from the date of the Adjudicator’s determination to 
apply for relief to the High Court with jurisdiction, which will consider the merits of 
the complaint in question.379 
 
3.3.2.4 Legal status of a pension or provident fund 
 
Because of the reference to the board of management of a fund as “trustees”, a 
popular perception exists that a pension or provident fund in law constitutes a 
trust.380  However, the preponderance of evidence demonstrates that a fund is a 
legal person separate from its members. 
 
Once a retirement fund is registered, it acquires its own legal identity and is 
acknowledged as a separate legal persona.  According to section 5(1)(a) of the 
Pension Funds Act, the effect of registration under the Act is that the fund381 
becomes 
a body corporate capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name and of 
doing all such things as may be necessary for or incidental to the exercise of its 
powers or the performance of its functions in terms of its rules. 
                                                 
377Section 30M. 
378Section 30O.  Execution of judgment occurs in the same manner as for a civil court of law. 
379Section 30P.  See eg Shell Southern Africa Pension Fund and Another v Sligo and Others 
[1999] 11 BPLR 235 (C).   
380 See the Adjudicator’s comments in Venter v Protektor Pension Fund [2000] 3 BPLR 340 (PFA) 
345. 
381 S 5(1)(a) applies to paragraph (a) pension fund organisations, i.e. an association of persons 
established with the object of providing benefits to members.  See above at 3.3.2.1.1 for the 
distinction between paragraph (a) and (b) pension fund organisations. 
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A retirement fund can therefore enforce its decisions and rules by means of legal 
proceedings.382 
 
Section 5(1)(b) of the Pension Funds Act states as one of the effects of 
registration of retirement funds383 that  
all the assets, rights, liabilities and obligations pertaining to the business of the 
fund shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in the memorandum, 
articles of association, constitution or rules of any body corporate or unincorporate 
having control of the business of the fund, be deemed to be assets, rights, 
liabilities and obligations of the fund to the exclusion of any other person, and no 
person shall have any claim on the assets or rights or be responsible for any 
liabilities or obligations of the fund, except in so far as the claim has arisen or the 
responsibility has been incurred in connection with transactions relating to the 
business of the fund. (my emphasis) 
 
The liabilities of the fund are, generally, the benefits paid to members, as well as 
administrative costs. 
 
As section 5(1)(b) does not specifically make reference to the fund becoming a 
“body corporate capable of suing and being sued” as section 5(1)(a) does, it has 
been argued that the legislature only intended to confer legal personality on 
section 5(1)(a) funds to the exclusion of section 5(1)(b) funds.  In Mostert NO v 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa) Ltd384 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (per Smalberger ADCJ) analysed section 5(1)(b) and held that it should 
                                                 
382Downie (1999) The essentials of retirement fund management in South Africa, chapter 1, 2.B. 
383 S 5(1)(b) applies to paragraph (b) pension fund organisations, i.e. any business carried on 
under a scheme or arrangement established with the object of providing benefits for persons who 
belong or belonged to the class of persons for whose benefit that scheme or arrangement has  
been established, e.g. an agreement between an employer and an underwriter to provide benefits 
for a category of employees.  See Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African 
retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 85. 
384 [2001] 8 BPLR 2307 (A). 
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be seen within the context of section 5(1) as a whole.  Where it states that upon 
registration all the assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of the fund shall be 
“deemed” to be those of the fund, it also means that the assets are to be 
“regarded” as the assets of the fund.  The fund therefore owns the assets, which 
sets it apart from non-legal persona such as a trust or a deceased estate.385  
Smalberger ADCJ concluded: 
Although the Fund has its origins in a scheme, it was established for the benefit 
of persons who have become its members.  The Fund is clearly an entity 
separate from its members.  It can hold its assets and acquire rights and incur 
obligations apart from them and has perpetual succession.  It has the essential 
attributes of a universitas at common law with concomitant legal personality…. 
The result is that if section 5(1)(b) does not in terms confer legal personality, on a 
proper interpretation it must be taken to do so.386 
 
In addition, section 5(1)(c) provides that the assets, rights, liabilities and 
obligations of any fund (including any assets held by any person in trust for the 
fund), as existing immediately prior to its registration, shall upon registration vest 
in the registered fund without any formal transfer or cession. 
 
All the money and assets belonging to a retirement fund is owned by the fund.  
The fund is also obliged to maintain the necessary accounting records.387 
 
A retirement fund is a legal persona and therefore its legal capacity to enter into 
a particular contract “must be sought for exclusively within the express or implied 
                                                 
385 At 2317 para 47. 
386 At 2318 para 49.  This interpretation could mean that paragraph (a) funds acquire their legal 
status through a statute (s 5(1)(a)), whereas paragraph (b) funds are regarded as common law 
legal persons.  See also Venter v Protektor Pension Fund [2000] 3 BPLR 340 (PFA) 345. 
387Section 5(2). 
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provisions of its constitution”.388  If the authority to enter into a contract is to be 
found outside of the rules, the contract will be null and void as the board of 
management has exceeded its powers in entering into such as contract and their 
actions will be ultra vires.389 
 
It was held in Technical Workers Union v Transnet390 that the Industrial Court did 
not have jurisdiction over a pension, provident or medical aid fund which 
functions separately from the employer’s business in the sense that the employer 
does not control the fund.  The reason for this is that the fund is a third party and 
no employment relationship exists between the employee and the fund.  Should 
the employer, however, control the fund, then the Industrial Court would have 
had jurisdiction.391 
 
Taking the point that a pension fund is an entirely separate legal entity to its 
extreme, the employer in SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Garlick Stores 
(1922) (Pty) Ltd392 denied that it was under a duty to negotiate with the union 
regarding the amalgamation of the business of the fund with that of another fund.  
It contended that it had been the board of trustees of the fund that had taken the 
decision to amalgamate the fund.  The employer therefore allegedly did not have 
                                                 
388 Abrahamse v Connock’s Pension Fund 1963 2 SA 76 (W). 
389 Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) 898 para 28. In 
Venter v Protektor Pension Fund [2000] 3 BPLR 341 (PFA) 346, the Adjudicator drew attention to 
the fact that the Pension Funds Act does not contain a provision similar to s 36 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 which seeks to ameliorate the effects of the ultra vires – doctrine. 
390(1994) 15 ILJ 1084 (IC) 1088 (under the pre-1995 definition of an unfair labour practice). 
391 The same would currently apply to the CCMA and the Labour Court. 
392(1996) 17 ILJ 255 (IC). 
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the power to set aside the trustees’ decision to amalgamate.393 
 
Brand SM agreed that the fund was a separate legal entity and that once the 
board of trustees had made the decision to amalgamate, there was nothing the 
employer could have done to set aside such decision.  However, after studying 
the rules of the fund, the conclusion was reached that the employer had such a 
dominant position relative to other interested parties in the board of trustees, that 
it could have influenced the decision taken by the board.394 
 
Section 5(1)(b), read in conjunction with the prohibition on loans to or investment 
in the shares of the employer by the fund,395 forbids the employer from using the 
fund to finance its own business. 
 
Based on section 5(1)(b), applicant’s counsel in Lorentz v Tek Corporation396 
argued that the whole of the assets of the pension fund are owned and vest in 
the pension fund to the exclusion of all other persons and that the employer 
accordingly has no claim to any part of the surplus.  Navsa J agreed in principle 
                                                 
393 At 258. 
394The relevant rules scrutinised in casu were rule 9.1, which determines that the fund is to be 
controlled by a board of trustees, comprising three employer trustees and two employee trustees; 
rule 9.1(2), stacking the board even more in the employer’s favour by stating that the employer 
has the right to remove from office any member of the board and to replace such a member with 
another; rule 9.2(1), empowering the employer to appoint the chairman and vice-chairman of the 
board of trustees; and rule 11.5(b), giving the employer a veto over all the rules of the fund  The 
definition of an “unfair labour practice” in s 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as 
amended) includes “any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and an employee 
involving …(a) unfair conduct by the employer relating to the … provision of benefits to an 
employee” and therefore arguably takes account of a situation such as the dominant position of 
the employer on the board of trustees described above. 
395 Section 19(5B)(b). 
396 1998 1 SA 192 (W).  See also Group of Concerned SAPREF Pensioners v SAPREF Pension 
Fund and Others [2000] 1 BPLR 44 (PFA) 50. 
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but pointed out that the proviso to section 5(1)(b) might, under the appropriate 
circumstances, be interpreted as permitting the employer to take a contribution 
holiday.397  It was found that the employer seeking the trustees’ agreement to it 
taking a contribution holiday after over-contribution could be construed as a claim 
arising “in connection with transactions relating to the business of the fund”.398 
 
On appeal, in Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz,399 Marais 
JA reiterated that the fund is a legal persona that owns its own assets and that 
the trustees of the fund owe a fiduciary duty to the fund, its members and other 
beneficiaries.  He pointed out that although the employer “is not similarly 
burdened”, it however does owe a duty of good faith to the fund and its 
members.400  As to the employer’s right to the surplus, Marais JA held: 
Once a surplus arises it is ipso facto an integral component of the fund.  Unless 
the employer can point to a relevant rule of the fund or statutory enactment or 
principle of the common law which confers such entitlement or empowers the 
trustees to use the surplus for its benefit, the employer has no right in law to the 
                                                 
397 A “contribution holiday” in the case of a defined benefit fund means “payment by the employer 
of less than the contribution rate the valuator recommends be payable by the employer, taking 
into account the circumstances of the fund and ignoring any surplus or deficit” (s 1 Pension Funds 
Act).    See above at 2.6 for employers’ contribution liability in defined benefit funds.  In relation to 
a defined contribution fund, “contribution holiday” means “payment by the employer of less than 
the employer contribution rate defined in the rules prior to application of any credit balance in any 
employer reserve account as defined in the rules or employer surplus account” (s 1 Pension 
Funds Act). 
398 Lorentz v Tek Corporation 1998 1 SA 192 (W) 227.  It was, however, held that on the facts the 
proviso to the section did not apply. 
399 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA). 
400 At 894 para 15.  E.g. where the employer insists that a substantial surplus be kept in the fund 
to prolong its contribution holiday, whereas the trustees have recommended that pensions be 
increased (and such increase would have no effect on the employer’s liability to contribute), the 
employer’s behaviour would not be consistent with the good faith it is required to show towards its 
employees (at 897 para 24).  See also Group of Concerned SAPREF Pensioners v SAPREF 
Pension Fund and Others [2000] 1 BPLR 44 (PFA) 53; Harris v AECI Pension Fund and Another 
[2000] 7 BPLR 737 (PFA) and specifically, Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco 
Ltd [1991] 2 All ER 597 (Ch) where the requirements for the employer’s duty of good faith were 
stated. 
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surplus.401 
 
3.3.2.5 Protection of retirement benefits 
 
The absence of legislation mandating retirement fund membership effectively 
removes those workers who prefer to take extra cash home, instead of 
contributing to a pension or provident fund, from the scope of application of 
schemes providing for retirement.402 
 
Attempts are being made to extend the coverage of retirement schemes to 
persons deriving their income from informal, irregular or unregulated economic 
activities.403 
 
To ensure that those who choose to make provision for their old age do not lose 
these benefits due to unforeseen financial crises, the Pension Funds Act protects 
retirement benefits from creditors.  The general rule to prevent alienation of 
benefits is contained in section 37A of the Act.  It provides that no benefit or right 
to such benefit may be reduced, transferred or otherwise ceded, pledged, 
hypothecated or be liable to be attached or subjected to any form of execution 
under a judgment.  A maximum amount of R3000 per annum can be taken into 
                                                 
401 At 895, para 17.  Since 2001, matters related to a surplus in a fund, such as rights of use of,a 
surplus, apportionment of existing and future surpluses, the utilisation of a surplus for the benefit 
of members or the employer, and the right to share in surplus accounts on exist from the fund are 
regulated i.t.o. ss 15A – 15K Pension Funds Act. 
402 Conditions of service often make retirement fund membership compulsory, but this is not 
necessarily the case.   See below at 5.5 for a more detailed discussion of the problems caused by 
the voluntary nature of the pension system. 
403 Measures to provide social security, including retirement benefits, to workers in the informal 
economy are discussed below at 5.6. 
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account in terms of section 65 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act judgment debt 
procedures.404  If a member or beneficiary tries to part with his or her benefit in 
one of the above ways, the fund may withhold or suspend payment of benefits.405  
The fund may however pay out a benefit transferred to the member’s dependant, 
beneficiary or guardian of a dependant.406  Exceptions to this provision are 
deductions allowed under section 37D,407 and where the fund wishes to recover  
arrear contributions owed to the fund by the member, but excluding amounts 
which are in arrear due to the failure of the employer to pay over the 
contributions after deduction thereof from the member’s salary.408  The Act also 
makes provision for exceptions in the case of payment of income tax and 
maintenance payments.409 
 
If the fund’s rules provide for the deduction of any debt due by the member to the 
fund before the benefit is paid, section 37A(2)(a) regards the deduction as an 
impermissible deduction.  The same goes for the set-off of any debt against a 
benefit.410 
 
If a member’s estate is sequestrated, retirement benefits form no part of the 
                                                 
404 Procedure for execution of judgment debts, Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (as amended).  
405 Section 37A(1).   
406 Proviso to s 37A(1). 
407 Even though these deductions strictly speaking reduce the member’s benefits, s 37A(1) makes 
allowance for this exception by providing “Save to the extent permitted by this Act…”  The 
deductions allowed i.t.o. s 37D are listed below. 
408 Section 37A(3)(c) and (d). 
409 See Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other 
employee benefits (Vol 1) 162-164 for more on the practical problems faced by funds that are 
required to make deductions from fund benefits for arrear maintenance. 
410 Section 37A(2)(b). 
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insolvent estate and cannot be claimed by creditors of the insolvent estate.411  
This has prompted Marx and Hanekom412 to observe that “[i]t appears that  
members who are insolvent enjoy better protection against creditors in respect of 
their retirement fund benefits than those who could only be said to be in financial 
difficulty.” 
 
Section 37D permits a fund to make the following deductions from retirement 
benefits: 
 (a) any amount due to the fund in respect of a housing loan granted to  
the member by the fund;413 
 (b) any amount due to the fund in respect of the fund’s liability under a 
guarantee furnished in respect of a housing loan to the member made 
by another party, e.g. a bank;414 
 (c) any amount owed to the employer in respect of a housing loan; 
 (d) any amount owed to the employer in respect of a guarantee furnished 
in respect of a housing loan made by another person; 
 (e) compensation to the employer for damage caused to the employer by 
reason of theft, fraud, dishonesty or misconduct by the member, if the 
member has admitted his or her liability in writing, or if the member 
has been convicted in court;415 
 (f) any payments made by the fund by arrangement with, and on behalf 
of, the member for medical aid subscriptions; 
                                                 
411 Section 37B.   
412 Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 164. 
413 I.t.o. s 19(5). 
414 Section 37D(1)(a)(ii). 
415 Section 37D(1)(b)(ii).  In Buthelezi v Municipal Gratuity Fund and Another (1) [2001] 5 BPLR 
1996 (PFA) 1999 paras 18-20 the Adjudicator held that a fund may withhold payment of a benefit 
for a reasonable time pending the determination or acknowledgment of a debt.  He stressed that 
the implicit power to withhold the benefit must be exercised reasonably and within a reasonable 
time.  In casu, the delay of just under two years was regarded as an unreasonably long delay. 
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 (g) any payments made by the fund by arrangement with, and on behalf 
of, the member for insurance premiums; 
 (h) any payments made by the fund by arrangement with, and on behalf 
of, the member in respect of any purpose approved by the registrar, 
on the conditions determined by him, upon a request in writing from 
the fund.416 
 
Before 2007, the payment of divorce benefits was regulated in terms of the 
Divorce Act417 which provided that the non-member spouse would only receive 
payment upon retirement of the member spouse.  The new position418 is that 
benefits in terms of a divorce orders are deemed to have accrued on the member 
spouse on the date of the divorce order.  The fund must therefore deduct the 
member’s benefit on the day the fund receives the court order and either pay it 
over to the non-member spouse or transfer it to an approved fund.419  The fund 
may also deduct amounts payable by the member in terms of a maintenance 
order.420 
 
                                                 
416 Section 37D(1)(c)(iii). 
417 Section 7(8) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
418 Section 37D(1)(d) Pension Funds Act (as introduced by the Pension Funds Amendment Act 
11 of 2007 and amended by the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008).  
The new position applies retrospectively to divorces concluded prior to 13 September 2007 (s 
37D(4)(d)).  For an overview of the position before and after the 2007 and 2008 amendments, 
see Nevandwe “The law regarding the division of the retirement savings of a retirement fund 
member on his or her divorce with specific reference to Cockroft v Mine Employees Pension 
Fund, [2007] 3 BPLR 296 (PFA)” (2009) 1 LDD 1-12. 
 
419 Section 37D(4). 
420 Section 37D(1)(d) Pension Funds Act (as amended).   
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3.3.2.6 Summary 
 
The object of retirement funds is to provide members with benefits when they 
retire, so that they can provide for themselves financially and not be a burden on 
the state (and thereby taxpayers).  Any fund rules or administrative practices that 
may have the effect of reducing a member’s ability to provide for him- or herself 
financially when he or she retires would hence be in conflict with the recognised 
purpose of a retirement fund.421 A variety of measures have been put into place 
to ensure that retirement benefits are only utilised to provide for the member’s 
retirement and not for other purposes.  These measures range from tax 
incentives for certain choices of funds to protecting retirement benefits against 
creditors, and the creation of a dispute resolution procedure. 
 
3.3.3  Private retirement savings vehicles 
 
Insurance companies offer private pension policies or retirement annuities, 
utilised mainly by those who have no other retirement options, particularly the 
(professional) self-employed or those employees who are not covered by an 
occupational retirement scheme.  Retirement fund members also make use of 
private retirement savings methods such as retirement annuities and endowment 
policies to supplement their income on retirement.  The retirement savings 
vehicles discussed below are all examples of how an individual can provide for 
financial security in his or her old age.  Given the nature of these savings 
methods, the solidarity that is found between members of an occupational 
                                                 
421 Sebola v Johnson Tiles (Pty) Ltd and Others [2002] 3 BPLR 3242 (PFA) 3249. 
 
 
 
 
 161
retirement fund is lacking. 
 
3.3.3.1 Retirement annuity fund 
 
Retirement annuity funds have been operating in South Africa since the 1960s to 
provide self-employed persons benefits similar to those of retirement funds.422  
Although a retirement annuity fund operates similarly to a defined contribution 
pension fund,423 it can be distinguished from a pension fund in that membership 
of the fund is voluntary and not linked to employment.424  As no employer 
contribution is made on the member’s behalf, the retirement benefit consists of 
the member’s own contributions to the fund425 plus investment returns.   
 
The following extract from Tshabalala and Others v South African Retirement 
Annuity Fund426 provides a helpful summary of how a retirement annuity fund 
operates in practice: 
The rules of the fund allow its board of management to apply to the underwriter 
… to issue policies in favour of the fund on the lives of the members.  The fund 
collects contributions from the members and in turn pays them over to the 
underwriter.  A member may decide what contribution he/she wishes to make to 
the fund, subject to certain conditions laid down by the insurer with whom the 
fund concludes the policy contract.  Contributions start at the inception date of 
membership, and are payable as the board of the fund agrees with the 
underwriter.  All monies payable by the underwriter in terms of the provisions of 
the policy are paid to the fund.  The board, in turn deals with the payment of 
benefits in accordance with the rules of the fund.  Upon attaining membership of 
the fund, a certificate is issued to each member by the underwriter setting out the 
benefits and conditions applicable to the benefits. 
 
                                                 
422 Cameron (2006) “Secure good line of defence for your retirement” Personal Finance 28 
January 2006 http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 09/06/2006). 
423 Retirement annuity funds are also administered in terms of the Pension Funds Act. 
424Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African retirement funds and other employee 
benefits (Vol 1) 637; Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 38. 
425 Para (b)(i) of the definition  of “retirement annuity fund” in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
426 [2001] 1 BPLR 1534 (PFA) at 1535, para 4. 
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The Commissioner of SARS will only approve a retirement annuity fund if its 
rules provide that a maximum of one-third of the retirement annuity may be 
commuted in cash.  The remaining two thirds must be applied to the purchase of 
a life annuity.427  Age restrictions are also placed on retirement annuity benefits, 
as benefits are only payable from age 55.428 
 
In Dempster v South African Retirement Annuity Fund and Another,429 the 
Adjudicator dismissed a complaint about the retirement annuity fund’s refusal to 
pay out the capital value of the retirement annuity as a lump sum.  The 
complainant had already received the one-third of the value of the retirement 
annuity as a cash lump sum and was to receive the remainder as a monthly 
pension as allowed for in the rules of the fund.  As a result of financial difficulty 
she required the capital value to be paid out as a lump sum.  As neither the 
definition of a retirement annuity fund nor the rules of the particular fund made 
provision for such a payment, the Adjudicator could not order the fund to make 
the lump sum payment.  
 
Retirement annuities have traditionally been used as the main retirement vehicle 
by entrepreneurs who are not members of occupational retirement funds.  They 
are also utilised by many pension and provident fund members who wish to 
                                                 
427 Except where two-thirds of the total value does not exceed R 50 000 (definition of “retirement 
annuity fund” para (a) read with (b)(ii) Income Tax Act, as amended by the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act 8 of 2007.  
428Retirement age is minimum 55 (definition of “retirement annuity fund”, para (b)(v) read with 
definition of “normal retirement age” Income Tax Act).    
429 [2005] 8 BPLR 696 (PFA). 
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supplement their retirement savings.  The reason for the preference for 
retirement annuities was mainly based in the tax incentives430 that are similar to 
those enjoyed by pension fund members. 
 
Retirement annuity fund membership is not completely without disadvantages, as 
• Initially the major portions of contributions to retirement annuities are spent on 
administrative expenses and only a small portion is allocated to investments.  
The Adjudicator has lashed out against the practice of retirement annuity 
funds to charge costs that do not form part of the rules of the fund, thereby 
significantly reducing the benefit payable to the member.431 
• Retirement annuities are inherently inflexible, as they may not be touched 
before the age of 55, except where the member’s full benefit value is less 
than R7 000 or the member plans to emigrate.  In Tshabalala and Others v 
South African Retirement Annuity Fund,432 the Adjudicator held that, where 
the rules of a fund are subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, they 
must be adhered to even if it may cause unintended hardship to members.  
As a result, he dismissed a claim of a group of retirement annuity fund 
                                                 
430 Similar to the tax deductions allowed in the case of contributions to a pension fund - see above 
at 3.3.2.1.2(b).  S 11(n)(aa) provides the formula for determining the maximum amount of 
member contributions that are deductible from gross income.  The greatest of : 
(a) 15% of an amount equal to the amount remaining after admissible deductions from, or 
set-off against, the income derived during the year of assessment, excluding income from 
retirement-funding employment and any retirement fund lump sum benefit;   
(b) R3 500 less any current deductible contributions to a pension fund; or 
(c) R1 750.  
Upon retirement, a portion of the lump sum (maximum one-third) is paid tax-free.  The remaining 
two-thirds that are annuitised are taxed as income. 
431 See also De Beer v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 3 BPLR 257 (PFA); 
Schwartz v Central Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 5 BPLR 435 (PFA); Walters v 
MM Retirement Annuity Fund and Another [2005] 8 BPLR 719 (PFA). 
432 [2001] 1 BPLR 1534 (PFA). 
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members who claimed payment of their benefits before they had attained the 
age of 55. 
 
Other private retirement funding possibilities include deferred compensation 
schemes, unit trusts and endowment policies.   
 
3.3.3.2 Deferred compensation schemes 
 
 
In the case of a deferred compensation scheme, the employer invests a sum of 
money on behalf of the employee in lieu of a salary increase, based on a 
mutually arranged plan between the employer and employee.  These schemes 
are generally set up by employers to reward employees for long service or as a 
measure to retain employees’ service, as employees find it difficult to leave their 
employment and hence lose benefits.433 
 
Deferred compensation schemes are usually funded by endowment policies 
taken out by the employer on the life of the employee.  The employer is the 
owner of the policy and pays the contributions.  On retirement of the employee, 
the investment is realised and the returns are paid over to the employee as a 
cash lump sum (gratification).  On the one hand there are certain tax advantages 
attached to a deferred compensation scheme,434 but the tax advantage involved 
                                                 
433 E.g. the tax concessions that make deferred compensation schemes attractive relative to other 
savings vehicles only come into effect five years prior to retirement. 
434 If the employee receives a pay increase, that increase could lead to increased tax payable, 
whereas with deferred compensation the employer invests the “increase” before tax, which 
results in better benefits.  See also s 11W Income Tax Act.    
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in this type of benefit will be more important than the corresponding salary 
increase only in the case of better-paid employees with higher tax brackets, e.g. 
senior executives.  With this type of scheme the employee’s retirement provision 
is linked closely to the employer’s fortunes, with the risk that in the event of the 
employer’s insolvency it could be unprotected.435 
 
3.3.3.3 Unit trusts 
 
Whereas retirement annuity funds are the alternative to pensions available to 
person other than employees, unit trusts are the nearest available option to 
someone who has no occupational provident fund but whose retirement planning 
is based on receiving a lump sum payment upon retirement.   
 
A unit trust can be described as a fund set up by a management company to 
channel investors’ money into certain specified assets, particularly shares.  The 
units reflect the underlying value of the overall investment portfolio, protecting the 
investor against the risk of a particular share price falling.  In the case of a unit 
trust investment, the units may be sold as and when money is required, making a 
lump sum of money available to the investor.  This option is more flexible than 
the retirement annuity, although unit trusts are not usually seen as short-term 
investments.436 
 
                                                 
435 Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 39. 
436 Sharenet.”What are unit trusts?” http://www.sharenet.co.za/free/library/ut_01.htm (accessed 
2009/07/02); “How to get a retirement annuity to work for you” Business Times (2 Febr 1997) 
http://www.btimes.co.za/97/0202/btmoney/money8.htm (accessed 02/07/2009). 
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Unit trusts are regulated by the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act.437  
The objects of the Act are to regulate and control the establishment and 
administration of collective investment schemes438 and therefore also unit trusts.   
 
3.3.3.4 Endowment policy 
 
An endowment policy with an insurance company is a further alternative when 
saving for a specific goal such as financial security after retirement.   It is mainly 
used as an alternative retirement savings vehicle to retirement annuities for 
persons wishing to supplement their retirement income from retirement funds. 
 
In the case of an endowment policy, the person making provision for retirement 
pays regular fixed monthly premiums on the policy.  On maturity of the policy 
(usually at retirement age) he or she receives a lump sum benefit which is usually 
dependant on the investment returns earned by the insurer.439 
 
Contributions (premiums) to an endowment policy are made with after-tax money 
but, on the other hand, no tax is payable on the proceeds of an endowment 
                                                 
437 Act 45 of 2002, which replaced the Unit Trusts Control Act 54 of 1981. 
438 A collective scheme for the purposes of this Act is defined in s 1 as “a scheme, in whatever 
form, including an open-ended investment company, in pursuance of which members of the 
public are invited or permitted to invest money or other assets in a portfolio, and in terms of 
which- 
(a) two or more investors contribute money or other assets to and hold a 
participatory interest in a portfolio of the scheme through shares, units or any 
other form of participatory interest; and 
(b) the investors share the risk and the benefit of investment in proportion to 
their participatory interest in a portfolio of a scheme or on any other basis 
determined in the deed, 
but not a collective investment scheme authorised by any other Act.” (my emphasis). 
439 Sephton (1990) A guide to pension and provident funds 40. 
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policy on maturity.440  Other advantages of endowment policies are that 
endowments can be used as security for a loan and that substantial death 
benefits are payable from endowment policies.  However, heavy penalties are 
imposed if the policy is stopped before the end of its term. 
 
The administration of endowment policies and the duties of parties involved are 
regulated in terms of the Long-term Insurance Act.441  The Act makes provision 
for the appointment of the Registrar of Long-term Insurance, who is responsible 
for administering the Act, and for supervising compliance with the Act.442  All 
insurers carrying on long-term insurance business have to be registered to do so 
and must carry on their business in accordance with the Act.443 
 
Part IV of the Act deals with the various financial requirements and arrangements 
put in place to ensure that insurers at all times maintain their business in a sound 
financial condition.444  Should an insurer fail to meet this requirement (or be in 
danger of failure) it should contact the Registrar for assistance.445 
 
                                                 
440 Cameron “You can’t beat RAs for tax benefits and versatility” Personal Finance 11 Oct 2003. 
http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 02/07/2009). 
441 Act 52 of 1998. 
442 Section 2. 
443 Section 7(1). 
444 Section 29(1) requires insurers to have suitable assets sufficient to cover their properly valued 
liabilities and to conduct their business in such a manner that they would be able to meet their 
liabilities and capital adequacy requirement at all times. 
445 Section 35. 
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In terms of section 48446 every new policy holder must be provided with a 
summary of the main features of the policy within 60 days of entering into the 
policy.  Policy holders are also entitled to a copy of the full policy document.  This 
ensures transparency and understanding by policyholders of their rights and 
benefits, as well as any limitations that might be placed on such rights and 
benefits by the policy. 
 
Section 62 makes provision for the creation of a set of Policyholder Protection 
Rules.  Such rules were drafted by the Registrar and took effect on 1 July 
2001.447 
 
3.3.3.5  Other retirement savings vehicles 
 
In addition to the savings methods discussed above, other options such as 
savings accounts and notice or fixed deposits at banks, or savings clubs or the 
Stokvel method of saving are available to individuals wishing to improve their 
post-retirement financial position.448   
 
                                                 
446 Section 48 forms part of part VII of the Act which deals with the regulation of certain business 
practices for consumer protection . 
447 The detailed provisions of the Long-term Insurance Act and the Policyholder Protection Rules 
fall outside the scope of this work.  See Marx and Hanekom (2004) The manual on South African 
retirement funds and other employee benefits (Vol 1) 445-473. 
448 See Dekker and Olivier “Informal forms of social security and informal sector social security”  
in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 91 for Stokvels and other kinship or 
community-based social security measures. 
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3.3.4 Provision of care and support services to older persons 
 
 
3.3.4.1 Introduction 
 
Care and support services for older persons form part of social security.449  
However, most legislation aimed at realising older persons’ right of access to 
social security focuses on the payment of grants or retirement benefits.  The 
Department of Social Development also treats care and support services for 
older persons as a function separate from the payment of grants.  There is no 
national legislation dealing specifically with access to and allocation of care and 
support services to older persons.   
 
In 2001 the Ministerial Committee on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-treatment of Older 
Persons gave horrific accounts of older persons suffering neglect and abuse in 
residential care, in their communities and in their family homes in their report 
titled Mothers and Fathers of the Nation: the forgotten people?450  The long-
awaited Older Persons Act451 provides the legislative framework for the provision 
of care and protection to older persons.   
 
The aim of this section of the chapter is to trace the legislative and policy 
developments from the Aged Persons Act452 up to the current Older Persons Act.  
                                                 
449 See above at 1.3 and 2.2.  The two types of care and support services, residential and 
domiciliary care are defined above at 2.8.  See also Olivier “The concept of social security” in 
Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 16-17. 
450 Hereafter “Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report”. 
451 Act 13 of 2006. 
452 Act 81 of 1967 (as amended by the Aged Persons Amendment Act 100 of 1998). 
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The Older Persons Act is compared to the Aged Persons Act to determine 
whether any significant progress has been made in increasing the protection 
provided to older persons. 
 
3.3.4.2 Older persons and the parties responsible for their care 
 
The state plays a pivotal part in ensuring that “the necessary environment is 
created for older persons to make a meaningful contribution to the socio-
economic and political development of the country, within the context of a safe, 
secure and sustainable developmental environment”.453 
 
According to the White Paper for Social Welfare,454 the state cannot accept sole 
responsibility for meeting the basic socio-economic needs of all persons in need 
of support and civil society will have to meet some of the social service needs.  
Families are regarded as the basic unit of society and would be required to carry 
some of the responsibility of providing social support.455  Social welfare 
programmes are to be designed to enhance people’s independence,456 therefore 
state assistance is to be reserved for those unable to support themselves and 
their dependants.457 
 
                                                 
453 Department of Social Development (2002) National Report on the Status of Older Persons 
Report to the Second World Assembly on Ageing, Madrid, Spain 7 (hereafter “National Report on 
the Status of Older Persons (2002)”). 
454 GN 1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997 (hereafter “White Paper for Social Welfare (1997)”) at 
19. 
455 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 20. 
456 Department of Social Development (2001) “The Road to Social Development” 3. 
457 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 16. 
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This general approach has been reaffirmed in the White Paper for Social Welfare 
as far as the state’s duty to take care of older persons is concerned.  It states that 
every individual has the personal responsibility to provide for his or he own 
retirement and old age.  The state’s only role is to provide for the needs of 
disadvantaged, destitute and frail older persons who required 24-hour care and 
who do not have the financial resources to meet their own needs.458  Failing this, 
the family is viewed as the core of the support systems of older persons.   
 
A common law reciprocal duty to support each other exists between parents and 
children.  Therefore children have a duty to support their parents.459  The parent’s 
need and the child’s ability to support are criteria that are taken into 
consideration.460   
 
Our courts have held that a parent relying on support from a child has to prove 
indigence on the parent’s part.461  It was held in Oosthuizen v Stanley462 that 
support includes not only “food and clothing in accordance with the quality and 
condition of the person to be supported”, but also lodging and care in sickness.  It 
will depend on the circumstances of each case whether the parent is “in such a 
                                                 
458 At 71. 
459 The duty of children to support their parents is based on a sense of dutifulness which every 
child owes its parents (Voet 25 3 4 cited in Anthony v Cape Town Municipality 1967 4  SA 445 (A) 
447). 
460 Van Zyl (2005) Handbook of the South African Law of Maintenance 12. 
461 See Caldwell v Erasmus 1952 4 SA 43 (T) 50; Singh v Santam Insurance Co 1974 4 SA 196 
(D) 199 (means test as applied to a parent’s claim for support from a child is a stringent one); 
Pike v Minister of Defence 1996 3 SA 127 (CkS) 133. 
462 1938 AD 322 at 327. 
 
 
 
 
 172
state of comparative indigency or destitution that a court of law can compel a 
child to supplement the parent’s income.” 
  
According to Gihwala AJ in Smith v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd463, a 
stringent criterion of need has to be established in order to prove indigence.   
To be indigent means to be in extreme need or want whereas to be poor means 
having few things or nothing.  Accordingly, when the plaintiff pleads indigence, it 
is not sufficient to show that the plaintiff lives on very little or nothing… The 
plaintiff must prove something more.  The plaintiff should prove that there is an 
extreme need or want for the basic necessities of life.464 
 
Indigence is therefore not a synonym for “poverty”.  An older person, who lacks 
income and hence qualifies for the older person’s grant, can use the grant to 
provide for the “basic necessities of life”.  Conversely, it is possible that an older 
person could have some form of income, but that it is not sufficient to provide for 
basic necessities.  Whereas the older person in the first example may be 
considered as being “poor”, only the older person in the latter example would 
qualify as “indigent”.  The fact that the parent’s current situation should be taken 
in account, rather than the past, makes provision for deterioration in parents’ 
health and their ability to care for themselves.  As their health deteriorates, their 
basic needs increase, with the result that some older persons who previously 
would not have qualified as “indigent” may become so. 
 
                                                 
463 1998 4 SA 626 (C) 631. 
464 Smith v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1998 4 SA 626 (C) 632.  In Van Vuuren v Sam 
1972 2 SA 633 (A) 642 it was held that basic necessities are items such as food, clothing, shelter, 
medicine and care in times of illness. 
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Assuming then that it is the family’s responsibility to take care of older family 
members, should they not be able to rely on assistance from the state?  Currently 
the only statutory assistance available to families caring for older persons in the 
family home is the grant-in-aid available to an older person who is eligible for the 
older person’s grant and who requires regular attendance by another person 
owing to his or her physical or mental condition.465  This arrangement aims to 
encourage people to stay in their homes as long as possible, but whether this 
object can be met through a grant that at present only pays R240 per month466 is 
open to discussion. 
 
3.3.4.3 The Aged Persons Act 
 
The Aged Persons Act467 regulated the provision of residential care for “aged 
persons”,468 particularly in homes for the aged,469from 1967 to 2006.  
 
The Act distinguished between state-run homes and state-subsidised homes.470  
Residents of state-run homes are the sole financial responsibility of the state and 
                                                 
465 Section 12 SAA.  See above at 3.3.1.2.for the requirements for the grant-in-aid. 
466 Department of Social Development “Grant in Aid” http://www.dsd.gov.za (accessed 
20/07/2009). 
467 Act 81 of 1967 (as amended by the Aged Persons Amendments Act 100 of 1998). 
468 An “aged person” for the purposes of the Aged Persons Act was defined as a 65-year and 
older male or a female of sixty years and older.  The same definition for an “older person” is used 
in the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, s 10. The age differentiation in terms of which men and 
women qualify for the older person’s grant led to a challenge in 2005 in the Pretoria High Court.    
The outcome of this case has become moot, as the Social Assistance Act has been amended by 
the Social Assistance Amendment Act 6 of 2008 to progressively reduce the qualifying age for 
men..  See also Kruger “’Come back when you are 65, Sir.’ Discrimination in respect of access to 
social assistance for the elderly” (2006) 10 LDD 70.  No similar amendments have been made to 
the Aged Persons Act, or the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 (see 2.8 above). 
469 See above at 2.8 for the distinction between residential and domiciliary care.  A home for the 
aged was defined in the Aged Persons Act as “any institution or other place of residence 
maintained mainly for the accommodation and care of aged or debilitated persons”. 
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therefore do not qualify for any other assistance such as social grants for older 
persons.  State-subsidised homes are usually funded by non-governmental 
organisations and are as a rule not established as profit-making concerns.471  
The state has a measure of control over the management of state-subsidised 
homes, in that it regulates the registration of such homes, as well as the 
management of the homes.472 
 
Those older persons who do not qualify to be accommodated in state-run homes 
for the aged and who have no family to care for them, are forced to rely on the 
generosity of their communities and welfare organisations.  Many older persons 
therefore need to be accommodated in state-subsidised old-age homes. 
 
The original aim of the Aged Persons Act, enacted in the apartheid era, was to 
protect older white persons who were living in private boarding houses in 
unsatisfactory conditions.  The main object of the Act was therefore to provide for 
the establishment and registration of residential homes that would receive 
generous subsidies from provincial Social Development departments for 
providing safe accommodation and care of mainly white older persons.473  
According to the Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report, many organisations 
have abused this arrangement and have since changed the use of the homes 
                                                                                                                                                 
470 Section 2. 
471 Which distinguishes state-subsidised homes for the aged from retirement villages run by profit-
making organisations. 
472 Sections 2(b) and 2A Aged Persons Act; Olivier “Old age and retirement provision” in Olivier et 
al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 282. 
473 Draft response to Older Persons Bill by Joint Forum for Policy on Ageing (2005); Olivier “Old 
age and retirement provision” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 282. 
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built with government loans or sold them.474  In addition, unregistered private 
boarding homes seemed to be on the increase once more,475 indicating that the 
aims of the Aged Persons Act have not been achieved.  
 
Older persons from previously disadvantaged groups had difficulty finding 
appropriate and affordable residential care.476  The need for homes for the aged 
to reflect broadly the race composition of South Africa was addressed by section 
3C of the Act.477  Any person who unfairly discriminated directly or indirectly on 
illegal grounds against an applicant when determining eligibility for admission to a 
home, would have been guilty of an offence.478  This section therefore afforded a 
person who was refused admission to a home for the aged the opportunity to 
query the reasons for such refusal.479 
 
The Aged Persons Act stated the rules according to which homes for the aged 
had to be established and maintained.  In particular, section 3 of the Act 
prohibited the running of state-subsidised homes that had not been registered.  It 
also regulated the registration of such homes. 
                                                 
474 A condition of the loans viz. that 60% of the residents of homes built with the loans be social 
pensioners, has therefore been disregarded (Executive Summary Mothers and Fathers of the 
Nation Report (2001) paras 1.2 and 1.6). 
475 Executive Summary Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report (2001) para 1.2. 
476 Access to state run facilities that do not charge fees is limited, as there were only seven state 
run homes for the aged nationally in 2002 (National Report on the Status of Older Persons (2002) 
39).  No current statistics on the number of state run facilities are available, but in the light of the 
current policy preference for community-based care (see 3.3.4.5 and 4.2 below) it is unlikely that 
this number has increased significantly since 2002. 
477 Section 3C was added by the Aged Persons Amendment Act 100 of 1998. 
478 Section 3C(2). 
479 Section 3C(4) did not state the remedies available to an applicant who is refused admission 
and is not satisfied by the reasons given for the refusal, if a reason for refusal is not one of the 
prohibited grounds for discrimination referred to in s 3C(1). 
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In old-age homes with more than 10 aged residents, an elected management 
committee was tasked with monitoring the management of the home. 
 
Section 3B of the Act listed the main duties of the management of an old-age 
home as: 
• Facilitating interaction between the residents of the homes and their 
families, the public in general and the management committee; 
• Providing quality service to the home; 
• Providing training opportunities to the staff of the home; 
• Applying principles of sound financial management; 
• Monitoring activities at the home in order to deal speedily with any 
incidents of abuse of the residents of the home;  
• Consulting the management committee in the appointment of the staff of 
the home; 
• Establishing complaints procedures for the residents and the staff and 
persons who wish to lodge a complaint on behalf of a resident; and 
• Taking all steps that are necessary or expedient for the effective 
functioning of the home. 
 
Sections 6A to 6C of the Aged Persons Act provided for the protection of older 
persons against abuse.  Section 6A obliged dentists, medical practitioners, social 
workers or other persons who examined, attended to or dealt with an older 
person to notify the Director-General of Social Development of suspected abuse 
or injuries.480  Section 6C made provision for a national register of all notifications 
                                                 
480 Although mention is made of “any other person who … deals with” an older person, the main 
emphasis of s6A is on the obligation of persons dealing with older persons in their professional 
 
 
 
 
 177
of suspected abuse and injuries in terms of section 6A.  The abuse of older 
persons was made an offence by section 6B and any person who abused an 
older person would have been liable upon conviction to a fine or to imprisonment 
for a maximum period of five years, or both a fine and imprisonment.   A person 
providing accommodation to an older person in circumstances likely to be 
injurious to the older person’s physical or mental well-being, could have been 
issued with a summons to appear before a designated body appointed by the 
Minister of Social Development.  On a finding that the allegations against the 
person were correct, the designated body may either have prohibited the person 
from accommodating or caring for the older person in question, or from 
accommodating or caring for any older person for such period, but not exceeding 
ten, years, as  determined by the designated body.481  Although these provisions 
appeared to be adequate in preventing alleged or convicted abusers to continue 
caring for older persons, the incidences of abuse by caregivers reported in the 
Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report seemed to reflect a different reality.482 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
capacity to report suspected abuse.  For this reason s 26 of the Older Persons Act is a vast 
improvement as it creates an obligation for “any person” who suspects abuse of an older person, 
to report such suspected abuse. 
481 Section 6(10) as amended by the Aged Persons Amendment Act 100 of 1998.  See Asher and 
Olivier “Old Age” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social Security: A legal analysis 257. 
482 See e.g. the list of 28 complaints of abuse of older persons in residential homes in the 
Western Cape alone, reported to the Ministerial Committee on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-treatment of 
Older Persons – Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report (vol 2) 
http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/reports/welfare/2001/elderprov.htm (accessed 
12/10/2009). 
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3.3.4.4 Limitations of the Aged Persons Act 
 
 
The provisions of the Aged Persons Act focused only on residential care with no 
mention made of older persons staying at home and with families.  In reality the 
majority of South African older persons lived, and still live in communities, with 
their families or alone.483 
 
Older persons in population groups that by and large were not able to make use 
of residential care, either because of lack of residential homes in their area, or 
because they could not afford the available care, were excluded from the 
statutory protection afforded by the Aged Persons Act that mainly focused on 
residential care.484  Many of the old-age homes and service centres that were 
available were used and occupied largely by whites.485  Attempts to redress this 
racial disparity, such as section 3C of the Aged Persons Act, were therefore not 
sufficient. 
 
The Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report recorded a vast number of 
instances of abuse and neglect of older persons.  It seems as if abuse of older 
persons was prevalent despite the measures to combat abuse contained in the 
                                                 
483 Submission by Action on Elder Abuse South Africa in the Report of the Portfolio Committee on 
Social Development on Public Hearings on the Older Persons Bill [B68B-2003] 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20050829-older-persons%E2%80%99-bill-hearings (accessed 
10/09/2008). 
484 According to the Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report, there has been a lack of 
transformation in homes for the aged, with most homes still situated in white areas, and with only 
few black residents in these homes (Executive summary Mothers and Fathers of the Nation 
Report (2001), para 1.11).   
485 See above at 3.3.4.3 for the apartheid-era origins of the Aged Persons Act and residential 
homes for the aged. 
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Aged Persons Act, partly because a great deal of the cases of abuse reported 
occurred in the family home or at pension pay-points, placing them outside the 
scope of protection provided by the Act.  Judging by the prevalence of abuse, 
neglect and ill-treatment in residential homes,486 the Aged Persons Act was 
unable to protect residents of these homes.  This could be as a result of the 
limited sanctions against abuse in residential homes contained in the Act. 487 
 
The Committee on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-treatment of Older Persons therefore 
recommended the enactment of comprehensive new legislation on the status of 
older persons. 
 
3.3.4.5  The Older Persons Act 
 
 
3.3.4.5.1 Rights-based approach 
 
The main distinguishing factor between the Aged Persons Act and the Older 
Persons Act (OPA)488 is the rights-based approach followed by the latter.  The 
focus of the OPA is therefore on the realisation of older persons’ constitutional 
rights489 rather than the regulation and monitoring of residential homes. 
 
                                                 
486 E.g. psychological abuse in the form of restricted contact between residents and their families 
and theft of the residents’ possessions (para 1.4 and 1.10 of the Mothers and Fathers of the 
Nation Report). 
487 Executive summary Mothers and Fathers Report (2001), para 1.3. 
488 Act 13 of 2006. 
489 See 3.2 above for a list of constitutional rights applicable to older persons. 
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The OPA aims to maintain and protect the rights of all older persons.490  To 
ensure that the Act is in line with policy documents, more emphasis is placed on 
community care for older persons, departing from the prior focus on regulation of 
residential care. 
 
The preamble to the OPA reiterates the need for existing laws on older persons 
to change “in order to facilitate accessible, equitable and affordable services to 
older persons”.  This is therefore in line with the essence of what was required by 
the abovementioned policy documents such as the Mothers and Fathers of the 
Nation Report and the National Report on the Status of Older Persons.491 
 
Chapter 1 of the original Older Persons Bill492 followed on from the preamble 
which stated that it is necessary to “empower older persons to continue to live 
meaningfully and constructively in a society that recognises them as important 
sources of enrichment and expertise”, and provided for the development and 
support of inter-sectoral493 programmes for development of older persons. 
 
                                                 
490 The objects of the OPA are stated in s 2 to be to- 
“(a) maintain and promote the status, well-being, safety and security of older persons; 
(b) maintain and protect the rights of older persons; 
(c) shift the emphasis from institutional care to community-based care in order to ensure 
that an older person remains in his or her home within the community for as long as 
possible; 
(d) regulate the registration, establishment and management of services and the 
establishment and management of residential facilities for older persons; and 
(e) combat the abuse of older persons.” 
491 Report to the Second World Assembly on Ageing, Madrid, Spain (April 2002). 
492 For an overview of the six year long legislative process to finalise the new comprehensive 
legislation on older persons and the different versions of the Older Persons Bill 68-2003, see 
Malherbe “The Older Persons Act: out with the old and in with the older?” (2007) 11 LDD 53-84. 
493 S 2(1) Older Persons Bill B68-2003 allowed for consultation between the Minister of Social 
Development and any other relevant Minister in the development of such programmes. 
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As ambitious as the idea of multi-sectoral programmes for the development of 
older persons might be, in the end and in versions B 68D-2003 to B 68F-2003 of 
the Bill,  Chapter 1494 as it stood was rejected in its entirety.  Many of the   
programmes for the development of older persons reappeared in the guiding 
principles for provision of services found in section 9 of the OPA, but this appears 
to be a comparatively relegated position compared to the prominent position 
given to multi-sectoral programmes in the original Bill.  The original Chapter 1 
was replaced by provisions that state the objects of the Act, reiterate the rights-
based approach to providing for older persons495 and stipulate the guidelines for 
future proceedings, actions and decisions concerning older persons.  The 
                                                 
494 Chapter 1 of B68-2003 provided as follows: 
“Programmes for development of older persons 
2.(1) The Minister may, in consultation with any other relevant Minister- 
(a) develop programmes contemplated in subsection (2) or cause such programmes to be 
developed; and 
(b) support any person who runs programmes contemplated in subsection (2). 
(2) The programmes referred to in subsection (1) are programmes aimed at – 
(a) the recognition of the social, cultural, economic and political contribution of older persons; 
(b) the participation of older persons in decision-making processes at all levels; 
(c) the access of older persons to information, education and training; 
(d) the development of older persons in rural areas; 
(e) the protection and promotion of the rights of older persons; 
(f) the establishment of norms and standards for companies selling funeral policies and 
extending loans to older persons; 
(g) the utilisation and management of existing facilities for older persons as multi-purpose 
community centres and the development of an integrated community care and support 
system; 
(h) the provision of basic affordable accommodation for older persons; 
(i) the provision of care and services to older persons in rural areas and in disadvantaged 
communities; 
(j) the access of older persons to health, welfare and other care and support systems in 
order to enable older persons to maintain or regain their optimal level of physical, mental 
and emotional well-being and live with dignity in the community; 
(k) the establishment of a national research plan and communication network on ageing; 
(l) the creation of employment opportunities for older persons; 
(m) the establishment of recreational opportunities for older persons; 
(n) the exemption of older persons from the payment of property rates and taxes; and 
(o) the availability and accessibility of free or subsidised public transport facilities for older 
persons.”  
495 Section 4. 
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emphasis of the OPA had therefore changed from empowering older persons 
through multi-sectoral programmes to the protection of the rights of older 
persons. 
 
The constitutional rights of older persons are to be the basis of all future 
proceedings, actions and decisions concerning older persons, as can be seen 
from section 5(2).  The important guidelines in any such proceedings, actions and 
decisions are to be 
• to respect, promote, protect and fulfil older persons’ rights; 
• the best interests of the older person concerned; 
• respect for the older person’s dignity; 
• fair and equitable treatment of older persons; and 
• the protection of older persons against unfair discrimination.   
 
3.3.4.5.2 Securing an enabling and supportive environment for older persons 
 
Chapter 2 of the Act aims to ensure that older persons’ communities offer an 
enabling and supportive environment.  As a start, national norms and standards 
that will determine service levels as well as monitoring systems will be applied to 
all services provided to older persons.496  It is hoped that applying uniform 
standards nationally would ease the current disparities in services and resources 
between provinces. 
 
                                                 
496 Section 6. 
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The inclusion of a provision such as section 7, which enumerates the particular 
instances where discrimination against older persons are prohibited, underscores 
the importance of respect of rights to create a supportive environment for older 
persons.497  The difficulty with this provision does not lie in the laudable aims, but 
in the text itself, which seems rather vague and presents interpretation problems.  
It states that: 
Older persons enjoy the rights contemplated in section 9 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa and in particular may not be unfairly denied the right to- 
(a) participate in community life in any position appropriate to his or her interests and 
capabilities; 
(b) participate in inter-generational programmes; 
(c) establish and participate in structures and associations for older persons; 
(d) participate in activities that enhance his or her income-generating capacity; 
(e) live in an environment catering for his or her changing capacities; and 
(f) access opportunities that promote his or her optimal level of social, physical, mental 
and emotional well being. 
 
Assuming that the abovementioned activities and programmes that older persons 
may not be denied access to actually exist, it is unclear whether this section 
merely provides protection to older persons as a group against discrimination on 
the ground of age, or whether it supplements existing protection of individuals 
who may face discrimination on other prohibited grounds, with specific reference 
to older persons. 
 
Section 7 must be read in the context of the prohibition of discrimination in terms 
of section 9 of the Constitution (the “equality clause”), the relevant provisions of 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (“the 
Equality Act”)498 and the preamble to the OPA.499  The interpretation of section 7 
                                                 
497 Submission on Older Persons Bill by Joint Forum for Policy of Ageing (2005) 7. 
498 Act 4 of 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 184
is dealt with in more detail below500 in the context of older persons’ ability to 
access existing community activities. 
 
3.3.4.5.3 Financial awards to service providers 
 
Similar to the subsidy provision in the Aged Persons Act,501 section 8 provides for 
the provision of financial awards by the Minister of Social Development to service 
providers that provide services to older persons.  The Minister may prioritise the 
needs and services for older persons that would receive such awards, as well as 
determine the conditions under which they would receive the awards.502   
 
To qualify for financial awards, service providers will have to comply with the 
guidelines for the provision of services stated in section 9.  The guidelines aim to 
create an enabling environment for older persons by: 
(a) Recognising the social, cultural and economic contribution of older 
persons,503  for example, acknowledgment of the role of older persons 
as caregivers, particularly of AIDS orphans.504 
(b) Promoting participation of older persons in decision-making processes 
at all levels, thereby giving credit for the accumulated wisdom of older 
persons. 
                                                                                                                                                 
499 The preamble to the OPA requires the State to “create an enabling environment in which the 
rights in the Bill of Rights must be respected, protected and fulfilled”. 
500 At 6.4.1. 
501 As well as s 4 of Bill 68 of 2003. 
502 Section 8(1)(b) and (d).  The Minister of Social Development is required to prescribe the 
penalties for non-compliance with the prescribed conditions (s 8(1)(e)). 
503 Section 2(2)(a) of Bill B68 - 2003 also made reference to the “political” contribution of older 
persons.    
504 Memorandum on the Objects of the Older Persons Bill, 2003. 
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(c) Recognising that all older persons do not have similar needs and that 
inter-sectoral collaboration should be encouraged. 
(d) Ensuring access of older persons to information, training and 
education. 
(e) Promoting the development of, and basic care and services for older 
persons in rural and urban areas. 
(f) Promoting the prevention of exploitation of older persons. 505 
(g) Promoting respect for older persons and enabling them to live with 
dignity in their communities. 
(h) In keeping with the guideline above, ensuring that older persons 
receive priority in the provision of basic services. 
(i) Ensuring rehabilitation506 and the provision of assisted devices to older 
persons. 
(j) Ensuring, as far as is practicable, that services and facilities are 
accessible to older persons.  One would presume that the “services 
and facilities” referred to here are those that cater for the community at 
large and not exclusively for older persons, otherwise the phrase “as 
far as is practicable” would not make sense. 
 
In order to retain the financial awards received from the state, service providers 
are encouraged by the abovementioned guidelines to comply with the aim of the 
OPA of building an enabling environment for older persons. 
. 
                                                 
505 Particularly by money lenders and companies selling funeral policies as mentioned by name in 
B 68 - 2003. 
506 ”Rehabilitation” is defined in s 1 “a process by which an older person is enabled to reach and 
maintain his or her optimal physical, sensory, intellectual, psychiatric or social functional levels, 
and includes measures to restore functions or compensate for the loss or absence of a function, 
but excludes medical care.”  No definition of “assisted devices” is provided. 
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3.3.4.5.4 Regulation of community-based care and support services 
 
 The one significant breakthrough which distinguishes the OPA from earlier 
versions of the Older Persons Bill507 is that the call for attention to areas of care 
for older persons other than residential care finally seems to be answered by 
Chapter 3, which provides for the regulation of community-based care and 
support services for older persons. 
 
In addition to the general rights of older persons, section 10 specifies the rights of 
older persons receiving community-based care and support services, the most 
important being the right to reside at home for as long as possible.508  In addition, 
older persons are afforded the rather more vague rights to “pursue opportunities 
for the full development of their potential” and to benefit from family and 
community care and protection “in accordance with society’s system of cultural 
values.”  Although these rights are in line with prior policy statements that 
designate families and communities as the core support structures for older 
persons,509 reports such as the Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report give 
such an indictment of the large scale ill-treatment of older persons in South 
Africa, that “society’s system of cultural values” could hardly be regarded as a 
benchmark for community-based care and services. 
 
                                                 
507 B68-2003 and B 68B-2003. 
508 Section 10(a). 
509 See above at 3.3.4.2. 
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Community-based programmes are categorised in section 11 as 
• prevention and promotion programmes510 which aim to ensure that the 
older person can continue to live independently in his or her community; 
and 
• home-based care511 under which a variety of services are provided to frail 
older persons512 in order that they can receive maximum care in the 
community.513 
 
Section 11 not only creates the scope for community-based programmes to be 
developed, but also creates the likelihood that the Department of Social 
Development (or any other department) may provide support (financial or 
otherwise) to the person running such a programme.514 
 
                                                 
510 For programmes to qualify as “prevention and promotion programmes”, their objects should 
include to: empower older persons economically; create recreational opportunities for older 
persons; provide information, education and counselling, particularly recognising the role of older 
persons as carers for AIDS orphans; offer spiritual, cultural, medical, civic and social services; 
provide needy older persons with nutritionally balanced meals; promote the skills and capacity of 
older persons to earn a living; provide professional services, including care and rehabilitation to 
enable older persons to live independently; provide assistance to indigent and vulnerable older 
persons; transform existing residential facilities to serve as multi-purpose community centres; 
provide integrated community care for older persons; and inter-generational programmes (s 
11(2)(a)(i)). 
511 Defined in s 1 as “care provided or services rendered at the place where a frail older person 
resides, excluding at a residential facility, by a caregiver in order to maintain such frail older 
person’s maximum level of comfort, including care towards a dignified death.”  S 11(3) lists the 
following examples of home-based care programmes: providing hygienic and physical care for 
older persons; providing support (including professional support) to carers of frail older persons 
within the home; rehabilitation programmes; provision of “respite care”, which is defined as a 
service offered specifically to a frail older person and to a caregiver and which is aimed at the 
provision of temporary care and relief; providing information to, educating and counselling family 
members, care-givers and the community regarding ageing and associated conditions; and 
providing free health care to frail older persons. 
512 The definition of “frail older person” covers “an older person in need of 24-hour care due to a 
physical or mental condition which renders him or her incapable of caring for himself or herself” (s 
1).  This definition corresponds with the requirements for the grant-in-aid referred to above at 
3.3.1.2. 
513 These would be the services that were categorised as domiciliary care above at 2.8.   
514 Section 11(1)(b). 
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All community-based care and support services have to be registered with the 
Department of Social Development.  Rendering an unregistered community-
based care and support service is a criminal offence.515  This could therefore 
have the consequence that, for example, a pastor giving spiritual support to an 
older person without the church or the pastor being registered might be guilty of 
an offence.516  
 
Prior to discontinuing a community-based care service, the provider must inform 
the older persons that would be affected by the stoppage.  He or she must also 
take reasonable steps to ensure that older persons currently benefiting from 
services would not be prejudiced or put at risk by the stoppage.  Steps should 
also be taken to refer the older person to other persons providing similar 
services.517  
 
The Act requires that home-based caregivers must be properly trained and 
registered.518  A code of conduct for home-based caregivers will also regulate 
this industry.519 
 
                                                 
515 Sections 12 and 13. 
516 Offering spiritual services is included amongst the objects of prevention and promotion 
programmes outlined in s 11(2). 
517 Section 13(4). 
518 Section 14.  All social workers and health care providers involved in home-based care for older 
persons must also be registered (s14(2)). 
519 Section 14(3)(a).  At date of writing the code of conduct has not been issued yet. The effect of 
the code of conduct will only become clear once it is prescribed by the Minister.  It is suggested 
that it should at least provide caregivers with guidelines on the rights of older persons, the most 
important provisions of the Act and their duties in terms of the Act and its regulations.  
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3.3.4.5.5 Residential facilities 
 
Respect for the rights of older persons in residential facilities is of the utmost 
importance and the following rights are listed (in addition to the rights that older 
persons have in terms of the Bill of Rights520 and section 7521).  Older person in 
residential facilities have the right to: 
“(a) appoint a representative to act on his or her behalf; 
(b) have reasonable access to assistance and visitation; 
(c) keep and use personal possessions; 
(d) have access to basic care; 
(e) be informed about the financial status of the residential facility and 
changes in management; 
(f) participate in social, religious and community activities of his or her 
choice; 
(g) privacy; 
(h) his or her own physician if he or she can afford it; and 
(i) be given at least 30 days’ notice of a proposed transfer or discharge.”522 
 
Section 18 prohibits the operation of a residential facility unless such facility has 
been registered.523  Anyone who wishes to operate a residential facility has to 
apply to the Minister of Social Development for the registration of the facility.524  
The Minister may refuse the application, or grant conditional525 or temporary526 
authority to the applicant to operate the facility.  One month’s notice has to be 
                                                 
520 See above at 3.2. 
521 See above at 3.3.4.5.1(b). 
522 Section 16. 
523 With the exception of a private residence where an older person is looked after by a family 
members (s 18(1)(b)). 
524 Section 18(2).  
525 Section 18(3)(a). 
526 Section 18(3)(b).  Temporary registration may not continue for longer than 12 months under 
the same conditions.  Registration certificates are non-transferable (s 18(7)). 
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given before the Minister may cancel or amend the registration certificate of a 
residential facility.527   
 
The services that may be provided by residential facilities include: 
”(a) 24-hour care and support services to frail older persons and older 
 special attention; 
(b) care and supervision services to older persons who are suffering from 
dementia and related diseases; 
(c) rehabilitation services; 
(d) public education on issues of ageing, including dementia; 
(e) counselling services to residents and family members who need these 
services; 
(f) implementation and monitoring of outreach programmes; 
(g) provision of beds  for the temporary accommodation of older persons at 
risk; 
(h) respite care services; 
(i) training of volunteer caregivers to deal with frail older persons; and 
(j) sport and recreational activities.”528  
 
Section 20, dealing with the establishment of residents’ committees for residential 
facilities, is for all purposes the same as section 3B of the Aged Persons Act.529 
 
Turning to the provisions regarding admission to residential facilities, section 
21(1) and (2) is largely a restatement of section 3C of the Aged Persons Act,530 
                                                 
527 Section 18(5).  The amendment or cancellation of a registration certificate will take effect on  a 
date at least three months after the date specified in the notice in the case of permanent 
registration and one month for temporary registration (s 18(6)(b)).  Steps have to be taken to 
ensure than older persons affected by the cancellation of a residential facility’s registration or the 
voluntary closing down by the operator thereof, are accommodated in another residential facility 
or with persons who “in the opinion of a social worker, are fit and proper persons for 
accommodating the older person or older persons” (s 18(8)).  The operator must provide the 
Minister with a report on the accommodation of the older persons concerned and hand over all 
assets bought with government funds to the Department of Social Development (s 19(3)).  
Contravention of the provisions concerning registration of residential facilities will be an offence 
(ss 18(9) and 19(4). 
528 Section 17. 
529 Barring the renaming of the committee from “management” committee to “residents’ 
committee” and the exclusion of shelters from the requirement to establish a residents’ 
committee.  See above at 3.3.4.3 for an outline of the provisions of s 3B of the Aged Persons Act. 
530 See above at 3.3.4.3. 
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but with the addition of subsections prohibiting the admission of an older person 
to a facility without his or her consent.  The detailed provisions for consent 
required before admission to a residential facility found in section 21 (3) to (7) 
demonstrate a clear policy decision to protect older persons against forced 
admission to residential facilities.531 
 
The only case where an older person may be admitted into a residential facility 
without his or her consent is where his or her mental condition renders him or her 
incapable of giving his or her consent.  In such cases, the older person’s consent 
will be substituted by consent given by – 
• a person authorised to give the required consent either in terms of a court 
order or any law;532 or  
• in the absence of abovementioned authorised person, the spouse or  
partner of the older person concerned; or 
• in the absence of a spouse or partner, an adult child or sibling of the older 
person;533 or 
• the Minister of Social Development.534 
 
Where the older person is capable of understanding, he or she must be informed 
of the intended admission, even if his or her mental condition requires consent to 
be given by another person.535 
 
                                                 
531 Contravention of this section constitutes an offence (s 21(8)). 
532 Section 21(3)(a). 
533 In the order as listed (s 32(3)(b)). 
534 Consent by any of these persons may only be given after a medical practitioner has certified 
that the admission of the older person is a matter of haste to avoid the older person’s death or 
irreversible damage to his or her health (s 23(3)(c)). 
535 Section 21(5). 
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The meaning of section 21(4) is not clear.  It requires the operator of a residential 
facility to “take all reasonable steps to obtain the older person’s consent”.  Were it 
to be interpreted as referring to circumstances where another person has already 
granted consent for the admission, the older person’s consent can have no legal 
consequence, as lack of mental capacity by the older person to give such 
consent is a requirement for another person’s consent.  It is unclear why the 
operator of the residential facility should then be required to take “all reasonable 
steps” to obtain the older person’s consent.  Likewise, it is unclear what 
measures would be regarded as “reasonable steps” in attempting to obtain 
consent from a person without the mental capability to give it in the first place. 
 
An alternative interpretation could be that this subsection deals with consent by 
an older person who is in fact capable of granting consent.  As this subsection is 
surrounded with provisions dealing with consent given by other persons, this 
would be surprising, all the more so as the operator of the facility is only required 
to “take reasonable steps” to get the older person’s consent.  Would this mean 
that even though no older person may be admitted to a residential facility without 
his or her consent, once all “reasonable steps” have been taken to obtain such 
consent but to no avail, he or she can then be admitted to the facility without his 
or her consent?  It is submitted that the purpose of this section, i.e. to protect 
older persons against coerced or forced admissions to residential facilities, would 
not be served by an interpretation of section 21(4) that would dilute the 
requirement of consent in such a manner. 
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To protect the residents of residential facilities, section 22 provides for the 
monitoring of registered residential facilities.  There are two groups of persons 
tasked with monitoring residential facilities: social workers employed by the State 
who may at any time inspect facilities536; and, social workers or other persons 
designated by the Director-General who are compelled to monitor facilities if 
requested to do so by the Director-General.537  Their tasks include: 
a) visiting and monitoring a registered residential facility in order to ensure 
compliance with the Act; 
b) interviewing any older person cared for in the facility; 
c) enquiring into the well-being of the older person;538 
d) directing any person to provide him or her with any book or document 
in his or her possession relating to the residential facility; 
e) reporting to the Director-General on the outcome of the inspection; and 
f) reporting to the operator of the residential facility on the findings of the 
inspection. 
 
A compliance notice may be issued to the operator of the residential facility by 
the social workers or designated person inspecting the facility.  The compliance 
notice is issued if a provision of this Act is not complied with and remains in force 
until compliance with the relevant provision has occurred.539  Section 22 does not 
                                                 
536 Although the Human Rights Commission has expressed its concern that there might not be 
enough social workers to carry out the duties imposed by this section (para 6.8 of the Report of 
the Portfolio Committee on Social Development on Public hearings on the Older Persons Bill 
B68B-2003). 
537 They will be provided with a certificate issued by the Director-General stating their function 
i.t.o. this section.  Such certificate must be produced upon request of the manager of the 
residential facility (s 22(2)). 
538 Either with or without the assistance of a health care provider. 
539 In which case a compliance certificate will be issued. 
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spell out the effect of a compliance notice.  However, section 8 allows the 
Minister of Social Development to set conditions for receiving financial awards, 
including compliance measures.  Hence, non-compliance with a compliance 
notice may lead to the suspension or termination of financial awards to service 
providers. 
 
Another measure to monitor conditions in residential facilities is the reporting 
requirement in terms of section 23.540  Every operator of a registered residential 
facility has to report annually541 to the Minister in respect of compliance with the 
prescribed service standards and the prescribed measures to prevent and 
combat abuse of older persons.  The report also has to cover the provisions of 
the prescribed service level agreements concluded during that financial year.  
The Minister is authorised to notify an operator that fails to comply with the 
reporting duty that if the report is not submitted within 90 days after the date of 
the notice, the registration of that residential facility may be withdrawn, and to 
withdraw the registration should the operator not comply within 90 days. 
 
3.3.4.5.6 Protection against abuse and neglect 
 
The measures to protect older persons against abuse and neglect are found in 
Chapter 5 of the Act.  As is outlined below, these provisions go beyond the 
                                                 
540 Section 23.  These provisions are similar to s 6D of the Aged Persons Act. 
541 Within 60 days after the end of the financial year for that facility. 
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protection afforded by sections 6 to 6D of the Aged Persons Act542 and can 
greater definitely be regarded as an advance in the effort to protect older 
persons. 
 
The provisions of the Older Persons Bill on combating abuse of older persons 
operate in conjunction with the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act.543  
Where the Domestic Violence Act provides greater protection to older persons 
who face abuse in a domestic relationship than the OPA, the former will apply. 
 
Section 25 of the OPA provides protection to older persons in need of care and 
protection.  The various instances where an older person could be regarded as 
“in need of care and protection” are described in section 25(5) as cases where 
the older person  
“(a) has his or her income, assets or old age grant taken against his or her 
wishes or who suffers any other economic abuse; 
(b) has been removed from his or her property against his or her wishes or who 
has been unlawfully evicted from any property occupied by him or her; 
(c) has been neglected or abandoned without any visible means of support; 
(d) lives or works on the streets or begs for a living; 
(e) abuses or is addicted to a substance and without any support or treatment 
for such substance abuse or addiction; 
(f) lives in circumstances likely to cause or to be conducive to seduction, 
abduction or sexual exploitation; 
(g) lives in or is exposed to circumstances which may harm that older person 
physically or mentally; or 
(h) is in a state of physical, mental or social neglect.” 
 
                                                 
542 See 3.3.4.3 above. 
543 Section 24 states that “the provisions of this Act must not be construed as limiting, amending, 
repealing or otherwise altering any provision of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act No. 116 of 
1998), or as exempting any person from any duty or obligation imposed by that Act or prohibiting 
any person from complying with any provision of that Act.”  The Domestic Violence Act requires 
the police service or other relevant authority to intervene in cases of suspected abuse. 
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Hence the term “older person in need of care and protection” includes older 
persons who have been neglected as well as those who have been victims of 
abuse.544  Abuse is, however, regarded as more serious, and a separate 
procedure is followed in terms of section 26 in cases where suspected abuse of 
older persons takes place.545 
 
Section 25 places a the duty on certain categories of persons to report cases of 
older persons in need of care and protection.  All cases where a person who is 
involved with an older person in a professional capacity on personal observation 
concludes that the older person is in need of care and protection have to be 
reported to the Director-General.  Any other person “who is of the opinion that an 
older person is in need of care and protection” may report such opinion to a 
social worker.546 
 
All reports of older persons in need of care and protection have to be 
investigated.  Once the report has been substantiated by the investigation, there 
are a number of options open to the Director-General or social worker concerned.  
The actions that may be taken include 
• facilitating the removal of the older person in need of care and protection 
to a hospital or shelter; 
• making a report to a police official, thereby initiating the procedure in terms 
of section 27 to remove the alleged offender from the home or place 
where the older person resides; 
                                                 
544 A definition of abuse of older persons for the purposes of the Older Persons Act follows below. 
545 The meaning and consequences of “abuse” are discussed more fully below. 
546 Section 25(2). 
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• taking the required steps to ensure adequate provision for the basic needs 
and protection of the older person concerned;547 or 
• assisting an older person who has been the victim of an offence or crime 
to lay a complaint at the police.548 
 
The definition of “abuse” includes a description of abuse as well as statutory 
examples of abuse.  Abuse of an older person is described as “any conduct or 
lack of appropriate action, occurring within any relationship where there is an 
expectation of trust, which causes harm or distress or is likely to cause harm or 
distress to an older person”.549 
 
Four particular instances of abuse are highlighted in section 30, namely physical, 
sexual, psychological and economic abuse.550  The concept of “physical abuse” 
is described as “any act or threat of physical violence towards an older person”.  
The inclusion of the other types of abuse show that abuse of older persons often 
goes much further than physical harm. Any conduct that violates the sexual 
integrity of an older person constitutes “sexual abuse”.  The protection against 
psychological abuse551 is of utmost importance, as many perpetrators of this type 
of abuse do not regard their actions as abusive.  The inclusion of psychological 
                                                 
547 Appropriate steps will depend on the circumstances of each older person in need of care and 
protection. 
548 Section 25(4). 
549 Section 30(2). 
550 For the interpretation of similar provisions in the Domestic Violence Act, see Omar v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Commission for Gender Equality, 
amicus curiae) 2005 (1) SACR 359 (CC); S v Engelbrecht 2005 2 SACR 41(W). 
551 The examples of psychological abuse of older persons cited in the Act are – 
“(i) repeated insults, ridicule or name calling; 
(ii) repeated threats to cause emotional pain; and 
(iii) repeated invasion of an older person’s privacy, liberty, integrity or security.” 
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abuse in the definition of abuse makes “any pattern of degrading or humiliating 
conduct towards an older person” a punishable offence.   
 
The following actions constitute “economic abuse” of an older person in terms of 
this legislation: 
“(i) the deprivation of economic and financial resources to which an older person 
is entitled under any law; 
(ii) the unreasonable deprivation of economic and financial resources which the 
older person requires out of necessity; or 
(iii) the disposal of household effects or other property that belongs to the older 
person without the older person’s consent.”552 
 
Whenever any person553 suspects that an older person has been abused or 
suffers from an abuse-related injury, he or she must act on that suspicion and 
immediately notify the Director-General or a police official of his or her 
suspicion.554  Failure to notify the relevant persons of suspected abuse of older 
persons constitutes an offence.555 
 
Various measures may be taken as a result of the notification of suspected 
abuse, depending on which party was notified:556 
• The Director-General must investigate the suspected abuse and if the 
suspicion is substantiated by the investigation, take any one of the actions 
listed in section 25(4). 
                                                 
552 Section 30(3)(d).  This definition of economic abuse corresponds with the definition in s 1 of 
the Domestic Violence Act.   
553 This goes much wider than s 6A of the Aged Persons Act which only obliged dentists, medical 
practitioners, nurses, social workers or other persons who examine, attend to or deal with an 
older person to notify the Director-General of the suspected abuse. 
554 Section 26(1).  A person acting in good faith will not be held liable i.r.o. a subsection (1) 
notification (s 26(2)). 
555 Section 26(3). 
556 Section 26(4). 
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• On receipt of a notification, a police official may refer the case of 
suspected abuse to the Director-General, in which case the process stated 
in the previous option will be set in motion. 
• The police official is also entitled to initiate the proceedings in terms of 
section 27, if he or she is satisfied that it will be in the best interests of the 
older person that the alleged offender is removed from the home or place 
where the older person resides. 
 
The process according to which a person suspected of abusing an older person 
can be removed from the home or place where the older person resides is 
outlined in section 27.  The police official to whom suspected abuse is reported 
must issue a notice557 calling upon the alleged abuser to leave the home or place 
where the older person is staying, as well as requiring the alleged offender to 
refrain from entering the home or having contact with the older person.558  The 
alleged offender must be notified of a magistrates’ court hearing where he or she 
will have the opportunity to state reasons why the prohibition of entering the 
premises where the older person stays should not be made permanent.  The 
magistrates’ court before which the alleged offender is brought, may summarily 
inquire into the circumstances that led to the removal of the alleged abuser. After 
the investigation into the alleged abuse and having heard the alleged offender, 
the magistrates’ court may extend the ban on entering the older person’s home 
or having contact with the older person.  The court may also allow the alleged 
                                                 
557 Stating the personal details of the alleged abuser (s 27(1)(a)). 
558 The ban on contact with the older person will be in force until the court hearing specified in s 
27(1)(c). 
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offender conditional access559 to the older person or the home or place where the 
older person stays or make any other order as the court deems fit.560 
 
As for dealing with the alleged abuse itself, section 28 deals with the procedure 
for bringing the alleged abuser before the magistrates’ court.  Section 29 deals 
with the procedural aspects of the magistrates’ court enquiry into the alleged 
abuse.561  If, after the investigation, it appears to the magistrate that the alleged 
abuse did in fact occur, the magistrate may still allow the person concerned to 
accommodate and care for the older person, but under such conditions as the 
magistrate may impose, or prohibit the person from accommodating and caring 
for older persons.562 
 
Any person who abuses an older person is guilty of an offence563 and would be 
liable upon conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a maximum period of five 
years, or to both a fine and imprisonment.564   
 
The abuse of an older person in the commission of any crime or offence will be 
regarded as an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes.565  In 
                                                 
559 As long as the best interests of the older person are served (s 27(6)(b)).   
560 Contravention on such a court order or failure to comply with the subsection (1) notice by a 
police official is an offence (s 27(8)). 
561 The law relating to procedure in criminal trials in magistrates’ courts “applies with the 
necessary changes in respect of subpoenas, the calling and examination of witnesses for the 
purpose of or at the enquiry, the taking of evidence and the production of documents and other 
articles thereat, and the payment of allowances to witnesses” (s 29(4)).  The submission and 
examination of reports by social workers or health care providers and the cross-examination of 
the persons making the reports are also regulated by s 29. 
562For a maximum of 10 years (s 29(10)).   
563 Section 30(1). 
564 Section 33(b). 
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addition, the Minister is required to keep a register of persons convicted of the 
abuse of an older person.566  A person whose name appears on such a register 
will be barred from operating or being employed by any residential facility and 
from providing any community-based care or support service to an older 
person.567 
 
3.3.4.6  Conclusion 
 
The Older Persons Act may have achieved its goal as far as facilitating 
accessible, equitable and affordable care and support services to older persons, 
although the focus is still too much on residential services in respect of the 
number of sections dedicated to residential services and the detailed protection 
offered to residents of these facilities as compared with other older persons.   
 
The sections setting out how community-based care and support services for 
older persons are to be regulated in future are the most significant advance made 
by the OPA.  At last there seems to be clear correlation between policies stating 
that communities and families should shoulder more of the responsibility of taking 
care of older persons, and the legislation providing for and regulating community-
based care and support services.  More can be done, however, to bring provision 
for community-based care and support services on a par with residential 
services. 
                                                                                                                                                 
565 Section 30(4). 
566 Section 31(1).  
567 Section 31(2). 
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3.3.5 Housing for older persons not housed in residential 
facilities 
The limited room in residential facilities for older persons is one of the main 
reasons for the policy shift to community-based and family care for older 
persons.568  Housing for older persons who do not have any family who can 
accommodate them and who struggle to afford their own housing569 is therefore a 
key concern for government, particularly in the light of section 26 of the 
Constitution which guarantees everyone the right of access to adequate housing 
and requires the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right. Adequate housing for older 
persons is also important in the light of legislation that aims to ensure that older 
persons remain in their homes within the community as long as possible.570   The 
following is a brief overview of the statutory provision for housing for older 
persons.571 
 
The housing subsidy scheme that has been established to provide access to low 
income groups and indigent persons makes special provision for recipients of the 
                                                 
568 See above at 3.3.4.4 for a description of the lack of residential facilities in certain areas and 
4.2 for a discussion of government policy regarding care and support of older persons. 
569 Private retirement villages and other housing options for older persons who can afford their 
own housing and the related legislation fall outside the scope of this thesis, which focuses on 
support and care for less well-off older persons. 
570 S 1 OPA. 
571 An exhaustive analysis of statutory provisions related to housing for older persons falls outside 
the scope of this thesis, as most of the housing options for older persons do not include care and 
support services for older persons. 
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older persons grant.572  Beneficiaries of the older person’s grant are at least 
theoretically eligible for the housing subsidy.  
 
The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 ensures the proper functioning of the rental 
housing market, which is a key component of the housing sector.  The Act 
creates methods to protect tenants against unfair practices.  Although the Rental 
Housing Act makes no direct mention of older persons, it provides that the 
government must ensure that the rental housing market meets the demand for 
affordable housing for historically disadvantaged and poor persons.573  
 
The Social Housing Act574 was enacted to address the “dire need for affordable 
rental housing for low to medium income households which cannot access rental 
housing in the open market.575  Social housing is defined as 
a rental or co-operative housing option for low to medium income households at a 
level of scale and built form which requires institutionalised management and which 
is provided by social housing institutions or other delivery agents in approved projects 
in designated restructuring zones with the benefit of public funding as contemplated 
in this Act.576 
 
Government, at all three levels, and social housing institutions must prioritise the 
needs of vulnerable groups, including older persons.577  Residents are entitled to 
a clean, healthy and safe environment to afford them “the necessary dignity and 
                                                 
572 South Africa Government Information “Housing” http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/housing.htm 
(accessed on 09/07/2009). 
573 S 2(1)(a) Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999, as amended.  For instance, the Minister of Housing 
is authorised by the Act to introduce a rental subsidy housing programme (s 3(1)). 
574 Act 16 of 2008. 
575 Preamble, Social Housing Act. 
576 Section 1. 
577 Section 2(1)(a). 
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privacy”.578  Discrimination against residents on any of the grounds set out in 
section 9 of the Constitution is prohibited by section 2(1)(d). 
 
The Act defines the roles and responsibilities of national government, provincial 
government and municipalities in the provision of social housing.579  A Social 
Housing Regulatory Authority is created to which all social housing institutions 
must apply for accreditation in order to receive government subsidies.580 
 
The legislation on housing options for older persons outlined above illustrate that 
the state has given attention to legislative measures to give effect to the right of 
access to adequate housing.  The provisions of the Social Housing Act may, if 
implemented correctly, provide clean and safe housing for older persons who 
qualify for social housing.  However, many older persons need more than 
accommodation and in addition require health and social care services.  The 
legislation on care and support services, the OPA, was discussed above.581  The 
notion that older persons must live in their communities as long as possible, links 
the legislation on affordable and safe housing for older persons with the OPA, 
which inter alia regulates the care and support services provided to older persons 
in their communities. 
 
                                                 
578 Section 2(1) c). 
579 Sections 3-5. 
580 Section 13 read with s 7. 
581 At 3.3.4.5.1. 
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3.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Whilst it is clear that every individual who is in a position to do so is required to 
make provision for his or her own financial security in old age, the state has a 
major role to play in the area of retirement provision in terms of its constitutional 
duty to take reasonable measures to progressively provide access to social 
security.  Firstly, the state has to create an environment that enables individuals 
to save for their retirement582 and protects the rights and interests of fund 
members.583  More importantly, the state has the constitutional duty to provide 
access to social assistance,584 currently in the form of grants paid, to the majority 
of older persons who did not have the means to save for their old age.585 
 
Financial security in old age will unfortunately have no meaning for an older 
person who cannot take care of him- or herself or who is the victim of abuse in a 
residential home for older persons.  The state has made it clear that its duty to 
provide care applies only in the case of indigent and frail older persons who have 
no family to care for them.  According to the state, family members should form 
the core support structure in caring for older persons.  Unfortunately many older 
persons live with family members who cannot cope with the financial burden of 
caring for an older person.  In many cases, the older person supports the family 
                                                 
582 E.g. the tax concessions in terms of the Income Tax Act.  
583 E.g. the provisions of the Pension Funds Act regulating the administration of retirement funds 
and the new minimum benefit requirements.  The provision of a dispute resolution forum such as 
the Pension Fund Adjudicator is also part of the state’s role in protecting the interests of fund 
members. 
584 S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
585 The administration of and requirements for older person’s grants are regulated by the Social 
Assistance Act.  The administration of grants is currently delegated to the South African Social 
Security Agency. 
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with his or her older person’s grant.  These families are not equipped to care for 
older family members, which means that support from community organisations 
are vital in protecting older persons against neglect and in many cases, 
regrettably, abuse.  Once again, community organisations cannot lend the 
support required without some assistance from the state.586 
 
The following chapter will deal with the key issues influencing the 
interrelationship between the different role players in providing financial security 
for retirement and protecting and caring for older persons.  In particular, the focus 
will be on the difficulties faced by families and community organisations in 
providing care for older persons.  The degree to which the state can shift the 
responsibility to care for older persons to other role players will also be 
investigated.  In the context of retirement provision, the various risks involved in 
an individual saving for retirement will be investigated to establish whether the 
state is providing sufficient protection against loss of retirement savings.  Various 
problems currently experienced in the provision of state grants to older persons 
will also be examined. 
 
                                                 
586 The Older Persons Act provides for the regulation of residential facilities and the broadening of 
the scope of financial assistance to community organisations to include community-based support 
programmes and home-based care. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 3 outlined the current legal framework for retirement provision and care 
of older persons.  The focus of this chapter is on intergenerational solidarity as 
the basis of state policy on the provision of social security to older persons and 
on the steps taken by the state to promote intergenerational solidarity in South 
Africa. 
 
This chapter initially examines the development of the state’s policy approach to 
meeting older persons’ financial and care needs and, hence, the level of 
importance attached to intergenerational solidarity by the state in South Africa.   
 
The focus then moves to the older person’s grant as the primary expression of 
intergenerational solidarity in current South African law.  The legislation on, and 
measures undertaken to implement the older person’s grant are analysed to 
determine their impact on intergenerational solidarity.1  Where obstacles to 
intergenerational solidarity are identified, suggestions are offered on steps that 
can be taken to promote intergenerational solidarity in the grant system.   
 
The promotion of intergenerational solidarity is closely related to older persons’ 
right of access to social security and right to dignity.  Therefore, this chapter also 
                                     
1 Some of the issues referred to in Chapter 3 will therefore not be dealt with in great detail as they 
have no direct effect on intergenerational solidarity. 
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deals with the extent to which the current grant administration system can be 
said to respect, protect, promote and fulfil2 older persons’ right of access to social 
security.3  The grant administration system is evaluated against the state’s duty 
to progressively realise older person’s right of access to social assistance and 
the extent to which older persons are protected against actions by the state or 
other parties that arbitrarily deprive them of their grants is analysed. 
 
4.2 GOVERNMENT POLICY ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
 
A chronological overview of developments in government policy as regards the 
level of state intervention required in social security provision is provided to 
contextualise the discussion of intergenerational solidarity in this thesis.4 
 
4.2.1 Privatisation 
 
During the 1980s the trend in government policy was towards the privatisation of 
welfare provision, reflecting the view that “the state would act as a safety net only 
where individuals, communities and the private sector were unable to take on 
new roles and responsibilities”.5  This approach is in line with what is known as 
                                     
2 Section 7(2) of the Constitution, 1996. 
3 Section 27(1)(c) and (2). 
4 The late 1980s were chosen as a starting point to distinguish the policies of the National Party 
government from those of the post-apartheid government. 
5 Lund “State restructuring of welfare” (1988) 6 Transformation 25. 
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the “residual model” of social welfare which envisages minimal state intervention 
in the provision of social welfare services and social security.  According to this 
approach the family and the market are primarily responsible to meet socio-
economic needs and state social welfare should only be of a short-term nature to 
provide assistance in times of crisis.6   The reduced state responsibility for 
welfare would, according to the residual model, free resources for industrial 
investment, resulting in economic growth, development and modernisation.7 
 
4.2.2 Partnership 
 
The National Party government in power in the late 1980s regarded social 
welfare as a partnership between the state, the private business sector and 
community and religious organisations.8  The approach at that time was geared 
towards privatisation of social welfare and social security, thereby limiting state 
responsibility for these services.  An example of this aspect of the government’s 
social policy at this time was the development of old-age homes initially as 
                                     
6 See MacPherson and Midgley (1987) Comparative social policy and the Third World 116; Patel 
(1992) Restructuring social welfare: Options for South Africa 18.  Patel also criticised the 
dominant political forces during the 1980s for "tending towards emergency measures" such as 
"safety nets based on social assistance, private and voluntary solutions and piecemeal reforms" 
(at 26). 
7 MacPherson and Midgley (1987) Comparative social policy and the Third World 120.  
Supporters of the residual model, such as Xulu (2005) “In search of a new social welfare system: 
Is the Basic Income Grant an appropriate policy framework for developing societies? The South 
African case” (2005) 1 (3) Ingede Journal of African Scholarship (available at 
http://ingedej.ukzn.ac.za) agree with the view that welfare should only be available to those 
individuals who truly need help and are unable to meet their own welfare needs. 
8 Department of National Health and Population Development (1992) Points of departure in 
developing a new social welfare dispensation for the RSA 2-4. See Patel (1992) Restructuring 
Social Welfare 45; and also the Mouton Committee Report which also had cooperation between 
the State, retirement fund system, community organisations and family members to assist older 
persons as its point of departure (Mouton Committee (1992) Report of the Committee of Enquiry 
into a retirement Provision System for South Africa para 3.4). 
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accommodation and places of care for older white persons.9  Even though the 
development of old-age homes was part of concerted government action to 
improve the care offered to older white persons, the vast majority of old-age 
homes were not state-run but merely state-subsidised.  As a result the 
development and regulation of old-age homes was still in line with the 
government’s “partnership” notion. 
 
4.2.3 Change in priorities? 
 
The Mouton Committee of Investigation into a Retirement Provision System for 
South Africa in its report published in 199210 ranked its recommendation that “the 
State shall assist individuals to meet basic subsistence needs in retirement or old 
age” above the recommendation that “individuals shall have responsibility for 
providing for their needs and those of their dependent spouses in retirement, if 
they wish to have more resources in old age than can be afforded by the State”.11  
The Committee deliberately chose this order of priority as they recognised the 
inability of many individuals to make meaningful provision for their own old age.12  
                                     
9See above at 3.3.4.3.  In line with the partnership model, the community was given primary 
responsibility for the care of older persons, with the state’s only responsibility being assistance to 
communities that could not independently manage their own social welfare problems and offering 
financial assistance to welfare organisations (Department of National Health and Population 
Development (1992) Points of departure in developing a new social welfare dispensation for the 
RSA 3). 
10 Hereafter the “Mouton Committee Report”. 
11 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 3.4(b) and (c). 
12 This approach has some elements in common with the "institutional" conception of social 
welfare, which is regarded as the opposite of the residual model outlined above.  According to 
Patel (1992) Restructuring social welfare: Options for South Africa 19 the State plays an integral 
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They also stressed the importance of the State setting up measures such as tax 
laws to encourage individuals to provide for their own old age and for employers 
to create and contribute to retirement funds.13  The significance of these 
statements by the Mouton Committee was that, at least as far as provision for 
retirement income was concerned, the pitfalls of privatisation of social security, 
such as social inequalities, were highlighted.14 
 
4.2.4 White Paper for Social Welfare 
 
The social security system inherited by the post-apartheid government in 1994 
was highly advanced, but riddled with obstacles.15  The system itself was made 
up of fragmented institutions, “culminating a non-viable, inefficient welfare system 
and the entrenchment of the subordinate quality of services to the majority of the 
South African population”.16   The migrant labour system in place during 
                                                                                                             
role in social welfare provision according to the institutional approach and “state interventionism is 
seen as a necessary step in meeting needs in a modern industrial society.”  According to the 
institutional view, access to welfare should be available to everyone as a basic right (Xulu (2005) 
“In search of a new social welfare system: Is the Basic Income Grant an appropriate policy 
framework for developing societies? The South African case” (2005) 1 (3) Ingede Journal of 
African Scholarship 8).  The institutional model regards welfare as “a proper and legitimate 
system of services and provisions which caters for the population as a whole” (MacPherson and 
Midgley (1987) Comparative social policy and the Third World 117). 
13 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 3.4 (d)-(f). 
14 Echoing the criticism against privatisation of social welfare and social security by authors such 
as Patel (1992) Restructuring social welfare: Options for South Africa 47-8; Lund “State 
restructuring of welfare” (1988) 6 Transformation 32. 
15 Makino (2004) Social security policy reform in post-Apartheid South Africa – a focus on the 
Basic Income Grant 6 links the gaps in the post-apartheid social security system to the 
fragmented system in existence under apartheid as follows: “Although the end of apartheid 
brought about deracialisation of existing social security provision, nothing has changed with what 
did not exist in the first place.”  See also Seidman Makgetla (2004) Women and the economy 15 
where she states that “government efforts since 1994 have not sufficed to overcome the backlogs 
created over centuries of oppressive rule.” 
16 Liffman “Social security as a constitutional imperative” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The 
extension of social security protection in South Africa 31.  See also Olivier and Kalula “Scope of 
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apartheid had also created a disparity between the situation in the rural and 
urban areas as it required male labourers to fluctuate between the ’homelands’ 
and urban areas, and prevented women and children from joining men in the 
cities,17 thereby creating a situation of dependency which continued after the 
demise of apartheid.   
 
It was generally accepted by authors such as Patel18 that once a democratically 
elected government came into power, the state would play a greater role in social 
welfare and social security provision.  However, this was not the case and the 
initial policy direction in the first years of a democratic South Africa was a shift to 
developmental social welfare and away from cash transfers through social 
grants.19  The trend towards privatisation of social security, and particularly social 
assistance continued in the drafting of the White Paper for Social Welfare.20   The 
                                                                                                             
coverage in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social security: a legal analysis 127; Department of National 
Health and Population Development (1992) Points of Departure in Developing a New Social 
Welfare Dispensation for the RSA 19. 
17 Xulu (2005) “In search of a new social welfare system: Is the Basic Income Grant an 
appropriate policy framework for developing societies? The South African case” (2005) 1 (3) 
Ingede Journal of African Scholarship 3. 
18 Patel (1992) Restructuring social welfare: Options for South Africa. 
19 As evidenced by the change of the relevant department’s name from “Department of Welfare” 
to “Department of Social Development”.  See Makino (2004) Social security policy reform in post-
Apartheid South Africa – a focus on the Basic Income Grant 9. 
20 GN 1108 in GG 18166 of August 1997 (hereafter White Paper for Social Welfare (1997)).  
Hassim “Social justice, care and developmental welfare in South Africa: a capabilities 
perspective” (2008) 34 (2) Social Dynamics 108 describes the White Paper as a “policy document 
produced out of compromise between different interests”, which therefore “inevitably embodies 
numerous tensions that are left to particular programmes to deal with.”  She views the main 
tensions as existing between expectations of what social security programmes are capable of and 
what she describes as “neo-liberal caveats”. Principles such as affordability and sustainability of 
social security programmes would therefore have a major effect on the progressive realisation of 
social security benefits.  Structural adjustment measures such as the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) adopted by the South African government in 1996 have been 
accused of limiting “the ability of governments to effect the required ‘progressive realisation’ of 
socio-economic rights” (Majola “A response to Craig Scott: a South African perspective (1999) 1 
(4) ESR Review 7. See also Xulu (2005) “In search of a new social welfare system: Is the Basic 
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vision for social welfare as declared in the White Paper was to facilitate “the 
development of human capacity and self-reliance within a caring and enabling 
socio-economic environment”.21  These goals were to be achieved “in a 
collaborative partnership with individuals, organisations in civil society and the 
private sector in keeping with the values, goals and priorities of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme”.22  The references to “self-
reliance” and partnerships with the private market and the community in service 
delivery are both core aspects of the ‘neo-liberal’ approach.23  The requirements 
of a global economy are seen as necessitating a reduction in the state’s 
responsibility for welfare together with an increase in individual responsibility.24    
The White Paper therefore did not meet the expectation of a clear policy shift 
towards greater state involvement in social welfare and social security.25 
                                                                                                             
Income Grant an appropriate policy framework for developing societies? The South African case” 
11; Makino (2004) Social security policy reform in post-Apartheid South Africa – a focus on the 
Basic Income Grant 12.  Furthermore, Hassim “Social justice, care and developmental welfare in 
South Africa: a capabilities perspective” (2008) 34 (2) Social Dynamics 109 questions whether 
the White Paper is not coached in too neutral terms leaving the actual implementation to be 
debated at a later stage where many interested parties who had participated in the drafting of the 
White Paper would have no or little power over budgetary choices.  She also faults the White 
Paper for being too vague in its description of the precise balance between the different role-
players in welfare provisioning. 
21 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) Chap 2, para 1. See also Fraser-Moleketi speech at the 
Institute for Retirement Funds Annual Conference (1999); Makino (2004) Social security policy 
reform in post-Apartheid South Africa – a focus on the Basic Income Grant 9. 
22 Preamble, White Paper for Social Welfare (1997).  Even the White Paper on Reconstruction 
and Development (1994) lamented the high level of dependency upon social grants, stating: “It is 
unfortunately true that many communities and families depend almost entirely on the cash from 
social grants.” (Ministry of the Office of the President (1994) White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development para 3.12.3).   
23 See above at 2,3 on ‘neo-liberalism’ and its impact on social security.  
24 Xulu (2005) “In search of a new social welfare system: Is the Basic Income Grant an 
appropriate policy framework for developing societies? The South African case” 4.  
25 The references to “partnership” and “self-reliance”  in the White Paper which was drafted by the 
post-apartheid government are remarkably similar to the basic point of departure for social 
welfare of the National Party government expressed as: “The social welfare service is based on 
the partnership model and is intended specifically to support and guide individuals, families and 
communities experiencing social welfare problems and social welfare needs towards achieving 
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An indication of the impact of the focus on “partnership” created by the White 
Paper on government’s policy directions regarding older persons was given by 
Minister Fraser-Moleketi when she stated in 1999 that “the challenge that we as 
South Africans face is to very quickly, progressively and dynamically find the right 
formula to manage our ageing process at individual, family and community 
levels”.26   
Although there has been a policy shift from a purely residual model for social 
welfare provision, social policy development in South Africa, as in most other 
developing countries, “can best be described in terms of the incremental model 
which accounts for an ad hoc linear expansion of social services”.27  The 
inequalities and inefficiency created by the ad hoc expansion of services 
necessitated a comprehensive social security system. 
 
4.2.5 Resistance to expansion of social security 
 
When the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security 
for South Africa28 released its report Transforming the present – Protecting the 
future in 2002 it met unanticipated resistance from some senior Cabinet 
                                                                                                             
such a degree of independence that they can provide their own living requirements and so raise 
their quality of life.” (Department of National Health and Population Development (1992) Points of 
Departure in Developing a New Social Welfare Dispensation for the RSA 3). 
26 Fraser-Moleketi speech to the Institute for Retirement Funds Annual Conference (1999). 
27 MacPherson and Midgley (1987) Comparative social policy and the Third World 122.  The 
institutional conception of social welfare giving the state a key role in social welfare provision has 
therefore not been adopted.  Recent examples of ad hoc expansion of social assistance are the 
gradual reduction in qualifying age for the older person’s grant for men from 65 to 60 years of age 
and the inclusion of permanent residents in the citizenship requirement for the older person’s 
grant (see 3.3.1.1.1 above). 
28 The Taylor Committee, so named after the chairperson of the committee, Vivien Taylor. 
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members.  This was in reaction to the Committee’s recommendations of 
extensions of social security29 which collided with the Cabinet’s view that “only 
the disabled or sick should receive hand-outs, while able-bodied adults should 
enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work”.30  The government 
raised the unintended consequence of dependency31 on the state as a 
justification for its position.32   
 
                                     
29 The Taylor Committee’s emphasis was on short-term “income poverty” measures such as cash 
transfers through social grants, constituting a clear reversal of the “developmental” trend initiated 
by the White Paper for Social Welfare.  Measures to address “capability poverty” (health, housing 
etc.) and “asset poverty” (land, credit etc.) could be rolled out in medium-term and long-term 
programmes once income poverty has been addressed (Makino (2004) Social security policy 
reform in post-Apartheid South Africa – a focus on the Basic Income Grant 19). 
30 Government spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe as quoted by Hassim “Social justice, care and 
developmental welfare in South Africa: a capabilities perspective” (2008) 34 (2) Social Dynamics 
111 and Makino (2004) Social security policy reform in post-Apartheid South Africa – a focus on 
the Basic Income Grant 21.  According to the BIG Financing Reference Group (2004) “Breaking 
the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 19 these and similar comments made by government 
members and spokespersons were “widely interpreted in the media as suggesting a dismissive – 
or even hostile – approach to the Committee’s recommendations, especially on the BIG”. 
31 On the exact meaning of the word “dependency” see the following quote by Makino (2004) 
Social security policy reform in post-Apartheid South Africa 7, fn 5: “The debate around 
dependency is actually a little more complicated, because being dependent on social grants can 
mean at least two different things; (1) being discouraged to get out of the situation of living on 
social grants because grants recipients would lose benefits once they start earning their own 
income, and (2) being in need of social grants because of poverty or other reasons. When social 
grants are criticised as “creating dependency,” it means the former, thus criticizing a BIG as such 
simply misses the point. On the other hand, when the RDP states its policy goal is to “minimize 
the extent of dependency of the State,” it means the latter, i.e., it envisages the society where the 
number of the people who live in poverty and need social grants would be minimized, and this 
ideal itself would be shared by most supporters of a BIG. Even this usage of the word 
“dependent/dependency” however connotes rather negative views on social grants that “it is 
better to do without them”, and induces the policy shift away from the social grants provision.”  
32 Xulu (2005) “In search of a new social welfare system: Is the Basic Income Grant an 
appropriate policy framework for developing societies? The South African case” 2 and 9.  See 
also Coleman (2003) Current debates around BIG: the political and socio-economic context.  
According to Seidman Makgetla (2004) Women and the economy 19 government anti-poverty 
programmes were generally “hampered by worries about cultivating a culture of dependency” 
until the early 2000s.  The deliberate shift from passive social assistance to active social 
assistance (which encourages independent participation in community life) has found support 
from social policy experts in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands.  See Vanderborght 
(2004) Universal Income in Belgium and the Netherlands EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/4.  
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It is not clear where older persons are to fit in this over-generalised view, as all 
older persons are not “disabled or sick” and the older person’s grant is designed 
particularly for those older persons who were denied the opportunity to save for 
their retirement when they could enjoy the “rewards of work”.33  The view that 
social security should be reserved only for groups that meet the set suggested 
eligibility requirements perpetuates the distinction between the “worthy and 
unworthy” poor34 that has attracted criticism from various quarters.35  The 
significance of the “opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work” as opposed 
to state social assistance as a mechanism to meet basic or consumption needs 
should also be considered in the context of the high unemployment rate.36  The 
                                     
33 See Vanderborght (2004) Universal Income in Belgium and the Netherlands 29 where the 
rationale for a universal pension for older persons as opposed to a basic income grant for the 
whole population is set out.  See also Baltes (1996) The many faces of dependency in old age 4 
who regards dependency in old age as socially acceptable as older persons are “coping with the 
unavoidable shrinking of reserves and capacities in old age”.  This she opposes to structural 
dependency created by the social structures in societies.  The ANC itself has recognised older 
persons as a vulnerable group targeted for additional support.  See ANC National Policy 
Conference Draft Resolution on Targeted Groups (2002). 
34 See Xulu (2005) “In search of a new social welfare system: Is the Basic Income Grant an 
appropriate policy framework for developing societies? The South African case” 11 where the 
following statement is made in the context of the Basic Income Grant: “The point is to improve the 
current conditions of the poor without having to deliver a social grant to undeserving people.” 
35 Such as Patel (1992) Restructuring Social Welfare: Options for South Africa 41.  She attributes 
this attitude towards social security to the influence of “The Poor Law Tradition” with its Calvinist 
origins.  The BIG Financing Reference Group (2004) 31 criticises the view that a universal grant 
would create “dependency” amongst people who are supposed to be self-reliant, whereas 
persons who belong to certain vulnerable groups, such as older persons, are regarded as 
“deserving” poor.  They argue that as the older person’s grant is used to support whole families, 
the notion that the grant is “targeted” to only “deserving” persons, is a fiction. 
36 According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), the official unemployment rate in the 
second quarter of 2009 was 23.6% (http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications (accessed 
01/09/2009)).  This was based on the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the 
labour force.  “Unemployed” persons are “persons aged 15 to 65 who did not have a job or 
business in the seven days prior to the survey interview but had looked for work or taken steps to 
start a business in the four weeks prior to the interview and were able to take up work within two 
weeks of the interview” (Lehohla “Sound detail lies at heart of official data” StatsOnline News 
Archive  http://www.statssa.gov.za/news_archive/26January2006_1.asp (accessed 16/03/2009)).  
The high unemployment rate led the BIG Financing Reference Group to the following conclusion: 
“Given the long-term structural nature of unemployment, the majority of poor South Africans have 
little prospect of formal employment.  Indeed, poverty is deepening precisely because more and 
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emphasis on individual responsibility for welfare through paying work also 
disregards the vital contribution made by the activities of many unpaid caregivers 
and volunteers.37  It is submitted that MacPherson and Midgley38 were correct in 
arguing that an attack on social security measures that are regarded as 
‘handouts’ is justified, not for the reasons that critics of these benefits recognise, 
but because those benefits should be available as of right. 
 
Despite the aforementioned resistance to the expansion of social security by 
government, many of the Taylor Committee’s recommendations have since been 
realised. They include the creation of the South African Social Security Agency39 
and the highly anticipated new national social insurance system due to be 
implemented by 2010.40  The policy documents41 driving the reforms required to 
implement the latter reflect elements of both the institutional42 and residual 
welfare models.  The aims of the reforms of the pension system are described as 
                                                                                                             
more people are being excluded from the labour market for increasing periods of time.  In this 
context, to champion the “dignity of work” as a simple alternative [to] social grants is at best 
misguided and at worst a cruel hoax.” ((2004) “Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in 
SA 30). 
37 Vanderborght (2004) Universal Income in Belgium and the Netherlands 31; Young “New 
disciplines of work and welfare” Dissent Summer 2000 http://www.dissentmagazine.org/ 
article/?article=687 (accessed 13/07/2008). 
38 MacPherson and Midgley (1987) Comparative Social Policy and the Third World 177. 
39 I.t.o. the South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004. 
40 See State of the Nation Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (9 February 
2007) http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007 (accessed 18/09/2008) and Budget Speech 2007, 
Minister of Finance, Trevor A Manuel (14 March 2007) http://www.info.gov.za/ 
speeches/2007/07022115261001.htm (accessed 13/07/2009). 
41 Department of Social Development (2007) Reform of retirement provisions Discussion 
document (hereafter DSD discussion document (2007)); National Treasury (2004) Retirement 
fund reform: a discussion paper (hereafter National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper); National 
Treasury (2007) Social Security and Retirement Reform: Second discussion paper (hereafter 
National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper). 
42 See above at fn 12. 
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“directly attacking poverty by reducing income vulnerability while also supporting 
employment creation”.43 
 
4.2.6 Recent policy developments 
 
Since the beginning of 2007 government policy on social security has 
increasingly begun to conform to the recommendations by the Taylor Committee.  
Although the ANC policy on social development still relies on empowering people 
to take them out of poverty whilst focussing social safety nets on protecting the 
most vulnerable in society, there is a noticeable shift to more comprehensive 
social security systems.  According to the ANC the eradication of poverty 
requires “a combination of policies around a social wage, social grants, as well 
as programmes aimed at engaging people in the reconstruction of our 
communities”.44  It advised government to continue with its plans towards a 
comprehensive social security system by consolidating and constantly reviewing 
all social security measures such as the older person's grants.45 
 
The ANC still seems to be opposed to a Basic Income Grant46 and argues that a 
comprehensive social security net which includes retirement benefits, social 
grants, free education and health care, household support, food security and a 
                                     
43 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 1. 
44 ANC (2007) Social Transformation Policy discussion document 2. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Which in their opinion “would neither have the broad or deep impact on poverty eradication nor 
the broad mobilisation of resources to address diverse aspects of poverty and the well-being of 
our people” (ANC (2007) Social Transformation 3). 
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range of co-ordinated and focused benefits would be more beneficial.  It is, 
however, in favour of exploring the removal of the means test for older person’s 
grants.47 
 
Social solidarity is emphasised by the ANC as one of the building bricks of the 
envisaged comprehensive social security system.48  While the emphasis on 
social solidarity in general is encouraging, it is submitted that for the reasons 
discussed above intergenerational solidarity, in particular, deserves greater 
prominence in future social policy developments. 
 
It is suggested that even though government policy has shifted from the 
preference for privatisation during the apartheid era, it does not as yet reflect the 
state’s full obligations under the Constitution.  The state is required to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.49  Section 27(2) qualifies 
the state’s duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the right to access to social 
security by requiring the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.  
This means that the state is required to devise a “comprehensive and workable 
plan” to meet its obligations.50  The test for the reasonableness of social security 
measures is whether they have responded to the needs of particularly vulnerable 
                                     
47 Ibid. 
48 ANC (2007) Social Transformation 3 and 4. 
49 Section 7(2). 
50 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1189 para 38. 
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and marginalised people.51  It is submitted that, as far as older persons are 
concerned, it is imperative that policy and measures to realise the right of access 
to social security are for the most part based on intergenerational solidarity, as 
an expression of the willingness of the working-age generation to support older 
persons as a particularly vulnerable and marginalised group.  Even deliberations 
on the availability of resources should be informed by a commitment to 
intergenerational solidarity.52   
 
The test to determine the reasonableness of state measures to give effect to 
section 27 of the Constitution is whether the measures taken are reasonable and 
effective in their conception and implementation.53  The importance of 
intergenerational solidarity as part of social security policy was established 
above.  The next section of this chapter deals with the extent to which the state is 
giving effect to its obligations in terms of section 27 at the level of implementation 
of the principal expression of intergenerational solidarity in the current social 
security system, the older person’s grant. 
 
                                     
51 At para 44. 
52 See above at 3.2.2.3. 
53 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1189 para 42. 
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4.3 INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE OLDER PERSON’S 
GRANT 
 
The older person’s grant system is a large-scale social assistance programme, 
currently providing assistance to over two million older persons.54  It is currently 
the primary expression of intergenerational solidarity in the South African social 
security system, as (mainly) working-age taxpayers are funding grants for older 
persons.  It is also a measure taken by the state to give effect to older persons’ 
right of access to social security.  Therefore, the older person’s grant is the ideal 
measure of the link between the promotion of intergenerational solidarity and of 
older persons' social security rights. 
 
 As was stated above in chapter 3, the implementation of the right of access to 
social security is qualified by factors such as the limitation of the state’s 
obligations to “available resources”.55  The fundamental question is therefore 
whether, if the state is taking reasonable measures “within its available 
resources” to achieve the realisation of older persons’ social security rights, it 
could be justified in shifting the responsibility for providing financially for older 
persons to private sector institutions, non-governmental organisations, 
individuals and to families.  A more detailed examination of the impact of limited 
                                     
54 2,210,288 beneficiaries as at 30 September 2007 (SASSA Business Intelligence Unit “Social 
security statistical report” http://www.sassa.gov.za (accessed 09/08/2008)). 
55 Section 27(2). 
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funds for the payment of older person’s grants on intergenerational solidarity 
follows below.56  
 
Applicants for the older person’s grant currently have to comply with a means 
test.  The advantages and disadvantages of means testing in general and the 
particular means test being utilised therefore deserves further scrutiny.57  The 
section of this chapter dealing with the means test aims to determine firstly, the 
fairness of the exclusion of potential beneficiaries by the means test and 
secondly, whether the abolition of the means test would promote 
intergenerational solidarity. 
 
Measures taken by the state to give effect to the right of access to social security 
have to be reasonable and effective both in their design and in their 
implementation.58  The grant administration system has been plagued with 
instances of fraud, corruption and misadministration in the recent past.  The 
extent to which the state is complying with its constitutional obligations toward 
beneficiaries of the older person’s grant under these circumstances is examined 
below.59  It is argued that fraud, corruption and mismanagement in the delivery of 
the older person’s grant should be regarded as obstacles to intergenerational 
                                     
56 At 4.3.1. 
57 Other constitutional issues attached to the older person’s grant have been dealt with above and 
are not included in the discussion below: for instance, the statutory exclusion of non-citizens from 
social assistance (at 3.3.1.1.1) and the former differentiation in pensionable age between men 
and women.(at 2.8 and 3.3.1.1.1).  
58 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1189 para 42. 
59 At 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. 
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solidarity as they may have a negative effect on the willingness of taxpayers to 
fund the system.  Measures to combat fraud and corruption and to improve 
service delivery related to the older person’s grant are discussed both in the 
context of the promotion of intergenerational solidarity and the compliance of the 
state with its constitutional obligations. 
 
4.3.1 Limited funds for social grants 
 
4.3.1.1 Global cut-back on social spending 
 
In the current era of a global economy and competition among states, doubts 
about whether states can afford public pensions for older persons are on the 
increase.  Most countries in the world, including the developing countries, have 
or are considering moving away from public pensions toward privatising at least a 
portion of the pension system and overhauling the pension structure.60  
Unfortunately, this new global trend coincides with new needs arising, such as 
people being dependant on pensions for longer as the average life-span 
increases, as well as increasing unemployment. 
 
                                     
60 Munro (1999 “A personal view of social security arrangements for old age and the risks 
inherent therein”); National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 6 and 64; Mouton Committee 
Report (1992) 15; National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 “Social Security” 110. 
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The relatively generous level61 and scale of South Africa’s social grant for older 
persons system is unique, if not globally, definitely in the developing world.62   
The financial burden on the state to provide grants for older persons is 
enormous,63 specifically if seen in the context of the abovementioned global trend 
to less state expenditure.  
 
4.3.1.2 Factors contributing to high grant costs 
 
At first glance, the monthly grant paid is not that much, but in terms of the 
average GNP per capita,64 the social assistance grants ”compare favourably 
internationally”.65  The reason for the high grant amount to GDP ratio is twofold: 
• South Africa is a relatively poor nation; 
                                     
61 Woolard (2003) Impact of government programmes 3 finds that the old age pension (older 
person’s grant), at a level of at least more than twice (in 2003) the median per capita income for 
Africans, can be regarded as generous by international standards. The 2009 budget provides for 
a monthly maximum older person’s grant of R1 010. 
62 Woolard (2003) Impact of government programmes 11; Munro “A personal view of social 
security arrangements for old age and the risks inherent therein” (1999) 6; Africa Recovery 
“South Africa tackles social inequities” 1(2001) 4 (4) Africa Recovery United Nations (available at 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/144soafr.htm); Liebenberg “The right to 
social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) Exploring the core content of socio-
economic rights: South African and international perspectives 148; Olivier and Kalula “Scope of 
coverage” in Olivier (eds) (2003) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 127; Matisonn and Seekings 
“Welfare in Wonderland? The Politics of the Basic Income Grant in South Africa, 1996 – 2002” 
(2002) 2. The Mouton Committee Report (1992) 14 singled South Africa out as the only 
developing country in the world providing social assistance to older persons “on a significant 
scale for even those who have been unemployed for most of their working lives”. 
63 In 2002 Bhorat estimated that the social old age pension reached close to 2 million older 
individuals and the grant payments made up 63% of the Department of Social Development’s 
total transfer expenditure (Bhorat “Is a universal income grant the answer?” (2002) 26 (2) SALB 
20).  By March 2006 the number of older persons receiving grants had grown to 2,3 million 
(Department of Social Development (2009) Annual Report 2008/9 17. 
64 GNP (gross national product) per capita is a measure of “the average income of each member 
of the population, including what they may earn or receive from abroad”: RICSA “Definitions for 
RICSA’s Poverty Project” http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/ricsa/projects/publicli/poverty/pov_def.htm# 
Gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP) (accessed 02/07/2009). 
65 Woolard (2003) Impact of government programmes 3. 
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• The grants were initially limited to the white population, making it possible 
to set the level of the grant at a higher amount.66 
 
Additional expenses in delivering older person’s grants that also contribute to the 
total cost of the grant are personnel expenditure, computer costs and transport 
costs.67  These additional expenses may have a significant impact on the 
resources available to the state to provide beneficiaries with grants.  It is 
submitted that the impact of such additional expenses on the amounts available 
for grants should be carefully monitored.  The state (or in the case of the grants, 
SASSA) should not be allowed to construct its grant payment structures in such a 
way as to have a negative effect on its “available resources”.68 In the context of 
the argument that limited funds are available for the payment of the older 
person’s grant, only the actual expenditure on grants paid to beneficiaries should 
therefore be taken into account when measuring the cost of the older person’s 
grant system. 
 
An additional expenditure which has to be taken into account in determining the 
costs of social grants is the additional expenses faced by the provincial 
                                     
66 Woolard (2003) Impact of government programmes 11; BIG Financing Reference Group (2004) 
“Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 3. 
67 Lund “State social benefits in South Africa” (1993) 46 (1) ISSR 8.   
68 I.t.o. s 27(2) of the Constitution the state’s duty to provide access to social assistance is limited 
to measures that can be taken within the available resources. See Lund “State social benefits in 
South Africa” (1993) 46(1) ISSR 8. 
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departments of Social Development as a result of the litigation by aggrieved 
grant applicants. 69  
 
4.3.1.3 Impact of fiscal policy 
 
Government’s own fiscal and monetary policy determines the extent of resources 
available for the payment of grants.70 Any discussion regarding the affordability of 
social grants such as the older person’s grant has to take place in the context of 
the macro-economic policy guideline in South Africa, namely Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which has been the main post-apartheid 
fiscal policy guideline.71  The policy measures undertaken in the name of GEAR 
included “fiscal deficit reduction, liberalisation of financial controls and trade 
regime, privatisation of state enterprises, and the pursuit of ‘regulated flexibility’ 
of the labour market”.72  Of these, restraint of expenditure to reduce the fiscal 
deficit would have the greatest impact on social grants.73  According to Makino, 
“the fiscal constraints under the GEAR strategy have effectively defined the 
                                     
69 See below at 4.3.4 for more on the litigation by aggrieved grant applicants against the delays in 
and mismanagement of the grant application process by the provincial governments.   
70 Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 (1) ESR Review 7. 
71 GEAR superseded the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1996. 
72 Makino (2004) Social security policy reform in post-Apartheid South Africa – a focus on the 
Basic Income Grant 12; Bhorat “Is a universal income grant the answer?” (2002) 26 (2) SALB 19. 
73 Although GEAR recognises that cash transfers through social grants play a major role in 
poverty alleviation, especially in the rural areas (Department of Finance (1996) Growth 
Employment and Redistribution – A macroeconomic strategy 15), its emphasis remains on 
achieving high economic growth and generation of more jobs (Africa Recovery “South Africa 
tackles social inequities” (2001) 14 (4) Africa Recovery United Nations (available at 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/144soafr.htm).  
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substance of the ‘available resources’, at least in the government’s 
interpretation”.74 
 
The GEAR strategy did not at first achieve the predicted high growth and the 
consequent increases in jobs.75  Since 2003, the government has moved away 
from the restrictive fiscal environment to a more expansionary fiscal policy and 
increased social spending.76   The current fiscal policy, AsgiSA (Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa), allows for increased infrastructural 
spending and for measures to move persons from the “second economy” to the 
“first economy”. The aim of AsgiSA is to halve unemployment and poverty by 
2014.77  However, AsgiSA has been criticised for being no more than a “wish list” 
for increased growth without the detailed guidelines found in GEAR.78  More 
fundamentally, the current economic outlook is one of recession at least until 
2010, and its impact on spending in terms of AsgiSA is uncertain at this stage.79 
 
                                     
74 (2004) Social security policy reform in post-apartheid South Africa – a focus on the Basic 
Income Grant 12. 
75 Africa Recovery (2001) “South Africa tackles social inequities”; “What is Asgisa?” 
http://www.fin24.com (accessed on 07/09/2008). 
76 BIG Financing Reference (2004) “Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 4 and 
20. 
77 “Key issues – Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA)” 
http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa/asgisa.htm (accessed 07/09/2008).  
78 “What is Asgisa?” http://www.fin24.com (accessed 07/09/2008). 
79 The Minister of Finance, P Gordhan, reiterated the government’s commitment to maintain 
spending on social protection despite the reduced revenue as a result of the recession and the 
increased budget deficit in the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2009.  However, he 
emphasised that public expenditure will be scrutinised to eliminate wasteful spending in order to 
“achieve more, with less” http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2009/09102715251004.htm (accessed 
12/11/2009). 
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4.3.1.4 Suggested measures to reduce costs of grants 
 
The high costs of the grants system and how best to reduce these costs have 
been explored by various committees and task teams since the 1990s. 
 
• The Mouton Committee of Investigation into a Retirement Provision 
System for South Africa80 was in favour of retaining an old age assistance 
system and even though it was in principle in favour of abolishing the 
means test, reluctantly concluded that it should be retained in order to limit 
the cost of such assistance.81  The Committee also recommended that the 
qualifying age of men and women should be equalised at 65 as a cost-
cutting measure.82 
 
In the context of intergenerational solidarity, the most significant measure 
to address the increasing unaffordability of grants for older persons 
suggested by the Mouton Committee was the proposed “all-party 
agreement” among the different political parties on grant expenditure.  The 
aim with the proposed “all-party agreement” was twofold.  Firstly, the limits 
on how much of the state’s available resources could be spent on 
                                     
80 The Mouton Committee was appointed in 1988 to review the effectiveness of retirement 
provision system in South Africa.  See above at 3.3.2.3.1(b) fn 294. 
81 Mouton Committee Report (1992) 14. 
82 Mouton Committee Report (1992) 15.  See above at 2.8 for an overview of the legal challenge 
on the constitutionality of the age differentiation in the qualifying age for men and women for 
grants i.t.o. the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004.  The Social Assistance Amendment Act 6 of 
2008 equalises the qualifying age for men and women at 60 and not 65 as the Mouton Committee 
recommended.  It can therefore be concluded that the legislature does not regard increasing the 
qualifying age as a cost-saving option. 
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financing assistance to older persons had to be agreed upon.  In the 
second place, agreement had to be reached to keep a tight rein on 
promises regarding the levels of future benefits payable to older 
persons.83  To this author’s knowledge no such agreement was ever 
reached, with the result that the expectation that the levels of grants to 
older persons would continue to increase persists, placing  the interests of 
older persons in competition with those  of other groups making demands 
on limited state funds. 
 
• The Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security 
for South Africa (the Taylor Committee) projected that the costs of the 
grant could be reduced by utilising the income tax system rather than 
means tests.84  As a last resort to cut the costs of the grant, the Taylor 
Committee recommended that an increase in retirement age for both men 
and women to 65 be considered.85 
 
• The Second Discussion Paper of the Treasury Task Team proposed the 
introduction of a “cost effective, basic contributory social security system, 
                                     
83 It was envisaged that parties would agree that pension levels would not form part of 
electioneering (Mouton Committee Report (1992) 15; 215-218).  A similar arrangement was 
proposed by the BIG Financing Reference Group in 2004 where the establishment of a 
government/civil society forum was advocated with the object of considering the practical issues 
related to a comprehensive social security system (“Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a 
BIG in SA 5). 
84 See the BIG Financing Reference Group (2004) “Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG 
in SA for detail on the use of various tax-based financing options (such as corporate tax, income 
tax or an increase in VAT) for recouping the costs of a universal grant. 
85 In the light of the legislation aimed at the equalisation of the qualifying age for men and women 
at 60, it is unlikely that such a drastic measure to save costs on the grant system would be 
considered.  See fn 82 above. 
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to complement the redistributive social grants programmes”.86  Together 
with this proposal, serious consideration has been given to abolishing the 
means test for the older person’s grant or at least raising the thresholds 
considerably.  Abolishing or relaxing the means test for the older person’s 
grant would allow the grant to be supplemented by the pension provided 
through the national social security system.87   
 
At first glance, it does not appear as if modifying the means test can be 
regarded as a cost-saving exercise.  However, it is suggested that it is the 
fact that the older person’s grant currently stands alone in providing 
benefits to older persons with no or low income that creates the 
expectation that the grant levels increase in line with inflation.88  
Enhancing the grant (whether the means test is relaxed on done away 
with completely) with a basic social insurance type benefit would cause 
the grant to become exactly what it was intended to be: a safety net and 
minimum income for those older persons who do not qualify for other 
                                     
86 National Treasury (2007) 2nd Discussion Paper 8. 
87 National Treasury (2007) 2nd Discussion Paper 14; National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 
2007 “Social Security” 115.  See 4.3.2 for a discussion of the recommendations for the abolition 
on amendment of the means test. 
88 Support for the notion that the means test in its current form is responsible for cost increases 
can be found in the Taylor Committee Report.  In this report it is estimated that the number of 
people eligible for the older person’s grant will increase by approximately 50% by 2017.  Should 
no changes to the older person’s grant structures be made, this increase in the number of 
beneficiaries is estimated to increase the annual cost of the grant to almost R30 billion (in 2002 
terms).  The Taylor Committee Report (2002) 98 blames the inability of the current means test to 
capture lump sum benefits for this projected cost increase. 
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benefits.  Pressure to increase grant levels should consequently ease off 
in the longer term.89 
 
• The administration of the grant system is one of the major components of 
expenditure on the older person’s grant.  For this reason the Treasury 
Task Team’s Second Discussion Paper recommends the consolidated 
administration of social security benefits with the resultant advantage of 
“economies of scale in administration”.90  Another important cost-saving 
suggestion is that the employment of regional outsourcing of grant 
payments to service providers should be reconsidered in favour of more 
modern and cost-effective arrangements.91  The 2007 Budget provides for 
R4,1 billion for the administration costs of SASSA, over half of which 
projected expenditure is for independent payments service provider 
contracts.92  Such a disproportionately large expenditure on the 
outsourcing of payments clearly necessitates research on how much it 
would cost not to outsource payments.  It is submitted that the Minister of 
                                     
89 COSATU, however, offers a counterargument to those that propose that including more 
persons under social insurance would address the problem of the “unaffordable” older person’s 
grant.  They argue that this view “ignores the fact that only employed workers benefit from social 
insurance and the continuing chronic levels of poverty in our society which require greater levels 
of social assistance, not less” (COSATU “Audit of COSATU positions on Social Security, October 
2000” http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?include=docs/policy/2000/ssaudit.htm (accessed 
01/07/2009)). 
90 National Treasury (2007) 2nd Discussion Paper 16-17; National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 
2007 “Social Security” 115.  The efficiency gains from transferring responsibilities for grants to 
SASSA and strategic improvements in administrative systems are expected to decrease service 
delivery costs (Budget Review 2007 101).  See also the proposals of the BIG Financing 
Reference Group (2004) “Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 27. 
91 National Treasury (2007) 2nd Discussion Paper 17.   
92 National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 “Social Security” 104. 
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Social Development should reconsider outsourcing of grant payments if 
there is evidence that it is not the cheapest option. 
 
The proposals of the committees and task teams therefore seem to suggest that 
the following steps be taken to reduce the costs of the older person’s grant: 
• raising the qualifying age for both men and women to 65; 
• abolishing or modifying the existing means test for the older person’s grant 
and recouping the additional costs through taxes; 
• consolidating the administration of older person’s grants. 
It is unlikely that raising the qualifying age would be considered so soon after 
legislation was passed to do the opposite, that is, to equalise the qualifying age 
at 60 for men and women.  It is suggested that the feasibility of the other 
proposed cost-cutting measures be examined by investigating whether similar 
measures were successful in other countries.93 
 
4.3.1.5 Impact of high grant costs on intergenerational solidarity 
 
Social grants such as the older person’s grant are funded through taxes on a 
solidarity or pay-as-you-go basis.  This means that current revenue is utilised to 
pay current benefits and that there is therefore no direct link between 
                                     
93 See below at 7.3.3 and 7.3.6 for a description of the Chilean and Swedish systems and the 
measures undertaken in these systems to reduce administrative costs.  Cost-cutting measures 
also have to be considered carefully in the context of the failure by government to deliver in the 
field of grant administration, which has been blamed on a shortage of financial resources.  See 
De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 3. 
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beneficiaries and contributors (taxpayers).94  Any non-contributory pay-as-you-go 
system relies on a healthy tax base and therefore a strong economically active 
sector of the population.  The increase of the mortality rate of the economically 
active part of the population attributable to the HIV/AIDS pandemic is expected to 
increase the drain on the already heavily burdened tax base.  A reduction in the 
economically active part of the population95 will leave the other generations, 
namely older persons and children, increasingly vulnerable.  Any future policy 
decisions will consequently have to allow for the impact of HIV/AIDS on the tax 
base. 
 
As was stated above,96 the success of the older person’s grant system and, 
should it become an option in South Africa, a state-run national pension scheme 
is of necessity linked to macro-economic factors.  The state’s responsibility in 
terms of section 27 is limited to what it can achieve within its “available 
resources”.  The moment that economic growth slows down and unemployment 
rises, the burden on the working population increases and less money is 
available to pension schemes.  Even worse consequences of low economic 
growth are decreases in tax revenue and increases in unemployment 
compensation.  More families will need state assistance with the cost of child-
                                     
94  See above at 2.7 for the distinction between pay-as-you-go and fully funded as funding 
methods. 
95 Which is already significantly reduced as a result of the high unemployment rate. 
96 At 4.3.1.3. 
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rearing as well, all of which marginalises funding for older person’s grants or 
pension systems as a priority in total public expenditures.97 
 
With unemployment figures at their current high (and growing) level,98 South 
Africa’s ability to manage an old-age security system relying mainly on public 
funds, and therefore tax revenue, is severely curtailed.99  The government’s 
inability to collect taxes from the large number of South Africans working in the 
informal economy worsens the burden on the already limited state funds that 
have to be applied to competing interests.100  The limited resources available for 
the older person’s grant will compel the state into difficult trade-offs in the 
relationship between different generations.101  It is submitted that 
intergenerational solidarity has to be entrenched by legislation to protect the 
                                     
97 See Woolard (2003) Impact of government programmes using administrative data sets: Social 
assistance grants 3 for how the introduction and growth of child grants has limited fiscal capacity 
to increase pensions for older persons. 
98 I.t.o. the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), the official unemployment rate in the second 
quarter of 2009 was 23.6% (http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications (accessed 01/09/2009)).  Note 
that the expanded definition of unemployment which includes the so-called “discouraged 
jobseekers” may far exceed the unemployment rate quoted above.  See BIG Financing 
Reference Group (2004) “Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 10. 
99 Already in 1999, the then Minister of Welfare and Population Development, Min Fraser-
Moleketi warned that South Africa is moving “into a sphere, when social assistance, especially a 
non contributory scheme, is becoming increasingly unaffordable as dependent populations 
increase and the tax contributory labour sector demand more benefit for their contributions” and 
that alternative ways of funding social security must be found (Fraser-Moleketi Speech at the 
Institute for Retirement Funds Annual Conference (1999)). 
100 The state’s constitutional obligation i.t.o. s 27 requires at the minimum provision of basic levels 
of social security to the most vulnerable groups in South Africa which include not only older 
persons, but also people living with disabilities and HIV/AIDS, caregivers of poor children and 
people who are destitute and cannot support themselves and their dependants (Liebenberg “The 
right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) Exploring the core content 
of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 158. 
101 The manner in which other countries have handled the trade-offs between the different 
generations is one of the issues covered in the comparative overview in Chapter 7. 
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interests of older persons from being outweighed by other short-term spending 
priorities such as soccer stadiums.102 
 
The large amounts spent on the older person’s grant impact greatly on job 
creation, housing and poverty relief.  This, coupled with the high unemployment 
rate, has driven the development of the proposed national social insurance 
system.  The limited resources available for social assistance for older persons 
have created the need for the integration of the public grants system and private 
and occupational retirement provision systems.  Only in a truly integrated system 
would the state be able to continue paying minimum benefits to those older 
persons who cannot provide for their own retirement.103  The state would be in 
the position to do so as the responsibility for the provision of retirement benefits 
for all who can afford to contribute to saving for their own retirement would be 
shifted to other “pillars” of the integrated national retirement funding system.104 
 
4.3.2 Means tests for older person’s grants 
  
Means testing is “used in selective income security programs to determine 
eligibility based on the income of the prospective recipient.  The benefit is 
                                     
102 See Mail & Guardian Online 21 February 2007 “Good news in budget on tax and spending” 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-02-21-good-news-in-budget-on-tax-and-spending (accessed 
01/07/2009).   
103 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 3.5 and 3.6. 
104 See below at 4.4 and 5.8 for further discussion of the advantages of an integrated retirement 
funding system.. 
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reduced according the income level, and there is always a level at which no 
benefit is granted”.105 
 
The older person’s grant is subject to a means test106 that has been criticised as 
being unjust, ineffective and socially disruptive by reason of  
• it being practically impossible to administer efficiently, as vast manpower 
has to be employed “to make detailed evaluations of small amounts of 
income that are likely to come from a variety of sources – formal and 
informal”;107 
• discouraging applicants who dread the stigmatisation and the “degrading 
inquisitorial investigation” into their private circumstances; 108 
• the difficulty in applying the means test equitably and fairly to all.109   
                                     
105 Definition of “means test”: http://www.socialpolicy.ca/m.htm (accessed 07/02/2009).  Another 
definition given for the term means test is “an investigative process undertaken to determine 
whether or not an individual or family is eligible to receive certain types of benefits from the 
government”: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Means_test (accessed 02/07/2009). 
106 The means test for the older person’s grant is found in Annexure A of GN R898 in GG 31356 
of 22 August 2008 (hereafter GN R898).  In essence it entails a reduction of the maximum grant 
payable (multiplied by a factor of 1,3) by 50% of any income received by single persons and 25% 
of any joint income received by married applicants and their spouses.  A person whose total 
assets are worth more than 40 times the annual maximum grant (or in the case of persons in 
spousal relationships, joint assets of more than 80 times the annual maximum grant) will be 
disqualified from receiving the grant.  Only an applicant with no income and limited assets will 
receive the maximum grant.  Property owned and occupied by the applicant and his or her 
spouse is not taken into account for the means test (reg 19(3)(a)).  The means test in Annexure A 
of GN R898 corresponds closely with the previous means test in reg 12 GN R418 in GG 18771 of 
31 March 1998, the only differences being that the maximum grant was previously multiplied by a 
factor of 1,15 for unmarried persons and 1,075 for married persons and the maximum assets that 
an applicant could own before disqualification was 30 times the annual maximum grant for 
unmarried, and 60 times the annual maximum grant for married persons.  The similarity between 
the two tests means that much of the criticism leveled against the previous test may apply to the 
current test. 
107 Asher (2005) Response to the National Treasury Retirement Fund Reform discussion paper 1; 
Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier (eds) (2003) Social Security: A Legal 
Analysis 249 lists various types of income that have to be taken into account by those 
administering the means test, such as income from renting of rooms and odd jobs, as well as 
income from subsistence farming.  The cost of administering the means test has to be balance 
against the relatively small saving in expenditure by the state by applying the means test.  See 
Lund “State social benefits in South Africa” (1993) 46 ISSR 6-7. 
108 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 89. 
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• the particularly unfair disqualification of those applicants earning an 
income just over the threshold set by the test, particularly as additional 
expenses related to increased medical and care costs are not taken into 
account;110 
• the test penalising those who are honest and rewarding those that cheat 
the system;111 
• the poverty trap: accumulating any personal wealth could lead to a loss of 
the right to an older person’s grant, acting as an disincentive for low-
income earners to save for their retirement.112 Although retirement fund 
members on average receive far greater monthly benefits than recipients 
of the older person’s grant, the pension received by low-income earners 
might just serve to disqualify them from receiving the state grant.  All that 
they therefore achieved through saving for their retirement is to disqualify 
themselves from receiving the older person’s grant.113  The means test 
therefore encourages some pensioners to sell or give away their assets in 
                                                                                                             
109 Munro (1999) “A personal view of social security arrangements for old age and the risks 
inherent therein” 7. 
110 Other reasons why the means test is regarded as being inequitable are that a higher rate of 
“tax” is applied to poorer people (the means test is seen as imposing a 50% “tax” on non-grant 
income at a very low level, which is significantly higher than income tax rates) and that the means 
test does not take non-cash income into account (Asher (2005) Response to the National 
Treasury Retirement Fund Reform discussion paper 1; Munro (1999) “A personal view of social 
security arrangements for old age and the risks inherent therein” 7; National Treasury (2007) 2nd 
discussion paper) 4).  Asher and Olivier (2003) “Retirement and old age” 249 point out that older 
persons who are adequately supported by their family members but who do not reflect any cash 
income on their means test would be entitled to the grant i.t.o. the current means test. 
111 Munro (1999) “A personal view of social security arrangements for old age and the risks 
inherent therein” 7.  The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (SAA) seems to provide for sanctions 
against knowingly giving false information on the means test: s 21 provides that an elderly 
applicant who furnishes information that to his or her knowledge is untrue or misleading in any 
material respect or makes a false representation, in order that he or she or another person may 
obtain social assistance to which they are not entitled, or may obtain more social assistance than 
to which they are entitled, such as person will be guilty of an offence.  The penalties for this 
offence are imprisonment (unlikely to be utilised against an older person) and/or a fine and 
therefore do not seem to be much of a deterrent against giving false information on a means test.  
In the words of Asher and Olivier (2003) “Retirement and old age” 249, “the means test cannot be 
enforced, and unenforceable law is bad law.” 
112 Asher and Olivier (2003) “Retirement and old age” 249; Mpedi “Administration and institutional 
framework” in Olivier (eds) (2003) Social Security: A Legal Analysis 163; Van der Berg (2002) 
Issues in South African social security 32; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 3;  
National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 “Social Security” 112. 
113 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 2.3. 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
order to qualify for the grant, even though this is discouraged by 
legislation.114  This could also possibly explain the widespread conversion 
from pension funds to provident funds over the last decade, as the receipt 
of a pension is regarded as income that disqualifies the recipient from the 
state grant.  The same does not apply to lump sum benefits and therefore 
the means test “is not effective in capturing lump sum proceeds from 
retirement funds”.115  The perception exists among many poor people that 
it is better to receive a lump sum which can be spent, leaving the 
pensioner without any income, consequently enabling him or her to qualify 
in terms of the means test for the older person’s grant.   
 
As a result of the abovementioned difficulties experienced with means testing, 
benefits subjected to means testing often fail to reach the needy, particularly 
individuals whose income exceeds the threshold set by the test by a small 
margin, but who face significant medical and care costs.  Whether the application 
of a means test to the older person’s grant should be maintained is therefore an 
issue of significant interest in the debate on intergenerational solidarity. 
 
The usual argument in favour of means testing the older person’s grant is that 
“greater grants can be paid to the more needy smaller number who qualify”.116  
                                     
114 In terms of reg 19(5) of GN R898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008 efforts by applicants to 
impoverish themselves by relinquishing assets would be thwarted, as such assets will be taken 
into account for the means test, together with any assets donated by the applicant or his or her 
spouse.  However, the regulation presupposes that the Agency will gain knowledge of the 
disposal of assets and consequently, abuse of the means test may continue in cases where the 
disposal of the assets can be successfully concealed. 
115 Taylor Committee Report (2002) 98. 
116 Munro (1999) “A personal view of social security arrangements for old age and the risks 
inherent therein” 7.  The Mouton Committee also reluctantly concluded that it would be better to 
provide a higher level of assistance to fewer (but deserving) persons than to provide the lower 
level of assistance that would be affordable should assistance be made available to all (Mouton 
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The abovementioned criticisms of means testing in general and the means test 
for the older person’s grant in particular, arguably outweigh the main advantage 
of the means test, which is to target potential beneficiaries more accurately. 
 
In order to determine whether the means test could potentially be abolished, the 
text of the Bill of Rights has to be considered.  Section 27(1)(c) provides for the 
right of access to social assistance to all persons who are “unable to support 
themselves and their dependants”.  It could be argued that this provision 
supports the retention of some test to determine the level to which the applicant 
is unable to support him/herself and his or her dependants and that a universal 
older person’s grant would strictly speaking not qualify as social assistance.117  A 
universal grant would, however, still qualify as “social security” in general, for 
which section 27(1)(c) does not have a requirement of proof that applicants are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants.  Section 27(1)(c) also does 
not necessarily require a means test for social assistance, as any method of 
targeting persons “unable to support themselves and their dependants” would 
qualify.  The strictly categorical approach to social assistance currently applied, 
whereby only older persons, people with disabilities, war veterans and people 
raising children can receive benefits, already targets groups of people that are 
                                                                                                             
Committee Report (1992) 14).  See also ASSA (2005) Comment on National Treasury’s 
discussion paper on Pension Fund Reform from a social security perspective 1. 
117 Liebenberg (2002) “The right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) 
Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 
155 distinguishes between a restricted interpretation of “unable to support themselves and their 
dependants” which only includes those whose inability to provide for themselves and their 
dependents stem from their physical or mental situation, and the broader interpretation which also 
refers to persons who are unable to find employment or generate sufficient income through other 
activities.  She suggests that the broad interpretation is more appropriate in light of the high levels 
of unemployment and poverty in South Africa. 
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considered to be unable to support themselves and their dependants.  More 
fundamentally, the Bill of Rights lays down a floor, not a ceiling, of rights.  Section 
27(1)(c) requires assistance to those who cannot support themselves, but does 
not prohibit casting the net more widely.  It is therefore submitted that abolishing 
the means test for the older person’s grant would not go against section 27(1)(c) 
of the Constitution.   
 
Asher118 advocates abolishing the means test for the older person’s grant and 
recouping the cost of a universal pension to older persons by making such a 
pension taxable as well as through the savings in administration.119  His call for 
abolishing the means test is joined by other calls for a review of the relationship 
between the means test and the older person’s grant.120  The Taylor Committee 
also recommended abolishing the means test for the older person’s grant and 
recouping costs via the income tax system.121 
 
                                     
118 He counters the case made by opponents of abolishing the means test, that payments would 
be made to wealthier persons as well, by arguing that wealthier persons are already receiving 
substantial tax concessions (Asher (2005) Response to the National Treasury Retirement Fund 
Reform discussion paper 1-2). See also Asher (2003) “Retirement and old age” 249 for additional 
arguments for abolishing the means test for the older person’s grant, such as that the expenditure 
saved by the state through targeting by way of a means test is relatively small. 
119 These are the same arguments made by advocates for a basic income grant (BIG) for all 
South Africans.  See BIG Coalition (2001) quoted in Makino (2004) Social security policy reform 
in post Apartheid South Africa 8 where it is argued that a universal grant “would diminish the 
administrative burden and opportunities for corruption that are often associated with means 
tested grants”.  See also Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier (eds) (2003) Social 
Security: A Legal Analysis 249. 
120 See National Treasury (2004) Retirement fund reform: a discussion paper (hereafter National 
Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper) 17.  Although the Mouton Committee was, in principle, in 
favour of abolishing the means testing of old age grants, they concluded that it was not possible 
(at that stage) due to the cost implications and they therefore recommended that the means test 
be amended (Mouton Committee Report (1992) 14). 
121 Depending on whether the Committee’s other recommendations, e.g. greater taxation of lump 
sum retirement benefits, are followed (Taylor Committee Report (2002) 98).  
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The Treasury Task Team initially merely recommended an amended means 
test122 allowing more low-income earners to receive a retirement benefit in 
addition to the grant.  The suggested amended means test offers a solution 
midway between calls to abolish the means test123 and the perceived threat to 
the financial viability of the grant system should the means test be abolished. 
 
The second discussion paper by the Treasury recommended removing the 
means test for the older person’s grant or at least amending it by shifting the 
threshold amounts out, thereby enabling poorer beneficiaries of retirement 
benefits to receive the grant.124 
 
One of the recommendations by the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) 
was to abolish the means test and to reduce the tax rebate given to older 
persons by the amount of the grant to recoup the costs of doing away with the 
means test.  As a result, higher income pensioners will lose the rebate, but gain 
access to the grant.  Lower income pensioners will now have access to the grant 
without having to provide information for the means test, thereby avoiding the 
associated stigmatisation.  ASSA proposes that this arrangement will even have 
                                     
122 A reduction of the grant by R0,50 for each R1 of income earned over R10 000 per year 
(National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 31. 
123 Advocates for abolishing the means test, such as Munro, are convinced that merely amending 
and simplifying the means test is doomed to failure (Munro (1999) “A personal view of social 
security arrangements for old age and the risks inherent therein” 7). 
124 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 3 and 14.  The cost of shifting the threshold of 
the means test out is estimated at about R4 billion a year (National Treasury (2007) Budget 
Review 2007 “Social Security” 115). 
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advantages for the state in the reduction of administrative costs and decreased 
losses through fraud.125 
 
In conclusion, there are two opposing arguments at play in the decision whether 
to continue with, amend, or abolish the means test for the older person’s grant: 
on the one hand it is argued that the limited financial resources available for the 
payment of the older person’s grant126 necessitates persistence with the means 
test, whereas the quest to exclude as few older persons as possible from the 
financial protection afforded by the older person’s grant demands the abolition or 
amendment of the means test.  However, the argument that the limited funds 
available for social grants necessitate a means test does not take the possibility 
raised above that the “loss” resulting from the abolition of the means test can be 
recovered through taxation and/or savings in administration costs into account. 
 
It is also submitted that the abolition of a means test for the older person’s grant 
makes sense in the context of intergenerational solidarity.  In terms of 
intergenerational solidarity benefits are payable to older persons to pay the dues 
for the contributions made by the older generation for the working age 
generation’s wellbeing when they were children and the older generation the 
taxpayers and caregivers.  To impose a means test for the older person’s  grant, 
                                     
125 ASSA (2005) Comment of National Treasury’s discussion paper on Pension Fund Reform 
from a social security perspective 3.  The BIG Financing Reference Group (2004) “Breaking the 
Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 27 also proposes that a universal grant has the advantage 
of doing away with the need for the costly (and potentially corrupt) bureaucracy that has to 
administer the means test. 
126 Discussed above at 4.3.1. 
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would be tantamount to taking the contribution of relatively more well-off persons 
of the older generation for granted and would hence be contrary to the notion of 
intergenerational solidarity. 
 
4.3.3 Fraud, corruption and bribery in application for and payment of older 
person’s grant 
 
The losses incurred by the Department of Social Development as a result of 
grant fraud are estimated at R1.5 billion per annum,127 and in the past have led to 
delivery failures in the grants systems of some provinces.128  The impact of fraud 
and corruption on the grants administration is an example of a problem that 
affects both the state’s ability to comply with its constitutional obligations in terms 
of section 27 of the Constitution and intergenerational solidarity.  The expenditure 
on grants is budgeted for on an annual basis and as a result, the money lost due 
to fraud and corruption linked to grants may mean that there is less money to be 
spent on the intended beneficiaries, thereby infringing their right of access to 
social security.  The alternative is that the state has to budget for additional 
fraud-related expenditure which leads to an increase in grant costs.129  
 
                                     
127 PMG “Social grants anti-fraud campaign: Special Investigation Unit briefing” (30 August 2006) 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060829-social-grants-anti-fraud-campaign-special-
investigation-unit-briefing (accessed 12/04/2009). . In Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1197, para 15 
the monthly cost of unentitled beneficiaries was estimated to be R65 million. See also at 1194 
para 7. 
128The budgetary constraints caused by high levels of fraud and corruption caused the MEC for 
Welfare in the Eastern Cape to order the cessation of payments of backlogs in 1997 (circular 
dated 26 September 1997, quoted in Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525 (W) 528.  See below at 4.3.4.2.  
129 The impact of high grant costs on intergenerational solidarity was discussed above at 4.3.1. 
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As far as the effect of fraud, corruption and bribery on intergenerational solidarity 
is concerned, reports of grants being paid to persons other than legitimate and 
needy beneficiaries do serious damage to the solidarity by tax payers that the 
grant system depends upon.130  The following paragraphs highlight instances of 
fraud, corruption and bribery in the grant administration system and evaluate the 
measures taken to combat fraud and corruption in the light of the constitutional 
obligation of the state to ensure progressive realisation of the right of access to 
social security. 
 
4.3.3.1 Instances of fraud, corruption and bribery 
 
Three types of fraudulent behaviour occur during the application process: 
• Applicants knowingly provide false information during the application 
procedure in order to receive grants. 
• Applicants who are not entitled to grants bribe officials to assist them in 
receiving grants. 
• Corrupt officials assist applicants (and sometimes themselves) to obtain 
grants that they are not entitled to. 
 
Fraud by applicants for the grant takes place mainly through false information 
provided regarding the applicant’s income and assets, or, in the case of non-
citizens, false South African identity documents.  Instances of applicants younger 
than the qualifying ages of 60 and 65 for women and men respectively providing 
                                     
130 See 2.3 above where it is explained that intergenerational solidarity implies that the older 
generation benefiting from solidarity would not make unnecessary (or in this context fraudulent) 
claims that will burden the solidarity-based system. 
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falsified proof of age have also been reported.131  In terms of the Social 
Assistance Act (SAA), it constitutes a criminal offence to knowingly provide  
information which is untrue or misleading in any material respect or to make a 
false representation in order to receive a grant to which one is not entitled to or to 
receive or to receive more social assistance than one is entitled to.132   As was 
stated above,133 the penalties attached to conviction for this particular statutory 
criminal offence do not serve as a sufficient deterrent to making fraudulent  
applications.  A far more successful deterrent is the requirement that all grant 
money that is paid to a beneficiary who is not entitled to the grant should be 
repaid.134 
 
Less than accurate targeting of recipients of these grants could be one of the 
reasons for the abuse of the grant, for example where older persons who do not 
qualify in terms of the means test still manage to get a grant.  According to the 
Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report, the independent administration of 
social grants by the “homelands” before 1993 meant that the means test for the 
old age pension135 was not applied consistently.  For instance, in the Transkei 
the old age pension was seen as a measure to assist desperate people living in 
                                     
131 Department of Social Development press release “Forty government officials to appear in 
court for defrauding the social grant system” www.info.gov.za/ 
speeches/2005/05110210451002.htm (accessed 16/08/2009). 
132 Section 21(1). 
133 See fn 111 above. 
134 Section 17 SAA 13 of 2004 (see above at 3.3.1.1.5) See 4.3.3.2.4 for successes in recovering 
grant money fraudulently obtained. 
135 The older person’s grant was previously called the state old age pension. 
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poverty and no means test was administered.136    “Fraudulent” beneficiaries 
were therefore tolerated because of poverty.  When the “homelands” were 
dissolved and their grants administration was incorporated in the national 
system, many older persons found themselves in the situation that they were 
receiving grants that they were not entitled to.  Their grants were subsequently 
cancelled without any poverty-relief actions to counter the impact of the stoppage 
of the grant. 137 
 
Strong attention has been drawn in the media to the vast numbers of corrupt 
officials that have defrauded the grant system for their own financial gain.138   It 
has been reported that some beneficiaries in the Eastern Cape were also 
registered on the Government Employees Pension Fund, indicating that they 
were government employees but still receiving grants.139  
 
4.3.3.2 Measures to combat fraud and corruption 
 
The Department of Social Development has shown a strong commitment to 
combatting the problem of fraud and corruption in the grant administration 
                                     
136 Mothers and Fathers of the Nation: the Forgotten People (2001) 
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/reports/welfare/2001/elder.html?rebookmark=1 (accessed 
23/06/2008). 
137 See below at 4.3.4 for a detailed discussion on the mismanagement of grants. 
138 “Grant fraud: 34 arrests” Citizen News 24 January 2007 http://www.citizen.co.za (accessed 
17/08/2009); “19 officials nabbed on fraud, theft charges” Dispatch Online 11 April 2003 
http:/www.dispatch.co.za/2003/04/11/easterncape/FRAUD.HTM (accessed on 17/08/2009). 
139 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 29. 
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system140 and has taken the following steps as part of a national Anti-Fraud 
Campaign: 
 
4.3.3.2.1 Amnesty process 
 
The amnesty process was initiated to enable those who were guilty of defrauding 
the grants system and corrupt grant officials to give themselves up in return for 
amnesty from prosecution.141  The process was coupled with a public awareness 
campaign and an anti-fraud hotline. 
 
4.3.3.2.2 The role of the Social Security Agency in combatting fraud and 
corruption 
 
The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)142 was created in part to 
administer grants as an independent agency which could distance itself from the 
fraud and corruption perpetrated in and against the Department of Social 
                                     
140 Minister Skweyiya expressed the commitment of the Department of Social Development to 
root out corruption and irregularities in the social grant system and to take action against 
“unscrupulous operators targeting benefits meant for the poor” (DSD press release “Forty 
government officials to appear in court for defrauding the social grant system” 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05110210451002.htm (accessed 16/08/2009)). 
141 “Come clean or face drastic action, Bisho warns grant fraudsters” The Herald 30 March 2005 
http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/03/30 (accessed 16/08/2009). 
142 Created in terms of the South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004 (SASSA Act), but 
most of its tasks are outlined in the SAA. 
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Development.143  SASSA is armed with an Inspectorate to ensure that fraud and 
corruption is eliminated.144  The role of the Inspectorate is to 
• conduct investigations into social assistance frameworks and systems; 
• execute internal financial audits and audits on SASSA to determine 
whether it complies with regulatory and policy measures and instruments; 
• investigate incidences of fraud, corruption and mismanagement by 
SASSA; and 
• take necessary steps to combat the abuse of social assistance.145 
  
The Inspectorate is able to identify fraud and corruption either through the 
investigations conducted, or in the course of the internal audits of SASSA. 146 
 
4.3.3.2.3 Provision of accurate data pertaining to applicants 
 
SASSA is dependant on reliable data from other government departments, for 
example accurate identity numbers from the Department of Home Affairs, in 
order to ensure that grants are awarded to the correct beneficiaries. In terms of 
section 22 of the SAA, SASSA is entitled to obtain information on grant 
applicants or beneficiaries from any organ of state or financial institution.  The 
database of the national electronic and information system, SOCPEN,147 is 
                                     
143 SASSA does not report to the national Department of Social Development, but rather to the 
Minister of Social Development directly (PMG Minutes of the Social Development Portfolio 
Committee of 16 August 2006 http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed 10/09/2008). 
144 Section 4(1)(c) SASSA Act provides for a “compliance and fraud mechanism” such as the 
Inspectorate to maintain the integrity of the social security system. S 3(c) of the SAA lists the 
creation of the Inspectorate as one of the main aims with the legislation.  
145 Section 27(1) SAA. 
146 Ibid. 
147 SOCPEN stands for Social Pension System (PMG (2002) “Auditor-General’s Report on 
provincial social grants: Department Response” http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20020213-auditor-
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checked against the population register on a monthly basis.148 However, the 
accuracy of the data still depends on whether provinces report deaths timeously 
to the national register.149  It is therefore possible that delays in the reports of 
deaths can occur, enabling fraudulent withdrawal of the grant until it officially 
lapses.  The current lack of integrity of the data received from other departments 
can be linked to many of the cases of grant fraud and SASSA is at present in the 
process of cleaning up unreliable data.150  However, stand-alone data correction 
on the side of SASSA and the Department of Social Development would not 
prove to be adequate and will require improvements to the information systems 
of the Department of Home Affairs as well.  Some provinces have reported 
significant reductions in the numbers of cases of social grant frauds through 
continuous data clean-up.151 
 
                                                                                                             
general%E2%80%99s-report-provinicial-department-social-grants-departm (accessed 
02/07/2009).  The Transvaal Provincial Administration developed and implemented the SOCPEN 
system in 1987.  In 1994 the process to amalgamate all provincial payment systems was initiated 
and in 1996 SOCPEN 5 became the national system on which beneficiaries’ details are stored 
(PMG “Cash Paymaster Services Presentation” (2001) http://www.pmg.org.za/ 
docs/appendices/010830CPM.htm (accessed 01/07/2009); Ngxuza and others v Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (12) BCLR 1322 (E) 1324). 
148 See Maluleke v The Northern Province Member of the Executive Council for Health and 
Welfare [1999] 4 All SA 407 (T) where the SOCPEN 5 data check in December 1997 uncovered 
some 94 806 potentially illegal grant beneficiaries in the Northern Province.  See also Ngxuza 
and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 2000 (12) 
BCLR 1322 (E) 1324 where the amalgamation of the different databases into SOCPEN 5 
revealed a number of incorrect records, duplication of  payments and ineligible beneficiaries. 
149 PMG Minutes of the Social Development Portfolio Committee on 30 August 2006 
http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed 10/09/2008); Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: litigation 
and the crisis in the administration of social grants in the Eastern Cape 29. 
150 PMG Minutes of the Social Development Portfolio Committee of 30 August 2006 
http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed 10/09/2008). 
151 See e.g. Speech by Premier of the Northern Cape Province – http://www.northern-cape.gov.za 
(accessed 06/12/2007).  
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4.3.3.2.4 The Special Investigation Unit 
 
The Special Investigation Unit (SIU) is an independent body sub-contracted by 
the Department of Social Development to investigate corruption and incidents of 
maladministration.  The President referred the investigation to the SIU by 
Proclamation R18 of 2005 on 6 April 2005 with the brief to investigate corrupt 
government officials responsible for the administration and payment of grants, as 
well as beneficiaries of social grants unlawfully receiving benefits.  This 
investigation formed part of the broader Anti-Fraud campaign of the Department 
of Social Development. 
 
The SIU acts similarly to a commission of inquiry and its team of forensic 
investigators, lawyers, accountants and analysts conducted multidisciplinary 
forensic investigations into matters referred to it.152  It has the power to institute 
civil legal action to recover illegal benefits, prepare disciplinary hearings of public 
officials and although its members have no power of arrest, they work closely 
with the SAPS and the National Prosecuting Authority to secure arrests and 
criminal convictions when they uncover evidence of a crime.153  The cooperation 
between the Department of Social Development (DSD) and the SIU has 
enhanced the department’s capacity to fight corruption.  Although the SIU 
requires constant cooperation from other departments and agencies, for example 
                                     
152 SIU presentation to the Social Development Portfolio Committee (30 August 2006) on Social 
Grant Investigation http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060829-social-grants-anti-fraud-campaign-
special-investigation-unit-briefing (accessed 12/04/2009). 
153 PMG Minutes of the Social Development Portfolio Committee of 30 August 2006 
www.pmg.org.za (accessed 10/09/2008). 
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the DSD providing it with access to its databases, it remains an independent and 
objective agency. 
 
The following is a summary of the key objectives of the SIU investigation as well 
as its achievements:154 
 
The initial focus of the investigation was to identify and remove illegal grant 
beneficiaries, starting with public servants.155  One of the key aims of the 
investigation was to deter fraud through prosecutions, which has led to the 
voluntary lapsing of grants that were fraudulently obtained, indicating some 
success with deterrence.156  The investigation identified certain systemic gaps in 
the grants administration that have enabled irregular beneficiaries to receive 
grants, for example inadequate system checks in registration and non-
compliance with standard operating procedures.157  846 prosecutions of public 
servants who were charged with fraud or receiving benefits, to which they were 
not entitled, resulting from misrepresentation about their income or employment 
status or failure to disclose change in their financial circumstances, were finalised 
                                     
154 See SIU presentation to the Social Development Portfolio Committee (30 August 2006) on 
Social Grant Investigation http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060829-social-grants-anti-fraud-
campaign-special-investigation-unit-briefing (accessed 12/04/2009). 
155 Of the 43 705 public servants identified on the SocPen database, 21588 were found to be 
irregular beneficiaries (SIU presentation http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060829-social-grants-
anti-fraud-campaign-special-investigation-unit-briefing (accessed 12/04/2009)). 
156 See e.g. press release by Department of Social Development 1 November 2005 “Forty 
government officials to appear in court for defrauding the social grant system” 
http://ww.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05110210451002.htm (accessed 16/08/2009) where it was 
reported that in KwaZulu-Natal many of the officials involved had voluntarily cancelled their grant 
claims since the implementation of the investigations. 
157 SASSA has been addressing these systemic gaps (see SIU presentation 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060829-social-grants-anti-fraud-campaign-special-nvestigation-
unit-briefing (accessed 12/04/2009)). 
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with a 91% success rate.  In addition, the public officials who received irregular 
benefits have been referred to their own departments for disciplinary processes.  
The SIU has taken steps to recover illegal benefits from those who are willing to 
start repaying.158  The aim of the recovery process has been to take the profit out 
of defrauding the system.159 
  
4.3.3.3 Evaluation of measures to combat fraud 
 
As was stated above, the solidarity by tax payers with legitimate and needy grant 
beneficiaries which underpins the grant system presupposes measures to ensure 
that other persons do not unlawfully benefit from the system.  On the whole, the 
measures to combat fraud in the grants system can be regarded as a positive 
step towards maintaining the integrity of the system and saving money for 
expenditure on legitimate beneficiaries.  However, it is submitted that some 
aspects of the campaign against grant fraud still require some attention.  
 
An evaluation of the success of the anti-fraud campaign has to take into account 
that some of the instances of fraud against the grant system are committed by 
desperate people.  In order for the measures to combat fraud to be successful in 
                                     
158 In most cases the person convicted of unlawfully benefiting from the grants system (debtor) is 
required to sign an acknowledgement of debt stating the amount and repayment period that the 
debtor is willing to pay and can afford.  
159  Department of Social Development 1 November 2005 “Forty government officials to appear in 
court for defrauding the social grant system” http://www.info.gov.za/ 
speeches/2005/05110210451002.htm (accessed 16/08/2009). 
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the long term, they cannot be implemented in isolation without addressing the 
reasons why people attempt to receive grants that they are not entitled to.   
 
The anti-fraud campaign has shown significant short-term successes such as 
identifying and prosecuting fraudulent applicants, beneficiaries and officials.160  
Once the anti-fraud campaign and investigations have run their course, 
measures will have to be implemented to deter fraudulent behaviour on a 
continuous basis. 
 
SASSA must take care that efforts to clear up irregular beneficiaries are not 
regressive and consequently contrary to the requirement of progressive 
realisation of the right to social assistance contained in section 27(2) of the 
Constitution.161  An example of measures that should be avoided is the 1996 re-
registration of grant beneficiaries that led to many older persons, who were in 
fact entitled to benefits, losing them due to errors during the re-registration  
process.162 
                                     
160 According to the Social Cluster 2 Media Briefing, Parliament, Cape Town, 15 February 2007, 
more than 200 000 grants held by non-public servants have been cancelled or have lapsed 
through non-collection since the investigation commenced.  Roughly 6 000 public servants have 
started to repay the R 5 million they owe. In addition, 2000 public servants are facing disciplinary 
action by their departments (http://www.welfare.gov.za/media/2007/cluster.htm (accessed 
06/12/2007)). 
161 Liebenberg “The right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) 
Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 
158. 
162 The exclusion of beneficiaries as a result of the re-registration process has been one of the 
main causes of the litigation regarding social grants against provincial governments.  See below 
at 4.3.4 under “Mismanagement of social grants”.  See also Bacela v MEC of Welfare (Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525 for the adverse consequences to older persons 
grant beneficiaries when a blanket cessation of arrear payments once the cancelled grants are 
reinstated, is declared. 
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4.3.4 Mismanagement of social grants 
 
4.3.4.1 Introduction  
 
Older person’s grants are tax-funded and can be seen as one of the clearest 
expressions of intergenerational solidarity currently to be found in South Africa.  
Working-age tax-payers are prepared to fund the grant system, of course with 
the understanding that similar benefits would be available to them, should they 
qualify, when they reach retirement age.163  Pieters’ definition of social security 
as “the body of arrangements shaping solidarity with people facing a lack of 
earnings or particular costs”164 links the grant administration system (as the 
appropriate ‘body of arrangements’) with the degree of solidarity shared with 
grant beneficiaries.  Grant officials act as an administrative conduit in promoting 
intergenerational solidarity.  Mismanagement of grants can therefore lead to 
mistrust of the grant system, thereby undermining intergenerational solidarity. 
 
The object of any reform of the management of state grants for older persons is 
to discover the balance between the needs and constitutional rights of the elderly 
population and the capacity of the administration to deliver the constitutionally 
mandated services to the beneficiaries of the system.  The leading problem with 
the administration of grants for older persons may not necessarily be fraud and 
corruption or ill-treatment of older persons by grant officials.165 In many cases 
                                     
163 See above at 1.2 and 2.3 for detailed descriptions of intergenerational solidarity. 
164 Pieters (1993) Introduction into the basic principles of social security 2. 
165 As discussed above at 4.3.3. 
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mere inefficiency and mismanagement can be equally damaging,166 and 
unfortunately the grants delivery system in South Africa is fraught with 
administrative problems.167 
   
Section 27(2) of the Constitution requires the state to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures to ensure the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
social security.  It was held in the Grootboom case that the reasonableness of 
measures to progressively realise socio-economic rights is not assessed merely 
on the design of the measures, but also on the implementation.168  Changes to 
the administration of grants are therefore required to deal with mismanagement 
and bring the grants system in line with constitutional requirements.   
 
State systems such as the social grant system experience the disadvantage 
caused by the scale and complexity of the administration of such systems.  Some 
instances of administrative errors are therefore to be expected.169  However, it is 
the nature and level of legislative and administrative steps taken to remedy such 
                                     
166 E.g. the Transkei pensioners who were dropped from the provincial welfare roles in 2000.  
Africa Recovery (2001) “South Africa tackles social inequities” 14 (4) Africa Recovery United 
Nations (available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/144soafr.htm)  . 
167 Liebenberg “The right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) 
Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 
153. 
168 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 1172. 
169 According to the Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report, there were a number of instances 
recorded where provinces paid grants to beneficiaries not qualifying for a grant (e.g. the payment 
of grants without subjecting them to a means test in the Transkei).  In these instances neither the 
grant beneficiaries nor the officials involved in processing the application or paying the benefit 
had the intention to defraud the grant system.  The erroneous grant payments were due mainly to 
mismanagement and uninformed decisions by grant officials.  See Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and another v Ngxuza and others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 
1194 para 7, where erroneous payments were ascribed to inaccurate claimant records caused by 
the fragmented system in existence before 1994 which tasked six different administrations with 
the responsibility for social grants. 
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errors that distinguishes an inefficient grants system from one that can meet its 
constitutional obligations.  
4.3.4.2 Unlawful suspension of grants 
 
As was stated above in the context of measures to eliminate grant fraud, the 
government’s methods in dealing with “ghost beneficiaries” and other persons 
receiving grants that they do not qualify for seem to contribute to the woes of 
legitimate grant beneficiaries. The need for clean-up measures is not in dispute, 
merely the measures taken to ensure that the list of actual beneficiaries 
corresponded with the database of person who comply with the statutory 
requirements for grants.  The desperate position many deserving grant 
beneficiaries found themselves in after “cleanup” measures such as re-
registration were implemented to rid the system of “ghost beneficiaries,170 serves 
as an example of the dangers of an over-zealous reaction to instances of fraud.   
In many cases a moratorium on the processing of new applications and seeing to 
                                     
170 Liebenberg “The right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) 
Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 
153.  The re-registration process was initiated to clean up incorrect and out-of-date data on the 
system and to ensure that each beneficiary had a 13-digit identity number (PMG “Cash 
Paymaster Services Presentation” (2001) http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/appendices 
/010830CPM.htm (accessed 01/07/2009)).  The intention with the re-registration process was 
therefore to ensure that the information on record for beneficiaries was complete, to bring 
duplication of payments to an end and to establish the eligibility of beneficiaries for grants 
(Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000(12) BCLR 1322 (E) 
1324; Maluleke v The Northern Province Member of the Executive Council for Health and Welfare 
[1999] 4 All SA 407 (T)).  The adverse consequences of re-registration were seemingly not 
foreseen by the then Minister of Social Development, Min Skweyiya, who envisaged that the re-
registration was “to be properly managed in a humane way with due regard for the rights of 
beneficiaries and the requirements of administrative justice”. (Skweyiya Social Development 
Budget Vote 2001, NCOP http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/0106707945a1005.htm 
(accessed 02/07/2009)).  This was however not to be the case. 
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arrear payments was imposed together with the re-registration process.171  
Beneficiaries whose grants were suspended were not able to meet their and their 
dependants’ basic needs such as rent, electricity, burial policy payments, school 
fees and food.172  The Constitutional Court held in Grootboom173 that the 
measures that the state takes in realising socio-economic rights such as the right 
of access to social security, should be evaluated according to whether the needs 
of the “most vulnerable” members of society are met.  Previous grant recipients 
who had to re-register for their grants have been referred to as “most lacking in 
protective and assertive armour”.174  The right of access to social security and 
the reasonableness of measures taken to give affect to the right should therefore 
be interpreted with them in mind.  As the re-registration process affected their 
right to access social assistance, the process was clearly unreasonable and, 
therefore, unconstitutional. 
 
The issue of arbitrary suspension of older person’s grants was central to the case 
                                     
171 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and another v Ngxuza and 
Others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1194, para 8. 
172 Evidence led in Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
2000(12) BCLR 1322 (E) revealed that up to 2000 previous beneficiaries in the Eastern Cape had 
complained that their grants were terminated as a result of the re-registration process (at 1325) 
and that the beneficiary list had shrunk with close to one hundred thousand people (at 1326).  
The Auditor-General’s finding for the Eastern Cape for 2003/04 drew attention to the lack of 
control over social security files which led to the periodic unavailability of identity documents and 
the inability to confirm the existence of eligible beneficiaries (Joseph (2005) Resorting to the 
courts: litigation and the crisis in the administration of social grants in the Eastern Cape 32).  This 
situation led to eligible beneficiaries having their grants cancelled as they were believed to be 
dead. In the Northern Province 92 046 benefits were suspended in 1998 (Maluleke v The 
Northern Province Council for Health and Welfare [1999] 4 All SA 407 (T) 412). 
173 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC). 
174 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and 
others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1195 para 11. 
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of Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government).175  The 
applicant was granted an old age pension in terms of the 1992 SAA and its 
regulations and was promised an amount in arrear grant payments.   In response 
to the high levels of corruption, fraud and abuse of the social security system in 
the province and the resultant budgetary constraints for the department, the 
respondent issued a circular ordering that backdated payments would no longer 
be possible.176  Mpati J held that the respondent was bound by the Social 
Assistance regulations to pay grants and back-payments to entitled beneficiaries.  
Her decision to suspend arrear payments was therefore unlawful and the 
applicant was declared to be entitled to payment of her arrear pension.177 
  
The case of Rangani v Superintendent-General, Dept of Health and Welfare, 
Northern Province178 confirmed that the Northern Province (now Limpopo) 
experienced similar problems to the Eastern Cape.  The background facts 
regarding the problems experienced in this province with grant payments provide 
some insight into the deterioration of the service provided by provincial grant 
administrations. 
 
After the respondent was appointed as Superintendent-General in the 
Department of Health and Welfare in the Northern Province in 1995, he 
attempted to address the chaos in the grant payment system.  The cause of the 
                                     
175 [1998] 1 All SA 525 (W). 
176 At 528. 
177 At 529. 
178 1999 4 SA 385 (T). 
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chaotic situation was the existence of seven different administrations dealing with 
pensions and grants in the province,179 resulting in widespread fraud, corruption 
and improper payments.  He introduced various measures such as SOCPEN 5, 
the national computer system,180 in an attempt to eliminate fraud and to retrieve 
information destroyed by officials.  According to SOCPEN, as many as 94 806 
“beneficiary” records appeared irregular.181  The respondent concluded that the 
only way to clear up the irregular records was to suspend all benefits and to 
require beneficiaries to apply for the reinstatement of benefits.  Although the 
respondent had instructed officials to take a number of steps to notify 
beneficiaries of the suspension of their grants,182 most beneficiaries received no 
notice of the termination of their grants and their entitlement to re-register for 
their grants.  Errors arose in the process of reinstatement183 and many 
beneficiaries who in fact qualified for grants had their grants terminated.  The 
system to eradicate fraudulent and ghost beneficiaries therefore led to hardship 
for beneficiaries who were in fact entitled to grants, but whose benefits had been 
unilaterally terminated.   
 
The court held that the applicant had a right to receive the benefit that was 
                                     
179 At that time there were 17 different grant administrations nationally (at 388) and seven in the 
Northern Province, namely Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda, the Transvaal Provincial Administration, 
the Administration of the House of Assembly, the Administration of the House of Delegates, and 
the Administration of the House of Representatives (at 389D). 
180 See fn 147 above. 
181 According to the respondent, non-existent and “ghost” beneficiaries were costing the state 
between R14million and R28million per month (at 388E). 
182 Such as radio announcements and announcements at pay points that beneficiaries of 
suspended grants were entitled to re-register and that arrears would be paid to them if their 
grants were reinstated (at 388). 
183 Such as extensive “down-time” on the computer system (at 389B). 
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granted to her until it was lawfully terminated.  As her grant was terminated 
without a prior hearing, the audi alterem partem rule was not applied in casu, nor 
was the requirement of procedurally fair administrative action in terms of section 
33(1) of the Constitution followed.184 
 
Similar circumstances led to the case of Maluleke v MEC, Health and Welfare, 
Northern Province.185  Social grants were suspended to root out the 92 046 
alleged “ghost beneficiaries” in the province.186  The department viewed the 
blanket suspension of grants and subsequent reinstatement of grants solely for 
deserving beneficiaries as the only method to identify fraudulent beneficiaries 
and to address the serious financial losses.  The applicant approached the court 
for an order declaring the cancellation of her grant unlawful, as well as leave to 
institute a class action on behalf of other beneficiaries whose grants have been 
cancelled under similar circumstances.  The court held that the suspension of the 
applicant’s grant was unlawful.187   However, it was held that a class action was 
not available in terms of section 38 of the Constitution, as Southwood J found it 
difficult to imagine how “the suspension of payment of any benefits payable in 
terms of the various Acts referred to could be an infringement of a right in the Bill 
                                     
184 At 394. 
185 [1999] 4 All SA 407 (T). 
186 The estimated number of fraudulent beneficiaries differs from the number of irregular 
beneficiaries cited in the Rangani case (see fn 181 above) and was later reduced to between 30 
000 and 60 000, but the cost of the fraudulent benefit was still estimated between R14 million and 
R28 million per month (at 412). 
187 I.t.o. the Gazankulu Social Pensions Act 7 of 1976 and not the Social Assistance Act.  The 
Gazankulu Act did not deal with the suspension of grants (Maluleke v MEC, Health and Welfare, 
Northern Province [1999] 2 All SA 407 (T) 413). 
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of Rights”.188 
 
 Plasket189 argues that Southwood J erroneously held that no fundamental right 
had been infringed in casu as it is obvious that both the right to just 
administrative action and the right to access to social assistance are violated 
when the grants for the aged are cancelled without authority as occurred in 
Maluleke.190 It is submitted that Plasket’s criticism of the judgment is justified.  
Since both the Gazankulu Social Pensions Act191 and the Social AssistanceAct192 
were enacted to implement the right of access to social security, the suspension 
of grants paid in terms of these two Acts clearly constitutes an infringement of a 
basic right.   
 
The view that the suspension of grants infringes upon beneficiaries’ constitutional 
rights finds support in a number of judgments.  Froneman J in Ngxuza and others 
v Secretary, Dept of Welfare, Eastern Cape193 found that the suspension of grant 
without a hearing was unlawful and definitely infringed the applicants’ 
constitutional rights to just administrative action and may also have infringed the 
right to access to social security. 
 
The case of Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
                                     
188 At 414.  Overruled in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and 
Another v Ngxuza and others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1200 para 19. 
189 Plasket “Standing, welfare rights and administrative justice” (2000) 117 SALJ 647.  
190 At 652-653. 
191 Act 7 of 1976. 
192 Act 59 of 1992. 
193 2002 (12) BCLR 1322 (E) 1330. 
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Cape and Another194 is yet another example of the termination of grants without 
any notice of or reasons for the cancellation. The applicant was also not afforded 
any opportunity to be heard before his grant was terminated, but was merely 
verbally advised by a clerk that his grant has been cancelled.  The cancellation of 
his grant was the result of a decision in 1996 to review all disability grants.195  
The department had attempted to notify grant recipients of the review of grants 
by distributing pamphlets and through the print media and radio broadcasts.  It 
was held that these generalised attempts to notify grant recipients did not qualify 
as proper notice to the applicant.196 The cancellation of his grant was held to be 
unlawful because his right to a proper hearing was infringed.197  The respondent 
was ordered to reinstate the applicant’s grant and to pay him the amount that he 
would have received had the unlawful cancellation not occurred. Following the 
Bushula judgment, the Eastern Cape Welfare department’s reaction to the 
Bushula judgment was merely to note that it has “taken note of the judgment and 
the valuable guidance given in it in respect of the suspension and/or cancellation 
of disability grants” and that officials “have been instructed to act accordingly”.198  
It is clear from subsequent litigation against the department199 that the procedure 
                                     
194 2000 (7) BCLR 728 (E). 
195 At 730.  As a large number of grants had to be reviewed, the department did not regard it as 
practicable to give individual notice to each of the beneficiaries whose grants were to be reviewed 
(at 734). 
196 At 734 A-B. 
197 At 734-5. 
198 Ngxuza and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and Others 
2002 (12) BCLR 1322 (E) 1326. 
199 Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (12) BCLR 1322 
(E) and Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and another v Ngxuza and 
others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA); Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province 
Unreported case no 1281/04; Ntame v MEC, Dept of Social Development, Eastern Cape [2005] 2 
All SA 535 (SE); Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), 
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to reinstate deserving beneficiaries was not proceeding according to plan.200 
 
The landmark case of Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape and Others201 followed on the Bushula judgment and was 
yet  another example of “victims of official excess, bureaucratic misdirection and 
unlawful administrative methods”202 seeking redress from the courts after their 
grants had been unilaterally and without notice been terminated. The applicants’ 
disability grants were revoked as a result of the re-registration process embarked 
upon to verify the particulars of all beneficiaries, but no notice of or reasons for 
the termination of their grants was provided.  Despite the many efforts by various 
non-governmental organisations, including the Human Rights Commission, to 
persuade the department to rectify the situation and implement a fair procedure 
when terminating grants, the department failed to respond.203 The court found the 
                                                                                                             
where Yacoob  J expressed surprise in the lack of proactive measures to reinstate cancelled 
grants.  According to him he would have expected that the Provincial Government would have 
accepted “both that their procedure had been wrong and that all grants improperly cancelled 
ought to be fully reinstated in the sense ordered in Bushula.  All affected people ought to have 
been placed in the position in which they would have been absent the unlawful administrative 
decision” (at para 16).  Unfortunately, this had not happened and the Provincial Government had 
rather “failed dismally in its constitutional obligations” (at para 18). 
200 This was despite media releases in which the Department had promised to re-evaluate all 
cancellations and to use ‘mobile task teams’ to reinstate all grants that were mistakenly 
suspended (Daily Dispatch “Grants to be re-evaluated” 29 November 2001 
http://www.dispatch.co.za/2001/11/29/easterncape/PEGRANTS.HTM (accessed 27/10/2008).  It 
was also reported that during 2000/01 the Department had prioritised the re-instatement of grants 
erroneously removed from the system as well as the timeous processing of social grant payment  
Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 27. 
201 2002 (12) BCLR 1322 (E); 2001 2 SA 609 (E).  Other cases on the unlawful suspension and 
termination of grants include Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province 
Unreported case 1281/04 SE; Ntame v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape; Mnyaka v 
MEC, Dept of Social Development, Eastern Cape [2005] 2 All SA 535 (SE). 
202 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and 
others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1195, para 11. 
203 Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (12) BCLR 1322 
(E) 1326.  See also Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v 
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suspension of the grants unlawful and ordered that the grants be reinstated and 
that arrear payments be made.204 
 
This case may be only one in a long line of judgments finding the provincial 
government’s suspension of grants unlawful.  It is, however, significant because 
of the link made between fundamental rights and solidarity.  The concept of 
solidarity and the damage that is inflicted upon it by unlawful termination of 
grants was central to Froneman J’s conclusion that the courts have the 
constitutional duty to prevent the unlawful deprivation of socio-economic rights 
“by way of administrative stealth”.205  He classified the right to access to social 
security as one of the “rights which give expression to the ‘oneness of 
community’ that Steve Biko spoke of as at the heart of black culture” and 
concluded that the department had been sadly lacking in the “oneness of 
community” with grant beneficiaries.206  In other words, fulfilment of the right of 
access to social security is unlikely where solidarity with grant beneficiaries is 
lacking. 
 
Froneman J also granted the successful applicants leave to institute a class 
action on behalf of the many other beneficiaries whose grants were unlawfully 
                                                                                                             
Ngxuza and others  2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 119 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1195 par 10; Vumazonke 
v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 229 (SECLD) 240 par [18]. 
204 Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (12) BCLR 1322 
(E) 1337.   
205 At 1334. 
206 Ibid. 
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suspended.207 On appeal it was confirmed that the circumstances were indeed 
suitable for a class action.208  
 
In Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v 
Ngxuza and others (“the Ngxuza appeal case”) Cameron JA accepted that many 
grants may have been paid in error and that steps to remedy the situation were 
required.  However, he criticised the methods chosen to correct the erroneous 
payments as being "extreme and the consequences for large numbers of needy 
people savage".209  The failure to differentiate between beneficiaries defrauding 
the system and deserving beneficiaries when requiring them to re-register left 
many persons who “were manifestly not ghosts” destitute.210  The need for 
measures to verify and update pensioner records was not in question, but the 
methods chosen to undertake this task were found to be “undifferentiatingly 
harsh” and unlawful.211  The scathing criticism against the provincial department 
was therefore not reserved only for the unlawful conduct by the department 
against the applicants, but particularly for the lack of response to the applicants’ 
                                     
207 Described as “many tens of thousands of Eastern Cape disability grantees” in a similar 
situation to the successful applicants (Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1190 par 1).  The respondents 
objected to the class action and argued that practicalities and scarce resources would make it 
impossible for the courts and the public administration to handle cases involving thousands of 
persons.  Froneman J answered this objection by stating that it is in the power of the department 
to avoid this type of litigation by acting within the principle of legality (Ngxuza and Others v 
Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (12) BCLR 1322 (E) 1333). 
208 The detailed requirements for instituting a class action fall outside the scope of this work.  See 
Plasket “Standing, welfare rights and administrative justice” (2000) 117 SALJ 647. 
209 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1194, para 7. 
210 Ibid. 
211 1195, para 9.  Cameron JA criticised the provincial authorities for their failure to expedite the 
re-registration process and referred to the countless “unfulfilled undertakings, broken promises, 
missed meetings, administrative buck-passing, manifest lack of capacity and at times gross 
ineptitude.” (1195 para 8). 
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needs and the subsequent use of legal processes to impede the applicants’ 
claims against it.  The department’s approach to the class action by beneficiaries 
was described by Cameron JA as  
contradictory, cynical, expedient and obstructionist.  It conducted the case as 
though it were at war with its own citizens, the more shamefully because those it 
was combatting were in terms of secular hierarchies and affluence and power the 
least in its sphere.212  
 
From the series of cases discussed above it can be concluded that the unlawful 
suspension or termination of grants, albeit to rectify payments made in error, not 
only infringes the rights of beneficiaries, but erodes solidarity with deserving 
grant beneficiaries.213  There can be no solidarity with grant beneficiaries if the 
very department tasked with administering the grants seems to be “at war”214 
with the beneficiaries.  It is therefore in the interest of continued solidarity with 
grant beneficiaries, and older persons in particular, that the courts use their 
constitutional mandate to enforce social security rights.215 
                                     
212 Para 15. 
213 Particularly when the unlawful action is directed against entitled beneficiaries as well as “the 
bogus” (Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and 
others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1197 para 15).  
214 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and 
others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) 1197 para 15.  In 2002 President Mbeki expressed his indignation 
about the “cruel and irresponsible manner” in which civil servants delayed back payment of old 
age grants unlawfully suspended for up to two years Daily Dispatch “R2bn cash boost for 
pensioners”, 15 February 2002 http://www.dispatch.co.za/2002/02/15/easterncape/ 
AAALEAD.HTM.(accessed 27/10/2008). 
215 The remedies available to grant beneficiaries whose social security rights have been infringed 
are discussed below at 4.3.4.. 
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4.3.4.3 Measures to address mismanagement of grants 
 
Mismanagement of grants does not only include erroneous payments made to 
undeserving recipients as discussed above, but also tardy processing of grant 
applications or failure to pay grants to deserving grant beneficiaries, including 
older persons.  The provincial departments that were previously responsible for 
grant applications and payments stated a number of justifications for 
mismanagement.   
 
The SOCPEN computer system216 and errors at pay points have been among the 
major contributing factors to non-payment of grants.217  A recurrent problem is 
computer records indicating two persons with the same initials and surname 
receiving a grant.  This irregularity is usually only resolved when the correct 
beneficiary produces identification.218  The validity of grants and the amounts that 
particular beneficiaries were entitled to in some provinces could not always be 
                                     
216 See fn 147 above. See also Maluleke v The Northern Province Member of the Executive 
Council for Health and Welfare [1999] 4 All SA 407 (T) 412 where the re-registration of 
beneficiaries was delayed by “down time” on the computer system.  In some instances it was not 
the computer system itself that was at fault, but rather the data punched into the computer.  In 
Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525, the initial 
delay in the processing of the grant application was caused by an incorrect reference number 
being allocated to the applicant and entered into the computer. 
217 Payment contractors have blamed incorrect data regarding the numbers of beneficiaries at 
given pay points for the situation where no provision has been made for payment for a number of 
the older persons arriving to collect grants on the SOCPEN computer system.  See “AllPay 
blames govt dept for pension crisis” Dispatch Online  16 January 2003 
http://www.dispatch.co.za/2003/01/16/easterncape/AAAALLPAY.HTM (accessed 28/10/2008);  
The Herald “Minister tasks top team to probe pension payouts” 
http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2003/01/16/news/n10_16012003.htm (accessed 28/10/2008). 
218 As was the case in Maluleke v The Northern Province Member of the Executive Council for 
Health and Welfare [1999] 4 All SA 407 (T). 
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confirmed as all grant types were not always captured on SOCPEN.219 
 
As early as 2001, the Minister for Social Development described the SOCPEN 
system as antiquated and, recognising that it was inadequate to provide the 
information required for efficient service delivery, reported that plans were 
underfoot to revise the SOCPEN system.220  The South African Social Security 
Agency Act of 2004 requires SASSA to establish a national data base of all 
applicants for and beneficiaries of social assistance. Such data base should be 
capable of collecting, collating, maintaining and administer the information 
necessary for the payment of social security.221  Based on the criticism levelled at 
the SOCPEN system, it is clear that an overhaul of the current system or steps to 
replace it with another data base that can meet the requirements set by 
legislation such as the South African Social Security Agency Act are required.222  
SASSA is in the process of introducing a new payment management system to 
promote uniformity and “address issues of inefficiency”.223 
 
In many rural areas the lack of access to technology meant that applications had 
to be capture manually and information then sent to other service points, leading 
to severe delays.  SASSA has since installed low-cost energy-saving computer 
                                     
219 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 29 and 33. 
220 Skweyiya Development Budget Vote 2001 www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/010607945a 
1005.htm (accessed 02/07/2009). 
221 S 4(1)(b) SASSA Act 9 of 2004. 
222 An efficient data base is also required to enable administrators to provide the information 
required by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
223 SASSA (2008) Strategic Plan 2008/09 – 2010/11 18. 
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systems in a number of rural SASSA offices with a significant reduction in the 
turn-around time for grant applications.224 
 
The effects of the amalgamation of the 14 different social security systems under 
the apartheid system225 have also been blamed in the past for delays in the 
processing of grant applications.  Although the provincial departments may have 
had to deal with inherited problems, SASSA aims to put processes and 
procedures in place “to promote uniformity and standardisation”.226 
 
The absence of a proper communication strategy for conveying decisions on 
grant applications has notably contributed to litigation against provincial 
governments.227  The rural nature of many provinces exacerbated the problems 
experienced with communication with grant applicants and beneficiaries.228  
SASSA has responded to this problem by introducing the Integrated Community 
Registrations Outreach Programme (ICROP) to reach remote areas.229 
 
However, it seems that judges in social assistance-related cases regarded the 
                                     
224 See Omni “SASSA cuts costs and improves service delivery in rural areas with Novell and 
Userful Multiplier” http://www.omni-ts.com/success/linux-desktops-government.html (accessed 
20/08/2009). 
225 In MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 460 para 10, it was 
recognised that the Eastern Cape provincial grant administration had to deal with a number of 
inherited administrative problems at the same time as the expansion of the social assistance 
system. 
226 SASSA (2008) Strategic Plan 2008/09 – 2010/11 18. 
227 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: Litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 5.  See below at 4.3.4.4 for more on the statutory and constitutional 
obligation to provide grant applicants with reasons for denying their applications and the litigation 
against provincial departments that failed to comply with this obligation. 
228 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: Litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 5. 
229 SASSA (2008) Strategic Plan 2008/09 – 2010/11 17. 
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main contributing factor to mismanagement to be “laziness and incompetence”230 
on the part of provincial Social Development departments.  Even some politicians 
admitted that the litigation against provincial governments can be attributed to the 
fact that “arrogant staff dragged their feet in processing the grant applications.”231  
Severe staff shortages in some provinces have also contributed to 
mismanagement of application procedures.232   The constant changing of MEC’s 
for Social Development in provinces such as the Eastern Cape created a 
leadership crisis and hampered the department’s ability to engage with the 
problems that it faces.233  These human resources issues have been addressed 
by SASSA by the introduction of a national performance management plan to 
address the issue of incompetent staff. 
 
To deal with grant processing delays, SASSA has launched the Improved Grant 
Application Process (IGAP) with the aim to process applications and provide 
applications with feedback within one day.234 
 
It is submitted that the steps taken by SASSA to improve service delivery and 
                                     
230 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another  [2003] 2 All SA 223(SCA) para 18.  See 
also Mbanga v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare and Another 2001 (8) BCLR 821 
(SE) 830 where Leach remarked that “Public servants are, as their very name implies, there to 
serve the public: not to sit inert and immobile, doing little apart from drawing their salaries and 
pensions.” 
231 MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape, quoted in “New MEC promises to crack down on 
lazy staff” The Herald 1 March 2005 http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/03/01/ 
news/n04_01032005.htm (accessed 27/10/2008). 
232 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: Litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 3 and 35. 
233 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts 36. 
234 SASSA (2008) Strategic Plan 2008/09 – 2010/11 17.  The programme has already been 
implemented in Mpumalanga, the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 
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thereby access to social assistance for older persons constitute reasonable 
measures in terms of section 27 of the Constitution.  The improvement in service 
delivery in the grants system can be regarded as a response to “the needs of 
those most desperate”235 and, hence, as a reasonable measure to give effect to 
the right of access to social security. 
 
4.3.4.4 Administrative justice requirements  
 
In terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution everyone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  It is 
therefore imperative that the rules for eligibility for grants and the termination 
thereof are reasonable and fair.236  The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(PAJA)237 was enacted to give effect to the right to fair and reasonable 
administrative action in general.  The SAA and its regulations also give effect to 
the right to fair administrative action specifically during application for and 
                                     
235 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) para 44. 
236 Liebenberg “The right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) 
Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 
157.  In Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525 it 
was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the MEC’s decision not to backdate grant payments 
adversely affected not only the applicant, but “a large number of other people in the Eastern 
Cape” (at 527).  Although the applicant’s case was based mainly upon the respondent infringing 
the applicant’s right of access to social security, it was argued that the adverse decision infringed 
on the right to fair administrative action and the right to dignity as well.  The court concluded that 
the respondent’s actions were unlawful and for that reason it was not necessary to consider the 
issue whether the applicant’s constitutional rights were infringed (at 529).  See also Bushula and 
others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government 
2000 (7) BCLR 728 (E) where Van Rensburg J stated that a grant, “once granted, confers upon 
the beneficiary the right to receive that grant until it is lawfully terminated in terms of the Act and 
the regulations.  In my judgment such right cannot be validly terminated without the rules of 
natural justice and the right to fair administrative action, including the right to be heard, being 
observed” (at 732-3).   
237 Act 3 of 2000. 
 
 
 
 
274 
 
payment of grants.  The SAA therefore has direct application to administrative 
action taken during the application process and payment of grants and, where it 
is silent, PAJA applies.238 
 
4.3.4.4.1 Notification of outcome of grant application 
 
Various rights stem from section 33 of the Constitution.  An applicant for an older 
person’s grant has the right to be notified of the outcome of the application and in 
the case of rejection, the reasons for disqualification.239  In terms of regulation 
13(1)240 the applicant is entitled to be notified of the outcome of the application 
within three months of the date of the application. 
 
In terms of PAJA, failure to take action and, therefore, failure to make a decision, 
is one of the grounds for judicial review.241  Where an administrator is obliged to 
make a decision and fails to do so and there is no prescribed period within which 
the administrator has to make the decision, the person affected can apply for 
judicial review on the basis of an unreasonable delay in making the decision.242  
Where the applicable legislation prescribes a period within which the decision is 
to be made and the administrator failed to make a decision before that period 
expired, the person affected can institute proceedings for judicial review of the 
                                     
238 The relationship between the SAA and PAJA is dealt with in more detail at 4.3.4.4.2 below. 
239 S 14(3) SAA.   
240 GN R898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008.  The written notice of rejection of the application 
must contain the reasons for the refusal and inform the applicant of his or her right to appeal the 
decision (reg 13(4)). 
241 S 6(2)(g) PAJA. 
242 S 6(3)(a) PAJA. 
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failure to make the decision.243  A grant applicant can only institute proceedings 
once the three months provided for in regulation 13 has expired. 
 
In addition, section 5(1) of PAJA allows any person whose rights have been 
materially and adversely affected by administrative action244 and who has not 
been given reasons for the action, to request that written reasons for the action 
be provided by the administrator.245  Such request should be made “within 90 
days after the date on which that person became aware of the action or might 
reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action”.  After 
receipt of the request, the administrator to whom the request was made has 90 
days to provide adequate reasons for the decision.246  Thereafter the aggrieved 
applicant can lodge an application to the court for relief in terms of section 5 of 
PAJA.  
 
Section 5(2) PAJA should not be interpreted to mean that the aggrieved applicant 
may not approach a court before the 90-day period has lapsed, as it merely 
states the time frame within which the administrator has to gather the necessary 
information to present the applicant with the reason for refusal.  Depending on 
the circumstances of each case, failure by the administrator to provide reasons 
for the decision within 90 days may lead to the presumption that the decision was 
                                     
243 S 6(3)(b) PAJA. 
244 Which includes making, suspending or refusing to make an award (s 1(i) read with s 1(v) 
PAJA). 
245 Previously the request for reasons would have to be made to the Permanent Secretary of the 
provincial Department of Social Development, but would now be directed to SASSA as 
administrator. 
246 S 5(2) PAJA.  
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taken without good reason.247 An administrator who is approached to provide 
reasons for a decision is required to act in accordance with the values and 
principles set out in section 195 of the Constitution when complying with the 
request.  These values and principles include the obligation to promote 
transparency by providing the person requesting the reasons with timely and 
accurate information.248 An administrator can therefore not “with impunity wait 
until the 90-day period has all but expired” before providing the requested 
reasons, but should rather furnish the reasons as soon as they are available.249 
Much of the litigation against the provincial Social Development departments was 
a result of the absence of reasons for non-approval of grant applications.250 
 
4.3.4.4.2 Judicial review of administrative action 
 
In the light of the above statutory requirements and the constitutional right to 
“lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair” administrative action,251 the conduct of 
or lack of response by provincial governments in handling grant applications has 
been held to be unlawful and unconstitutional.  The cases discussed below were 
selected for their description of the obligations of the provincial departments with 
regard to the administration of social grants and because they reveal the 
                                     
247 Sikutshwa v MEC for Social Development, EC Province & another [2005] JOL 14413 (Tk) para 
70-77. 
248 Section 195(g). 
249 Obiter remarks by Goosen AJ in Sikutshwa v MEC for Social Development, EC Province & 
another [2005] OL 14413 (Tk) para 77. 
250 E.g. Sikutshwa v MEC for Social Development, EC Province & another [2005] JOL 14413 (Tk).  
See the discussion below at 4.3.4.4.2. 
251 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
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approach of many provincial grant administrations to grant applicants. 
 
The case of Vumazonke and others v MEC for Social Development, Eastern 
Cape252 serves as an example of the growing impatience of the courts with the 
unsatisfactory performance of the “unrepentant” social assistance administration 
in the Eastern Cape Province.253  This case was only one of a number where the 
applicants had applied for social assistance and had either received no response 
or had to wait an unreasonably long period for a response.254  When Ms 
Vumazonke finally received a response from the department, it was only to 
inform her that her application was unsuccessful, as a medical officer had 
recommended that her application be refused.  This, in itself, did not constitute 
an adequate reason for the refusal of the grant255 and provided her with no basis 
for the only internal remedy available to her, which is to appeal to the Minister.  
As she had received no reasons for the refusal of her application, the 90-day 
period to lodge an appeal had not begun to run yet and she was free to appeal. 
 
                                     
2522005 6 SA 229 (SE). 
253 At paras 2 and 10. 
254 Plasket J stated that the “depressing tales of misery and privation contained in an ever-
increasing volume of cases that clog their Motion Court rolls, in which applicants complain about 
administrative torpor in the processing of their applications for social assistance was a common 
phenomenon that the Judges in the Eastern Cape Division were getting accustomed to (at para 
2).  See also Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another 2002 1 SA 342 (SE).  
By the latter part of 2005, there were almost 2000 cases related to the provincial government’s 
failure to implement the provisions of the Social Assistance Act and “the conspicuous and 
endemic failure” by the department to take reasonable measures to make the grant system 
effective on the roll of the High Court (MEC Department of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 
(SCA) paras 3 and 5). 
255 2005 6 SA 229 (SE) 243 para 32.  The response from the department would have constituted 
a reason for refusal if it had informed the applicant of the basis upon which the medical officer 
had come to the conclusion that the applicant did not qualify for a disability grant.  See also 
Sikutshwa v MEC for Social Development, EC Province & another [2005] JOL 14413 (Tk) para 
33. 
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In the case of the other applicants in the Vumazonke case, no response to their 
applications had been forthcoming.  They therefore approached the court for an 
order compelling the respondent to take the decision to grant or refuse the 
applications.  Even though at the time no legislation prescribed a time period 
within which the applications had to be processed, it was held that there had 
been an unreasonable delay in taking the decisions.256  Where part of an official’s 
function is to take a decision and the official fails to exercise his or her powers, a 
court may compel the defaulting official to take a decision.257  The court ordered 
the respondent or any other duly authorised official in her department to consider 
and decide upon the applicants’ grant applications.258 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate259 provided 
some guidelines on what would constitute a reasonable time for the grant 
administration to process and approve or reject an application.  Depending on 
the circumstances, whether or not an unreasonable delay occurred in the 
processing of a grant would depend upon “the nature of the particular application, 
the enquiries that need to be made, the volume of similar applications that need 
                                     
256 Mainly based on the department’s own undertaking to take decisions within three months from 
the application date (2005 6 SA 229 (SE) 245 para 39).  See also Mahambehlala v MEC for 
Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another 2002 1 SA 342 (SE) where the then Regional Director of the 
Department of Welfare in Port Elizabeth argued that the turn-around time for deciding upon an 
application should “ideally” be three months, but a longer period taken to come to a decision is 
not necessarily unreasonable (at 348).  Leach J held that under the circumstances, “common 
sense tells one that in a case such as this where no unduly intricate investigations have to be 
made, a period of three months would normally be more than sufficient to take an administrative 
decision (at 351).  The Constitutional Court found that, depending on the circumstance of the 
case, three months can be regarded as a reasonable period within which a grant ought to be 
approved (Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), fn 3). 
257 At 244 para 35.  However, the court may not compel the official to decide in a particular way. 
258 At 246-247 para 44.  
259 [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA). 
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to be dealt with, the administrative capacity that is available for processing such 
applications, and other matters of that nature”.260  The court that is tasked with 
determining whether a delay in processing a grant is unreasonable is required to 
take into account the difficulties that the grant administration has to overcome.261 
  
Only once the internal remedy provided by the SAA, namely the appeal 
procedure, has been exhausted, may the aggrieved older person institute 
proceedings in a court of law or a tribunal for an administrative review in terms of 
PAJA.262  PAJA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional right to 
procedurally fair administration and to codify the common law principles of 
natural justice.263  Section 3 of PAJA requires administrative action which 
“materially and adversely affects the rights and legitimate expectations of any 
person” to be procedurally fair.  “Administrative action” includes not only any 
decision taken, but also failure to take a decision,264 by any organ of state when 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation, “which adversely affects 
                                     
260 MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 459 para 10.  The 
Constitutional Court added another factor, the urgency with which the application is to be finished, 
specifically where the applicant is a poor woman with little education (Njongi v MEC for Welfare, 
Eastern Cape 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC) para 6). 
261 MEC, Department of Welfare  v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 460 para 10. 
262 Section 7(2)(a) PAJA read with s 6.  The only exception to this rule would be if the court or 
tribunal approached by the complainant is of the view that it would be in the interests of justice to 
allow the complainant to proceed with the review before exhausting the applicable internal 
remedy (s 7(2)(c) PAJA).  See Ntame v MEC, Dept of Social Development, Eastern Cape [2005] 
2 All SA 535 (SE) where the applicant sought to be exempted from the obligation of exhausting 
internal remedies before approaching the court for an administrative review.  In casu PAJA was 
found not to be applicable.  It was held that an order i.t.o. s 7(2) was in any case not required, as 
s 7(2) “merely defers the right of access to court until any internal remedy provided by any law 
has been exhausted, or the time period for utilising that internal remedy has expired”. The section 
does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts until the applicant has exhausted the internal remedy 
(para 30). 
263 PAJA preamble. 
264 See Vumazonke and others v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 229 
(SE) 245 para 37. 
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the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect”.265  Any 
action taken by staff members of SASSA or the Department of Social 
Development while performing their tasks in terms of the SAA may therefore be 
open to review proceedings in terms of PAJA. 
 
The requirements for procedurally fair administrative action set by PAJA entitle a 
person affected by administrative action to  
“(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action; 
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(c) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where 
applicable; and 
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.”266 
 
Any older person who is denied a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations regarding his or her grant application or payment or who is not 
given adequate notice of his or her right to request reasons for a decision by an 
official, will therefore be entitled to institute proceedings in a court of law for an 
administrative review based on the procedurally unfair administrative action.267 
 
                                     
265Section 1(i)(a) PAJA.   
266 Section 3(2)(b) PAJA.  S 5 allows any person whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action, to request the reasons for such administrative action. 
267 In the case of Bushula and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government and Another 2000 (7) BCLR 728 (E), grants were cancelled without 
notice or hearing.  The court held that the cancellation was unlawful and procedurally unfair.  It 
has to be noted that even though the Bushula judgment occurred before PAJA was in force, the 
judgment was still based on the right to fair administrative action, including the right to be heard 
and the rules of natural justice.  In Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province 
Unreported case no 1281/04 SE payment of the applicant’s grant was suspended and she 
applied for an administrative review in terms of PAJA.  Unfortunately her cause of action arose 
before PAJA came into force and therefore it did not apply.  An administrative review in terms of 
the common law was therefore the appropriate action (para 3). 
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An administrator may, however, in certain circumstances decide that it is 
reasonable and justifiable not to comply with all of the abovementioned 
requirements268 and may use this decision as a defence where an older person 
institutes proceedings for an administrative review.  It is therefore theoretically 
possible that an older person whose grant is suspended as a result of a re-
registration process, would on review not succeed in having the suspension 
overturned,269 as SASSA could claim that re-registration is required to promote 
an efficient administration and hence reasonable and justifiable under the 
circumstances. 
 
The grounds for judicial review of administrative actions are set out in section 
6(2) of PAJA.  The following grounds for judicial review are pertinent to grant 
applicants and beneficiaries:270 
• the administrator’s actions were biased or could reasonably be suspected 
of bias;271 
• the procedures prescribed by the empowering provision and its 
regulations272 were not complied with;273 
                                     
268 Sections 3(4)(a) and 5(4)(a) PAJA.  Statutory examples of the factors that would assist the 
administrator in deciding whether departure from the requirements for fair administrative action or 
to furnish reasons is reasonable and justified are listed in ss 3(4)(b) and 5(4)(b) and include “the 
need to promote an efficient administration and good governance”.(ss 3(4)(b)(v) and 5(4)(b)(vi)). 
269 An order setting aside the offending administrative action is one of the remedies in 
proceedings for judicial review listed in s 8(1) PAJA.  Other remedies include: court orders 
directing the administrator to give reasons for the administrative action; directing the administrator 
to act in accordance with the court order; prohibiting the administrator to act in the offending 
manner; setting aside the administrative action and referring it back to the relevant administrator; 
ordering the administrator (or any other party) to compensate the aggrieved person; declaratory 
orders; orders granting temporary relief; and, cost orders. 
270 The grounds for review may overlap in some instances.  See Ntame v MEC, Dept of Social 
Development, Eastern Cape [2005] 2 All SA 535 (SE) 548 para 35. 
271 Section 6(2)(a)(iii) PAJA. 
272 Section 14(3) SAA and reg 13(1) GN R898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008. 
273 Section 6(2)(b) PAJA.  
 
 
 
 
282 
 
• the procedure followed in the grant application or payment of the grant 
was unfair;274 
• the payment of a grant is suspended arbitrarily;275 
• the grants official’s actions are not authorised by the empowering 
provision;276 
• the rejection or delay in processing a grant application or the suspension 
or termination of a grant 
“…(ii) is not rationally connected to 
(aa)  the purpose for which it was taken; 
(bb)  the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc)  the information before the administrator; or 
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator;”277 
• SASSA failed to make a timeous decision regarding an application for an 
older person’s grant;278 
• the refusal to approve a grant, or the suspension or withdrawal of an 
existing older person’s grant was so unreasonable that no reasonable 
person would have exercised his or her power or performed his or her 
function in that manner;279 or 
• the withdrawal or suspension of the grant was unconstitutional or 
unlawful.280 
An application for administrative review should clearly identify which ground for 
review the application is based on and which provisions of PAJA are relied on.281  
 
The internal remedies in terms of the SAA have to be exhausted before an 
                                     
274 Section 6(2)(c) PAJA.  The application for judicial review of administrative action in Ntame v 
MEC, Dept of Social Development, Eastern Cape [2005] 2 All SA 535 (SE) was based on an 
administrative act (the unilateral withdrawal of a grant) performed in a procedurally unfair manner. 
275 Section 6(2)(e)(vi) PAJA. 
276 Section 6(2)(f)(i) PAJA.   
277 Section 6(2)(f)(ii) PAJA. 
278 Section 6(2)(g) PAJA.  See e.g. Vumazonke and others v MEC, Social Development, Eastern 
Cape and others 2005 6 SA 229 (SE) 245 para 37, 246 para 39. 
279 Section 6(2)(h) PAJA. 
280 Section 6(2)(i) PAJA. 
281 See Cele v SASSA Unreported case no. 7940/07 D&CLD para 48 where Wallis AJ cautioned 
against a “check box” approach to s 6 of PAJA, whereby every conceivable ground for 
administrative review is listed in applications for fear of omitting any relevant ground. 
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application in terms of PAJA can be made.  The relationship between the 
remedies in terms of the SAA and PAJA was illustrated in Njongi v MEC for 
Social Development, Eastern Cape Province.282  The applicant’s grant had been 
terminated without any explanation and she was merely informed that she had to 
reapply for the grant.283  She did so and her grant payment resumed.  She 
claimed that the amount of “back-pay” she had received for the time her grant 
was not paid was not enough and she instituted a claim for the remainder of her 
back-pay.  The question was whether the applicant should simply have lodged a 
claim in the magistrate’s court for money owed to her in terms of sections 2 and 3 
of the 1992 Social Assistance Act284 and whether she was entitled to combine a 
claim for a money payment with a review application in the High Court.  Although 
it had become “common practice” to combine a claim for money with a review 
application where an administrative action had led to the money claim, Jones J 
issued a warning that the process could be abused “by disguising what is really 
only a money claim as an administrative review”.285  There will be no abuse of 
the process if the particular administrative action has to be set aside in order for 
                                     
282 Unreported case 1281/04 SE. 
283 When this matter reached the Constitutional Court, the court expressed its regret that Mrs 
Njongi “was not the only victim compelled mercilessly to suffer the pain, misery and indignity of 
non-payment” and that there were “literally tens of thousands of others” suffering the same fate 
(Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), para 5).   
284 As was argued by the respondent in Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape 
Unreported case 1281/04 SE (see para 7).  
285 Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Unreported case 1281/04 SE para 6.   
See, however, Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) 
160 para 31 where Froneman J reacted as follows to the concern expressed by his colleagues on 
the abuse of motion proceedings in order to obtain financial compensation: “On reconsideration, 
however, it seems to me that our irritation at the use of proceedings not customarily geared to 
such ends has to give way to the fact that it has proved to be a relatively cheap and efficient way 
of finalising litigation…  It is, of course, not the ideal way of ensuring an efficient and accountable 
public administration.  But until the provincial administration starts getting that right the courts 
have to do what the Constitution demands of them, even if that means inflated motion court rolls.” 
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a claim in money to arise.286  It was held that the decision to cancel a grant 
without notice or a hearing constitutes irregular administrative action which is 
subject to review.  Until this decision is taken on review and corrected, it will 
stand.  A money claim in the magistrate’s court would therefore be met with the 
valid defence that no money is payable to the applicant as the grant had been 
terminated.287  It can therefore be concluded that in the case of unlawful 
cancellation of a grant, the grant beneficiary would be well-advised to first apply 
to have the cancellation set aside on review and then proceed with the money 
claim in the magistrate’s court.288  Review is therefore necessary as a 
precondition to the enforcement of the debt in the magistrate’s court.289  In other 
instances, such as delays in payment, the best course would be to proceed 
directly with a money claim in terms of the SAA.290 
 
The question arises whether a grant applicant affected by an unreasonable delay 
in the processing of his or her application may be entitled to remedies in addition 
to a money claim in terms of the SAA and the various PAJA remedies.  In 
particular, the courts have had to consider to which extent “constitutional 
remedies” can be used in circumstances where other remedies are not available. 
                                     
286 Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Unreported case 1281/04 SE para 6.  
Even if the respondent concedes that the cessation of the grant payment was unlawful, said 
cessation is still administrative action which is subject to review (para 7). 
287 Para 8. 
288 This view was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC),  para 47. 
289 Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), para 51.  
Where government admits that its administrative decisions are subject to challenge, it should not 
be necessary for each such decision to be set aside by a court before the underlying debt can be 
enforced (para 56) . 
290 Mfubu v MEC of the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Province [2005] JOL 13874 (SE) at 
7 and 8. 
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In Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another,291  it was held 
that taking eight months to process a grant application was an unreasonable 
delay in approving the grant292 and therefore an unlawful and unreasonable 
infringement of the applicant’s right to just administrative action in terms of 
section 33 (1) of the Constitution.  A common-law review would have been 
available to the applicant as a result of the failure by the department to consider 
the application.293  The court could, however, not order the department to pay the 
back pay owed to the applicant in terms of the common law.294  As the common-
law remedies were held to be insufficient to address the effects of the delay of 
the applicant’s grant and it was held to be “unrealistic to expect her to institute a 
separate action to claim damages”,295 the court felt compelled to forge 
“constitutional relief” to enforce the applicant’s right to just administrative 
action.296  Leach J regarded placing the applicant in the position she would have 
been in, had her right to lawful and reasonable administrative action not been 
infringed, as appropriate relief.  He held that the applicant was entitled to a lump 
sum payment of the amount she would have been entitled to, had her grant been 
                                     
291 2002 1 SA 342 (SE). 
292 It was ruled that three months was sufficient time to process a grant application (at 351-352). 
293 At 353. 
294 It was held that even if the court could substitute its decision for that of the second respondent, 
the Director-General for Welfare, Eastern Cape, it was not clear how “it could do so with 
retrospective effect, particularly as the second respondent has no power under the regulations to 
approve a grant retrospectively” (at 354). 
295 At 355. 
296 I.t.o. s 38 of the Constitution which entitles the courts to grant appropriate relief for the 
infringement of a fundamental right read together with s 172(1) which allows courts to make any 
order that is just and equitable.  Contra, see Ackermann J’s criticism of constitutional damages as 
“appropriate relief” in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security  1997 3 SA 786 (CC) paras 71 – 72. 
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approved within a reasonable time.297 
 
In a similar case, Mbanga v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare and 
Another,298 Leach J reiterated that he regards three months to be a reasonable 
time limit within which a decision on a grant application should be taken.  The 
thirty-two month delay in approving the grant in casu was therefore an 
unreasonable delay which infringed the applicant’s constitutional right to “lawful 
and reasonable” administrative action.299  Leach J expressed his concern over 
the fact that such delays were not isolated incidents and that they rather “appear 
merely to be the tip of the iceberg”.300  He found that the inefficiency of public 
servants not only constituted abuse of the human rights of others, but also 
caused considerable sums to be paid from the public purse.301  He therefore, as 
in Mahambehlala, awarded the applicant interest for the months he was without 
the grant he should have had as “appropriate” relief in terms of section 38 of the 
Constitution.302 
 
An different approach to “constitutional damages” was taken by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial 
                                     
297 Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and another 2002 1 SA 342 (SE) 356.  This 
amounts to payment of back pay, plus interest on the arrears. 
298 2001 (8) BCLR 821 (SE). 
299 At 829. 
300 Ibid. 
301 He remarked on the intolerable state of affairs that “as long as administrative inefficiency 
continues to plague this province, public funds are going to continue to be wasted solely because 
public officials do not do the work which they are being paid to do” (at 830). 
302 At 830. 
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Government and another,303 where Conradie JA was critical of the development 
of “constitutional relief” by the High Court in Mahambehlala. The main reason for 
the different approach was that PAJA304 provided the applicant with statutory 
remedies and that “constitutional relief” was therefore not the appropriate 
remedy.305 
 
Understandably, the decision in Jayiya elicited a reaction from the High Court in 
the Eastern Cape, as Jayiya frustrated its efforts to “ensure compliance on the 
part of the provincial government with its constitutional duties of efficient and 
accountable public administration”.306  In Kate v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 
Province307 the facts of the case fitted the pattern of the numerous applications 
for administrative review to the High Court in the Eastern Cape308 – a grant 
applicant who had to wait three years for her grant to be awarded and who only 
received partial payment of the “back pay” due to her.309  The court was 
approached for a review of the respondent’s conduct as well as for a claim for the 
                                     
303 [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA). 
304 Which was not applicable in Mahambehlala, as it was not yet in force during the applicant’s 
grant application . 
305 [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA) 228 para 9.  As long as the remedies provided by PAJA are 
“constitutionally unobjectionable” they must be used.  It has to be noted that the comments made 
in Jayiya on the correctness of the constitutional damages awarded in Mahambehlala were only 
obiter. 
306 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) 146, paras 1 
and 4. 
307 2005 1 SA 141 (SE). 
308 Froneman J referred to the “persistent and huge problem with the administration of social 
grants” in the Eastern Cape (at 148, para 5). 
309 With no explanation offered for the length of the application process or for non-payment of a 
significant part of the amount she was entitled to (at 159, para 28).  
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outstanding payment plus interest due to her.310  It was submitted on her behalf 
that the unreasonable delay in the processing of her grant deprived her of her 
right of access to social security during the period of the delay and that she is 
therefore entitled to compensation. 
 
In determining whether the respondent was liable for constitutional damages as a 
result of the belated approval of the applicant’s grant, Froneman J reaffirmed the 
duty of courts to devise new means of enforcing fundamental rights that were not 
recognised in terms of the common law.311  In doing so, courts have to recognise 
the practical difficulties experienced by the new executive and administration in 
providing for fundamental rights.  The courts should be wary of moving into areas 
that fall outside their domain due to the constitutional separation of powers.312  
However, this consideration for the role of the administration and the constraints 
posed by separation of powers do not mean that the courts cannot create new 
remedies “simply because they did not exist under the common law”.313  As the 
                                     
310 The respondent paid the back pay owing to her, but refused to pay interest (at 148 para 2.  
The reason why the case was not decided on the basis of PAJA was that the applicant did not 
apply for judicial review of the respondent’s action within 180 days as required by PAJA (s 7(1)). 
311 At 152, para 16.  Froneman J did consider the remedies afforded by PAJA, but see fn 304 for 
the reason why it was not applied in casu.  It is submitted that the internal remedy available under 
the SAA (the appeal process) was also not available to the applicant, as the administrative action 
was a delay in notifying the applicant of the outcome of the application.  Until the applicant heard 
from the department, she had nothing on which to base an appeal on. 
312 Ibid.  See Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1) 
2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 113 where it was held that the courts should pay due regard to 
the roles of the legislature and the executive, but that “when it is appropriate to do so, courts may 
– and if need be must – use their wide powers to make orders that affect policy as well as 
legislation”.  Froneman J’s views as expressed in Kate v MEC are therefore supported by the 
Constitutional Court. 
313 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) 152 para 16.   
At 160 para 31 Froneman J states that the Constitution and PAJA “provide for the granting of just 
and equitable relief, unencumbered by the possible technical niceties of relief under common-law 
review, a system not premised on a constitutionally entrenched fundamental right to lawful 
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common law did not provide for financial redress for damages resulting from the 
improper exercise of public powers by state officials, the courts in the Eastern 
Cape merely complied with their constitutional duties by forging new remedies as 
they did in Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another.314 
 
The MEC for Welfare appealed against Froneman J‘s decision that Kate was 
entitled to “constitutional damages” for the belated approval of her grant 
application.315  Nugent JA found that the approach in the court a quo and in 
Mahambehlala was too narrow, as the focus was mainly on the breach of the 
section 33 right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative action.  He held that 
through the denial of a grant applicant’s right to fair administrative action, his or 
her right of access to social assistance is also denied, as the realisation of the 
latter depends upon the following of an effective process.  The denial of the 
substantive right of access to social assistance therefore should be the focus of a 
claim under these circumstances.316  It was held that the remedy of mandamus 
was not sufficient under the circumstances to protect Kate’s rights317 and she 
was awarded constitutional damages as compensation for the breach of her 
                                                                                                             
administrative action”.  He also stated that even if PAJA was applicable, the remedies would have 
been similar.  A court can set aside administrative action i.t.o. s 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) and “in exceptional 
cases” award compensation.  The infringement of basic  rights in casu, constitutes an 
“exceptional case” (at 155, para 20). 
314 2002 1 SA 342 (SE). 
315 One of the reasons for granting leave to appeal was to allow the issues that were raised in 
Jayiya to be reconsidered in order to lessen the uncertainty regarding the suitability of 
“constitutional damages” as a remedy for the breach of grant applicants’ rights (MEC, Department 
of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 462 para 18). 
316 MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 464 para 22. 
317Mandamus as a remedy is only effective where it is possible to act swiftly to prevent a breach 
by a public official of a constitutional or statutory duty.  It was held that due to her circumstances, 
“it is most unlikely that Kate had the capacity or the means that were required to act swiftly once 
the delay set in and it would be quite unrealistic to expect the remedy to have been effective in 
her hands” (467 para 31). 
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rights.318 
 
The same approach was followed in Ntame v MEC, Department of Social 
Development, Eastern Cape,319  where appropriate relief had to be found for the 
unlawful suspension of the applicant’s grant.  The grant was only reinstated thirty 
months later.  Plasket J found that it would be insufficient merely to hold that the 
administrative act in question - the stoppage of the grant - was inconsistent with 
the Constitution.  In order to provide the applicant with “proper, adequate, fair 
and effective” relief for the violation of her right to just administrative action, he 
ordered the respondent to pay the amount owing to the applicant in terms of the 
Social Assistance Act plus interest on that amount.320 
 
The Constitutional Court had occasion to consider the issue in question, which is 
the right of grant recipients to lawful administration action when their grants are 
cancelled in Njongi v MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape.321  The 
constitutional issues the Constitutional Court had to consider were the 
                                     
318 At 467 paras 31 and 33. 
319 [2005] 2 All SA 535 (SE). 
320 At 550 para 41.  The relevant provisions of PAJA were not applicable as the cause of action 
arose before PAJA came into force (at 542 para 14). 
321. 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC),  Another issue that stood to be determined was whether the state 
could rely on extinctive prescription of its obligation towards grant recipients in order to avoid 
paying their grants.  The South Eastern Cape High Court held in Njongi v MEC for Social 
Development, Eastern Cape Province Unreported case no 1281/04 that prescription does not run 
against a person claiming arrear grant payments as long as the unlawful administrative action 
(the decision not to pay the grant) continues.  The MEC for Social Development was successful in 
appeal to the Full Court of the Eastern Cape where it was found that prescription can run in 
favour of a provincial government in such circumstances, even where the administrative action 
concerned had not yet been set aside (MEC for Welfare v Njongi Case 62/06, Eastern Cape High 
Court, unreported).  Ms Njongi appealed to the Constitutional Court.  The Constitutional Court 
had to determine when the state is entitled to rely on the defense of prescription and held that 
prescription had not started to run on the arrears as the applicant’s grant had not yet been 
reinstated in full (2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), para 58).  
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consequences of unlawful administrative action in relation to the administration of 
social assistance and whether the Provincial government had complied with the 
constitutional obligation imposed by section 27 of the Constitution.322  In similar 
vein to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxuza and others323 the 
social standing of the people who were deprived of their grants as a result of “the 
bewildering conduct of the Provincial Government” was central to the finding by 
the Constitutional Court that the denial of their grants was unconstitutional and 
unlawful.  They were described as “the poorest people in our society” and 
therefore the unlawful denial of their grants was “unthinkably cruel and utterly at 
odds with the constitutional vision to the achievement of which that Government 
ought to have been committed”.324  Yacoob J remarked that the “unarguably 
unlawful”325 administrative decision to cancel the grant has caused “untold misery 
and suffering”.326  The apathy with which the provincial government regarded its 
obligations arising out of court judgments was singled out for criticism.327  The 
Constitutional Court set aside the orders of the court a quo and declared the 
administrative action of the department in terminating the applicant’s social grant 
to be invalid and set it aside. It ordered that the applicant’s grant be reinstated 
and the department to pay her the amount in back pay still owed, plus interest on 
                                     
322 At para 41.  It was argued on behalf of the applicant that her claim was not merely based on a 
debt which can prescribe, but also a violation of her fundamental rights to access social security 
and to fair administrative action. 
323 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 9. 
324 Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province 2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), para 
17.  See also para 66 where Yacoob J draws attention to the extent of the applicant’s poverty and 
disability and the perverse aims of the government in opposing the applicant’s claim. 
325 At para 71. 
326 At para 46. 
327 At para 84. 
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that amount, as well as all her costs.  It is submitted that the views expressed in 
this judgment indicate the seriousness with which the Constitutional Court 
regards infringements of the right of access to social assistance and the right to 
just administrative action.  The Njongi judgment is therefore a turning point 
illustrating the Constitutional Court’s willingness to address unlawful actions by 
the executive branch of government. 
 
Despite the right of access to social assistance in terms of section 27 of the 
Constitution and the right to administrative justice328 and the state’s duty to take 
steps to fulfil these rights, it was shown above that courts have been inundated 
with applications to compel provincial governments (the Eastern Cape in 
particular) to comply with their obligations.  As can be seen from the quotation 
below, government officials ignoring court orders undermine the rule of law. 
In a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law final and definitive court 
orders must be complied with by private citizen and the state alike. Without that 
fundamental commitment constitutional democracy and the rule of law cannot 
survive in the long run.  The reality is as stark as that.329 
 
The courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that the exercise of public 
power conforms to the principle of legality.330  The Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
fair.331  The values that the public administration is obliged to adhere to and 
                                     
328 I.t.o. s 33 of the Constitution. 
329 Magidimisi NO v The Premier of the Eastern Cape and Others Case 2180/04 Bisho High Court 
par 1. 
330 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & Others; In re: Ex Parte President of the 
RSA 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) paras 20 and 39; Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000(12) BCLR 1322 (E) 1326. 
331 Section 33(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
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promote are found in section 195 of the Constitution.  Most importantly, section 
195(1)(e) requires public servants to respond to people’s needs.  When delays in 
grant applications occur due to mismanagement, there clearly is a failure to 
respond to the needs of grant applicants.  In addition, section 195(1)(f) states 
that the public administration must be accountable.  The courts are empowered 
by the Constitution to ensure the accountability of the exercise of power by the 
public administration.332  The persons in charge of the grant administration in the 
provinces can therefore be held accountable for the mismanagement of grants.  
Where officials of the grant administration ignore court orders against their 
departments, they flout the abovementioned obligations that the Constitution 
imposes upon them.333 
 
A greater reason for concern is the spate of litigation against the Eastern Cape 
provincial government regarding its failure to comply with court orders made in 
favour of grant applicants.334  The judiciary’s remedial power in cases where 
                                     
332 Sections 34 (the right of access to courts) and 165(5) (court orders binding on organs of 
state).  
333 Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts: Litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 52. The reason why the common law cannot provide sufficient 
guidance on remedies for the failure of government departments to comply with court orders, is 
precisely because the courts have not needed to decide on the matter, as government 
departments have until recently complied with orders issued by courts of law.  It is only recently 
that “the attitude of State departments towards courts’ orders has changed” leading to the   
alarming increase in applications before the courts (Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, 
Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (TkH) 452 B-C). 
334 According to Jafta J in Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 
(TkH) 452 C, the number of applications before the Court where the applicant seeks a remedy 
that would force the respondent to comply with prior court orders has risen “at an alarming rate”.  
The problem of the excessive litigation caused by mismanagement of grants is unfortunately 
compounded by dubious lawsuits against the provincial Social Development Departments (and, 
recently, SASSA) by unscrupulous attorneys.  See MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 
All SA 455 (SCA) 458; Cele v The South African Social Security Agency and 22 related cases 
Unreported 7940/07 Durban and Coast Local Division, paras 14 and 24. Similar sentiments were 
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grant applicants’ rights in general and older persons in particular, have been 
violated is analysed in the section below. 
 
4.3.4.4.3 Failure to comply with court orders 
 
A recent example of this trend of ignoring of, or failure to comply with, court 
orders by government officials is the case of Magidimisi NO v The Premier of the 
Eastern Cape and Others.335  In this case the premier of the Eastern Cape, the 
MEC for Finance, the MEC for Social Development as well as the head of 
Department of Social Development were served with notices by the Bisho High 
Court compelling them to rectify flaws in the administration of social grants in the 
province after the provincial government failed to make payments as ordered by 
courts to welfare litigants who won court orders against the province.  
                                                                                                             
expressed in other cases such as Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 
SA 446 (TkH) where the court a quo made a qualified order for costs based on its finding that the 
appellant’s attorney had abused the court process by instituting 139 separate, but similar, 
applications, whereas one application with 139 applicants would have sufficed (450 F).  Other 
cases where the injudicious use of a computer-generated precedent by attorneys without 
considering the real thrust or true facts of the applicant’s complaint was criticized include 
Sikutshwa v MEC for Social Development, EC Province & another [2005] JOL 14413 (Tk) at 4; 
Nyumbana v MEC of the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Province [2005] JOL 13882 (SE) 
at 7; Mfubu v MEC of the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Province [2005] JOL 13874 (SE) 
at 5 where reference was made of “the somewhat slipshod way in which the claim was 
formulated”.  The Constitutional Court in Njongi v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape 
2008 (6) BCLR 571 (CC), elected not to involve itself in the claim on behalf of the Department 
that it has to face many spurious claims, but rather chose to focus on the claim in hand which was 
clearly not a spurious claim (para 89). 
335 Case 2180/04 Bisho High Court.   Other cases where the failure of provincial officials of the 
Department of Social Development to give heed to court orders were at issue, include Mjeni v 
The Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (TkH); Kate v MEC for the 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE); Jayiya v Member of the Executive 
Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA); MEC, Department of 
Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA). 
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Magadamisi appeared as the representative of his mother’s estate336 in order to 
recoup the money owed to her after she had successfully sued to have her 
outstanding disability grants paid to her.  She unfortunately did not live to see the 
benefits paid to her.   
 
Froneman J stated that it was common cause that the Eastern Cape Provincial 
administration had in a number of instances not complied with court orders to pay 
money to successful litigants.337  His impression was that the respondents were 
under a “misapprehension as to the nature and extent of their constitutional duty 
to obey and give effect to court orders”.338  He was also not impressed by the fact 
that the premier and the MECs felt wronged by what they saw as incorrect 
perceptions “also amongst members of the judiciary” about the alleged lack of 
performance by the provincial government and its causes.339  According to him 
their general defence illustrated their “fundamental misconception” of their 
obligation to comply with court orders.340  Instead of addressing the central 
complaint relating to non-compliance with court orders,341 their response centred 
on general excuses for bad performance such as the legacy of apartheid 
institutions dealing with social assistance; the increase of the number of 
                                     
336 He also acted as the representative of 59 other judgment creditors in similar circumstances.  
His application was also made in the public interest, as he regarded it in the public interest that 
the respondents’ failure to obey court orders against them be addressed (para 9). 
337 Para 5. 
338 Para 7. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Para 10. 
341 Froneman J regards the lack of any description of the process of payments of debts out of 
provincial finances as a “curious and telling omission” (para 12). 
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applications for social assistance; and the communication problems existing in 
the application process.342 
 
The judge regarded the province’s response on the papers as “misconceived and 
wrong”.343   He added that “[o]n the face of it, the response appears to be 
arrogant and even callous”.344 
 
As the rule of law is one of the founding values of the Constitution and as a result 
everyone, including the state, is bound by the law and court orders, Froneman J 
then examined the constitutional and statutory duties of each of the respondents 
with regards to the responsibility to ensure that court orders regarding the 
payment of social grants were obeyed.  He came to the conclusion that each of 
the first four respondents “bears the constitutional duty to act in accordance with 
the rule of law, which in the context of this application means that they must 
ensure that court orders made against the province are paid”.345  Their failure to 
comply with this duty was caused by their fundamental misconception of their 
duty to protect, uphold and enhance the rule of law346 as well as the lack of 
                                     
342 Para 11.  Reference was also made to the potential improvement of the situation brought 
about by the creation of SASSA.  Froneman J expressed his hope that the national agency would 
in fact bring about such improvements, but indicated that this did not address the central 
complaint in the case, which was the then failure of the provincial government to comply with 
court orders. 
343 Para 17.  One example of this was the persistent use of the department’s own calculations of 
amounts owed, instead of the exact amounts as ordered by the courts (para 15). 
344 Para 17.  See e.g. counsel for the respondents’ argument that the order sought in casu is 
“neither necessary nor necessarily effective.” (para 5). 
345 Para 24. 
346 The reasons for non-compliance with court orders included: being under the impression that 
the judgments against the department were wrongly granted; that the grants were assessed by 
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processes for dealing with judgments against the province for payment of 
money.347 
 
Froneman J ruled that the respondents’ “persistent and lengthy”348 failure to 
ensure that the province complies with the previous court orders constituted an 
ongoing violation of their duties under the Constitution and that the provincial 
government has a legal obligation to satisfy the payments of the orders.349  He 
ordered the respondents to take administrative steps to ensure compliance with 
his order within 14 days.  He also ordered that the respondents deliver a full 
written report to the registrar of the Bisho High Court within 21 days to show how 
they would give effect to his order.  This was in line with what the judge regarded 
as the court’s competence to retain a supervisory role over the process of 
compliance with its order.350  Should the respondents fail to comply within the 
stated times the applicant could seek further relief from the High Court.351 
                                                                                                             
the time the judicial process had run its course; and cases where the department “preferred to 
follow its own assessment rather than comply with the exact terms of the court order” (para 15).   
347 Ibid. 
348 Para 33. 
349 In Vumazonke v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 229 (SECLD) 236 
para 9 Plasket J justified judicial involvement in the relations between provincial departments and 
grant beneficiaries as follows: “Judges have criticised the performance of the Department of 
Social Development, not because they see themselves as super-ombudsmen or wish to involve 
themselves in politics, but because the administrative failings of the department have 
consequences that bring its performance within the heartland of the judicial function: those 
failings infringe or threaten the fundamental rights of large numbers of people to have access to 
social assistance, to just administrative action and to human dignity.” 
350 Magadamisi para 32.  This type of remedy where the court orders an organ of state to report 
on its progress in complying with the court order is called a structural interdict. State compliance 
with its duty to provide socio-economic rights can be enforced effectively via a structural interdict, 
mainly because the state is obliged to report to the court on its progress in implementing the 
terms of the court order.  A structural interdict also states the time frame within which the court 
order has to be complied with (De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” 
(2007) 3 PER 10.  One advantage of the court’s supervisory role is that the court gains a better 
understanding of the problems that the province experience in complying with their duties.  See 
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Froneman J described the balance between the respondents’ duty to take 
reasonable measures to give effect to the applicant’s rights and the court’s 
obligation to ensure that they do so, as follows: 
In this case the constitutional duty of the respondents was to give effect to the 
fundamental right of the applicant and others to social security and assistance 
under section 27 of the Constitution, by properly administering the provisions of 
the Social Assistance Act.  This includes reasonable measures to make the 
system effective.  The constitutional duty of the courts in this regard is not to tell 
the respondents how to do this, but merely to ensure that they do take 
reasonable measures to make the system effective.  In this manner the 
respondents (representing the province), as well as the courts, are enjoined to 
ensure the realisation of the same goal, albeit in different ways.  The 
respondents do not have a choice but to administer the administration of grants 
in a reasonable manner making the system effective.  The courts have no choice 
but to give redress when this is not done.  And after the courts have made a final 
pronouncement on the issue in accordance with legal procedures, the 
respondents have no constitutional choice to disregard the courts' judgments.  If 
they nevertheless do, the courts in turn have no constitutional choice other than 
to ensure as far as possible that practical effect is given to those judgments.352 
 
In Mjeni v The Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape,353 the court had to 
consider whether disobedience of a court order by the state through its officials 
could lead to an order of contempt of court.  In particular, the court had to 
determine whether contempt of court proceedings were appropriate to enforce an 
                                                                                                             
also Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” 2004 SAJHR 
414 for the advantages of supervisory jurisdiction. 
351 Para 39.  The “further relief” sought by the applicant would quite likely include contempt of 
court proceedings. 
352 Para 26. 
353 2000 4 SA 446 (TkH). The respondent had been ordered to pay the applicant’s costs for an 
application for the reinstatement of the applicant’s old age grant.  The respondent failed to pay 
within the required period.  The applicant then lodged an application that the respondent be 
ordered to pay costs and failing that, the respondent be ordered to appear in court to show cause 
for holding her in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order to pay costs.  In the court a 
quo the costs awarded to the applicant were reduced, as the court found that the applicant’s 
attorney had abused the Court process by instituting 139 similar applications, whereas one 
application with 139 applicants would have sufficed.  The appellant appealed against the 
reduction in costs, and the respondent lodged a cross-appeal against the contempt of court order. 
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order for payment of money, and what was the impact of section 3 of the State 
Liability Act,354 which prohibits the execution of judgment against the state.355 
 
The Minister of a government department is cited as the nominal defendant or 
respondent in litigation against the department.356  Execution of judgment against 
a provincial department or the state is prohibited in terms of the State Liability Act 
in order to prevent the disruption which execution against state assets would 
cause.357  The same therefore goes for the Minister or MEC who serves as 
nominal defendant or respondent.358  
 
A long line of judicial authority supports the view that an order for the payment of 
money cannot be enforced by means of committal for contempt.359  Jafta J in 
Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape360 distinguished the 
previous decisions from the matter at hand, on the basis that none of the 
previous decisions had dealt with the state as the judgment debtor, and that the 
previous cases emphasised the fact that the successful party had other modes of 
                                     
354Act 20 of 1957. 
355 In general, when a judgment debtor fails to comply with a judgment debt payable in money, 
the judgment creditor can rely on execution of judgment, whereby the debtor’s property is 
attached and sold to pay the debt.  As a consequence of the State Liability Act, the state as 
judgment debtor proves the exception to this rule. 
356S 2(1) State Liability Act 20 of 1957. 
357 S 3.   See Jayiya v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 
[2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA) 230 para 16 where Conradie JA calls attention to the fact that the 
legislators of 1957 could not have foreseen that the time might come “that the state or a Province 
might not promptly comply with an order of court”. 
358 “Minister” is to be interpreted to include the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of a 
province as well (s 2(2)). 
359 As does s 1 of the Abolition of Civil Imprisonment Act 2 of 1997, although no reference was 
made to this provision in Mjeni. 
360 Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (TkH). 
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execution than committal for contempt of court at its disposal.361  A party who 
succeeds in a claim against the state does not have such “other modes of 
execution” at his or her disposal, as the State Liability Act precludes him or her 
from executing against state property.  Application of the common-law rule 
excluding contempt of court proceedings against judgment debtors to cases 
where the state is the judgment debtor would mean that the judgment would be 
unenforceable.  As a consequence, “the State could just ignore such judgements 
with complete impunity”.362  This would be contrary to the state’s constitutional 
duty to comply with orders or decisions issued by the courts.363  As deliberate 
non-compliance with court orders has a negative impact on the dignity and 
effectiveness of the courts, it constitutes a breach of that constitutional duty.364    
 
Jafta J also held that the prohibition of “execution, attachment or like process” 
against a nominal respondent in the State Liability Act, does not include arrest for 
contempt of court.  The intention with the State Liability Act was not to place 
ministers of state above the law, but only to ”prohibit attachment and/or execution 
against the personal property of the Minister cited or that of the State”.365  He 
therefore concluded that Ministers of state and other public officials such as 
                                     
361 At 451. 
362 At 454A.  See also Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 
(SE) 157 para 22. 
363 S 165 (5) Constitution, 1996.  The state is also obliged to use legislative and other measures 
to “assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility 
and effectiveness of the courts” (s 165(4)).  Where the government ignores court orders to pay 
social grants, it is acting contrary to s 165(4) and therefore unconstitutionally. 
364 Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (TkH) 452G. 
365 At 455F. 
 
 
 
 
301 
 
MECs of departments can be declared in contempt of court.366  Due to the 
limitations imposed by the State Liability Act this was the only means available to 
the court to enforce judgments. 
 
The Mjeni judgment opened the door for individual public responsibility for public 
officials dealing with the grants administration for their actions or omissions.367  
However, in the subsequent judgment in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern 
Cape and Another,368 the approach in Mjeni was abandoned for a more 
conservative interpretation of the court’s ability to fashion remedies to successful 
applicants.  The Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine the most appropriate 
sanction against the respondents369 for their failure to comply with a court order 
directing them to pay a lump-sum back payment plus interest on that amount.370  
                                     
366 At 455G. In casu the facts did not show that the respondent was aware of the existence of the 
court order and had deliberately disobeyed it and contempt of court proceedings could therefore 
not succeed (at 454G). 
367 In Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) the effect of 
the Mjeni judgment on the personal accountability of public officials was summarised as follows: 
“Where they acted wrongly the poor and disabled applicants could be compensated by being paid 
what they should have received in the first place.  And if, nevertheless, the State failed to comply 
with the court order of payment, the possibility of committal for contempt of court, or at least a 
declaration to that effect, could help individual public officials to pay heed to their constitutional 
public duties” (at 149 para 11). 
368 [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA). 
369 The respondents were the MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and the 
Permanent Secretary: Welfare of the Eastern Cape Provincial Government.  The applicant sought 
an order that the first respondent make the lump sum and interest payment, but the court a quo 
made the order against the second respondent (at 227 para 4).  The fact that the second 
respondent never should have been cited, contributed to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding 
that the contempt application could not succeed (at 229 para 14).  In Kate v MEC for the 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) only the MEC for Welfare was cited, 
presumably in reaction to the finding in Jayiya.  See Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape at 150, para 12. 
370 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the court a quo should not have made the order for 
“constitutional damages” in the form of the interest on the lump sum payable.  “Constitutional 
damages” are only payable where no common law or statutory remedy is available.  The 
inference can be drawn that as the order for “constitutional damages” was not appropriate under 
the circumstances, the respondents’ failure to pay does not constitute contempt of court.  
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One of the important issues was whether incarcerating the second respondent 
for contempt of court was the appropriate remedy. 
 
Conradie JA referred to the State Liability Act and stated that section 3 outlaws 
the issue of “execution, attachment or like process” against nominal respondents 
in proceedings against a government department.371  In terms of the Abolition of 
Civil Imprisonment Act,372  the respondent was protected against incarceration 
for the non-payment of a debt.  The Supreme Court of Appeal considered the 
attempts by the High Courts in the province to develop the common law in such a 
way as to address the “wholesale non-compliance with court orders”.373  It also 
recognised that the object of taking disputes to court is to provide successful 
litigants with the opportunity of having their rights enforced.  However, it 
disagreed that the common law should evolve to create remedies in conflict with 
statutory law, which would have been the case if the respondent was jailed for 
contempt of court in conflict with the State Liability Act.  Thus, apart from the fact 
that the wrong respondent was cited for contempt of court374 and the application 
could not succeed on the facts, the Supreme Court of Appeal was also in 
principle opposed to holding nominal respondents liable for contempt of court.375 
                                                                                                             
370 The applicant should have sought her remedy in terms of PAJA (at 228 para 9).  The inference 
can be drawn that as the order for “constitutional damages” was not appropriate under the 
circumstances, the respondents’ failure to pay does not constitute contempt of court.  
371 At 230 para 16. 
372 Act 2 of 1977, s 1. 
373 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and another [2003] 2 All SA 
223 (SCA) 230 para 17. 
374 See fn 369 above.  See also Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 
SA 141 (SE) 157, where Froneman J expressed the view that the decision in Jayiya should be 
read in the context of the particular facts of the case.  
375 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA) 231 para 18. 
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One interpretation of the Jayiya judgment could be that it pronounces that 
individual public officials cannot be sued for wrongful administrative acts, that the 
state is not obliged to comply with orders to pay money; and that the courts are 
not capable of enforcing court orders sounding in money against state officials.376   
This was the interpretation the department chose in dealing with court orders 
against it.  Froneman J in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape disagreed that this was the only possible reading of Jayiya.377  He 
considered that section 38 of the Constitution empowers any court to grant 
“appropriate relief” when dealing with infringements of the Bill of Rights.  In 
addition, section 172 (1) of the Constitution provides that when deciding a 
constitutional matter, a court “must declare that any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency”.378  
The court may make any order that is just and equitable and appropriate.379  
                                     
376 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 15 summarise 
the post- Jayiya situation as follows:  “The practical consequence of this judgment is that 
successful litigants with court orders sounding in money against the state in their favour, faced 
with a state organ that ignores the court orders can neither successfully have state officials who 
were responsible for implementing the order, but failed to do so, imprisoned for contempt of court, 
nor attach state property in execution of the debts owing to them.”  
377 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) 152 para 15.  At 158, para 26, he expressed his concern that the decision 
in Jayiya would be abused by public officials as an excuse not to comply with court orders.  Much 
of Froneman J’s judgment consisted of a reaction to the Jayiya judgment. 
378 Courts are constitutionally mandated to determine whether state policy and actions are 
inconsistent with the Constitution.  In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 
721 (CC) para 99  it was stated that “[w]here state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the 
Constitution, courts have to consider whether in formulating and implementing such policy the 
state has given effect to its constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given case that the 
state has failed to do so, it is obliged by the Constitution to say so.  In so far as that constitutes an 
intrusion into the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself.”  
Although the courts should show due regard to the role of the legislature and executive, they may 
- and are sometimes even obliged to - make orders that affect policy (para 113). 
379 Trengove “Judicial remedies for violations of socio-economic rights” (1999) 1 (4) ESR Review 
8.  
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Courts therefore have wide remedial powers as long as the remedies are 
appropriate in the circumstances.380  Court orders against the state are binding, 
as section 165(5) of the Constitution provides that court orders bind “all persons 
to whom and organs of state to which is applies”.  In terms of section 239 of the 
Constitution an individual functionary is included in the definition of “organ of 
state”.  Hence, public state functionaries can be held individually accountable in a 
court of law for how they exercise their power.381 
 
It is important to note that the State Liability Act read with the Abolition of Civil 
Imprisonment Act only protects a state official from being liable for contempt of 
court in cases of money orders.  Where the court orders the state official to do 
something or refrain from doing something and the official fails to do so, he or 
she is liable to be committed for contempt of court and “there is nothing in Jayiya 
that suggests the contrary”.382 
 
Froneman J was of the view that a strict reading of Jayiya, that section 3 of the 
State Liability Act forbids even an order calling upon state functionaries to explain 
                                     
380 Minister of Health v TAC 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 113; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19.  The  inquiry into the appropriateness of relief should be guided by 
“the objective, first, to address the wrong occasioned by the infringement of the constitutional 
right; second, to deter future violations; third, to make an order that can be complied with; and 
fourth, of fairness to all those who might be affected by the relief.  Invariably, the nature of the 
right infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief 
in the particular case” (Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45). The courts 
are not merely granted the power to fashion new orders to ensure compliance with orders, but 
they actually have the power to decide exactly what the offending party needs to do to remedy 
the situation (De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 8 fn 
28. 
381 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) 154, para 19. 
382 MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 467, para 30. 
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why they have not complied with court orders and why they consequently should 
not be held in contempt of court, would render section 3 unconstitutional, as it 
would place such public officials above the law.383  The consequence of a strict 
reading of Jayiya would be that the state could not be held accountable for its 
actions.  At the most, Jayiya serves as authority that public officials “cannot be 
held guilty of the crime of contempt of court for non-compliance with a money 
judgment”.384  Any other reading would lead to a constitutional crisis between the 
judiciary and the state.  
 
Froneman J considered another option to ensure compliance with court orders, 
such as, an order declaring the offending public official in contempt of court 
without criminal sanction.  Such a declaration of contempt could co-exist with the 
rule forbidding the conviction of a person for a retrospectively created offence.385  
                                     
383 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) 156-7, paras 
21 and 22.  At 157-8, para 25, Froneman J states that “[i]f the interpretation of s 3 of the State 
Liability Act in Jayiya means that the Government is not bound to comply with court orders 
sounding in money, or that the courts cannot devise other legal means to ensure compliance with 
court orders, then there is no possible way that I can think of how s 3 of the State Liability Act, if 
interpreted in this manner, can serve the rule of law and the Constitution”.  Froneman J has been 
supported in Sikutshwa v MEC for Social Development, EC Province & another [2005] OL 14413 
(Tk) paras 53 and 55.  See also Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 
446 (TkH) 454A.   
384 At 157, para 23.  This view was also confirmed on appeal in MEC, Department of Welfare v 
Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 462 para 19.  The Supreme Court of Appeal found that many of 
the statements made in Jayiya were obiter.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Appeal declined 
to revisit the Jayiya decision where it was not material to the Kate case, as “to add to the non-
binding statements that were made in that case and in the court below will only add to any 
uncertainty” (462, para 19). 
385 At 157, paras 21 and 22. 
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State officials would merely be required to state why they have not complied with 
the court orders and how they intend to comply with them.386 
 
The matter of whether a state official could indeed be held in contempt of court 
was settled in MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate387 where the Supreme Court 
of Appeal unanimously held that “there ought to be no doubt that a public official 
who is ordered by a court to do or to refrain from doing a particular act and fails 
to do so is liable to be committed for contempt”. 
 
When social security rights are infringed, it therefore becomes the judiciary’s 
concern.388  Once the courts have determined that the relevant policy is 
unconstitutional, government has to give effect to the court orders “whether or 
not they affect its policy and has to find the resources to do so”.389 
 
Court orders should be flexible and allow the executive a margin of discretion to 
adapt and change policies where it considers it appropriate to do so whilst still 
complying with the court orders.390   However, this should not entail deferring to 
the executive to such extent that the court orders are “so vague that respondents 
                                     
386 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 16 question 
whether even such a declaratory order would serve any practical purpose, as it is possible that 
the responsible state official would still do nothing even after the declaratory order. 
387 [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 467 at para 30. 
388 Vumazonke  v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 229 (SE) 236 para 9. 
389 Minister of Health v TAC 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 99. 
390 Provided that the amended policies are constitutional and legal.  Minister of Health v TAC 
2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 114; see also Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 414 - 415; Vumazonke v MEC for Social Development, 
Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 229 (SE) 237 para 11. 
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do not know what is required of them, or that the effectiveness of the remedy is 
compromised”.391   
 
It has been argued that the decision by courts not to exercise supervisory  
jurisdiction might compromise the efficacy of the court order, leaving the 
applicant with no other option as to resort to contempt proceedings to secure 
compliance with the judgment.392  The Constitutional Court has also been 
criticised for remaining “peculiarly hesitant to showcase the full extent” of the 
competence of the court to affirm the judiciary’s competence to enforce socio-
economic rights.393 
 
In MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate394 the Supreme Court of Appeal had the 
opportunity to resolve the question of what the consequences of public 
functionary not complying with duties and court orders should be.  It held that the 
courts are willing to “fashion innovative remedies” to ensure that their orders are 
properly implemented.395  In some instances the particular public official does not 
fail to make payment of a debt, but rather neglects to consider and decide upon a 
grant application.  Therefore “there ought to be no doubt that a public official who 
is ordered by a court to do or refrain from doing a particular act and fails to do so 
                                     
391 Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 
SAJHR 412-3. 
392 Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 416. 
393 Ibid.  In the wake of the Magadimisi judgment, De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-
economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 13 expressed the hope that the Constitutional Court would take a 
less cautious approach than before and follow the example of the High Courts in making use of 
structural interdicts.  A failure by the Constitutional Court to do so would, in their view, “render the 
concept of justiciable socio-economic rights a mockery.” 
394 [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA). 
395 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 7. 
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is liable to be committed for contempt in accordance with ordinary principles and 
there is nothing in Jayiya that suggests the contrary”.396 The current position is 
therefore that a state official can under certain circumstances be held liable for 
contempt of court, for example where the official is ordered to see to it that 
systems are put into place to ensure the prompt payment of the applicant’s older 
person’s grant and then fails to do so.397 
 
Another possible remedy is in interpreting the “constitutional relief” available in 
terms of section 38 to include damages payable in terms of the delictual liability 
of a state official who acts negligently fails to perform his or her duties properly.  
Nugent JA in MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate398 had no doubt that “delictual 
principles are capable of being extended to encompass state liability for the 
breach of constitutional obligations”.399  If the state can be delictually liable for the 
actions or omissions of officials, individual officials as “organs of state”400 can 
also be personally liable for damages caused by their negligent actions or 
omissions. 
 
De Beer and Vettori agree that delictual liability of a state official who does not 
comply with a court order is a remedy which has to be given serious 
                                     
396 MEC Department of Welfare, v Kate [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 466 para 30.  
397 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 22. 
398 [2006] All SA 455 (SCA). 
399 At 465, para 27. 
400 I.t.o. s 239 of the Constitution an individual functionary is included in the definition of “organ of 
state”. 
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consideration.401  They propose that once it is accepted that a state official can 
be held in contempt of court, “there is no reason why a state official should not be 
civilly liable in delict for not complying with a court order or for simply not 
performing adequately in his capacity as state employee”.402 
 
The advantages of individual delictual liability include reimbursement of the loss 
or damage suffered by the wronged person, as well as increased accountability 
for individual state officials due to the threat of personal liability should they 
neglect their duties.403 
 
A delictual claim against a particular state official would ideally follow on a 
structural interdict which would name the persons responsible for fulfilling the 
terms of the order.  Should the named person fail to comply with the structural 
interdict, he or she can be held liable in terms of a delictual claim for damages 
suffered.404 
                                     
401 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 16. 
402 At 16 and 18. 
403 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 18.  They 
defend their view on the advantages of delictual claims as remedies against recalcitrant state 
officials as follows: ““To those who perceive personal delictual liability of state officials as a drastic 
measure, our response is two-fold.  Firstly, drastic times call for drastic measures.  When 
something as fundamental to the fabric of our society such as the rule of law is threatened and 
when the result of this is that the poorest sections of society are denied their constitutional rights 
to socio-economic rights and ultimately to life, it is clear that this state of affairs simply cannot be 
allowed to continue.  Secondly, in the light of the fact that in order to succeed in a delictual claim 
both wrongfulness and damages have to be proved, there will be no liability unless the state 
official acted in an unreasonable manner.” (2007) 3 PER 20. 
404 Provided all the elements of a delict can be proved (De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of 
socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 20.  Therefore, only those state officials who conduct 
themselves in an unreasonable manner can be held liable, taking into account that more can be 
expected of higher ranking officials than others occupying less important positions.  Innocent 
officials conducting themselves in a reasonable manner would not be liable for damages as they 
have not been acting wrongfully, but “the disregard for human dignity and for the rule of law 
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It is submitted that a delictual claim is not as readily available to all wronged 
grant applicants as De Beer and Vettori suggest.  The problem lies therein that to 
succeed with a delictual claim, the claimant has to prove all the elements of a 
delict.405  The claimant would therefore have to prove the quantum of damages in 
monetary terms, something which is difficult to prove in the case of a grant 
applicant or recipient facing unreasonable delays in having their grant 
applications processed or their grants paid.  Whereas it is easy enough to 
calculate the arrears owing on the grant,406 as well as the shortfall on a grant, 
these are not the only losses suffered by victims of unreasonable and unlawful 
delays by state officials.  In MEC, Department of Welfare v Kate,407 Nugent JA 
held that there is “no empirical monetary standard” against which to measure the 
enduring poverty and reduced dignity suffered by persons who are unlawfully 
deprived of a grant.   
 
In comparison to the High Courts in the Eastern Cape, the Constitutional Court 
has been quite cautious with its use of “the remedial arsenal at its disposal”.408 In 
Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign the constitutional 
                                                                                                             
displayed by the officials of the Department of Social Welfare in the Eastern Cape is so 
outrageous that it will easily qualify as wrongful for the purposes of a delictual claim” (De Beer 
and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 21). 
405 As De Beer and Vettori rightly acknowledge in “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” 
(2007) 3 PER 20-21. 
406 In terms of reg 12 read with reg 10(4) of G R898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008, the grant 
accrues from the date when the application form was signed in the presence of a designated 
officer.  The arrears owing to the applicant are therefore calculated from the date that the 
application was made. 
407 [2006] 2 All SA 455 (SCA) 468 para 33. 
408 Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 
SAJHR 414.   
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court did not feel the need to impose a structural interdict upon the government, 
as “[t]he government has always respected and executed orders of this Court.  
There is no reason to believe that it will not do so in the present case”.409 
 
Even the landmark Grootboom judgment410 has attracted criticism for failing to 
provide the anticipated results with regards to access to housing for people in 
desperate need.  Pillay411 contends that the problem with the Constitutional Court 
order lies in the declaratory nature of the order, in that no time frames were set 
for state action on the order.  In her view, this has led to “a clear lack of 
understanding that the judgment requires systematic changes to national, 
provincial and local housing programmes to cater for people in desperate and 
crisis situations”.412  In addition, the court declined to exercise a supervisory role 
in order to ensure that the state complies with the court order, with the result that 
the state’s tardiness in complying with the order would only have been dealt with 
when poor communities and their representatives brought a new case.413 
 
                                     
409 Minister of Health v TAC 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 763 at para 129.   De Beer and Vettori “The 
enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 9 are of the opinion that the Constitutional 
Court’s view that it was “unnecessary for it to play a supervisory role in order to ensure 
implementation of its order by the government”, was “misplaced and naïve”, in the light of the 
government’s failure to act on the declaratory order until the TAC took further steps.  See below 
at fn 415. 
410 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC). 
411 Pillay “Implementing Grootboom: Supervision needed” (2002) 3 ESR Review 14. 
412 Ibid. 
413 Ibid.  
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Trengove414 argues that supervisory orders are the appropriate remedy in cases 
where “the pattern of violation may be too widespread and diffuse to put a stop to 
it by a single Court order”.415  It is submitted that the widespread violations of 
grant beneficiaries’ rights of access to social security and right to just 
administrative action could only be stopped by supervisory orders ensuring that 
the required reforms in the social grant system take place.  The courts “should be 
adventurous in crafting means to ensure that their orders are properly 
implemented and adhered to”,416 whilst still ensuring that the remedies imposed 
are appropriate and practicable.417  
 
4.4  STATE LIABILITY TOWARD OLDER PERSONS: CONCLUSION 
 
In terms of sections 27(1)(c) and (2) of the Constitution the state is required to 
design and implement within its available resources a comprehensive system to 
realise progressively the right of older persons to have access to social security, 
particularly social assistance.  This system must be realised within available 
                                     
414 Trengove “Judicial remedies for violations of socio-economic rights” (1999) 1 (4) ESR Review 
9. 
415 In hindsight, the case of Minister of Health v TAC 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) was exactly the type of 
case where supervisory orders are appropriate according to Trengove, given the widespread 
violation of rights and the failure of the government to act on the declaratory order.  The court had 
ordered the government to make nevirapine available without delay at hospitals and clinics when 
the treatment was medically indicated, in order to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV.  The government did not act without delay and only proceeded to roll out the provision of 
nevirapine after the TAC had taken further steps.  See De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of 
socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 9. 
416 De Beer and Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2007) 3 PER 3. 
417 Cele v SASSA Unreported 7940/07 Durban and Coast Local Division (19 March 2008) para 
37. 
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resources and must include reasonable measures to provide for older persons 
currently excluded from the grants system. 
 
While the South African older person’s grant system is unequalled in other 
developing countries, particularly in terms of its coverage of the many older 
persons who have been deprived of the opportunity to provide for their own 
retirement income, it does display some weaknesses and to that extent falls short 
of compliance with the requirements of section 27 of the Constitution.  Issues 
such as the exclusion of certain groups of older persons from the grant, for 
example, permanent residents and men between the ages of 60 and 65, have 
been addressed by amendments to the SAA and its regulations.  The widespread 
fraud and corruption in the current administration of the grant will most probably 
decline as SASSA takes full control of the administration and once all the 
measures envisaged to counter fraud have been implemented.418   
 
It is hoped that transfer of the grant administration function to SASSA and the 
resultant reconfiguration of the grants delivery system will over time lead to an 
improvement in the chaotic situation caused by mismanagement of grants 
described above.419  Placing the responsibility for the administration of grants in 
the hands of one central organisation could also lead to a reduction in the costs 
                                     
418 See above at 4.3.3 for a discussion of the problem of fraud and corruption in the grants 
administration system and the measures that the Minister of Social Development and SASSA 
have undertaken to purge the system of fraud and corruption. 
419 At 4.3.4.  The Memorandum on the objectives of the South African Social Security Bill 51 of 
2003 noted that certain weaknesses in the social grant administration and payments necessitated 
the creation of a “focused, specialised delivery mechanism” such as SASSA.  See also Cele v 
SASSA Unreported case no. 7940/07 D&CLD para 15.  
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of service delivery and gains in efficiency.420  The fact that SASSA is also  
accountable for the operation of the SOCPEN data system has increased 
confidence that “ghost beneficiaries” and other incidences of mismanagement 
will decrease.421  SASSA has developed a communication strategy, whereby 
grant applicants can be informed of the decision on their applications within a 
reasonable time.422  The improved communication strategy is required to comply 
with the SAA and administrative justice requirements.423  Above all, it is 
submitted that the greatest advance in creating SASSA is moving the 
responsibility for the administration and payment away from provincial 
departments that clearly did not have the capacity to handle these tasks.424 
 
It is anticipated that the grant function shift to SASSA would at least in future 
entail improved conditions and better accountability.  The Constitution requires 
SASSA, as an organ of state, to overcome the administrative problems that it 
inherited from provincial governments in order to progressively realise the right of 
                                     
420 S3 of the South African Social Security Agency Act (SASSA Act) aims that SASSA will 
eventually act as the “sole agent” to ensure the efficient and effective management, 
administration and payment of social assistance.  See 4.3.1.4 above where the consolidation of 
the grant administration is listed as one of the factors that may in the long run reduce grant costs. 
421 See 4.3.3.2.3 where data correction is listed as a crucial measure to combat grant fraud.  
422 SASSA Act s 4(1)(b) requires SASSA to “collect, collate, maintain and administer such 
information as is necessary for the payment of social security”.  
423Joseph (2005) Resorting to the courts :Litigation and the crisis in the administration of social 
grants in the Eastern Cape 5.  See above at 4.3.4.4 for a discussion of the case law on non-
compliance with administrative justice requirements. 
424 During the transition process (SASSA only became fully operational nationally on 1 April 2006) 
where the liability for grant administration was transferred from the provincial departments to 
SASSA, some confusion existed about who should be liable for claims that result from grant 
applications made to the provincial departments before SASSA even existed. In Cele v SASSA 
Unreported case no. 7940/07 D&CLD paras 4 and 51, Wallis AJ held that the administration of 
and responsibility for paying social assistance grants has been delegated to SASSA as from 1 
April 2006 and that SASSA would be responsible from that date for claims arising from grant 
applications before SASSA started operating. 
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access to social security, as well as the right to just administrative action.  In 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others425 it was held that “the Constitution requires that everyone must be 
treated with care and concern”. Therefore the level of care and concern for the 
needs “of those most desperate”426 must be taken into account when evaluating 
whether the measures taken by SASSA to give effect to the right of access to 
social security are “reasonable” in terms of section 27 of the Constitution.   
 
Unless the courts can ensure that the government is forced to comply with its 
constitutional and statutory duties, the rights of older persons to access social 
security and to administrative justice are not protected and the rather pessimistic 
view of Wallis AJ in Cele v SASSA on the extent of the powers of the courts to 
address the situation will prevail: 
With the best will in the world it cannot force the employees of SASSA and the 
Department of Social Development to do their jobs properly, although it has 
striven hard to do so over the years, as it did with the provincial authorities in the 
past.427 
 
The abovementioned problems with the grant system do not, however, detract 
from the number of advantages the older person’s grant hold as a means to 
alleviate poverty, for example, the fact that it is well targeted at rural women, and 
the positive effect it has on the welfare of household members other than the 
grant recipient. Social assistance for older persons therefore has to remain a 
                                     
425 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 44. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Unreported case no 7940/07 D&CLD (19 March 2008) para 26. 
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policy priority in the face of other competing interests,428 such as assisting 
families with children and providing assistance to persons with HIV/Aids, as can 
be seen from the following quote from the 2007 Budget Review: 
How a society provides for ordinary people’s income security beyond their 
working years is one of the central expressions of its long-term institutional 
stability, integrity and social solidarity.429 
 
The abovementioned issues will have to be addressed before the older person’s 
grant can be said to meet the standard set by section 27 of the Constitution and 
the goal of “every elderly citizen and qualifying resident of South Africa to have, 
as a minimum, sufficient total income to meet basic subsistence needs” as 
recommended by the Mouton Committee.430 
 
Another major concern is the lack of coordination between the two chief systems 
to provide income during retirement: the older person’s grant system discussed 
above, and the occupational retirement fund system.  Combined, the two 
systems provide a retirement income for a vast majority of older persons in South 
Africa and demonstrate that providing retirement income to older persons 
remains a priority issue.431  As the state cannot possibly provide “a reasonable 
                                     
428 The potential impact that high grant costs may have on the state’s spending priorities and, 
therefore, on intergenerational solidarity was analysed above at 4.3.1. 
429  National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 “Social Security” 114.  See also Liebenberg 
“The right to social security: Response” in Brand and Russell (eds) (2002) Exploring the core 
content of socio-economic rights: South African and international perspectives 154. 
430 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 3.3(a).  See also BIG Financing Reference Group 
(2004) “Breaking the Poverty Trap” – Financing a BIG in SA 4 where it is stated that “government 
has both a constitutional obligation and a political and moral commitment to ensuring that all in 
South Africa have the means to meet their basic needs”. 
431 In 1992 the Mouton Committee reported the resources allocated to the two systems combined 
as nearly 7% of the gross domestic product. 
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level of replacement income after retirement for all”,432 a certain measure of 
integration between state social assistance and occupational retirement provision 
is required. Unfortunately, the two systems can be mutually exclusive, as benefits 
from retirement funds may disqualify an older person from receiving the older 
person’s grant due to the means test.433  It is submitted that a coordinated 
national “multi-pillar” retirement income system with the older person’s grant and 
a national retirement fund as the basic pillars, would reduce the adverse effects 
of the current means test for the older person’s grant.434  Therefore, an argument 
for a national retirement fund for South Africa is made in Chapter 5 below.   
   
 
                                     
432 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 3.5. 
433 Discussed above at 4.3.2. 
434 See below at 7.3 for a comparative overview of the retirement funding systems in Chile, 
Sweden, the UK and the USA, with particular reference to the balance between the national 
retirement fund and non-contributory (social assistance) benefit systems in these countries. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
The quotation above underlines the importance of solidarity as a principle 
guiding the organisation of retirement savings measures.  More so, the 
reference to “confidence in the long-term continuity of institutions” and “trust 
in the law and sound financial and economic management” relates to the 
important role of intergenerational solidarity as an expression of the South 
African nation’s values.  Intergenerational solidarity is where the younger 
generation ensure that sufficient retirement protection is available to retired 
persons through pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems.1  The aim of this chapter is 
to show that the principle of intergenerational solidarity (more so than intra-
generational solidarity) is fundamental to the current process of pension 
reform and the resultant legislation.2  
                                     
1 In the context of retirement funding, there is, however, also a component of intra-
generational solidarity, where the working age members of a retirement fund share the risk of 
income loss at retirement among themselves through their contributions into a retirement 
fund system.  This solidarity is more tenuous than intergenerational solidarity, as each 
member’s contributions are paid into an individual account for that member in the fund.  See 
above at 2.3 for descriptions of inter- and intragenerational solidarity, and 2.7 for the 
distinction between PAYG and fully-funded retirement systems. 
2 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 10 describes the 
close link between the law, pension systems and intergenerational solidarity as follows:  “A 
pension system is one of the income redistribution devices of a national social protection 
system.  It is essentially a set of legal rules which govern the functioning of that redistribution.  
“The organisation and financing of income security in retirement is amongst 
the most profound expressions of a nation’s cohesion and values.  It relies 
on confidence in the long-term continuity of institutions, it rests on trust in 
the law and sound financial and economic management, it embodies 
principles of solidarity, risk-sharing and prudential foresight.” (National 
Treasury Retirement Fund Reform: a discussion paper (2004) 4) 
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The current South African retirement funding structure unfortunately does not 
reflect the abovementioned values of solidarity and risk-pooling.  Instead, it 
attempts to combine a ‘neo-liberal’3  approach which encourages individuals 
to provide for their own financial security in old age with a social assistance 
system paying older person’s grants to older persons without means.  As was 
seen in the Chapter 3, retirement provision law is spread over different pieces 
of legislation, regulations and practice notes, of which very little aims to 
promote solidarity. 
 
Evidence of a ‘neo-liberal’ approach can be seen in the National Treasury’s 
2004 objectives of retirement policy which include the intention to: 
• Encourage individuals to provide adequately for their own retirement and the 
needs of their dependants. 
• Encourage employers and employees to provide for retirement funding as 
part of the remuneration contract. 
• Ensure that retirement funding arrangements are cost-efficient, prudently 
managed, transparent and fair. 
• Promote the retention of purchasing power of pensions through protection 
against the effects of inflation, within the resource constraints of the fund. 
• Improve standards of fund governance, including trustee knowledge and 
conduct, protection of members’ interest, accountability, and disclosure of 
material information to members and contributors. 4 
 
These objectives are dealt with individually below as the key issues that will 
                                                                                                        
In effect the legal rules determine how much the active (insured) population has to allocate to 
the non-actives.” 
3 See above at 2.3 for a discussion of ‘neo-liberalism’ and its impact on social policy. 
4 National Treasury (2004) Retirement Fund Reform: a discussion paper (hereafter “National 
Treasury (2004) Discussion paper”) 4.  Provision of social assistance to older persons is 
reserved only for those older persons who could not be reached by the above objectives. 
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determine the individual’s ability to adequately5 save for his or her own 
retirement.  The current retirement provision system6 provides an opportunity 
for a large proportion of the formally employed to contribute towards providing 
for their own retirement income needs.7  Without aiming to detract from its 
positive aspects, it is submitted that there are some weaknesses in the 
system that could lead to a lack of or decline in retirement income for fund 
members, with resultant reliance on assistance from the state. 
 
The current retirement funding system requires reform as it has been 
described as “fragmented, inadequate, prohibits portability, punishes those 
who wish to transfer benefits, excludes low-income people, the costs are the 
highest in the world and benefits do not always provide value for money”.8  
This chapter is dedicated to examining the extent of the defects in the current 
occupational retirement funding system and to determining the appropriate 
policy and statutory interventions to improve the system. In particular, the 
shortcomings in the current system that have a significant impact on 
                                     
5 According to the National Treasury Discussion paper (2004) 30 “adequate” retirement 
benefits would be 75% of earnings in the year before retirement for low-income earners, with 
a possible reduction in applicable percentage for higher income levels. 
6 As opposed to the non-contributory means-tested social assistance system intended for 
those in financial need, the occupational retirement fund system is a voluntary earnings-
related system (Department of Social Development (2007) Reform of Retirement Provision 
Discussion Document 61, hereafter referred to as “DSD Discussion document (2007”)). See 
above at 2.2 for the distinction between social assistance and earnings-related social 
insurance. 
7 Estimated at 9,85 million members for 2004 according to the DSD Discussion document 
(2007) 59.  The National Treasury (2007) Social Security and Retirement Reform 2nd 
discussion paper 5 (hereafter referred to as “National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper”) 
estimates the number of members at 9 million.  Both sources warn that the number of 
members may be overestimated due to double-counting of members belonging to more than 
one fund. 
8 ANC (2007) Social Transformation 4. 
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intergenerational solidarity have been selected for further analysis and 
include: the type of fund the individual belongs to;9 leakage from the 
retirement funding system due to a lack of preservation of retirement benefits; 
the voluntary nature of retirement funds; limited access to retirement funds for 
workers in the informal economy, low-income workers, the unemployed and 
family caregivers; and fund governance. 
 
5.2 THE PENSION REFORM PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
President Mbeki announced the overhaul of the South African retirement 
funding system in February 2007.  He revealed that the new social security 
system will be based on the principle of social solidarity, among others.10  It 
was envisaged that the reformed social security system would be made up of 
a number of ‘pillars’, more or less based on the World Bank’s multi-pillar 
model.11   
 
The stated aims with the reform process were to: 
• Encourage higher levels of retirement savings, including measures to 
assist lower income employees to save for their retirement; 
• Create a single national retirement fund to “take advantage of 
economies of scale” and reduce costs; 
• Support current fund members’ efforts to save for their retirement;  
                                     
9 Certain problems relate only to certain types of funds. 
10 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 1.   
11 For more on the World Bank model and the adoption thereof in other countries, see below 
at 7.3.2.  
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• Build on current retirement legislation;12 and 
• Create a sustainable pension structure.13 
 
The emphasis in these aims on assisting employees to save for their 
retirement still reflects a ‘neo-liberal’ element, but this is balanced with the 
aim of pooling of risks and costs in a national system which is characteristic of 
social solidarity. 
 
Various discussion documents have been published to facilitate the reform 
process and to ensure as much public participation as possible.14  The 
following is an outline of the features of the future social security system 
proposed in the discussion documents.15 
 
It is envisaged in the discussion documents that social assistance for older 
persons will constitute the first pillar of the reformed social security system.  A 
mandatory contributory retirement funding scheme for all employees, with 
possible contributions by self-employed individuals and workers in the 
                                     
12 Joint press statement on Retirement Reform by Government, COSATU, FEDUSA and 
NACTU issued on 27 June 2008. 
13 Cameron “SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 Jan 2008 
http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 05/02/2009). 
14 The discussion documents include the National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper and 2nd 
discussion paper (2007); the DSD discussion document (2007); and the Taylor Committee 
Report (2002).  The reform process is driven by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the 
Minister of Finance and will include negotiations with trade unions and other social partners, 
as well as broad public consultation (Joint press statement on Retirement Reform by 
Government, COSATU, FEDUSA and NACTU issued on 27 June 2008; Cameron “SA’s new 
retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 January 2008). 
15 The DSD and National Treasury discussion documents reflect significantly different views 
on only a few points.  These are discussed below when they arise in the context of the 
discussion on how the proposed reforms can address the current shortcomings in the 
retirement funding system.  
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informal economy, is planned as the second pillar.  The retirement funding 
pillar of the reformed system will be based on principles such as equity, 
pooling of risks, mandatory participation, administrative efficiency and 
solidarity.16  These principles are closely related to the promotion of 
intergenerational solidarity and are dealt with in more detail below.17  The 
remaining pillar(s) of the social security system will be supplementary 
retirement saving schemes to boost retirement income received from the 
second pillar scheme,18 as well as systems to assist older persons with 
medical care and accommodation.  At first glance, these ‘pillars’ seem to 
correspond with the current three-pillared framework for retirement funding.19 
The significant difference between the current and the proposed multi-pillar 
system is that voluntary membership of occupational retirement funds is to be 
replaced with mandatory national retirement fund membership. 
 
The social security reforms aspire to develop a retirement system “in keeping 
with South Africa’s level of development and its need to ensure adequate 
access to social security as required by the Constitution”.20  Section 27(2) of 
the Constitution requires the state to take reasonable measures to realise the 
                                     
16 National Treasury (2007) Budget review 2007 110. 
17 See 5.3 for the impact that fund choices can have on intergenerational solidarity and 5.5 for 
a discussion of the advantages of compulsory participation in retirement funds.  Pooling of 
risks and solidarity as principles on which the reformed retirement scheme is to be based are 
discussed throughout the chapter. 
18 It is envisaged by the Department of Social Development that the mandatory PAYG 
retirement fund will be supplemented by a mandatory tier of defined contribution fully-funded 
benefits (“third pillar”).  Employees who wish to save even more for retirement can take part 
in voluntary retirement savings schemes (“fourth pillar”).  See DSD discussion document 
(2007) 93. 
19 See above at 3.3.2. 
20 DSD Discussion document (2007) 92. 
 
 
 
 
 325
right of access to social security.  The ‘reasonableness’ of measures will be 
determined based on the “disproportionately high” levels of unemployment 
prevalent in South Africa and the legacy of inequality.21  It is submitted that 
the level of support of intergenerational solidarity will also affect the 
‘reasonableness’ of measures such as funding for retirement and the social 
security reforms. 
 
Social security reforms occur in the context of the resources available to the 
state.22  Therefore, some of the reform proposals deal with alternative uses of 
available resources; for example, doing away with tax incentives for 
retirement savings and instead making retirement fund membership 
mandatory in order to increase the resources available for the reformed 
system.23 
 
In addition, the parties driving the pension reform will have to be mindful of 
the constitutional imperative of progressive realisation of social security 
rights.24  Therefore, the reforms must not adversely affect existing social 
insurance benefits. 
 
The effect that the pension reforms will have on the right to access to social 
security has great significance for intergenerational solidarity, as the solidarity 
                                     
21 National Treasury (2007) Budget review 2007 112. 
22 See above at 3.2.2.3 for more on the impact of limited resources on the realisation of social 
security rights. 
23 See below at 5.5.6. 
24 S 27(2) of the Constitution, 1996. 
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principle “stems directly from the recognition of an individual right to social 
security protection for all human beings”.25 
 
5.3 CHOICES OF FUNDS: COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES 
 
The nature of a retirement fund determines the rights and interests of the fund 
members.  The following comparison of the different categories of funds does 
not serve to highlight all of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
the different types of funds,26 but it is intended to establish the optimal fund 
type choice for the planned national social security system, measured against 
the impact of the various fund types on intergenerational solidarity and the 
constitutional obligations of the state.  As was explained above,27  all 
retirement funds can be classified as either pension or provident funds in 
terms of the frequency of benefit payments, and defined benefit or defined 
contribution funds in terms of the method of determining benefit levels. 
 
5.3.1 The creation of a public retirement fund 
 
The differences between public (national) and occupational retirement funds 
were outlined in Chapter 2.  It now seems a fait accompli that the reform 
                                     
25  Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 7. 
26 The relative advantages and disadvantage of the different fund types were discussed 
above at 2.4 (national retirement schemes and private and occupational pensions); 2.5 
(pension funds and provident funds); 2.6 (defined contribution funds and defined benefit 
funds); and 2.7 (pay-as-you-go and fully-funded schemes). 
27 At 3.3.2.1.1. 
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process will result in a mandatory national fund as the basic form of saving for 
retirement. 
 
The envisaged national fund can be regarded as evidence that the state is 
taking steps to improve access to social security. Whereas the regulation of 
private/occupational funds by the state can be regarded as the state fulfilling 
its duty to take reasonable measures to ensure access to social security 
indirectly, a public fund shows direct participation by the state in the 
implementation of the right of access to social security. 
 
The extent to which the creation of a national fund will have an impact on 
intergenerational solidarity is unclear at this early stage of the reform process.  
The only pointers available are the experiences of other countries that have 
adopted various forms of the multi-pillar pension model.  A comparative 
overview of the pension structures of these countries and particularly the 
influence a national pension fund had on intergenerational solidarity follows 
later in this thesis.28 
 
5.3.2 Effect of the choice between pension and provident funds on 
 intergenerational solidarity 
 
The relative advantages and disadvantages of pension and provident funds 
                                     
28 See below at 7.3. 
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were compared in Chapter 2.29  From this comparison it becomes clear that 
the choice of fund will have important consequences upon retirement.  On the 
one hand there is the freedom offered by the provident fund benefit, but with 
the risk that it may not last the beneficiary’s lifetime.  On the other hand, there 
is the relative security of the pension benefit. 
 
Even though the perceived advantages of provident funds over pension funds 
have made them the more popular option in South Africa, the absence of 
compulsory periodical payments30 causes provident funds to fall foul of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards. The Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention,31 and the Invalidity, Old-Age and 
Survivors’ Benefit Convention32 both require that any old-age benefit in cash 
must be a periodical payment provided throughout retirement.  Retirement 
funds are consequently required to provide benefits from retirement to death.  
Although neither of the Conventions has been ratified by South Africa, they 
serve as a benchmark for the interpretation of the Bill of Rights and social 
security legislation.33 
 
Intergenerational solidarity is the solidarity that the working age generation 
                                     
29See above at 2.5. 
30 The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended, allows provident funds to pay lump sums.  
Depending on the rules of the fund, there is nothing barring provident funds from paying 
periodical payments. 
31 Convention 102 of 1952, Art 28 and 30. 
32 Convention 128 of 1967, Art 17 and 19. 
33 The significance of international law, in general, and international social security standards, 
in particular, is outlined below at 7.2.1 and 7.2.4 respectively. 
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has with older persons.  In the case of retirement funds it will therefore 
constitute the solidarity between working-age fund members and retirees.   
Pension funds have more in common with intergenerational solidarity as they 
provide life-time benefits to retired fund members and therefore the solidarity 
with retired members extends all through their retirement.34 
 
The lump sum payments made by provident funds leave little space for 
solidarity with retirees by  the younger working-age generation and rather   
amount to an abdication of the responsibility that the younger generation has 
toward older persons once the lump sum payment is made.  It is therefore 
submitted that only pension funds correspond with the notion of 
intergenerational solidarity, as well as complying with international standards 
that require benefits to last until the beneficiary’s death.  For that reason it is 
imperative that the new national retirement fund is designed as a pension 
fund.   
 
Support for the arguments above in favour of a pension fund as the future 
national retirement fund is found in recent policy documents that tend to lean 
in the direction of the payment of benefits in the form of an income after 
retirement, with only a modest lump sum made available to settle debt.35  This 
would require a significant amendment of current legislation as well as 
                                     
34 Assuming that the requisite measures to ensure that retired members in rural areas have 
access to their pension payments are taken. 
35 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 36; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion 
paper 24 – 25.   
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amendments to the existing provident fund rules.36 
 
5.3.3 Effect of the choice between defined contribution and defined 
benefit funds on intergenerational solidarity 
 
The choice between defined contribution and defined benefit funds is 
important for an individual who is given the option to join either fund, as a 
misguided choice could lead to inadequate savings at retirement.  As was 
explained above,37 defined contribution fund benefits are determined by 
contribution levels and investment returns, whereas defined benefit funds pay 
guaranteed benefits based on a set formula. 
 
The most significant difference between defined benefit and contribution 
funds, from an intergenerational solidarity perspective has to be the location 
of investment risk.  With defined contribution funds the investment risk lies 
with the member, whereas the employer, or in the case of a national fund, the 
government, bears the investment risk in the case of defined benefit funds.38  
Exposing the retired generation to the unpredictable consequences of 
investment decisions and market fluctuations, as is the case with defined 
contribution funds, runs contrary to the concept of intergenerational solidarity.  
On the other hand, the shift of investment risk to a third party coupled with the 
notion of guaranteed benefits payable upon retirement from defined benefit 
                                     
36 In effect they would no longer be provident funds as the major characteristic of provident 
funds would have been removed. 
37 At 2.6. 
38 See above at 2.6. 
 
 
 
 
 331
funds supports and strengthens intergenerational solidarity.39 
 
In addition, defined contribution funds will find it difficult to comply with the 
requirement set down by the ILO Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits 
Convention that a retirement benefit must replace previous earnings of a 
beneficiary to a certain specified extent,40 as the benefit is not calculated in 
relation to pre-retirement income but is based on contributions and returns on 
investments.41 
 
5.3.4 The effect of the choice between PAYG and funded systems on 
intergenerational solidarity  
 
The choice of funding arrangement for (mainly public) retirement funds is the 
factor regarding retirement funding with the greatest potential impact on 
intergenerational solidarity.42 
 
In funds that are funded on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, current financing 
sources such as contributions from the current active members are used to 
                                     
39 Solidarity is strengthened by the working-age generation’s knowledge that they will be 
entitled to guaranteed benefits when they reach retirement and because the benefit structure 
creates clearly defined limits to the obligations of the working age generation. 
40 Convention 128 of 1967, Art 26(1). 
41 Convention 128 has not been ratified by South Africa, but still serves as a guideline for the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights and social security legislation.  See below at 7.2.1 and 7.2.4 
for the role of international law, particularly international social security standards, in South 
African law. 
42 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 7. 
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fund the retirement benefits of the currently retired population.43  No assets 
are held to cover future liabilities.44  The link between PAYG funds and 
intergenerational solidarity is clear: in an ideal PAYG scheme, the current 
retired generation funded the retirement pensions of the previous generation 
of older persons.  The current working-age population makes contributions to 
current retirement provision in the knowledge that the PAYG nature of the 
scheme will entitle them to similarly calculated benefits when they retire.  
Their contributions therefore serve to fund current pension payments as well 
as to establish their future pension rights.45 
 
With fully-funded schemes,46 the retirement benefits paid to a fund member 
are linked to the contributions made by (or on behalf of) a fund member, as 
the contributions are invested in the long term for the payment of that 
particular member’s benefits.  In other words, current benefits are paid from 
previously accumulated funds.47   
 
 
The intergenerational ‘contract’ that the following generation is responsible for 
the pensions paid to the older generation has the result that older persons 
                                     
43 Kalisch and Aman (1998) Retirement income systems: the reform process across OECD 
countries 11; Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 92; Cameron 
“SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 January 2008.   
44 Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 253. 
45 Kalisch and Aman (1998) Retirement income systems: the reform process across OECD 
countries 12. 
46 The differences between PAYG and fully-funded schemes are outlined above at 2.7. 
47 Barr “Economic theory and the welfare state: a survey and interpretation” (1992) 30 Journal 
of Economic Literature 769; Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 92. 
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may resist pension reforms that may lead to their benefits decreasing.48 In 
terms of the ‘contract’, the younger generation are promised similar benefits 
on retirement to those paid by them to the older generation.  Hence, public 
pensions cannot be changed swiftly or without giving affected persons 
sufficient notice of the change so that they can adjust their retirement savings 
plans.49 
 
PAYG funding arrangements in many developed countries have run into 
funding problems as a result of demographic changes such as an “ageing” 
population,50 leading to a conversion to fully-funded pension systems in many 
of these countries.51  South Africa still has a relatively “young” population52 
and therefore the ratio between the generations by itself does not disqualify 
PAYG funding. 
 
The composition of the workforce may pose a more significant problem for a 
South African PAYG scheme.  Whereas many of the current retirees had one 
full-time permanent job throughout their career, the current labour market is 
more flexible, with contract and temporary employment on the rise and many 
                                     
48 Ibid. 
49 Hicks “The policy challenge of ageing populations” (1998) 212 The OECD Observer 
http://www.oecd.org/publications/observer/212/Article2_eng.htm (accessed 30/10/2008). 
 Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) Retirement-income reforms in the context of OECD 
work on ageing 8. 
50 Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 256. Ageing populations lead to fewer people of 
working age having to support more people not working. 
51 Kalisch and Aman (1998) Retirement income systems: the reform process across OECD 
countries 12; Cameron “SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 
January 2008.   
52 DSD discussion document (2007) 16; Olivier “Old age and retirement provision” in Olivier 
et al (eds) Introduction to social security (2004) 270. 
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employees having faced unemployment at some or other stage of their 
career.  The current working-age generation may therefore not be able to 
contribute enough to fulfil the PAYG fund’s liabilities to current retirees without 
increasing the contributions currently payable.53   The question therefore 
becomes: to which extent can government burden future generations of 
workers to fund public pensions of future generations of retired persons?  In 
other words, do the cross-subsidisation and pooling of risks inherent in PAYG 
funds discriminate against younger generations?54 
 
Partridge55 points out that “younger and generally healthier” persons are 
required to balance out the cost of older lives in a PAYG fund. The time may 
come when younger fund members realise that their benefits may increase if 
they only carried the cost of their own risk.  She therefore regards the cross-
subsidisation in PAYG funds as the problem and the incorporation of fully-
funded aspects to these funds as the solution.56 
 
A contrary view is held by O’Regan who views the pooling and sharing of 
risks as central to pension schemes.  The intergenerational pooling of risks 
leads to “inevitable conflict between individual fairness and the pooling of 
                                     
53 Barr “Economic theory and the welfare state: a survey and interpretation” (1992) 30 Journal 
of Economic Literature 769. 
54 Assuming for now that the retired members outnumber the younger generation. 
55 Partridge “The Bill of Rights and its effect on the allocation of death benefits and other 
issues relating to retirement funds” Pension Lawyers Association Conference (1998). 
56 Holzmann et al “Comments on Rethinking pension reform” in Holzmann and Stiglitz (eds) 
(2001) New ideas about old age security 63 also caution against the impact on the welfare of 
the young of a PAYG system.  In their view prefunding the retirement system helps to 
“insulate the system from demographic shock”. 
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risks.  Somebody is going to come off badly by definition and end up 
subsidizing other members of the group”.57  Cross-subsidisation by younger 
members is therefore justifiable, as the idea is not to specifically disadvantage 
any individual younger member but to create a system that is of advantage to 
the entire group of fund members. 
 
Admittedly, when a PAYG scheme has just been established and it 
immediately has to provide benefits to a generation of members who did not 
contribute, it may not seem to be the ideal expression of intergenerational 
solidarity.58  In the words of Orszag and Stiglitz, the situation “may be 
understandable in terms of political exigencies but may or may not make 
sense in terms of intergenerational welfare policy”.59 
 
Naturally, the comments above regarding “cross-subsidisation” of retired 
members by the younger generation will only ring true if the retirees are 
proportionately more than the younger generation.  Where the younger 
generation outnumber retirees, the fund can build up a surplus, the use of 
which is determined by legislation but may include advantages to the younger 
generation such as transferring the surplus to a trust fund to bolster the 
                                     
57 O’Regan “The achievement of equality: a new challenge for retirement funds” Keynote 
address at the 1998 Pension Lawyers Conference. 
58 In a newly created PAYG system the first beneficiaries may not have directly contributed to 
the system themselves.  See Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 26. 
59 Orszag and Stiglitz “Rethinking pension reform: Ten myths about social security systems” 
in Holzmann et al (eds) (2001) New ideas about old age security 29. 
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system against future demographic shocks.60 
 
The question therefore arises whether intergenerational solidarity is sufficient 
justification for the perceived inequality created by the cross-subsidisation 
intrinsic to PAYG funds. 
 
Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution guarantees the right of access to social 
security.  In addition, section 27(2) requires the state to take reasonable 
measures to progressively provide access to social security within its 
available resources.  It is submitted that if government is serious about the 
pressing need to provide more employees with access to social security in the 
form of retirement insurance, a PAYG fund is the fastest means to achieve 
this goal as benefits are available immediately to retirees. 
 
The Department of Social Development is of the view that public PAYG 
systems effect the redistribution of funds from young people to retirees, as 
well as from the rich to the poor.61  South Africa’s unique history and socio-
economic conditions necessitate this type of cross-subsidisation to deal with 
the high levels of unemployment and inequality.62 Redistribution of funds is 
the essence of intergenerational solidarity, which can only be achieved by 
PAYG funds.  A system that redistributes funds to retirees and the poor from 
                                     
60 However, trust funds do not offer 100% protection against demographic shocks as 
illustrated by the financial difficulties facing the Trust Funds of the Social Security and 
Medicare systems in the USA.  See below at 7.3.5.5. 
61 DSD discussion document (2007) 20. 
62 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 12. 
 
 
 
 
 337
working-age income earners can therefore be regarded as a “reasonable 
measure” undertaken by the state in terms of its obligations under section 
27(2) of the Constitution, as it provides benefits to a vulnerable sector of our 
society.  The likelihood that wealthier individuals may prefer a fully funded 
system should not detract from the fact that section 27 provides a 
constitutional mandate to provide benefits to vulnerable older persons and 
that their interests should be the primary policy priority.  Therefore, a 
redistributive measure such as a PAYG fund can be regarded as a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation in terms of section 36 of the Constitution63 
of the rights of wealthier individuals who feel that they may have received 
better benefits from a fully funded system.64 
 
Internationally, the proponents of fully-funded schemes aver that replacing 
PAYG schemes with fully-funded schemes leads to increased national 
savings which in turn lead to higher levels of investment.65  This view is 
regarded as controversial and the assumption that full funding automatically 
                                     
63 See above at 3.2.1. 
64 See Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) BCLR 139 (CC) the applicant 
sought to have s 35 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Disease Act 130 of 
1993 declared unconstitutional, as it barred her, as an employee, from suing her employer for 
damages related to a workplace injury, whereas nothing bars non-employees from suing 
under similar circumstances.  Yacoob J held (at para 8) that “[t]he Compensation Act is 
important social legislation which has a significant impact on the sensitive and intricate 
relationship amongst employers, employees and society at large.  The state has chosen to 
intervene in that relationship by legislation and to effect a particular balance which it 
considered appropriate.”  The logical and rational connection between s 35 and the legitimate 
purpose of the Act led the Court to a finding that s 35 is constitutional.  Similarly, a PAYG 
system is logically and rationally connected to the constitutional mandate to implement 
reasonable measures, that in the context of retirement funding translate to measures that will 
benefit vulnerable older persons.  
65 See e.g. Shapiro “Rethinking Social Security” (1995) 7 (5) The New Democrat 16. 
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leads to increased savings is disputed.66  Authors such as Orszag and Stiglitz 
warn that it is dangerous to conflate privatisation of pension systems with 
prefunding of benefits and that many of the estimated savings through 
privatising pension systems are incorrectly ascribed to prefunding. 
 
Cursory comparisons of PAYG and fully funded schemes may create the 
impression that individual accounts by and large offer higher rates of return 
than PAYG systems.  This notion can be misleading if the administrative 
costs of individual accounts are not included in the comparative 
calculations.67 
 
PAYG funds may experience sustainability problems when the “political 
willingness” to maintain high benefits overrides the fiscal soundness of the 
retirement funding plan.68  If the persons in charge of the reform of the South 
African social insurance system decide on a PAYG public fund, they will have 
to give careful consideration to the exact structure of the fund.  It will be 
difficult to reform the structure of the fund at a later stage, because 
adjustments to the system will be politically unattractive once politicians 
realise that gains from reforms will only be clear some time after they are out 
                                     
66 DSD discussion document (2007) 20 and 22-23; Barr “Economic theory and the welfare 
state: a survey and interpretation” (1992) 30 Journal of Economic Literature 774; Orszag and 
Stiglitz “Rethinking pension reform: Ten myths about social security systems” in Holzmann et 
al (eds) New ideas about old age security (2001) 23; Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) 
Retirement-income reforms in the context of OECD work on ageing 15-16.  
67 Orszag and Stiglitz “Rethinking pension reform: Ten myths about social security systems” 
in Holzmann et al (eds) (2001) New ideas about old age security 24. 
68 Holzmann et al “Comments on rethinking pension reform: ten myths about social security 
systems” in Holzmann et al (eds) (2001) New ideas about old age security 58 and 74. 
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of office.69 
 
5.3.5 Conclusion: fund types compatible with intergenerational 
solidarity 
 
A concept such as solidarity is hard to define and it is therefore difficult to 
measure whether one type of fund supports intergenerational solidarity more 
than another:  The discussion documents on the reform of the retirement 
system in South Africa demonstrate the different views within government on 
the role of, and the relative importance of solidarity in, a retirement funding 
system. 
 
The Director-General of the national Department of Social Development, Vusi 
Madonsela, is of the view that “a retirement system, as part of the overall 
social security system, is about a commitment to risk pooling and the sharing 
in the benefits.”70  A fully-funded defined contribution scheme as the main 
component of the reformed retirement system is therefore ruled out, as the 
individual accounts in such a scheme put paid to the idea of risk pooling.  The 
Department of Social Development is therefore in favour of a defined benefit 
                                     
69 See below at 7.3.5.5 for a discussion of the failed attempts to reform the Social Security 
programme in the United States of America.  One of the perceived advantages of a defined 
contribution fully-funded scheme is that benefits only depend on the individual’s savings for 
retirement, “rather than being subject to the risk that government, at the time of retirement, 
may be unwilling to levy the taxes required to finance the earlier level of benefits”. (Heller 
(1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 7).  In Heller’s view defined contribution 
fully-funded schemes are no more “transparent” than defined benefit PAYG schemes as the 
long-term projections of the rate of return on investment are just as uncertain as the political 
willingness of the state to step in with defined benefit PAYG funds.   
70 Madonsela (2008) “Keynote address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference 6. 
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system which is “in line with the principles of social solidarity and risk 
sharing”.71 
 
The Department of Social Development discussion paper recommends that at 
least half of the proposed mandatory social insurance system should involve 
a PAYG defined benefit scheme.  This scheme must be designed so as to 
enable it to cope with long-term demographic changes,72 changes in financial 
conditions, employment levels “and all other variables which could create 
unintended implicit cross-subsidies”.73  It therefore proposes that the PAYG 
tier of retirement benefits be “formula-based, with automatic adjustments in 
benefits over time if the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries changes”.74  
Where the redistribution of funds to retirees inherent in intergenerational 
solidarity is an aim of the state, PAYG defined benefit funds are the only 
funds that can make such redistribution possible.75    
                                     
71 Madonsela (2008) “Keynote address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference 7. 
72 Hicks “The policy challenge of ageing populations” (1998) 212 The OECD Observer http:// 
www.oecd.org/publications/observer/212/Article2_eng.htm (accessed 30/10/2008) warns that 
“the failure to keep up with demographic realities can cause a misallocation of resources 
between older and younger people”. 
73 DSD discussion document (2007) 39.  The scheme’s ability to manage changes to the 
benefit formula will have to be carefully considered as “often attempts to change defined 
benefit formulas to make them more equitable and efficient meet with unmitigated failure for 
political reasons: the beneficiaries are well-defined groups who know they are benefiting and 
do no want to lose their privileges”. (Holzmann et al “Comments on Rethinking pension 
reform: ten myths about social security systems” in Holzmann et al (eds) (2001) New ideas 
about old age security 67). 
74 DSD discussion document (2007) 93. 
75 Barr “Economic theory and the welfare state: a survey and interpretation” (1992) 30 Journal 
of Economic Literature 772.  The Department of Social Development’s view is that a 
mandatory PAYG scheme is “the best way to ensure effective cross-subsidisation between 
contributors and beneficiaries” (DSD discussion document (2007) 94).  As long as the 
formula on which benefits are based is correctly specified, such a PAYG scheme will create 
balance between contributors and beneficiaries.  See also Madonsela (2008) “Keynote 
address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference 7. 
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The Department of Social Development envisages that the PAYG tier should 
be complemented by a second tier of retirement benefits comprising defined 
contribution fully-funded benefits.76 
 
Because some fund members may lack knowledge of how retirement funds 
work, it is important that a default investment vehicle for retirement insurance 
is developed to relieve individual fund members from investment decisions.77  
It has been proposed that the PAYG tier of the retirement system be run by 
the Government Sponsored Retirement Fund (GSRF).78  In addition, it is 
proposed that the GSRF take responsibility for the implementation of the 
legislation creating the fully-funded defined contribution part of the retirement 
system, as well as for the management of part of said fully-funded tier.79 
 
                                     
76 DSD discussion document (2007) 93.  Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston Retirement-
income reforms in the context of OECD work on ageing (1997) 13 advise that a mix between 
PAYG and fully-funded pillars is advisable to diversify risks. The compulsory PAYG tier is 
intended to meet the poverty reduction objectives of the scheme, whereas a voluntary fully- 
funded tier would allow individuals to take some responsibility for their retirement saving 
choices (at 21). 
77 The retirement funding systems in the UK (see 7.3.4 below) and Sweden (see 7.3.6 below) 
make provision for default investment vehicles. 
78 DSD discussion document (2007) 95. 
79 DSD discussion document (2007) 96.  One of the reasons advocated for a multi-pillar 
approach for the reformed retirement system, is recognition of the concerns raised about a 
single national pension fund approach and the failures of such funds in other countries 
(Madonsela Keynote address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference (2008) 8). According 
to Holzmann et al “Comments on rethinking pension reform: ten myths about social security 
systems” in Holzmann et al (eds) (2001) New ideas about old age security 59, the track 
record on investments of public PAYG funds is “not encouraging”.  See below at 7.3 for 
examples of other countries where systems based on single national pension funds were 
replaced by multi-pillar schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 342
The National Treasury Task Team’s second discussion paper80 takes a 
different view and proposes that the envisaged national retirement scheme be 
fully-funded.  In their view  
modern data management techniques make it administratively practical for 
retirement funding contributions to accumulate in individual accounts and to 
be credited with a standard real return on investment, effectively providing a 
secure mandatory savings arrangement in which all contributors share a 
common administrative platform and a pooled common rate of return on 
savings. 
 
 
It is submitted that the view of the Department of Social Development that the 
national retirement scheme must comprise of a PAYG defined benefit scheme 
complemented by a fully-funded defined contribution scheme is more 
compatible with the notion of intergenerational solidarity as it creates a 
common goal for all generations, that is, to provide adequate retirement 
benefits.81   
 
It is understandable that the fact that defined contribution fully-funded 
schemes are not redistributional is perceived as an advantage by members of 
these types of funds, as members can be assured that their contributions are 
allocated to their own individual accounts.82  Altruistic notions such as 
redistribution and intergenerational solidarity tend to take a back seat.  It is 
submitted that it is precisely for this reason that the main pillar of the reformed 
system should not be defined contribution or fully-funded and why legislation 
                                     
80 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 16. 
81 See Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 27 for support for a “well-
formulated” public defined benefit pillar as the principal source of retirement income. 
82  See Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 23. 
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advancing the cause of intergenerational solidarity is required.  
Redistributional issues must be addressed from the outset of the reform 
process.83 
 
In the final analysis, the level of priority that intergenerational solidarity enjoys 
compared to other interests will determine the choice of funds to make up the 
reformed pension structures in South Africa.  It is therefore submitted that the 
legislation used to create the new pension structure must also include 
sections establishing and entrenching intergenerational solidarity as one of 
the main  of the retirement scheme.  Hence, a study of reform processes in 
other countries will be a useful source of suggestions on how to bolster 
intergenerational solidarity through social security legislation.84   
 
5.4   LEAKAGE 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
In addition to the choice of funds discussed above, another factor that may 
have a significant impact on the level of an individual member’s retirement 
benefit and on intergenerational solidarity in general, is leakage of members 
from funds.  Many ex-members of occupational retirement funds still live out 
their old age in poverty as a result of exiting the funds before retirement and 
                                     
83 Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 27.  See above at 5.3.4 for the 
importance of having a redistributive PAYG system as the main pillar of a multi-pillar system. 
84 See below at 7.3. 
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failing to reinvest the benefit paid out to them.  Such leakage from the 
retirement funding system indicates that not all individuals can take sole 
responsibility for saving for their retirement and is a good example of a case 
where the law has to intervene to secure an adequate retirement income for 
the individual.  Such statutory intervention can occur either in the form of 
prescribed minimum benefits payable or compulsory preservation of benefits. 
 
5.4.2 Withdrawal benefits 
 
Withdrawal benefits are payable when an employee is dismissed, retrenched 
or resigns prior to retirement age.85  Resignation benefits paid by retirement 
funds generally are lower than retirement benefits.86 Therefore, an employee 
would have to remain in his or her employer’s employ until retirement age to 
receive the full benefit.87 On the surface this practice seems justified, as 
retirement funds are supposed to provide for retirement.  However, low 
withdrawal benefits may have a negative impact on a person’s ability to save 
for retirement.   
 
                                     
85 See above at 3.3.2.2.2 for a discussion of withdrawal benefits payable in terms of fund 
rules, as well as the minimum withdrawal benefits payable in terms of the Pension Funds Act 
24 of 1956, as amended by the Pension Funds Second Amendment Act 39 of 2001. 
86 The failure of many funds to pay adequate withdrawal benefits is discussed above at 
3.3.2.2.2. 
87 Reineck (1999) A specie of promise and its effect on the pension fund surplus 7.  
Strasheim “Determining ‘fair retirement fund practices’ in relation to fair withdrawal benefits” 
Pension Lawyers Association Conference 1998 http://www.icon.co.za/ 
~pla/con_98/Feedback/PLA%20P%20Strasheim%20unf%20ret%20prac.htm (accessed 
10/03/2008)) describes low withdrawal benefits as “golden handcuffs”.   
 
 
 
 
 345
Low withdrawal benefits payable to retrenched fund members have been an 
even greater source of discontent for some time as the socio-economic 
circumstances of employees dismissed for operational requirements 
seemingly are overlooked in favour of the stated objective that the foundation 
of retirement funds should remain the payment of benefits at retirement.  The 
traditional justification of low withdrawal benefits, that is, ensuring that an 
employee remains in the employ of the employer until retirement, has been 
overtaken by “modern workplace realities” such as greater occupational 
mobility.88 Hence, the retention of low withdrawal benefits penalise individual 
fund members even further than a situation not of their making. 
 
The Pension Funds Second Amendment Act89 attempted to address this 
problem by providing for “minimum benefits” payable to fund members even 
upon withdrawal from the fund. Members are now entitled to payment of a 
“minimum individual reserve”.90 
 
The debate about withdrawal benefits has been resurrected by the social 
security reform process.  Views range from that of the African National 
Congress, which wants government to rule out early withdrawals from the 
                                     
88 Strasheim “Determining ‘fair retirement fund practices’ in relation to fair withdrawal 
benefits” Pension Lawyers Association Conference 1998 http://www.icon.co.za/ 
~pla/con_98/Feedback/PLA%20P%20Strasheim%20unf%20ret%20prac.htm (accessed 
10/03/2008). 
89 Act 39 of 2001. 
90 S 14A(1)(a) Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (as amended) is discussed above at 3.3.2.2.2. 
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envisaged national retirement fund,91 to the National Treasury’s stance that 
provision for withdrawal benefits may be necessary to deal with “life crises”.92 
 
The current position regarding withdrawal benefit levels was discussed in 
Chapter 3.93  The close connection between the issues of withdrawal benefits 
on the one hand, and preservation and transferability of benefits on the other, 
requires a closer examination of the latter two issues. 
 
5.4.3 Lack of compulsory preservation of funds 
 
The absence of statutory measures to compel occupational fund members to 
preserve savings for retirement may lead to a lack of adequate accumulated 
savings at retirement.94  These difficulties arise particularly when individuals 
change jobs or are dismissed and they take their retirement benefits in cash 
in order to fund periods of unemployment.  Their retirement benefits are 
consequently neither transferred to another fund, nor reinvested in a 
retirement savings vehicle.95 
 
The three main ways to re-invest money after leaving retirement funds are to 
transfer to a new fund as soon as one is employed again, to transfer funds 
                                     
91 ANC (2007) Social Transformation 4. 
92 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 14. 
93 At 3.3.2.2.2. 
94 According to the National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 5 less than 10% of people 
leaving retirement funds preserve their benefits. 
95 Private retirement savings vehicles such as retirement annuities and unit trusts are briefly 
discussed above at 3.3.3. 
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from the previous fund to a preservation fund,96 or to purchase a retirement 
annuity.97  The relative merits of the various options to re-invest money 
withdrawn from a previous retirement fund are not the main issue where 
preservation of retirement benefits is at stake.  Issues such as whether the 
fund member had been given a reasonable opportunity to exercise his or her 
preservation options, and whether the member had elected to exercise any 
preservation option at all, are of far greater significance. 
 
A retirement fund must offer a retrenched or dismissed member reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his or her preservation options before the fund pays 
out a cash withdrawal benefit.98  Fund rules must also encourage 
preservation of retirement benefits.  Failure to do so constitutes 
                                     
96 See s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 for the definitions of “pension preservation fund” 
and “provident preservation fund”.  Membership of pension preservation funds and provident 
preservation funds includes former members of a pension fund who had resigned, or were 
retrenched or dismissed and who elected to have their lump sum withdrawal benefit 
transferred to the fund; and former members of a fund that had been wound up and the 
members elected to transfer to the preservation fund.  In addition, a former employee of an 
employer whose business has been transferred to another employer becomes a member of a 
preservation fund if the member elects to transfer to the preservation fund.   
97 Retirement annuities are described above at 3.3.3.1.  Where a member withdraws from his 
or her retirement fund before the age of 55, he or she can transfer funds from the pension or 
provident fund tax free into a preservation fund.  The member can then withdraw up to 100% 
of his or her funds only once before retirement.  The detailed workings of a preservation fund 
full outside the scope of this research.  See SARS Practice Note RF1/98 “Funds for the 
preservation of the retirement interests of employees” read with Addendum A to RF1/98 
(2000); Addendum B to RF1/98 (2001); Addendum C to RF1/98 (2007); Addendum D and E 
to RF1/98 (2008); Human v Protektor Pension Fund [2001] 9 BPLR 2462 (PFA); Cloete v 
Sasol Pension Fund and Another (1) [2000] 11 BPLR 1210 (PFA). 
98 Maepa v Sanlam Retirement Fund (Office Staff) [2002] 2 BPLR 3093 (PFA) 3096.  This 
rule applies unless the fund rules make provision for a specific period within which the option 
must be exercised. 
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maladministration by the fund and a complaint can be lodged with the 
Pension Fund Adjudicator.99   
 
The debate regarding compulsory preservation of benefits has to be 
understood in the context of the hardship faced by retirement fund members 
who become unemployed but are not allowed to access retirement savings.  
Due to the myriad of administrative problems and delays experienced with the 
unemployment insurance fund100 many fund members have to rely on their 
retirement benefits to support themselves and their dependants.101  It is 
therefore strictly speaking not correct to refer to a “choice” not to preserve 
benefits.102  As long as the high levels of unemployment continue, so too will 
the preference for cash benefits rather than preservation of benefits.103  The 
National Treasury supports the principle that employees should only be 
allowed access to their retirement savings once their unemployment benefits 
                                     
99 See e.g. Fourie v Free State Municipal Pension Fund [2002] 12 BPLR 4131 (PFA) where 
the fund rules provided for higher withdrawal benefits for members who resigned from service 
than those colleagues who transferred to another fund.  The rules clearly discouraged 
preservation of retirement savings and were held to be unconstitutional on the basis of unfair 
discrimination between members transferring benefits to a preservation fund and those 
drawing withdrawal benefits. 
100 Established in terms of s 4 of the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001.  For more on 
the problems experienced in the unemployment insurance system, see Olivier and Van 
Kerken “Unemployment insurance” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to Social Security 
301 and 318; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 16-17. 
101 Shipman “Fair retirement fund practices” PLA Conference 1998. 
102 The dilemma of retrenched employees who have to rely on their retirement funding during 
a time of no income was summarised succinctly by the complainant in Maepa v Sanlam 
Retirement Fund (Office Staff) [2002] 2 BPLR 3093 (PFA) 3095:  “I find it very strange and 
unfair for the company to say that for me to get the company’s contribution, I was supposed 
to transfer my benefits to a Pension Fund of a new employer or Retirement Annuity.  How 
can that happen because when retrenched, it is impossible for one to get a new job in a very 
near future for the benefits to be transferred.  Lastly money is needed to pay up debts, that is 
the fact that made it impossible to transfer the benefits to a Retirement Annuity.” 
103 Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 253 states that withdrawal benefits act as “an 
important and irreplaceable extra buffer” against unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 349
have been exhausted, but acknowledges that this principle “is reliant on the 
efficient functioning of the UIF”.104   
 
The Treasury Task Team’s second discussion paper also makes allowance 
for the early withdrawal of retirement savings “to take account of life crises” 
such as unemployment and debts,105 but only as an exception to the broad 
steps to encourage preservation of retirement savings.  The interface 
between retirement benefits and unemployment benefits needs to be 
formalised in legislation to avoid over-reliance on withdrawals from retirement 
benefits in the event of loss of employment.106   
 
In the context of the level of preservation of benefits required, a distinction 
can be made between a member losing his or her employment completely 
and the case of a change in jobs.107  In the latter case the need to access 
retirement savings falls away and members should not be allowed to 
withdraw their benefits in cash.  Even so, the flexibility of the labour market 
requires legislative measures aimed at reducing retirement saving losses on 
job changes.108  The fact that an employee has undergone many job changes 
                                     
104 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 39.  The Mouton Committee found that: “There 
are indications that the making of provision for pre-retirement life crises, for example, 
unemployment, may be seen by many employees as more important than retirement 
provision in some of these funds.  Clearly, an emphasis on provision for longer term 
retirement needs will only be possible if and when the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
becomes recognised as providing more effective protection against short term unemployment 
needs.” (Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 2.5). 
105 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 14. 
106 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 23. 
107 Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 9.2.1.2. 
108 Asher (2001) Retirement and old age 258. 
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during his or he career should not in itself lead to diminished retirement 
benefits. The Taylor Committee’s recommendations would restrict compulsory 
preservation of benefits, by transfer to the new employer’s fund or another 
fund of the member’s choice, to instances where the member remains in the 
formal sector after the job change.109  Where the member cannot find 
alternative employment in the formal sector, he or she should be entitled to 
withdraw only a portion of their benefit and only once unemployment benefits 
have been exhausted. 
 
As was stated above,110 intergenerational solidarity requires that the older 
generation does not squander benefits paid by the younger.  This also 
includes cash withdrawals while of working age, thereby forfeiting benefits 
payable upon retirement.  As intergenerational solidarity relies on the pooling 
of resources, preservation of retirement benefits also means that benefits that 
may have been withdrawn from the solidarity “pool” are retained.  The 
proposals for compulsory preservation of benefits until retirement, therefore, 
have to be understood in the context of their positive impact on 
intergenerational solidarity. 
 
                                     
109 Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 9.2.1.2. 
110 At 2.3. 
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5.4.4 Section 14 transfers   
 
The issue of the pension rights of employees of a business that is transferred 
to a new employer as a going concern is an intersection between labour law 
and retirement fund legislation.  The protection of employees against the 
potential loss of a portion of their benefit entitlements when they are 
transferred to a new fund is as fundamentally important to intergenerational 
solidarity as the other factors leading to leakage of pension benefits 
discussed above.111 
 
Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act112 regulates the transfer of a 
business or part of a business as a going concern.113  In terms of section 
197(2) the employees of the seller become entitled to be employed by the 
purchaser under the same conditions of employment as applied with the 
seller.114  Employment benefits such as pension rights are included within the 
                                     
111 See 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 above. 
112 Act 66 of 1995. 
113 For more on the interpretation of “transfer”, “business or part of a business” and “as a 
going concern” see Bosch “Of business parts and human stock: some reflections on s 
197(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act (2004) 25 ILJ 1865; Bosch “Balancing the Act: Fairness 
and business transfers” (2004) 25 ILJ 923; Bosch “Reincarnating the vibrant horse? The 
2002 amendments and transfers of undertakings” (2002) 1 LDD 84; Du Toit “The transfer of 
enterprises and the protection of employment benefits” (2004) 1 LDD 98 – 101; Todd, Du Toit 
and Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South Africa. 
114 In terms of ss 197(2)(a) and (b), which provide that in the event of a transfer of business 
protected by s 197, 
(a) “the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old 
employer in respect of all contracts of employment in existence 
immediately before the date of transfer; 
(b) all the rights and obligations between the old employer and an 
employee at the time of the transfer continue in force as if they had 
been rights and obligations between the new employer and the 
employee”. 
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scope of section 197(2).115 The purchaser (new employer) might be placed in 
an extremely difficult position in the case where the employees belonged to a 
defined benefit fund and it is expected of the new employer to attempt to 
reproduce the same retirement funding scheme.  Then again, employees who 
had been members of a defined benefit fund before the transfer are entitled to 
protection against erosion of their guaranteed pension benefits.116  
 
In terms of section 197(3) the employment conditions at the new employer 
must be “on the whole not less favourable to the employees than those on 
which they were employed by the old employer”.117  Whether or not the new 
employer will be able to provide such employment conditions would depend 
on the “pension promise” made by the old employer and how much of those 
obligations are transferred to the new employer.118  It is submitted that Todd 
is correct in stating that the employer’s promise to employees can merely be 
described as “a promise of participation in a fund”.119 
 
                                     
115 Du Toit “The transfer of enterprises and the protection of employment benefits” (2004) 1 
LDD 104. 
116 Du Toit (2004) 1 LDD 109. 
117 Whether or not this occurred will depend on the facts of each case (Todd, Du Toit and 
Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South Africa 97).  S 197(3) 
therefore does not guarantee identical retirement benefits to those received from the old 
employer. 
118 Todd, Du Toit and Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South Africa 
100. 
119 In Todd, Du Toit and Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South 
Africa 101. 
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Specific provision for the transfer of an employee from one fund to another 
retirement or similar fund is made in section 197(4).120  The difficulty with 
section 197(4) is that it merely allows for the transfer of an employee to a 
different retirement fund.  It does not require that the employee’s existing 
pension rights must be transferred to the new employer’s fund. The 
uncertainty regarding the extent of the new employer’s obligations increases 
where the new employer does not have any retirement fund.121  According to 
Todd,122 it cannot be expected from the new employer in a section 197 
transfer to “provide a new pension fund which is in all respects identical to the 
old fund”.  
 
However, section 197 should be read not in isolation but together with section 
14(1)(c) of the Pension Funds Act,123 which provides that no transfer to 
another fund has force unless the Registrar of pension funds is satisfied  that 
the scheme is reasonable and equitable and “accords full recognition to the 
                                     
120 Section 197(4) provides that “subsection (2) does not prevent an employee from being 
transferred to a pension, provident, retirement or similar fund other than the fund to which the 
employee belonged prior to the transfer, if the criteria in section 14(1)(c) of the Pension 
Funds Act, 1956 (Act No. 24 of 1956), are satisfied” (my emphasis).  See Todd, Du Toit and 
Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South Africa 111. 
121 Du Toit “The transfer of enterprises and the protection of employment benefits” (2004) 1 
LDD 110-111. 
122 In Todd, Du Toit and Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South 
Africa 114.  He postulates that “[t]he primary difficulty is that not all employment rights are 
capable of unqualified transfer from the old employer to the new employer.  Some form of 
modification will sometimes be inevitable…[I]t is frequently not possible for the new employer 
to provide transferred employees with continued access to the benefit schemes provided by 
the old employer.” (at 98). 
123 Before the amendment of the Labour Relations Act in 2002 (by s 49 of Act 12 of 2002) 
adding s 197(4) and thereby specifically including the transfer of employees from one fund to 
the others, there were conflicting decisions in different fora on whether s 14 was applicable to 
such transfers.  See Younghusband & others v Decca Contractors (SA) Pension Fund and Its 
Trustees (1999) 20 ILJ 1640 (PFA); Resa Pension Fund v Pension Funds Adjudicator & 
others 2000 3 SA 313 (C); Telkom SA Ltd & others v Blom & others 2005 5 SA 532 (SCA). 
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rights and reasonable benefit expectations” of the transferring members in 
terms of the rules of the old fund.124  The Registrar consequently issues a 
certificate of approval of the transfer scheme.125 
 
Whether a particular transfer scheme “accords full recognition to the rights 
and reasonable benefit expectations” of the transferring members, as 
required by section 14 (1)(c), will depend on a variety of factors.  In an 
attempt to provide more clarity on the extent of the obligations of the new 
employer,126 Todd came to the following conclusion:127 
                                     
124 Additional benefits that the transferring members may be entitled to and minimum benefits 
payable in terms of s 14A also have to be considered (s 14(1)(c)(ii) and (iii)).  The financial 
soundness of the transferring fund is also a factor to be considered by the Registrar.  The 
instances where the Registrar’s approval is not required for a transfer, for example, transfers 
between two beneficiary funds, are listed in s 14(8). 
125 In Tek Corporation Provident Fund and others v Lorentz 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) the 
Supreme Court of Appeals had to determine whether the Registrar’s approval of a transfer 
scheme in terms of s 14(1) of the Pension Funds Act precluded the Court’s jurisdiction unless 
the Registrar’s certificate is set aside.  The Court held that if the trustees’ decision to allow 
the transfer scheme was ultra vires, the decision is open to attack despite the Registrar’s 
certificate (at 902 para 41).  Marais JA held that there is a measure of uncertainty regarding 
the meaning of the expression “reasonable benefit expectations” referred to in s 14(1)(c)(i).  
He held that it must mean “something over and above the defined benefits to which the 
persons mentioned are entitled.”  He cited periodic inflation-related increases in payments to 
existing pensioners as an example of “reasonable benefit expectations” (at 903, para 47).  
The Registrar’s certificate of approval is not required where a member’s (or non-member 
spouse’s) interest in a retirement annuity fund is transferred to another retirement annuity 
fund (s 14(7)(a)). 
126 The Treasury Task Team pointed out that the extent of the obligations of the new 
employer in terms of the current law on transfer schemes is ambiguous because it is “by no 
means clear that employees are entitled to identical retirement fund benefits” (National 
Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 61) and “there is never any certainty that a particular 
employee will remain in employment until retirement, or become entitled to retrenchment or 
disability benefits.” (at 62).  To lend more certainty to the situation, the Task Team has 
recommended that employers should be entitled to arrange the transfer of their employees 
from a defined benefit fund to a defined contribution fund,126 without the consent of the 
employees.  Employees should however be informed before such a conversion from defined 
benefit to defined contribution funds occur.  The employer should ensure that the opening 
fund credit of each affected fund member in the new fund will be equivalent to the member’s 
minimum individual reserve in the old fund.  The employer should also be required to make 
such contributions that “can reasonably be expected to procure for the employee a retirement 
benefit equivalent in value to the benefit to which the employee would have been entitled on 
retirement in terms of … his or her original fund” (at 62).  
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Where a new employer, acting on reasonable actuarial advice, has 
established a new retirement fund that provides benefits that may be 
demonstrated to be a reasonable and equitable substitute, on the actuarial 
assumption used, for the benefits provided by the transferring employees’ 
previous retirement fund, then the new employer must be considered to have 
satisfied the primary employer promise in the employment contract,...and to 
have satisfied the obligations articulated in the provisions of section 197. 
 
It is submitted that the aim of the labour and pension legislation with regard to 
the transfer of undertakings discussed above is to find a balance between 
allowing employers to restructure their operations without undue financial 
burden and to protect the retirement savings of members being transferred 
from one fund to another.   
 
The current pension reform process aims to create a national mandatory 
retirement fund, which will ease concerns regarding transfers of undertakings.  
In future, even if the business of an employer is transferred, the employees 
will remain members of the national fund.  The interface between labour law 
and pension legislation on transfers of businesses will only remain relevant 
for employees belonging to the proposed additional voluntary or ‘top-up’ 
funds. 
                                                                                                        
127  In Todd, Du Toit and Bosch (2004) Business transfers and employment rights in South 
Africa 117.  He came to this conclusion after examining and adapting the guidelines used in 
the United Kingdom for transfers of employees from the public to the private sector. 
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5.5  VOLUNTARY NATURE OF RETIREMENT FUNDS 
 
5.5.1 Current voluntary participation 
 
 
There is currently no statutory compulsion for individuals to join and 
contribute to a retirement fund, which makes the existing South African 
position “unique from an international perspective”.128  In addition, no positive 
duty is placed on employers to establish retirement funds for their 
employees.129  Once the employer decides to establish a fund, the decision 
can be made what categories of employee are eligible to join the fund.130   
 
As far as South African employees are concerned, a statutory compulsion to 
participate in retirement funds is absent.  An employer who participates in 
respect of any category of employee may, however, compel future new 
entrants to that category to join the particular retirement fund contractually.  If 
employees are not bound through their conditions of employment to belong to 
the employer-sponsored fund, they have the choice of joining that fund or an 
individual retirement fund.  Therefore, currently “only employees who meet 
eligibility criteria for the company’s fund and whose conditions of employment 
so determine” are compelled to contribute to a retirement fund.131 
                                     
128 DSD Discussion document (2007) 57. 
129 Lezar v Braitex Pension Fund and Another [2001] 8 BPLR 2380 (PFA) 2382 para 14. 
130 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 18.   
131 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 41.1 
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The Treasury Task Team has observed that it is remarkable how the 
retirement fund industry has flourished in the absence of compulsion to 
establish or join a fund.132  It is submitted that the high levels of participation 
by formal sector employees can be attributed to the tax incentives currently 
offered for contributing to a fund and the realisation by employees of the 
importance of saving for retirement. 
 
One of the key issues addressed in the process of reforming the South 
African retirement funding system, is the lack of adequate accumulated 
retirement savings caused by the non-compulsory nature of the current 
system.133  Intergenerational solidarity in the context of retirement funds 
requires that the working-age generation contribute to the retirement income 
of the older (retired) generation.  A lack of compulsion for the working-age 
generation to contribute therefore disturbs the balance required for 
intergenerational solidarity. 
 
5.5.2 Need for mandatory membership 
 
International best practice frameworks for developing countries suggest that 
governments should set up systems based on compulsory contributions for 
                                     
132 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 18. 
133 The proportion of potential contributors to retirement funds who do not participate in 
retirement savings is estimated at 47,8% (DSD Discussion document (2007) 62). 
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retirement.134  Compulsory fund membership as a method of saving for 
retirement hold advantages for 
• the individual fund members, as it enables them to meet the costs of 
retirement; 
• the state, as it reduces the dependence on the state for older person’s 
grants; and 
• the country as a whole, as it builds up “long term savings to help fund 
the country’s development program”.135 
 
The problems associated with voluntary membership of retirement funds have 
been ascribed to the myopic view of employees regarding future needs such 
as financial security after retirement.136  Other possible reasons for non-
participation by lower income earners include that saving for retirement could 
potentially disqualify employees from receiving the older person’s grant due to 
the grant currently being means tested,137 and the difficulties faced by low 
earning workers to save adequately for their retirement. 
 
The different commissions and task teams on retirement fund provision have 
come to different conclusions regarding the level of compulsion that is 
required in the context of fund membership.  The Taylor Committee Report 
recommended that all formal sector employees be compelled to make a 
                                     
134 DSD Discussion document (2007) 39; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 10. 
135 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 41.3. 
136 Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 3.6.1; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion 
paper 9. 
137 See above at 4.3.2 for a discussion on the negative consequences attached to the 
administration of a means test. 
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minimum contribution138 to their retirement savings.139  This was in line with 
the earlier recommendations of the Mouton Committee that, despite 
difficulties with compulsory contributions such as the high level of 
unemployment, mandatory fund membership would be a necessary step in 
broadening the scope of application of retirement insurance.140  
 
The Treasury Task Team’s 2004 discussion paper highlighted experiences of 
other compulsory systems141 where it was found that mandatory systems 
“may encourage people and businesses to remain in the informal sector 
because of the perceived costs associated with moving to the formal 
sector”.142  It therefore recommended that rather than compulsory fund 
membership enforced by legislation, measures to encourage the extension of 
retirement provision to all employees in the formal sector should be promoted 
as long as the current high levels of unemployment continue.143  Out of the 
various possible measures to encourage participation in retirement funds 
recommended by the Task Team, the preferred options were to make fund 
membership a condition of employment and to compel employers to educate 
their employees on the desirability of retirement savings.144  The onus would 
                                     
138 Calculated as a prescribed minimum percentage of their income. 
139 Transforming the present – protecting the future Consolidated report (2002) 94.  
140 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 29.14. 
141 For instance Chile – see below at 7.3.3 for a comparative overview of the Chilean 
retirement funding system. 
142 National Treasury Discussion Paper (2004) 19.  See below at 5.6 for more on the 
exclusion of workers in the informal economy from retirement saving structures. 
143 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 19. 
144 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 19-20, 24.  
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therefore once again be on employers to increase the number of fund 
members. 
 
However, the suggested retention of the current system with various 
occupational funds would not address the difficulties experienced with 
monitoring fund membership resulting from the multitude of funds in 
existence.  Hence, the Treasury Task Team, after considering the 
submissions after the first discussion document, shifted to the notion of 
mandatory participation in a pooled social insurance fund.145  In its second 
discussion paper it states a preference for mandatory participation in a 
national retirement provision system, particularly as it offers the advantage of 
economy of scale in the maintenance and monitoring of member records.146  
It envisages mandatory supplementary contributions to occupational pension 
funds or independent retirement funds to supplement the mandatory 
contributions to the national fund.147 
 
The likely consequences of pension reforms and the creation of a single 
public fund are that smaller funds will disappear, while some will merge with 
the national fund and others will continue to provide supplementary benefits in 
the voluntary savings pillar.148 
                                     
145 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 10. 
146 At 9. 
147 At 10. 
148 Cameron “SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 January 2008 
http://www.persfin.co.za  (accessed 05/02/2009).  The Treasury Task Team has   
recommended that existing funds may continue to collect contributions to “top-up” on the 
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Almost all the discussion documents outlining the possible structure of the 
reformed retirement system refer to compulsory membership of a national 
pension fund.149  The widespread support for the notion of mandatory fund 
membership addressed one of the main concerns of the Mouton Committee, 
which expressed its belief that reforms culminating in a system requiring 
compulsory membership have to be preceded by “strong consensus support 
among all interested parties” or otherwise face unintended consequences.150  
Compulsory fund membership has the advantage that arbitrary exclusions of 
certain groups of persons from fund membership become less of an issue as 
the eligibility requirements for the fund will be set in the founding legislation.  
However, some institutional obstacles, such as determining which state organ 
should enforce the mandatory membership and contributions,151 must first be 
overcome.152  
 
                                                                                                        
benefits provided by the compulsory national system (National Treasury 2nd discussion paper 
(2007) 15). 
149 The ANC (2007) Social Transformation Policy 3  supports the concept of mandatory   
retirement savings and the establishment of a national fund such as the proposed GSRF.  
See also DSD discussion document (2007) 92; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion 
paper 19.  
150 Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 41.1 and 41.9. 
151 The Taylor Committee recommended that SARS be tasked with identifying non-
contributors, specifically employers (Transforming the present – protecting the future 
Consolidated report (2002) 94). 
152 Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social security – a 
legal analysis 289. 
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5.5.3 Proposed wage subsidy 
 
While it is clear that the unemployed will not gain by compulsory fund 
membership for all employees, compulsion may make a significant change in 
the retirement income of lower earners.  As lower earners often do not earn 
enough for additional expenses such as retirement savings, the National 
Treasury has recommended that the pension contributions of low-income 
workers be subsidised by the state.153  The wage or employment subsidy can 
take the form of a broad-based subsidy, or be targeted at lower earners, at 
young work seekers or at a specific sector of workers.  The aims of the 
proposed wage subsidy are to create a system that 
• allows lower income workers to save for their own retirement; 
• increases the labour income of lower earners; 
• has the potential to lower the costs of employment.154 
 
It is submitted that a wage subsidy will lead to a significant increase in the 
number of participants in the reformed pension system.  Any such increase of 
participants will have an effect on intergenerational solidarity.  The more 
people participating in a particular scheme to save for their retirement, the 
                                     
153 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 14.  See also Sapa “Pension savings are 
safe – govt” 19 May 2008 http://www.fin24.com/articles/default/display_article.aspx? 
ArticleID=1518-1786_2325320 (accessed 01/05/2009). 
154 National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 112. One of the proposed design options 
for the wage subsidy is the reimbursement of employers’ contributions, possibly as a tax 
rebate or credit.  The aim is to encourage employers to increase low wages, as increased 
wages paid would lead to increased subsidies (National Treasury (2007) Budget review 2007 
113). The detail of the design options for the proposed wage subsidy falls outside the scope 
of this study.  See below at 7.3 for examples of wage subsidy schemes or “credits” in other 
countries. 
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greater the interest in defending and maintaining the system until their 
retirement.   
 
The state will also be meeting its constitutional obligation to take reasonable 
measures to promote access to social security in terms of section 27 of the 
Constitution.  The implementation of a wage subsidy is a reasonable step 
towards achieving increased access to retirement insurance to lower earners, 
who as a group count among the most vulnerable people in South Africa.155  
 
5.5.4 Inclusion of self-employed persons 
 
Attention should also be given to the position of self-employed persons and 
independent contractors who currently  have to rely on retirement annuity    
funds and other private savings vehicles, as they are disqualified from 
belonging to occupational retirement funds because the required employer-
employee relationship is lacking. 
 
The Treasury Task Team initially recommended the creation of Individual 
Retirement Funds that would not have the employer-employee relationship as 
a prerequisite as is currently the case with retirement funds.  Instead, the 
                                     
155 In terms of s 27 of the Constitution the state is only required to take the steps in realising 
the right of access to social security that are feasible within its available resources.   It is not 
possible at this stage to determine the availability of resources for the wage subsidy, although 
some of the proposals for the reformed social insurance system recommend the reform of 
many of the current tax incentives to belong to a retirement fund (National Treasury (2007) 
Budget review 2007 115; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 34; DSD discussion 
document (2007) 92), thereby creating the potential for freeing funds for the wage subsidy. 
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primary relationship would have existed between the member and the fund.156  
The Treasury Task Team subsequently adjusted its position regarding 
Independent Retirement Funds for self-employed persons.  In the second 
discussion document it recommends that provision be made for the phasing 
in over time of mandatory contributions to the national retirement fund by self-
employed persons.157  It is submitted that the inclusion of self-employed 
persons in the national fund is in the interest of social solidarity: not only will 
self-employed persons stand to gain from the retirement benefits offered by 
the national fund, but the fund (and therefore other fund members) will also 
benefit from their contributions.  The same large-scale sharing of risks will not 
occur were self-employed persons to be consigned to independent funds. 
 
5.5.5 Compulsory fund membership and freedom of association 
 
The next question to address is whether the intended legislation compelling 
employees to become members of a retirement fund(s) would constitute an 
infringement of the employees’ freedom of association, in the sense that they 
would no longer have a choice regarding which fund to join. 158 
 
                                     
156 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 26-27.  The Treasury Task Team 
recommended that Independent Retirement Funds be defined contribution funds allowing 
irregular contributions.  It also recommended that similar arrangements to those applicable to 
occupational retirement funds with relation to the transfer of retirement savings between 
funds, disclosure of prescribed information and the prohibition of payment of commission by 
an Independent Retirement Fund to an intermediary for inducing a member to join the fund, 
be contained in the enabling legislation. 
157 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 14. 
158 S 18 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of association. 
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Freedom of association is not an absolute right.  The restriction of freedom of 
association by legislation introducing compulsory fund membership would 
need to meet the criteria set by section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
 Section 36(1) restricts the limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights to limitations 
“only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
A court determining whether mandatory fund membership limits employees’ 
freedom of association would have to take into account all the relevant 
factors, including the factors listed in section 36(1).159 
 
Mandatory fund membership can be compared to closed shop agreements in 
the sense that both limit an employee’s freedom of association.  In both cases 
the limitation serves to reinforce another fundamental right:  in the case of a 
closed shop, the right of trade unions to engage in collective bargaining; in 
the case of mandatory fund membership, the state’s ability to progressively 
provide access to social security.160  The limitation of an individual 
employee’s freedom of association by compelling him or her to become a 
                                     
159 Rautenbach (2008) Introduction to the Bill of Rights para 1A66.1. 
160 For a discussion of the constitutionality of closed shop agreements see Du Toit et al 
(2006) Labour relations law: A comprehensive guide (5th edition) 191-193. 
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fund member, serves an important purpose161 as compulsory fund 
membership broadens the scope of application of earnings related social 
insurance and reduces the reliance on social assistance measures. 
 
It is suggested that limiting freedom of association and compelling employed 
persons to join one national fund and/or occupational funds would lead to 
increased social solidarity and economies of scale and therefore the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose is clear.162 
 
The measures that are currently employed to encourage participation in 
occupational retirement funds, such as tax incentives163 and, depending on 
the rules of the fund, providing members with security for loans, have not 
proven to be sufficient motivation for workers to participate in the current 
voluntary system.164  It is therefore submitted that there are no other less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose of including all employed persons in 
a national social insurance system and that the limitation of the employee’s 
freedom of association is justifiable in terms of section 36(1)(e). 
 
It is submitted that the criterion of the reasonableness and justifiability of 
limiting individual employees’ right to freedom of association by compelling 
                                     
161 S 36(1)(b). 
162 As required by s 36(1)(d). 
163 The main reason being that tax incentives lead to greater savings for higher income 
groups who are subject to higher tax rates.  See Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension 
reform initiatives 24.   
164 Low-income workers may find it difficult to save for their retirement and/or fear that any 
retirement savings may count against them in the means test for the older person’s grant. 
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them to join and contribute to a national fund is met and as such a mandatory 
system would be constitutional.165  Mandatory fund membership will reduce 
the burden on the state and enable provision to be made for retirement 
benefits for all employees.  Such a measure will enhance equality as all 
employees will be required to join.166 
 
The contributions in terms of a mandatory retirement fund will have to be set 
at reasonable and financially affordable levels; otherwise their levels would 
not be “politically acceptable”.167  However, there are difficulties in evaluating 
the affordability of a particular pension system for the state and for individual 
fund members.  According to Gruat:168 
What matters therefore is not so much the absolute or relative share of social 
security financing expressed as a percentage of salaries or of GDP, but what 
remains to cover other basic needs once the size of resources allotted to 
social protection has been decided upon.  In other words, there is no 
absolute figure, or threshold, which would form an objective limit to what a 
society, or a group can afford to spend for its social protection. 
 
Although compulsory pension systems seem to shift the responsibility to save 
for retirement to the individual employee, it can also be argued that by legally 
requiring contribution, the state assumes “some responsibility in the event 
that the ultimate investment outcome proves unsatisfactory”.169  Compulsory 
                                     
165 Depending, of course, on the actual provisions of the proposed legislation creating the 
mandatory national fund. 
166 Partridge “The Bill of Rights and its effect on the allocation of death benefits and other 
issues relating to retirement funds” Pension Lawyers Association Conference 1998. 
167 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 9. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 15. 
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fund membership also leads to maximum participation, which in turn 
strengthens the solidarity base.   
 
5.5.6 Mandatory participation: concluding remarks 
 
As a by-product of compulsory fund membership, the need for tax incentives 
for saving for retirement all but disappears. Tax incentives to belong to 
retirement funds can therefore be confined to the envisaged voluntary pillar of 
the reformed system.  The goal of such tax incentives must be to encourage 
retirement savings beyond the compulsory minimum contributions required by 
the other pillars.170  It is recommended that the money saved by abandoning 
tax incentives for fund membership could contribute to the costs of the wage 
subsidy to lower earning workers.171 
 
The full effects of a mandatory system will only be clear once the reformed 
system has been operational for some time.  The success of, or problems 
experienced with, compulsory fund membership in other countries therefore 
serves as a valuable guideline for policy makers and the legislature.172 The 
extent of voluntary supplementary participation in the reformed social 
                                     
170 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 32.  One of the points of difference  
between the Treasury Task Team and Department of Social Development’s discussion paper 
is whether tax incentives are at all necessary.  The Department of Social Development’s view 
is that compulsory fund membership will render tax incentives unnecessary (DSD discussion 
document (2007) 84), whereas the Treasury Task Team ((2007) 2nd discussion paper 34) 
underscores the value of tax incentives for supplementary savings. 
171 The proposed wage subsidy is discussed above at 5.5.3.  
172 See below at 7.3 for an overview of the mandatory retirement funds in Chile, Sweden, the 
UK and the United States. 
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insurance system is not clear at this stage and as such the discussion of how 
voluntary participation should be combined with compulsory membership will 
be limited to the various models implemented in other countries.173   
 
5.6 EXCLUSION OF WORKERS IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY, LOW-
INCOME WORKERS AND THE UNEMPLOYED 
 
5.6.1 Workers in the informal economy 
 
Internationally, the growth of the informal economy,174 which leaves large 
sections of the active population without social security protection is 
recognised as one of the important factors informing social security 
reforms.175 
 
The South African retirement fund system currently caters mainly for formally 
employed workers, as funds are by and large created by employers.  
Coverage of employees in the formal sector is relatively good,176 but 
                                     
173 See below at 7.3 for examples of retirement funding systems that successfully combine 
compulsory and voluntary participation. 
174 The term “informal economy” is used where possible instead of “informal sector” which 
does not really denote a specific “sector”, but is rather used to describe all workers deriving 
their income from informal and unregulated activities.  However, the use of the terms “formal 
sector” and “informal sector” throughout the sources referred to in this section, makes the 
occasional reference to these terms unavoidable. 
175 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 3. 
176 Estimated between 66% and 84% of employees in the formal sector, which is good, even 
when compared to international levels (National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 13 and 
17.  The Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 9.1.1 estimates coverage at about 80% of 
formally employed workers. 
 
 
 
 
 370
exclusive, as workers outside of this sector do not enjoy the same 
protection.177 
 
South Africa has a large and growing informal economy,178 characterised by 
informal traders, small-scale manufacturers and domestic workers.179 In the 
absence of a public national retirement insurance scheme, workers deriving 
their incomes from informal or unregulated activities are therefore left to their 
own devices when it comes to securing retirement income.  Most workers in 
the informal economy lack the means to pay regular contributions and 
administration costs and are thereby excluded from retirement funding 
schemes.180  The National Treasury’s Retirement Fund Reform discussion 
paper rightly identified providing improved access to an affordable retirement 
saving vehicle for those with irregular and informal earnings as a key reform 
objective.181 
 
                                     
177 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 13. 
178 20% of the economically active population are made up of persons deriving their income 
from informal, irregular or unregulated economic activities (National Treasury (2004) 
Discussion paper 12).  The DSD discussion document (2007) 62 estimates that there are 2,5 
million informal sector workers. 
179 Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social security: a 
legal analysis 253. 
180 According to the National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 21 fn 17, “[t]he administration 
cost of operating an individual account for a member of an occupational retirement fund is 
equivalent to so large a percentage of likely savings for such a person that participation in an 
occupational retirement fund or a retirement annuity fund is not feasible.”  Workers so 
excluded could potentially qualify for the older person’s grant, provided they can meet the 
requirements for the grant.  The Mouton Committee used students and housewives as 
examples of persons involved in the informal economy and who are unlikely to be able to 
contribute to the formal retirement system (Mouton Committee Report (1992) para 2.4). 
181 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 12.  See also National Treasury (2007) 2nd 
discussion paper 19. 
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Workers in the informal economy mainly rely on social assistance such as the 
older person’s grant for retirement income.  The means test for the older 
person’s grant as currently applied, combined with the relatively high level of 
the grant compared to the earnings of the majority of workers in the informal 
economy,182 may serve as a disincentive to save for retirement through 
contributory earnings- related schemes.183  Informal social security measures 
are seen as alternative social protection measures by many persons 
marginalised in terms of the formal system.184 
 
That said, it is submitted that cost-effective options to progressively include 
workers in the informal economy in the earnings-related pillars of the 
reformed social insurance scheme should be investigated.185  One option 
would be the progressive inclusion of workers in the informal economy in a 
mandatory social insurance scheme that is adapted to make provision for 
workers from this sector.  A major difficulty for the inclusion of workers in the 
informal economy in a mandatory system is the collection of their 
contributions and therefore only those informal sector employees whose 
                                     
182 Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier et al (eds) Social security: a legal 
analysis (2003) 254. 
183 Future changes to the older person’s grant, for instance, if the means test were to be 
abolished (as proposed above at 4.3.2), may have a positive effect on the participation of 
workers in the informal economy in the retirement funding system. 
184 Burial societies and stokvels are examples of informal social security measures.  See 
Dekker and Olivier “Informal social security” in Olivier et al (eds) Social security (2003) 559-
593 for a discussion of the role of informal social security structures in South Africa. 
185 See below at 7.3 for a discussion of the coverage of the informal sector in other countries. 
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contributions can effectively be collected could be included.186  It should be 
recognised that once workers in the informal economy are included in a 
mandatory system and arrangements made for the collection of their 
contributions, they pro tanto become part of the formal economy.  Due to the 
abovementioned difficulties with compulsory participation by informal sector 
workers, the Treasury Task Team in its second discussion paper 
recommends that steps be taken to encourage voluntary participation by 
workers in the informal sector.187   
 
The other option is the creation of a low cost savings scheme for workers 
marginalised from the formal retirement funding structures.188  It is submitted 
that workers in the informal economy should be encouraged to join the 
savings scheme on a voluntary basis to avoid the abovementioned problems 
related to mandatory systems and the collection of contributions. 
  
5.6.2 The effect of low wages and sporadic unemployment on coverage 
 
South Africa has a high rate of unemployment.189  The unemployed are not 
covered by the current retirement funding system as only employees can 
                                     
186 The Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 3.6.2 suggested that “if the mechanisms for 
collection are not likely to be efficient, regulations for the introduction of compulsory cover will 
not be effective, and should not be introduced”. 
187 National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 14. 
188 As proposed by the Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 9.2.6.3; National Treasury 
(2004) Discussion paper 22 and National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 14. 
189 The unemployment rate for the 3rd quarter of 2009 was 24.5% (StatsSA (2009) “Latest key 
indicators” http://www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/keyindicators.asp (accessed 11/11/2009). 
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become members of occupational retirement funds.190  They therefore have 
to rely on social assistance in the form of the older person’s grant when they 
reach retirement age.  Retirement funds, including public funds, are seen as 
part of social insurance and therefore aim to compensate workers for loss of 
income. 191  For this reason persons who remain unemployed for most of their 
working lives will continue to fall outside the scope of retirement insurance. 
 
Unemployed persons are not the only persons that find themselves 
marginalised in the current retirement funding system.  Both defined benefit 
and defined contribution funds have factors that have a prejudicial effect on 
the retirement benefits of low wage workers and ‘atypically’192 employed 
workers. In the case of defined benefit funds, lower paid and “atypical” 
employees are penalised by the benefit formula, as the employee’s final 
wage193 and years worked194  would yield lower benefits.  With defined 
contribution funds, the benefit is based on contributions made by and on 
behalf of the employee.  As contributions are usually based on a percentage 
of the wage set out in the fund rules, the contributions for low wage 
                                     
190 In theory, an unemployed person can purchase a retirement annuity, but it is unlikely that 
the majority of unemployed South Africans can afford to do so. 
191 See above at 2.2 for the distinction between social assistance and social insurance. 
192 E.g. contract workers who might experience periods of no income once a particular 
contract is terminated, casual employees and seasonal workers (although “atypical” may be a 
misnomer, as this type of employment is becoming increasingly prevalent).  Casualisation of 
the workforce also has an impact on retirement income as many of these employees have no 
benefits such as retirement fund contributions paid on their behalf.  See Bodibe (ed) (2006) 
The extent and effects of casualisation in Southern Africa: analysis of Lesotho, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe 13. 
193 Which would be low for lower paid workers. 
194 Atypical (or ‘non-standard’) workers have difficulty with accumulating a sufficient length of 
service as they work fewer and irregular hours. 
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employees would be low which translates into lower retirement benefits.  This 
is particularly the case with employees who can only make irregular 
contributions to the fund.   
 
In terms of the current legislation applicable to older persons there are a 
number of disadvantages for low income workers in joining a retirement fund.  
In the first instance, they run the risk of being disqualified from receiving the 
older person’s grant, as other retirement income is currently taken into 
account in the means test for the grant.195  It was therefore recommended by 
the Treasury Task Team that the benefits received from the proposed 
National Savings Fund196 be exempt from the means test. However, an 
exemption of only members of the National Savings Fund could constitute 
unfair discrimination against low income earners belonging to other funds and 
a blanket exemption from, or abolishing the means test for the older person’s 
grant would be a better option, 
 
In addition, disincentives for saving for retirement such as high administration 
costs, the risk of low investment returns and the inability to make regular 
contributions exist.  These disincentives to retirement saving by low income 
workers can possibly be addressed in a retirement savings vehicle similar to 
the National Savings Fund proposed by the Treasury Task Team rather than 
                                     
195 Reg 19(1)(e) read with Annexure A of GN R898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008; National 
Treasury (2007) Budget review 2007 112. 
196 The National Savings Fund (NSF) is envisaged as a national savings vehicle for persons 
with low incomes.  See National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 22.   
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occupational retirement funds.197 It is recommended that the retirement 
savings fund be regulated to the same extent as existing funds as far as 
administration and governance is concerned in terms of legislation similar to 
the Pension Funds Act.  This would allay fears that the savings fund would be 
a less secure and inferior retirement savings vehicle compared with other 
funds. 
 
Restricted access to retirement funding is a problem for members of both 
defined benefit and defined contribution funds who have periods of 
unemployment scattered throughout their working lives, for example women 
who have to take time off from work to care for their children or elderly 
parents or who are relegated to informal or ‘atypical’ employment due to their 
care-giving tasks.   
 
Under the current retirement benefit system, only employees can become 
members of funds and thereby entitled to benefits upon retirement.  People 
who spend all their time on tasks that are not regarded as “work” for an 
“employer” such as household maintenance, caring for other household 
members and community service, therefore, have no access to retirement 
funds.  The time these caregivers spend caring for their children and elderly 
parents is time that they cannot earn pensionable income, leading to 
decreased or no retirement benefits and, in many cases, reliance on the state   
                                     
197 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 22-23 and 26. 
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The high cost of private retirement savings vehicles also prevent many care-
givers from saving for their own retirement.  As stated by Binney and Estes:  
Caregivers face financial burdens, loss of outside employment opportunities, 
disqualification from Social Security and penalties for “years out” of 
employment.198 
 
Pension reform will have to include special provisions to cater for the needs of 
caregivers who, relative to other members, could not accumulate enough 
contributions or years of service to benefit from a decent pension.199  The call 
for improved social security benefits for caregivers gains in importance in the 
context of legislation aimed at shifting much of the burden of caregiving of 
older persons to their families and communities.200 
 
Periodically unemployed and low income workers are economically 
vulnerable and increasingly so in their old age.  A retirement funding system 
that excludes them or pays them minimum benefits only, cannot be regarded 
as a reasonable measure to provide access to social security as required by 
section 27 of the Constitution.  In cases like these where there are design 
faults in the retirement benefit system, the state surely cannot require 
individuals to be responsible for their own retirement funding and should step 
in.  
 
                                     
198 This statement of Binney and Estes “The retreat of the state and its transfer of 
responsibility: the intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) International Journal of Health 
Services 92 was made in the context of caregivers in the USA, but is just as relevant to South 
African caregivers. 
199 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 11. 
200 See below at 6.2 and 6.3 for a discussion of the role of family and community caregivers in 
providing domiciliary care to older persons. 
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It is in the interest of intergenerational solidarity that provision is made for 
marginalised groups such as workers in the informal economy, family and 
community caregivers, low income workers and sporadically unemployed 
persons.  Even though the intergenerational contribution by formal sector 
employees is more noticeable and easily measured, the groups discussed 
above contribute (even if sometimes only indirectly) to the welfare of older 
persons and children in their families and communities.  As a consequence 
they are equally entitled to intergenerational support upon reaching retirement 
age than formal sector employees, and the law should make provision for 
measures to put intergenerational solidarity into effect.  What is required is an 
arrangement which allows the members of the marginalised groups 
mentioned above membership to a retirement funding system which is both 
flexible enough to handle irregular contributions and contains incentives to 
retain benefits until retirement.201 
 
5.7 FUND GOVERNANCE 
 
As was stated earlier in this chapter202 “confidence in the long-term continuity 
of institutions” and “trust in the law and sound financial and economic 
management” are central to a functioning retirement insurance system and to 
                                     
201 National Treasury (2004) Discussion Paper 20 – 23.  See also Taylor Committee Report 
(2002) figure 16 at 94 
202 Above at 5.1. 
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intergenerational solidarity.  The Fidentia scandal203 (and other less widely 
reported fund failures) has highlighted the importance of legal standards for 
the governance of retirement funds.  The various acts regulating the current 
retirement fund landscape were outlined above.204  The fragmented 
legislation, amongst a variety of other reasons, has led to problems of poor 
governance of retirement funds. 
 
The reform discussion documents examined in this chapter all point to one of 
the pillars (“second pillar”) of the new retirement system being a mandatory 
public fund.  Fund governance issues for the public fund such as oversight 
and disclosure of information can be addressed in the founding legislation.  
The situation would be different for the so-called “third pillar” funds 
(mandatory supplementary funds).  If the reformed system provides members 
with the option to choose which fund they want to belong to, improvements in 
the regulation of the different funds will be required.  Definite measures 
should be taken to minimise failures of these funds, particular if they are in 
the hands of private fund managers205 and to ensure that there is proper 
                                     
203 Fidentia Asset Management (Pty) Ltd was placed under curatorship in February 2007 by 
the Cape High Court after R689m of the Mineworkers’ Provident Fund invested in Fidentia 
through the Living Hands Investment Trust (owned by Fidentia) was found to be missing.  As 
a result many of the widows and orphans who depended on the payments from the 
Mineworkers’ Provident Fund for their livelihood were left destitute (Morris “Fidentia case: 
complaints by mine widows sparked probe” Cape Times 5 February 2007 
http://www.capetimes.co.za (accessed 16/05/2009); Steenkamp and Malan “How safe is 
safe” Febr 2009 USB Leaders’ Lab 26).  See also Financial Planning Institute of Southern 
Africa (2007) Social security and retirement fund reform in South Africa 9. 
204 At 3.3.2.1. 
205 ANC (2007) Social Transformation 4.  See below at 7.3.3.2 and 7.3.3.3 for a discussion of 
the Chilean experience with a variety of fund managers. 
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disclosure of all relevant information to fund members, so that they can make 
informed choices about which fund offers the best value. 
 
Fund governance will remain an important factor even in the reformed 
pension system, as no matter what the design of a retirement system is – 
whether it is PAYG or fully funded; defined benefit or defined contribution – if 
the persons in charge of funds do not comply with their legal duties, the 
benefits of some or, in worst-case scenarios, all members will be adversely 
affected.206  The Department of Social Development recognises that neither 
state-run nor private funds are immune to governance failures and suggests 
that an independent “special-purpose” regulator be established to oversee all 
retirement funds in the reformed system, whether the funds are public or 
private.207  It is submitted that a cohesive approach to the reformed multi-pillar 
system would indeed call for a “special-purpose” regulator for the whole 
system, as long as steps are taken to retain the expertise of the current 
regulator, particularly for the proposed occupational fund pillar(s) in the 
reformed system.208 
 
                                     
206 The “failure of trustees and product and service providers to recognise, disclose and 
adequately manage conflicts of interest” is a regulatory problem experienced worldwide 
(National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 26). 
207 DSD discussion document (2007) 41. 
208 It is worth mentioning that in the UK, the Pensions Act 2004 created the Pension 
Regulator to supervise all occupational funds and to ensure compliance with the relevant 
legislation (see below at 7.3.4.2).  The fact that the need for a regulator specifically for the 
occupational fund pillar of a multi-pillar system was identified in the UK should be taken into 
account when the level of supervisory authority for the proposed multi-pillar system in South 
Africa is determined. 
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The promotion of intergenerational solidarity is a long-term project.  The 
safeguarding of intergenerational solidarity therefore depends on effective 
fund governance to ensure that retired persons receive promised benefits and 
that future generations would be able to receive similar benefits. 
 
5.8 INCOME SECURITY IN RETIREMENT 
 
It is submitted that the state’s responsibility to retired older persons does not 
only entail the provision of retirement benefits but also includes measures to 
ensure that an individual who has saved for his or her retirement can be 
assured that promised benefits would not have dwindled by the time he or 
she retires.  This responsibility of the state209 towards an individual to secure 
an adequate standard of living throughout his or her lifetime has much in 
common with the concept of intergenerational solidarity, whilst still 
incorporating some aspects of ‘neo-liberalism’.  The mere presence of ‘neo-
liberal’ aspects in the retirement funding system will not of necessity detract 
from the goal of social solidarity, as long as a careful balance between self-
sufficiency (‘neo-liberal’) and redistribution (solidarity) is struck.  It is 
submitted that the appropriate tool to strike this balance is the legislation 
creating the reformed retirement funding system. 
 
                                     
209 I.t.o. s 27(1)(c) and (2) of the Constitution (right of access to social security); s 25 (right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of property); the equality clause (s 9) and the protection of human 
dignity of older persons (s 10). 
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 Because of limited financial resources, measures to encourage those 
individuals who are able to do so to save for their retirement will always form 
part of the South African retirement income system, despite their ‘neo-liberal’ 
slant.  This chapter of this thesis therefore aimed to determine whether the 
state offers adequate protection for those who wish to provide for their own 
retirement or whether more could be done.    
 
The National Treasury 2004 discussion paper210 estimates that although 
approximately 50% of the economically active population are able to provide 
for their own retirement through occupational retirement funds and voluntary 
savings arrangements, thus supporting the ideal of the individual providing for 
his or her own old age, a proportion of these will nonetheless fall back on the 
older person’s grant at a later stage.  This is a clear indication that the state 
should not be absolved of responsibility for even those that provide for their 
own old age and that steps have to be taken to make sure that their 
retirement income is secured.211 
 
It is submitted that even though there is a close relation between the 
individual’s moral obligation to make use of opportunities to provide for 
                                     
210 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 12. 
211 See Mokgoro J’s comments on the interface between “self-sufficiency” of an individual and 
the granting of access to socio-economic rights as part of the “cost we have to pay for the 
constitutional commitment to developing a caring society” in Khosa v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) 595, para 65.  Although these comments were made 
in the context of the right of access to social security of permanent residents, they can be 
equally applied to individuals who initially have the ability to save for their retirement but then 
fall on hard times. 
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financial security in old age and the extent of the state’s financial obligations 
towards that individual,212 this does not absolve the state from its duty in 
terms of section 27 of the Constitution to take “reasonable measures” to 
provide access to retirement funding.  The state’s constitutional obligation 
does not require a mere adoption of a legislative framework or regulation of 
the retirement system; it requires the state to actively participate as guarantor 
of the system.213  Participation by the state as underwriter of the reformed 
system is crucial as “history and experience have proved that the role of the 
State is critical providing the platform for a social insurance system to ensure 
the pooling of risks and to achieve social solidarity objectives”.214 
 
Ultimately, the pension reform process seeks to find a new balance of 
responsibilities between the state, employers and individual fund members.  
The reforms should build on the achievements of the current retirement 
funding system.  Although the regulatory functions performed by the state 
(supervision by the Registrar of Pension Funds) generally conform to 
international standards,215 there remains some scope for improvement.216 
                                     
212 S 27(1)(c) guarantees access to social assistance to those who “are unable to support 
themselves and their dependants”. 
213 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 8.  See ANC 
(2007) Social Transformation 3, in whose view the state “cannot simply assume the role of 
consumer protection and watch failures of private providers” (at 4). Although the National 
Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 7 plays down the frequency of pension failures, it admits 
that the consequences can be disastrous when pension funds do fail. 
214 ANC (2007) Social Transformation 4. 
215 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 12 and 17.   
216 See above at 5.7. 
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Hence, the reformed retirement funding system will require the creation of 
comprehensive standards of regulation and supervision.217 
 
Many of the problems currently experienced in the retirement funding sector, 
such as leakage,218 fund governance,219 and administrative costs could 
potentially be addressed through statutory amendments.  However, there 
seems to be consensus among commentators that a complete overhaul of the 
retirement funding system is required.220 
 
The objective of adequate retirement income for all will require an improved 
linkage between the retirement fund sector and private retirement insurance 
on the one hand and, on the other, social assistance and the benefits paid out 
of these programmes.  Many of the committees and task teams tasked with 
restructuring and reforming social security in South Africa have advocated a 
holistic approach to the provision of income in retirement.221  Most of the 
reform proposals envisage a multi-pillared retirement funding system that 
incorporates methods of retirement funding ranging from social assistance, to 
                                     
217 Madonsela (2008) “Keynote address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference 9. 
218 Discussed above at 5.4. 
219 Discussed above at 5.7. 
220 As proposed in the DSD discussion document (2007); National Treasury (2004) 
Discussion paper; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper; Madonsela (2008) 
“Keynote address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference 6 and 7, in whose opinion the 
reform of the retirement funding system is crucial to create social solidarity. 
221 Taylor Committee Report (2002) para 9.1.2; National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion 
paper 38 where it was stated that “South Africa has a well-established occupational and 
individual retirement funding industry that provides protection to many, and a substantial 
social assistance grant programme that provides income support to the poor.  But between 
the means-tested grant programmes and tax incentivised saving, there is effectively no fiscal 
support for saving and social insurance: the basic, contributory, earnings-related social 
protection system is incomplete and uncoordinated.” 
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mandatory and/or voluntary retirement fund membership.  The multi-pillar 
model of retirement funding creates the potential for retirement coverage of 
previously excluded persons, such as workers in the informal economy and 
employees with low and irregular earnings.222 
  
However, the achievements of the current system in addressing social need 
should be recognised and it follows that it should only be replaced by a 
system which is economically sustainable and has broad political support.223 
The retirement reform process is therefore based on principles such as 
solidarity, equity, inclusiveness and efficiency.224  Whether the product of the 
reform process, the new retirement funding system, will indeed incorporate all 
of these principles equally, will depend on factors such as the choice of the 
types of funds forming part of the system and governance structures. 
 
It is submitted that pension reform policies and legislation must be judged in 
terms of their likely promotion of intergenerational solidarity.  Evaluated in this 
context, a multi-pillar approach with universal social assistance with a PAYG 
tier complemented by a fully-funded component would create a common goal 
                                     
222 The proposals for the inclusion of currently excluded workers were discussed at 5.6.2 
above. 
223 The Treasury Task Team summarises the strengths of the current occupational fund 
system as follows: “South Africa’s retirement fund industry is supported by a wide range of 
sophisticated service providers, in areas such as administration, actuarial services, employee 
benefit consulting and investment management.  In reform, it is necessary to harness this 
existing capacity and build on the foundation laid by private sector retirement provisioning.  
Ensuring and maintaining a strong, cost-effective and well-regulated private pensions sector 
is thus a critical element of South Africa’s overall retirement funding strategy.” (National 
Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 18). 
224 Madonsela (2008) “Keynote address” Institute of Retirement Funds Conference 8.  These 
principles were discussed in various paragraphs in 5.3 - 5.7 above. 
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for all generations.  Such a scheme would promote the interdependence of 
generations through the social assistance and PAYG components whilst still 
allowing working age generations the option to save for their own 
retirement.225 
 
As was stated above, the South African population is still relatively young and 
therefore the PAYG component of the proposed scheme is sustainable and 
will most probably not experience the competition between generations for 
scarce resources found in aging populations.   
 
Even though retirement funding systems are a reflection of the political, 
economic and social environment, they can also influence that 
environment.226  It is submitted that intergenerational solidarity must be 
included among the points of reference for assessing the value of the pension 
reforms.  It is imperative that intergenerational solidarity in the pension 
system is entrenched by legislation and enforced by judicial precedent, as 
[p]olitically crafted solutions are likely to change as political circumstances 
change from time to time.  While change is not automatically for the worse, the 
danger exists that gains achieved at one particular stage may be easily lost.  In 
the past, one has seen governments with lofty ideas about the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights changing and reneging on their promises.  Sometimes it 
is economic realities which force them to take that route.227 
 
                                     
225 See Generations United (2007) GU Public Policy Agenda for the 110th Congress iv; vi and 
19. 
226 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 6. 
227 Majola “A response to Craig Scott: a South African perspective” (1999) 1(4) ESR Review 
7. 
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The aim therefore is to develop a pension system which is politically, socially 
and economically acceptable and which can guarantee the rights of current 
members as well as future generations of members.  Both the new retirement 
funding system and transitional measures will have to meet the constitutional 
requirements of reasonableness and progressive realisation of access to 
social security, with one goal being to limit the effect of reforms on current 
pensioners and persons nearing retirement.228 
 
At the heart of the pension reforms lie important issues like poverty alleviation 
and income replacement rather than the exact number of and composition of 
the different “pillars” of the reformed system.  It follows that these core 
functions should be guaranteed, which means that they must be “established 
by law, compulsory, placed under the responsibility and close guidance of the 
State while not necessarily directly managed by the State or its subsidiary 
bodies, and include as built-in elements a certain number of safeguards 
concerning notably good governance, financial viability, predictability and 
adequacy of benefits.”229 
 
                                     
228 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 8. 
229 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 11. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are three recognised ways of support for those older persons who no 
longer have earning capacity and/or the ability to care for themselves, namely 
families1, communities and the state.  One of the stated aims of this thesis is to 
determine with whom the obligation to care and support older persons lies: with 
the state only; with family members and the community where the older persons 
reside; or, the state, in partnership with families and communities.  This chapter 
will examine the validity of South Africa’s official policy that limits the state’s 
responsibility to caring for and accommodating frail and destitute older persons, 
with families, communities and non-governmental organisations being burdened 
with the care and support of all other older persons.  The need for financial 
assistance by the state to family and community caregivers will be discussed, 
with particular focus on the consequences for caregivers of the obligation to care 
for older persons.   In addition, measures to ensure that older persons are 
treated with the respect and dignity they deserve will be investigated.  Finally, the 
notion of ‘intergenerational equity’ and its potential impact on intergenerational 
solidarity and policy on older persons will be discussed. 
                                     
1 Family support is more dominant in developing countries. 
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6.2 THE FAMILY AS A SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR OLDER PERSONS 
 
In addition to the financial support provided for older person through older 
person’s grants and retirement fund benefits,2 older persons have an additional 
need for support and care. Due to the decreased ability of a large number of 
older persons to see to their daily needs and the increasing medical care 
required by many older persons, the physical circumstances of older persons 
need as much attention as their financial needs.  The protection of older persons’ 
right of access to care and support is part of their right of access to social 
security3 and is linked to their right to housing and, most importantly, their right to 
dignity.4 
 
The responsibility of families to care for older family members is discussed in this 
section.  The aim is to determine the boundary between the family’s legal 
obligation to care for older family members and the state’s obligation to take 
reasonable measures to provide appropriate care to older persons. 
6.2.1  History of and assumptions regarding familial support of older 
persons in South Africa 
 
Many references are made in this thesis to the “traditional” obligations of the 
family towards older family members.  This “tradition” is not confined to any 
                                     
2 Discussed above at 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2. 
3 The right of access to social security is discussed at 3.2.1 above. 
4 See above at 3.2.5 and below at 6.4.2 for discussions of older person’s right to dignity. 
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single ethnic group or culture and, as can be seen from the following quote from 
Midgley, it can be found in many communities in developing countries: 
The family has for centuries been the primary institution through which the basic 
needs of individuals have been met.  The family has also provided for those who 
could not participate fully in its efforts to produce enough for subsistence and 
exchange; in this way, those who were economically active, supported the 
young, elderly, handicapped, and sick whose productive capacities were limited 
or impaired.  These primordial responsibilities were institutionalized in most 
cultures in the patterns of kin and clan obligations which specified what help 
should be given, by whom, and under what conditions. 5 
 
Studies have shown that in developing countries, particularly in Africa, informal 
(family and community) systems “provide the bulk of social support for older 
persons” and that the public social security systems therefore play a less 
important role.6 
 
The rules of customary law have to a great extent determined the extent of the 
duty to care for older family members in South Africa.  The comments made by 
Langa DCJ in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others7 regarding 
the customary laws of succession are just as applicable in the context of the 
traditional obligation to support family members.  According to Langa DCJ: 
The rules did not operate in isolation.  They were part of a system which fitted in 
with the community’s way of life.  The system had its own safeguards to ensure 
fairness in the context of entitlements, duties and responsibilities.  It was 
designed to preserve the cohesion and stability of the extended family unit and 
                                     
5 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 103.  This view is echoed by 
Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) International 
Journal of Health Services who states (at 647) that the concept of children caring for their aging 
parents “has been an enduring facet of both western and eastern cultures for centuries”. 
6 Ståhlberg et al Retirement income security for men and women (2008) 10.  An in-depth study of 
informal kinship-based social security measures falls outside the scope of this research.  See 
Dekker and Olivier “Informal forms of social security and informal sector social security” in Olivier 
et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 83-99; Dekker “Mind the gap: suggestions for 
bridging the divide between formal and informal social security” (2008) 1 LDD 117-131 for more 
on informal social security measures. 
7 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
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ultimately the entire community.  This served various purposes, not least of which 
was the maintenance of discipline within the clan or extended family.  Everyone, 
man, woman and child had a role and each role, directly or indirectly, was 
designed to contribute to the communal good and welfare.8 
 
In his judgment in the same case, Ngcobo J explained the significance of the 
family unit in traditional society as follows: 
The family unit was the focus of social concern.  Individual interests were 
submerged in the common weal.  The system emphasised duties and 
responsibilities as opposed to rights… 
 
A sense of community prevailed from which developed an elaborate system of 
reciprocal duties and obligations among the family members.  This is manifest in 
the concept of ubuntu – umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – a dominant value in 
African traditional culture.  This concept encapsulates communality and the inter-
dependence of the members of a community….  It is this system of reciprocal 
duties and obligations that ensured that every family member had access to 
basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter and healthcare…. 
 
The obligation to care for family members is a vital and fundamental value in 
African social system.9 
 
During the apartheid era the assumption that socio-economic burdens are to be 
carried by families was the justification for excluding Africans from welfare 
provisions.10  Even though racial parity has been achieved in welfare provisions, 
government policy regarding older persons generally operates on the assumption 
that they can rely on their families for support.11  
 
Apartheid-era welfare policy was based on the assumption that all people lived in 
two-generational nuclear families headed by a male and with female 
                                     
8 At 26, para 75. 
9 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 50 - 51, paras 162, 163 and 166.  Reference is also made to Art 29 of 
the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which makes provision for the 
individual’s duty “to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need”.  See below 
at 7.2.5.1 for the duties created by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
10 Hassim (2005) “Gender, Welfare and the Developmental State in South Africa” 6. 
11 The White Paper for Social Welfare GN 1108 in GG 18166 of August 1997 (hereafter “White 
Paper for Social Welfare”) 93. 
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caregivers.12  This assumption ignored the reality of the variety of household 
forms in South Africa.13  The definition of “family” provided by the White Paper for 
Social Welfare14 reflects the shift to a more realistic concept of family that 
includes the extended family as “individuals who either by contract or agreement 
choose to live together intimately and function as a unit in a social and economic 
system”.  The family is regarded as “the primary social unit which ideally provides 
care, nurturing and socialisation for its members”.15 
 
The impact of the White Paper for Social Welfare on policy regarding care and 
support of older persons is twofold: 
• The family is seen as the core support structure for older persons; 
• Only frail and destitute older persons are deemed to be the responsibility 
of the state.16 
The assumption that families are the primary support structure for older persons 
therefore seems to translate into a limitation of state care and support for older 
persons.17 
 
                                     
12 Based on the Western-based nuclear family model from which family benefits as a branch of 
social security originated (Malherbe “Family” in Olivier et al (eds) (2003) Social security: a legal 
analysis 378. 
13 Dekker and Olivier “Informal forms of social security and informal sector social security” in 
Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 86.  See above at 4.2 for a general 
overview of apartheid-era welfare policy. 
14 White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 93. 
15 Ibid.  At para 2.31, the White Paper describes the family as “the basic unit of society”. 
16 White Paper for Social Welfare para 8.82. 
17 Other than the reference to the proposed programmes to promote home-care of older persons, 
including “support programmes for care-givers” (White Paper para 8.82(i)), no mention is made in 
the White Paper of any specific assistance for families as they take up their duties as the “primary 
support structure for older persons”.  S 11 of the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006, makes provision 
for some assistance for caregivers in the form of respite care for family members caring for older 
persons. 
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In 1984, Midgley18 described a situation where state schemes other than social 
assistance required beneficiaries 
 to be in a state of near or total destitution to qualify for help and normally the 
capacity of relatives to maintain the claimant is taken into account.  Generally, 
assistance can only be expected if there are no relatives who can support the 
claimant.  In many developing countries, the legacy of the English Poor Laws is 
still a powerful influence.  In addition to the notion of [relatives’] responsibility, 
which is incorporated into most schemes, residential care is widely used to deal 
with the destitute…19 
 
In many cases family caregiving is preferred over “impersonal” state services. In 
the absence of state-provided services, many older persons have to turn to 
traditional systems of support, of which support by the extended family is the 
most prevalent.20 
 
The situation described above theoretically21 still applies today and an older 
person may therefore be able to rely on the customary rule of support of older 
persons by their families described above in an action against his or her family 
members, as customary law is recognised by the Constitution as part of South 
African law.  In terms of section 211(3) of the Constitution, courts must apply 
customary law “when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law”.  In terms of section 39(3), 
rules of customary law are protected as long as they are consistent with the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.   
 
                                     
18 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 133. 
19 For more on the English Poor Laws see below at 7.3.4.4.1. 
20 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 196. 
21 See below at 6.2.2 for the view that the traditional family support structure for older persons is 
not necessarily the norm anymore. 
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The question arises whether an action based on the customary duty of support 
by family members is the best course of action for all older persons who are 
destitute or for whom family support is not forthcoming.  The problem with an 
action based on customary law is that it is “a dynamic system of law which is 
continually evolving to meet the changing circumstances of the community in 
which it operates”,22 making it difficult to determine whether the rule relied upon 
is still applied.  As will be seen below, there is sufficient evidence that the 
traditional system of reciprocal duties among family members has broken down 
to such an extent that family support of older persons cannot be regarded as the 
rule anymore. 
 
While basing an action against family members who are reluctant to fulfil their 
obligations toward older family members on customary support of older persons 
by families may prove to be problematic, older persons are not left without 
recourse.  South African common law recognises the rule of filial responsibility, in 
terms of which adult children are held responsible to care for their indigent 
parents.  The basis of the common law filial responsibility is the reciprocal duty of 
support existing between parents and children.  Just as parents are required to 
support their children, adult children are required to support their parents.23 
 
                                     
22 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 48, para 153.  
Statutes, textbooks and case law on indigenous law constitute codified or “official” customary law 
that must be distinguished from the customary law practiced in the community, the “living” law (at 
paras 150-154). 
23 Voet 25 3 4 cited in Anthony v Cape Town Municipality 1967 4 SA 445 (A) 447. 
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However, the common law filial duty to support parents lacks sufficient clarity to 
be used widely as the intersection between the family’s duty to care for the older 
person and state support for that older person.  As was shown above in the 
discussion of the case law on the duty to support parents,24 indigence on the part 
of the parent relying on support has to be proven.  Although the test for indigence 
is that there should be “an extreme need or want for the basic necessities of 
life”,25 whether a parent is indigent enough to be able to rely on support from his 
or her children will depend on the circumstances of each case.26  In addition, only 
children who are able to support their parents can be compelled to do so, but no 
clear benchmark for the ability to do so has been established. 
 
Because it is a common law duty, there is no statutory link between filial 
responsibility and the state’s statutory obligations to provide for older persons.27  
“Indigence” is the test for both state support28 and family support. Even if one 
were to accept the policy view that the state is only liable to provide care for older 
persons when their own children cannot, the absence of a statutory measure to 
determine where the filial obligations end and the state’s duties begin means that 
                                     
24 The South African case law on filial obligations was outlined above at 3.3.4.2. 
25 Smith v Mutual Federal Insurance Co Ltd 1998 4 SA 626 (C) 632.  Basic necessities of life 
include food clothing, shelter, medicine and care in times of illness (Van Vuuren v Sam 1972 2 
SA 633 (A) 642). 
26 Oosthuizen v Stanley 1938 AD 322 at 327. 
27 The means test for the older person’s grant does not include reference to adult children’s 
income and assets.  Of course, where the older person receives a grant from the state which 
enables the older person to provide for the “basic necessities of life”, the older person may not be 
viewed as being “indigent”. 
28 I.t.o. the White Paper for Social Welfare.  The Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 makes no 
reference to “indigent” older persons, except where the state is required to support community-
based programmes to provide “appropriate services contained in the indigent policy for vulnerable 
and qualifying older persons” (s 11(2)(h)).  
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there is no current measure to determine whether an indigent older person may 
directly rely on state support or should rather be advised to seek support from his 
or her family. 
 
It is submitted that legislation determining the filial obligation to support elderly 
parents is also required in order to clearly outline the responsible parties, in 
particular the circumstances under which an adult child is absolved from the duty 
to support.  Legislation can also determine the penalties for failing or refusing to 
support a parent, as well as measures to enforce the duty to support other than 
expensive civil actions.  
 
Most importantly, incorporating the filial obligation in legislation would clearly 
delineate the point where family obligations end and the state’s responsibility 
toward the older person begins.  Therefore, even though both the common law 
and customary law make provision for support of older persons by their families, 
the breakdown of traditional support of older persons necessitates statutory 
intervention to enforce the obligations of family members toward older relatives. 
 
Intergenerational solidarity implies the willingness of the working-age generation 
to provide financial and non-cash support to older persons.  Care and support 
services for older persons provided by and subsidised by the state can also be 
considered solidarity-based schemes.29  However, intergenerational solidarity 
                                     
29 See above at 1.3. 
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also entails that older persons abstain from unnecessary claims for support from 
solidarity-based schemes, as this may strain the willingness of the working-age 
generation to contribute to these schemes.  As with the older person’s grant, a 
solidarity-based measure where legislation clearly delineates the boundaries of 
solidarity for that particular measure by stating the requirements to benefit from 
the grant, legislation can, in the case of solidarity-based care and support 
services, require those older persons whose families have the means to provide 
care and support, but fail to do so,30 to claim support from their families rather 
than relying on state-run or state-subsidised services.31  Such legislation would 
have to define the duty to support that may include elements of the customary 
duty to support older family members and of the common law reciprocal duty of 
support.   
 
It is acknowledged that despite the general breakdown of traditional support 
systems for older persons,32 there are still families and communities in all racial 
and cultural groups where traditional support for older persons continues.  Some 
resistance to legislation regulating family obligations toward older persons is 
therefore to be expected.  It would serve the legislature well to heed the following 
warning by Dekker and Olivier:33  
                                     
30 The breakdown in the traditional support of older persons is discussed below at 6.2.2. 
31 This does not apply to whether or not the older person is entitled to an older person’s grant as 
the means of the older person’s family is not taken into account in the means test for the grant.  
See below at 7.3.5.7.3 for the interaction between filial support laws and Medicaid benefits 
(solidarity-based benefits for inter alia nursing home care) in a number of states in the USA. 
32 Discussed below at 6.2.2. 
33 Dekker and Olivier “Informal forms of social security and informal sector social security” in 
Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 87.  The warning by Dekker and Olivier 
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“It should also be borne in mind that African people, especially in rural 
communities, have a strong sense of pride in their own traditions and in the 
functioning of their community: they, therefore, often resist changes which are 
imposed on them from outside and which do not evolve from communities 
themselves.” 
 
For this reason, legislation on family obligations should incorporate as many of 
the customary law principles as possible.  The legislation will have to strike a 
balance between compensating for the breakdown of traditional family support, 
whilst still acknowledging and strengthening family support where it still exists.   
 
6.2.2 Breakdown of traditional support of older persons 
 
The breakdown of traditional support of older persons in the rural areas due to 
the migration of the younger generation to the urban areas is a global 
phenomenon also found in South Africa.34   
 
According to the National Report on the Status of Older Persons35 the 
assumption that families will care for older family members no longer holds true 
for a number of reasons, leaving older persons increasingly reliant on services 
provided by the community in the absence of state support. 
 
                                                                                                             
applies equally to other racial and cultural groups with a strong tradition of family and community 
support for older persons.  
34 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 
(1) Aging International 12; Bolani et al “Family support” in Olivier et al (eds) (1999) Social security 
law – general principles 270; Asher and Olivier “Retirement and old age” in Olivier et al (eds) 
(2004) Introduction to social security 270.  Ståhlberg et al (2008) Retirement income security for 
men and women 2 noted the following about family and community caregiving in developing 
countries: “Urbanization and changing family patterns put a heavy strain on the extended family 
or village support and make these informal security systems less reliable.” 
35 National Report on the Status of Older Persons (2002) 42 (hereafter referred to as “National 
Report”). 
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The main problem in respect of family support of older persons is the “increasing 
geographic distance between family members created by migration of younger 
persons and reduced availability of household members for support”.36 The 
following are additional factors leading to the decline in traditional support of 
older persons: 
• Poverty among rural families, making it difficult for them to provide any 
assistance to older relatives beyond the most basic support.37 
• Disintegration of cultural norms that value older persons and reluctance to 
accept responsibility for the care of older relatives.38 
• Traditional extended families have in many cases been replaced with 
nuclear families.  In particular, “modern urban communities and families 
are structured and organised differently and no longer purely along 
traditional lines”.39 
 
The abovementioned factors have all contributed to the “transformation of the 
traditional African communities into urban industrialised communities with all their 
trappings…”.40  This statement was made in the context of the traditional African 
duty of support, but is true for all racial groups.  Urbanisation and increasing 
                                     
36 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 
(1) Aging International 14.  According to Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third 
World 197 the migration of adult children to the urban areas has partly been caused by a growth 
in economic individualism which has undermined the reciprocal economic obligations that 
traditionally existed in the rural areas.  In addition, the practice of circular migration, whereby rural 
persons migrated to the urban areas to work, but returned to their rural home to share their 
income with their families, is declining and many adult children settle in the urban areas 
permanently. 
37 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 197. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Bhe and others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 27, para 80. 
40 At 58, para 190. 
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economic individualism are factors contributing to the breakdown of support for 
older family members in all racial groups. 
 
In far too many cases, older persons cannot rely on support from the younger 
generation and end up being the caregivers of their grandchildren.  The role of 
older persons as caregivers is brought about by increasing numbers of women 
entering the paid labour force and the decline in the number of members of the 
younger generation in the rural areas due to AIDS-related deaths.41 
 
Even if support by family members is to be regarded as the main source of 
support and care for older persons, this can of course only occur in cases where 
older persons indeed have adult children or other family members to care for 
them.  Many older persons have no family members to care for them, either 
because they have never been married and/or had children, or because they 
have outlived available family members.  These older persons are at risk of 
institutionalisation and poverty, unless their communities provide them with help 
and support.  It is submitted that the state has the responsibility to provide for 
these older persons what family members would provide for older persons with 
family caregivers. 
 
                                     
41 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 
(1) Aging International 13.  See also Tout “Grandparents as parents in developing countries” 
(1994) 21 (1) Ageing International 19-23 for the effect of men and women of working age leaving 
the rural areas and AIDS-related deaths on the extended family and the additional caregiving 
burden placed on older persons. 
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The disintegration of traditional support discussed below creates the need for 
formal support systems that cater for older persons in need.42 
 
6.2.3 Interaction between family and formalised care for older persons 
 
Any discussion of the choice between family and formal care for older persons of 
course assumes the existence of a viable system of care provided by, or 
subsidised by, the state.  This has prompted Myers and Agree43 to state that  
[b]ecause many of the options for formal service substitution are not available in 
the less developed regions, such tasks are more unambiguously the 
responsibility of family and friends. 
 
It can also not be said with certainty whether formalised care for older persons is 
needed as a result of the disintegration of traditional family support, or whether 
the existence of, and reliance on, formalised care in fact contributes to the 
breakdown of traditional family support. The fundamental questions are therefore 
how family caregiving should interact with state assistance and community care, 
or, more importantly, whether it can be regarded as an abdication of the state’s 
constitutional obligation to put reasonable measures in place to provide older 
persons with care and support when the care and support duty is shifted to family 
members.  Can the reliance on family members for care and support be seen as 
“reasonable” as required by section 27(2) of the Constitution if viewed in the light 
                                     
42 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 126.  See Dekker “The role of 
informal social security in an inter-generational society” ISSA 4th International Research 
Conference on Social Security, Antwerp 2003, 17. 
43 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 
(1) Ageing International 17. 
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of the breakdown of traditional family support?  Clearly the state’s limited 
resources for care and support services contribute to the reliance on family 
members to provide care and support, but it is not as clear whether this is 
sufficient reason to abandon the notion of state-run and financed care and 
support services for older persons. 
 
These questions can only be answered in the context of the consequences of 
family caregiving responsibilities for the family members involved and any 
assistance provided to family caregivers by the state.  Where state programmes 
to provide assistance to family caregivers are absent, or only provide limited 
services, 
the state should not be allowed to destroy the family, in its many and varied 
forms, by abandoning it to unsupported burdens in the name of fiscal austerity.  
Rather, it should become responsive to the needs of individuals and families.44 
 
Midgley45 believes that the answer to the lack of formal services for older persons 
lies in finding ways of “mobilizing and linking traditional practices to established 
government programmes”.  His solution is that “instead of lamenting the demise 
of traditional institutions, social security planners could more usefully seek to 
identify ways of strengthening them so that their protective functions are 
maintained”.    It is submitted that the more adequate the level of assistance 
provided by the state to family caregivers, the more reasonable the shift of the 
caregiving burden to family caregivers would be. 
                                     
44 Binney and Estes “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: the 
intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational Journal of Health Services 95. 
45 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 196. 
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6.2.4 Assistance to family caregivers 
 
6.2.4.1 Emphasis on “home-based care” 
 
Traces of the policy preference for family and community-based care over formal 
residential care can be seen in the Older Persons Act (OPA) where it is stated 
that older persons have the right to reside at home “as long as possible”.46  It is 
therefore envisaged that older persons should only rely on residential care once 
it is no longer possible for them to reside at home.  Older persons residing at 
home have the right to receive family and community-based care in line with 
“society’s system of cultural values”.47 
 
As was seen above,48 the cross-cutting cultural values that required family 
members to care for older persons have broken down to such an extent that they 
should not be regarded as the standard for older persons’ entitlement to family 
and community-based care.  It is therefore recommended that legislation 
outlining filial support49 and community care obligations be enacted, and that this 
legislation serve as the basis for an older person’s right to family and community-
based care, or, when applicable, residential care rather than waning cultural 
values. 
                                     
46 Act 13 of 2006, s 10(a). 
47 Section 10(c). 
48 At 6.2.2. 
49 See above at 6.2.1 for the argument for formalising filial support in legislation in order to 
determine the boundary between filial support and solidarity-based measures. 
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The OPA already regulates community-based care for older persons.  What it 
does not do, is to state at which point an older person becomes entitled to the 
types of services regulated by the Act.50  One option to secure older persons’ 
right to family and community-based care is to amend the Older Persons Act to 
make provision for assessment procedures as part of older persons’ applications 
for access to residential facilities.51  The factors that could be taken into account 
during such an assessment could include: 
• Whether care is available for the older person in the family home; 
• If so, what steps can be taken to ensure that the family complies with their 
obligation to support the older person, and whether the family caregiver 
has access to benefits and support services for caregivers; 
• If care is not available in the family home, whether the older person’s 
family can support him or her financially so that the older person can 
remain in his or her own home, and if so, whether the family can pay for 
care and support services; and 
                                     
50 Except for “home-based care” which is limited to frail older persons in need of full-time care. 
51 As argued below at 6.3.3.3, the proposed multi-pillar national social security system should 
incorporate a pillar dealing with family, community and residential care and support services for 
older persons, in addition to the pillars providing financial support.  In addition to possible 
amendments to the OPA, the founding legislation for the new system may offer another 
opportunity to delineate the boundaries between family, community-based and state care and 
support services for older persons.   
 
 
 
 
 405
• Whether there are free (or cheap) community-based care and support 
services available should the older person continue to reside in his or her 
home and the family is not in the position to support the older person.52  
 
If the proposed assessment shows that the family and community cannot provide 
the older person with the necessary support, residential care may then be 
determined to be the best alternative for the particular older person. 
 
Therefore, even though older persons are currently afforded the statutory right to 
reside at home by the Older Persons Act, they should also have the option not to 
reside at home where the necessary family and community support is absent. 
 
6.2.4.2 Consequences of being a family caregiver 
 
The high costs involved in employing a paid caregiver means that poor families 
have to rely on informal caregiving for older family members, which often falls to 
the women in the family.53 
 
A caregiver sees to the physical, psychological, social and material needs of an 
older person.  Although the term “caregiver” is generally a gender neutral 
concept, there is ample empirical evidence and other authority to safely claim 
                                     
52 See below at 7.3.4.4 for the legislation in the UK providing for assessment of older persons’ 
financial and personal circumstances before residential or community-based services are 
allocated to them. 
53 Binney and Estes “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: The 
intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational Journal of Health Services 95. 
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that women make up the majority of family caregivers.54  For this reason, it is 
submitted that Binney and Estes were correct in their assertion that “the call for 
family responsibility … is a euphemism for women’s responsibility”. 55 They also 
point out the consequences of the policies and laws that emphasise caregiving at 
home that are followed in many countries, including South Africa, as follows: 
“Although ‘the family’ has become a surrogate for ‘women’s work’, few women 
can expect to have caregivers in their own old age.”56 
 
South African caregivers also face the dilemma that they forfeit pension-earning 
employment to take care of older family members.57  The choice between 
pension-earning employment and family caregiving responsibilities may have a 
disproportionally adverse effect on women as family caregivers, and lead to their 
reduced retirement income for the following reasons: 
• Women’s “lower participation rate in the formal labour market”;58 
• The interruption of women’s careers in response to child-rearing; and 
• The longer life expectancy of women.59 
 
                                     
54 E.g. National Report (2002) 54; Badgett and Folbre “Assigning care: Gender norms and 
economic outcomes” (1999) 138 International Labour Review 311. 
55 Binney and Esters “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: The 
intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational Journal of Health Services 92.  According 
to Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 
21(1) Aging International 15 women are often expected to act as the main caregivers to older 
persons. 
56 Binney and Esters “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: The 
intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational Journal of Health Services 93. 
57 See above at 5.6.2 for the impact of family caregiving on retirement benefits. 
58 Ståhlberg et al (2008) Retirement income security for men and women 3. 
59 Ibid. 
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In many cases family caregivers themselves will be retired and nearing 
retirement.  According to Myers and Agree,60 
increased longevity also means that family caregivers will themselves be aged 
and subject to functional limitations.  Performing some of the most demanding 
physical caregiving tasks may be too difficult for them.  Under these 
circumstances, the availability of some kind of supplemental care is important so 
that individuals may be maintained in the community with their families and not 
confined to institutions. 
 
Support for female and older caregivers must therefore enjoy priority in measures 
aimed at improving the lives of caregivers. 
 
6.2.4.3 Avenues of state support for caregivers 
 
6.2.4.3.1 Caregivers’ benefits 
 
Cash benefits for taking care of parents or grandparents at home are paid in a 
number of countries61 in the form of direct payments to caregiving family 
members.62  
 
According to Midgley63 the payment of cash allowances to poor families, to 
enable them to take care of their needy older relatives at home, should be 
encouraged for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the state saves the costs of 
maintaining that older person in a residential home.  The allowances may not be 
                                     
60 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 
(1) Aging International 18. 
61 Such as Sweden – see below at 7.3.6.4. 
62 Benefits for taking care of adults are generally incorporated in other forms of comprehensive 
social security and are, therefore, not usually categorised as family benefits (ILO (1984) 
Introduction to social security 99). 
63 Midgley (1984) Social security, inequality and the Third World 197. 
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enough to sustain the older person on his or her own, but “may provide the 
incentive for relatives to support them”.64   
 
It is worth investigating the possibility of the payment of cash benefits to 
caregivers in South Africa and in this context the Swedish caregivers benefit and 
the legislation regarding the payment of the benefits will be examined below.65 
 
6.2.4.3.2 Cash payments to older persons  
 
Another avenue of support to older persons still residing at home is cash 
payments to the older person for the specific purpose of assisting him or her to 
pay for formal care or offset the costs of informal care by family or community 
members.66  In South Africa, the grant-in-aid currently is the only statutory 
assistance to families caring for older persons in the family home.  The grant-in-
aid is an additional grant payable to older persons already in receipt of the older 
person’s grant and who need regular attendance by another person.67  The 
current grant-in-aid amount is R240 per month68 and is negligible compared to 
the actual costs of formal care.69  In the light of the limited resources currently 
                                     
64 Ibid. 
65 At 7.3.6.4. 
66 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 
(1) Aging International 17 
67 Reg 5(1) GN R898 in GG31356 of 22 August 2008 read with s 12 Social Assistance Act 13 of 
2004.  See above at 3.3.1.2. 
68 SASSA “Grant amount” http://www.sassa.gov.za (accessed 04/06/2009). 
69 In countries such as Sweden and the UK the amount paid bears a closer relation to the actual 
cost of care.  See below at 7.3.4.4.4 and 7.3.6.4. 
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available for grants,70 it is unlikely that the the grant-in-aid amount will be 
increased to a level that bears a close relation to the actual cost of care.  It is 
suggested that further research be done to determine the cost of progressively 
increasing the grant-in-aid amount.  However, the additional money currently 
brought into the household, even if it is a negligible amount, may be to the 
advantage of the whole family71 and thereby improve the older person’s position 
in the family.  
 
6.2.4.3.3 Respite services for family caregivers 
 
Respite care is defined as “a service offered specifically to a frail older person 
and to a caregiver and which is aimed at the provision of temporary care and 
relief”.72   
 
Respite care is ideally suited to a situation where a frail older person is taken 
care of by a family or community caregiver at home and the caregiver needs time 
off from caregiving in order to rest or to take care of his or her other 
responsibilities.  Therefore, family and community-based care73 intersect where 
community - based organisations provide respite care to family caregivers.74  The 
                                     
70 The effect of limited resources on the payment of grants is discussed above at 4.3.1. 
71 According to the White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) para 7.7, the majority of poor people 
live in three-generation households and the older person’s grant is typically “turned over for 
general family use”, with the result that each pensioner’s grant income helps a number of other 
people in the household. 
72 Section 1 OPA. 
73 Discussed below at 6.3. 
74 Walker, Pratt and Eddy “Informal caregiving to aging family members: a critical review” (1995) 
44 Family Relations 408. 
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OPA makes provision for home-based care programmes providing respite care to 
older persons in the community and their caregivers.75  In addition, assistance to 
family members and caregivers of older persons in the form of education, 
information and counselling are also categorised as home-based programmes in 
terms of the Act.76  Respite care services can also be provided at residential 
facilities.77 
 
It is submitted that respite care is a valuable service provided to caregivers and 
that many caregivers would not be up to the task without respite care.  The 
promotion of respite care through legislation such as the OPA supports one of 
the main objects with the Act, which is to assist older persons to reside at home 
as long as possible. 
 
 6.2.4.3.4 Family responsibility leave from work for caregiving 
 
Section 27 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 78 allows employees to 
take three days paid family responsibility leave during each annual leave cycle, 
but only for limited events such as birth of a child, illness of a child or the death of 
a family member.79 
 
                                     
75 Section 11(3)(d). 
76 Section 11(3)(3). 
77 Section 17(h). 
78 Act 75 of 1997. 
79 Section 27(2). 
 
 
 
 
 411
No provision is currently made for family responsibility leave in the case where a 
parent is ill or otherwise in need of care.  It is worth investigating whether other 
countries provide for statutory family responsibility leave for caregiving of 
parents, in order to determine whether it would be advisable to extend the scope 
of family responsibility leave in South Africa to include caregiving 
responsibilities.80 
 
6.2.4.3.5 Including caregiving as pension earning-employment 
 
Another potential form of assistance to caregivers is the reform of the retirement 
income system to include caregiving as pension-earning employment through 
wage subsidies or pension credits.81  Women’s reproductive and caregiving roles 
are mostly not regarded as work.  Lund and Srinivas82 advocate that the 
contributions of women working in what they call the “care economy” should be 
recognised and their contributions be regarded as economic activities worthy of 
social protection. 
 
Any such measures would of course have to be available to all family caregivers 
and not just reserved for women caregivers.  For this reason Ståhlberg et al83 
warn that “it is important not to compensate for gender differences on the labour 
                                     
80 See below at 7.3.5.7.3 for an overview of the statutory provision for family responsibility leave 
for caregiving in the USA. 
81 See 7.3.4.2 for the pension credits for caregivers in the UK, 
82 Lund and Srinivas (2000) Learning from experience: A gendered approach to social protection 
for workers in the informal economy 105. 
83 Ståhlberg et al Retirement income security for men and women (2008) 3. 
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market in pension systems, as that would merely reinforce traditional gender 
roles and preserve discrimination in the labour market”.  The fact that most 
caregiving is done by women leads to a situation where even a gender-neutral 
measure aimed at improving retirement income for caregivers would lead to 
greater financial security in old age for many women.   
 
A formula for defined benefits that includes the years spent caregiving as years 
worked should lead to increased benefits for caregivers; otherwise they would 
forfeit benefits for the time spent in caregiving.  For this reason, a panel of 
international experts from the International Labour Organisation84 advised that 
one of the comparative advantages of a defined benefit national fund over a 
defined contributions fund would be that a defined benefit system makes 
provision for the crediting of insurance periods for caring.85  They acknowledge 
that caregiving is going to become increasingly important in South Africa in the 
near future. 
 
A wage subsidy86 would be of greater advantage for caregivers taking part in a 
defined contribution scheme, as there would be no contributions paid for them 
during their caregiving years in the absence of a wage subsidy. 
                                     
84 ILO Social Security Department (2008) Observations on social security reforms in South Africa 
Consultation Report 9. 
85 As a guaranteed amount is paid out at retirement based on the member’s final salary and years 
worked.  If the period that the caregiver cannot work due to caregiving duties is credited, the 
caregiving fund member will not lose out on retirement benefits.  A defined contribution system, 
on the other hand, would penalise caregivers for the period they are not working (and therefore 
not contributing) due to their caregiving responsibilities. 
86 See above at 5.5.3 for more on the proposed wage subsidy model. 
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One must be careful not to over-generalise the redistributional effect of  the   
abovementioned arrangements, as it will differ from case to case, depending on 
the age when the caregiver concerned takes off from pension-earning work to 
fulfil caregiving duties, the length of time taken off and the rules of the particular 
fund.87  It is recommended that the founding legislation of the reformed pension 
system incorporate the appropriate arrangements to compensate caregivers for 
the period they are not able to contribute to a retirement fund due to their 
caregiving obligations.  The inclusion of measures such as the proposed wage 
subsidy,88 or caregivers’ pension credits for the period spent caring for an older 
family member should therefore be considered. Legislation providing similar 
compensation to caregivers in other countries is examined below89 to determine 
whether such arrangements have the desired results. 
 
6.2.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The World Bank has incorporated “intrafamily or intergenerational sources of 
both financial and non-financial support” to older persons as one of the five basic 
                                     
87 “Certain rules favour certain women while putting others at a disadvantage.  If an individual’s 
pension is determined by the income of the best or final years, while pension contributions are 
proportional to income over all years women who alternate between non-market work and market 
work are at an advantage.  If the number of years required to qualify for a full pension is less than 
the number of potential years of contribution, for example, women who take a break from gainful 
employment while they have young children are at an advantage.  Women who continuously work 
part-time or have low wage throughout their working lives, on the other hand, are at a 
disadvantage under these rules.” (Ståhlberg et al (2008) Retirement income security for men and 
women 6). 
88 Subsidised contributions to the proposed national pension fund.  See above at 5.5.3. 
89 At 7.3.4.4 (UK) and 7.3.6.4 (Sweden). 
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elements of its updated multi-pillar pension system.90  This high-level 
international recognition of the role of the family as support structure of older 
persons echoes the policy views in the White Paper and has been included in the 
Department of Social Development’s discussion paper on retirement provision 
reforms.91 
 
However, legislative and policy measures to provide care and support for older 
persons can only be regarded as “reasonable” measures in terms of section 27 
of the Constitution if it makes provision for vulnerable groups such as older 
persons in need of care and support.  Reliance on laudable values such as 
families taking care of older family members unfortunately cannot be regarded as 
reasonable, when it discounts demographic data proving that family support has 
broken down to the extent that many older persons have now become the 
caregivers, and not visa versa.  
 
6.3 THE COMMUNITY AS A SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR OLDER 
PERSONS 
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
The continuum of support for older persons places community support for older 
persons between state support at the one end and family support at the other.  
                                     
90 Holzmann and Hinz (2005)  Old-age income support in the 21st century: an international  
perspective on pension systems and reform 1-2.  See below at 7.3.2 for an overview of the World 
Bank multi-pillar model. 
91 DSD discussion document (2007) 18. 
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State support for older persons and family care and support have been 
discussed above.92  This section of chapter 6 focuses on community care and 
support services for older persons.  However, the intersection between state, 
community and family care remains a recurring theme. 
 
Current legislation and policy documents tend to lean in the direction of 
increased community support for older persons.  Community support for older 
persons can be provided by non-governmental organisations, faith-based 
organisations and community-based organisations involved in the care and 
support of older persons (the welfare sector), or by neighbours of older persons 
or volunteers in the community (informal social networks).  Together, these 
sectors of civil society “have made and continue to make an important 
contribution to promoting the well-being and status of older persons”. 93   
 
Community support for older persons can therefore be categorised as services 
provided by the welfare sector or by informal social networks.  In terms of the 
OPA, care and support services to older persons can also be categorised as 
either residential care in residential facilities94 or community-based care and 
support services.95 
                                     
92 State support for older persons is discussed in chapter 4 and family care and support above at 
6.2. 
93 National Report (2002) 51; White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) paras 3 and 30.   
94 The OPA uses the terms “institutional care” (s 1) and residential care (s 1 and chapter 4) 
interchangeably. 
95 The terms “residential facility” and “community-based care and support services” are defined 
above at 2.8 and the provisions of the OPA related to these services are outlined at 3.3.4.5.2.  
Unless stated otherwise, these terms have the meaning ascribed to them in the OPA. 
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South Africa currently only has seven state-run residential homes for older 
persons.96  Most residential care for older persons is provided by the 
abovementioned organisations, with financial awards allocated to them by the 
state in return for the care provided.97  Residential care is therefore mainly 
provided by civil society with financial support from the state.98   
 
One of the aims of the OPA is to “shift the emphasis from institutional care to 
community-based care in order to ensure that an older person remains in his or 
her home within the community for as long as possible”.99  Family and community 
care intersect where older persons reside in their family homes within the 
community.  In terms of the OPA older persons have the right to benefit from 
both community and family care and protection.100 
 
It is possible that the support for community-based care rather than residential 
care is based on community-based care being more informal and less 
“impersonal” than residential care.  More importantly, the higher costs associated 
with residential care have contributed to the policy preference for community-
                                     
96 Therefore, references to “residential care” or “residential facilities” in this chapter will not 
consider state-run facilities.  
97 I.t.o. s 8 OPA. 
98 Profit-making institutions, such as privately owned retirement villages provide accommodation 
and care to older persons who can afford to pay for these services. Private retirement villages are 
also regulated i.t.o. the OPA but have traditionally not qualified for state support. 
99 Section 1 OPA.  Hence, the focus in this section of the chapter is mainly on community-based 
care and support programmes. 
100 Section 10(c). 
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based care.  In practice, however, residential care still receives more financial 
support than community-based care.101 
 
The following section aims to assess the level to which communities are capable 
of providing support to older persons and to determine the balance of state 
support for community-based and residential care for older persons.  In addition, 
this section seeks to evaluate whether the state, by shifting the responsibility to 
provide care and support to older persons to their communities and civil society, 
has succeeded in creating an enabling environment in which older persons’ 
rights are respected, protected and fulfilled.102 
 
6.3.2 Impact of the breakdown of traditional support of older persons on 
communities 
 
As was shown above, the breakdown of the traditional family support structure 
belies the assumption that all families willingly care for elderly members of the 
family.  As a result increased numbers of older persons have to rely on care and 
support from their communities and welfare organisations when they are no 
longer able to provide for themselves.  Older persons with no resources of their 
own and who have no family members to care for them, because they may have 
                                     
101 National Report (2002) 55; IOL “Older persons bill is ‘pretty pathetic’” http://www.iol.co.za 
(accessed 08/10/2008).  Although the following quote by Binney and Estes “The retreat of the 
state and its transfer of responsibility: The intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational 
Journal of Health Services 91 was written in the context of the care of older persons in the United 
States of America, it is just as relevant to the current situation in South Africa: “With costs for 
institutional care so high and its availability so limited, it is paradoxical that public policy actually 
gives far more financial support to institutionalization than to the community living situation of 
elders.” 
102 As envisaged in the preamble to the OPA. 
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never been married and/or had children, or because they have outlived available 
family members, will become dependent on community care.103 
 
6.3.3 The relationship between community-based care and support 
services and the state 
 
National policy documents104 and recent legislation such as the OPA emphasise 
community involvement in caring for older persons in addition to the support 
given by family members and government programmes.  The pertinent question 
is whether it is reasonable to require all community-based organisations, 
regardless of their financial situation, to bear the burden of caring for older 
persons in the community, given the level of poverty within many communities, or 
whether some measure of government intervention would not always be 
required?105  As was stated above,106 community support can be loosely 
categorised into two groups according to the level of formalised structure of the 
organisation providing the support: i.e., the welfare sector and informal social 
networks.  The following discussion deals with these two groups separately. 
  
                                     
103Unless they are placed in one of the few state-run residential facilities.  See above at fn 97. 
104 The White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) para 30 states that ”[i]n view of fiscal constraints, 
low economic growth rates, rising population growth rates and the need to reconstruct social life 
in South Africa, the Government cannot accept sole responsibility for redressing past imbalances 
and meeting basic physical, economic and psycho-social needs. The promotion of national social 
development is a collective responsibility and the co-operation of civil society will be promoted.”  
105 National Report on the Status of Older Persons (2002) 30. 
106 At 6.3.1. 
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6.3.3.1 Provision of services by the welfare sector 
 
As was stated above, much of the community support provided to older persons 
is provided by non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations and 
community-based organisations.  It is important that the state strengthens its 
partnerships with these organisations, as envisaged by the White Paper for 
Social Welfare107 where it is stated that 
Government will address needs which are not being met by its partners in civil 
society.  In this regard, Government will also play an enabling and pro-active role 
to ensure that services are provided in under-serviced areas.  Government will 
provide an enabling environment for the delivery of developmental welfare 
services by its partners”. 
 
 
The needs of particular groups, such as older persons have to compete with 
other interests, such as education and housing for support from non-
governmental organisations,108 and therefore the provision of services to older 
persons cannot be relegated to these organisations without providing them with 
reasonable state support where it is required.  
 
It is submitted that OPA has created an “enabling environment” for the delivery of 
care and support services to older persons as mentioned in the quote from the 
White Paper for Social Welfare above.  Whether the measures introduced by the 
Act will indeed address needs which are currently not met will depend on the 
implementation of the OPA. 
 
                                     
107 White Paper (1997) para 3.2. 
108 Patel (1992) Restructuring Social Welfare: Options for South Africa 109. 
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Organisations that deliver care and support services to older persons in terms of 
the OPA can be held liable for the infringement of older persons’ rights in terms 
of this Act because these rights, as well as the applicable fundamental rights, are 
capable of horizontal application.109 However, a distinction is drawn below 
between the duties of profit-making institutions110 or welfare organisations 
approved by the state to provide care and support to older persons and instances 
where informal social networks provide care and support without any formal 
authorisation. 
. 
6.3.3.2 Provision of services by informal social networks 
 
 
Apart from the welfare organisations mentioned above, much of the care and 
support services provided to older persons in their communities are provided by 
so-called “informal social networks” such as friends, neighbours, self-help 
groups, and spiritual and customary networks. 111 
 
In the context of community caregiving by informal social networks, it has to be 
established who the groups of community members are who are most likely to be 
performing these mainly voluntary tasks. 
 
                                     
109 I.t.o. s 4(3) of the OPA, the Act “binds both natural or juristic persons to the extent that it is 
applicable” taking into account the nature of the specific right i.t.o. s 7 of the OPA and the “nature 
of any duty imposed by the right”.  S 4(3) is therefore identical to s 8(2) of this Constitution.  See 
above at 3.2.4 for more on the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights. 
110 See above at fn 99. 
111White Paper (1997) para 3.2. 
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 The voluntary caring roles in the communities are mostly fulfilled by women.112  
The work of women volunteers in community based programmes is generally 
regarded “as an extension of their domestic tasks, rather than being recognised 
as ‘work’”.113  The logical consequence of these women’s caregiving tasks not 
being regarded as benefit-accruing work is that they do not have an equal 
opportunity to save for their old age.  They, therefore, have the same need for 
assistance as women fulfilling family caregiving tasks.114  Hence, it is suggested 
that the possibility of state measures to strengthen community support to older 
persons - for example, by crediting volunteering as a community caregiver as 
pension-earning work - should be examined.115  
 
In the context of informal community support for older persons the legal basis to 
compel informal social networks to provide care and support to an individual 
older person is absent as such services are provided voluntarily.  With family 
members, filial obligations form the legal basis to compel adult children to provide 
care and support to elderly parents.  There is no equivalent obligation on 
volunteers in the community to provide care and support for older persons.   
 
The question arises whether the OPA applies to voluntary services provided by 
informal social networks.  Section 1 of the Act defines a “service” in terms of the 
                                     
112 National Report (2002) 47. 
113 Patel (1992) Restructuring Social Welfare 89.  Male volunteers providing care and support for 
older persons would face the same challenges. 
114 See above at 6.2.4.3.5. 
115 The pension credits for volunteers could work along the same lines as the proposed credits for 
family caregivers. 
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Act as an “activity or programme designed to meet the needs of an older person”.  
Therefore, informal social networks may potentially qualify as “service providers” 
in terms of section 8(1) of the OPA in order to qualify for the financial awards 
made available to service providers to older persons.  However, most of the 
informal social networks may have difficulties in meeting the envisaged 
conditions for receiving financial awards, such as accounting and compliance 
measures.116  The fact that all community-based care and support services must 
be registered implies that informal support and care of older persons by 
volunteers, friends and neighbours are intended to be excluded from the ambit of 
community-based care and support services regulated by the OPA.  Therefore, 
the OPA does not seem to cover the care and support provided by informal 
social networks117 and their activities remain largely unregulated and without the 
financial assistance provided to regulated community-based care and support 
programmes. 
  
6.3.3.3 State support for community-based caregiving 
 
The emphasis shift toward strengthening community-based care and support for 
older persons instead of only relying on residential care, as expressed in section 
2 of the OPA, coupled with the financial support to qualifying service providers, 
can be regarded as reasonable measures to promote older persons’ right to 
                                     
116 Section 8(1)(d).  At the time of writing the regulations in terms of the OPA have not been 
published. 
117 Except for Chapter 5 of the OPA dealing with the protection of older persons against abuse 
and neglect. 
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dignity118 and right of access to social security.  The financial support offered to 
community-based programmes regulated in terms of the OPA is an expression of 
intergenerational solidarity with older persons in need of care and support.  
However, as was shown above,119 the provision of care and support by informal 
social networks is not regulated by the OPA and does not currently qualify for 
financial support from the state. 
   
It is, therefore, fitting that non-cash support to older persons has also received 
recognition as part of the social security reform process currently under way.  
One of the models for reform, the World Bank multi-pillar pension system,120 
includes an additional pillar of a national social security system for older persons 
comprising “informal intrafamily or intergenerational sources of both financial and 
non-financial support to the elderly, including access to health care and 
housing”.121  The additional pillar could in the South African context encompass 
family caregiving of older persons, the residential122 and community-based care 
and support programmes currently regulated by the OPA, and the support 
provided by informal social networks.123  It is recommended that steps be taken 
                                     
118 See below at 6.4.2 for a discussion of measures undertaken to ensure that older persons are 
treated with respect and dignity. 
119 At 6.3.3.2. 
120 Discussed below at 7.3.2. 
121 Holzmann and Hinz, (2005) Old-age income support in the 21st century 2 quoted in DSD 
discussion document (2007) 18. 
122 Specific mention is made by Holzmann and Hinz (2005) Old-age income support in the 21st 
century 2 of access to housing as part of the additional pillar, which points to residential facilities 
providing accommodation and 24-hour care (see definition of “residential facility” in s 1 of the 
OPA. 
123 Informal social networks can be regarded as informal  intergenerational sources of non-    
financial support i.t.o. the model proposed by Holzmann and Hinz. 
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to include this additional pillar in the reformed national social security system to 
bolster community and state non-cash support to boost the well-being of older 
persons.  It is submitted that the inclusion of non-financial measures of support 
for older persons in the national retirement system would lead to an integrated 
system of support for older persons which would be a significant improvement on 
the current system.  To this end, the integrated system employed in the UK will 
be studied below124 to determine whether a similar system would be suitable in 
the South African context. 
 
It is submitted that the proposed integrated system will not entail shifting all 
responsibility to care for older persons to the state.  On the contrary, it is 
submitted that family and community care and support structures for older 
persons will remain as important as they are currently, with the important 
difference being that in an integrated system the point at which the state can 
reasonably be expected to step in and provide financial and non-cash assistance 
can be clearly delineated.  
 
6.3.4  Health care for older persons  
 
Due  to  the  almost  inevitable  decline  in  health  and  the  resultant  increase in   
medical care associated with ageing, access to appropriate health care for older 
                                     
124 At 7.3.4.4. 
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persons is an important component of a national social security system for older 
persons.125 
 
In terms of the Constitution, everyone has the right of access to health services.  
The state is required to take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the right of access to health care, 
depending on the resources available.126  The public health sector is currently 
challenged by a lack of resources, which may explain the current health care 
policy which prioritises child and maternity care,127 thereby marginalising older 
persons’ health care needs.  Older persons who do not have the resources to 
pay for private health care are merely entitled to the free primary health care128 
available to everyone who is not a medical aid member,129 despite the fact that 
one of the objects of the National Health Act is to protect, respect, promote and 
fulfil the right of access to health care of older persons as a vulnerable group.130  
                                     
125  Holzmann and Hinz (2005) Old-age income support in the 21st century 2, quoted in DSD 
discussion document (2007) 18.  A detailed discussion of the current South African health care 
system and laws falls outside the scope of this thesis.  The points made below merely serve to 
illustrate the absence of a comprehensive national response to older persons’ health care needs.  
For more on the South African health care system, see Mpedi et al “Health care in South Africa” 
in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 233-252; National Report on the Status 
of Older Persons (2002) 27-36. 
126 Section 27 (1) and (2).   
127 Section 4(3) National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
128 Although older persons receiving grants in principle have access to free secondary health 
services at public hospitals, this is not always the case in practice.  In Ijumba and Day (eds) 
(2004) South African Health Review 2003/04, Joubert and Bradshaw cite the “preventive, curative 
and rehabilitative needs of older clients that have for the main part been integrated into general 
sessions at community clinics at the primary care level, and numerous community nurses that 
have been redeployed from geriatric services to assist, for example, in child immunisation 
programmes” as examples of the marginalisation of older persons as a national health priority (at 
157).  
129 In 2004 it was estimated that only 13% of persons over 65 had access to medical aid (Joubert 
and Bradshaw “Health of older persons” in Ijumba and Day (eds) (2004) South African Health 
Review 2003/04 157. 
130 Section 2(c)(iv) National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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Older persons’ constitutional right to good quality health care is thus 
“compromised as a function of biased policy and sectoral ills”.131  It is submitted 
that the lack of public health care resources cannot excuse the marginalisation of 
a particularly vulnerable group such as older persons. 
 
Much of the residential care provided in terms of the OPA to older persons in 
general, and frail older persons in particular, relates to health care.  The same 
can be said for community-based and home-based care provided to older 
persons still residing at home.  The OPA specifically lists medical services as 
community-based programmes for older persons regulated by the Act.132 
 
Home-based programmes in terms of the OPA are aimed at providing frail older 
persons within the community and these programmes include hygienic and 
physical care and free health care.133   Home-based care is strictly regulated by 
the OPA and section 14 requires that all caregivers employed by home-based 
care services must be trained and registered, and that social workers and health 
care providers must be registered with their respective professional councils. 
 
                                     
131 Ferreira and Kalula (2007) Human rights and ageing in South Africa 3. 
132 Section 11(2)(d) OPA.  As was stated above at 6.3.3.2, all community-based and home-based 
services have to be registered i.t.o. s 13 of the OPA in order to qualify for subsidies.  Friends and 
neighbours providing these services are not seen as “service providers” and hence do not have to 
register i.t.o. the Act.  Support and care provided by these informal support networks are 
therefore merely unregulated, not illegal. 
133 Section 11(3)(a) and (f).  The free health care for frail older persons can be extended to other 
older persons as determined by the Minister of Social Development. 
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Most importantly, the statutory guidelines to service providers require them to 
show preference in their services (thus also medical services) for older 
persons.134  Health service providers aiming to be registered in terms of the OPA, 
and thereby benefiting from the resultant financial awards in terms of section 8 of 
the Act,135 will therefore have to demonstrate that the provision of services to 
older persons is central to their endeavours.  However, the OPA does not 
guarantee the provision of medical services to older persons but merely provides 
a framework for the regulation of these services where they exist. 
  
It may be fitting that the Department of Social Development, which is primarily 
responsible for the well-being of older persons, should be at the forefront of 
ensuring that the health care services that are available to older persons are well 
regulated.  However, other departments have not responded equally, and older 
persons as a group are not targeted by the strategies of the national Department 
of Health, the department responsible for the promotion of the health of all South 
Africans, including older persons.136 
 
Other aspects of health care that can be found in other countries but that are 
absent in South Africa, thereby adversely affecting older persons, include: 
• subsidised medical aid membership after retirement;137 
                                     
134 Section 9(h). 
135 Financial awards i.t.o. s 8 of the Older Persons Act were discussed above at 3.3.4.5.3. 
136 Ferreira and Kalula (2007) Human rights and ageing in South Africa 1.  
137 The possibility of the inclusion of post-retirement medical aid coverage was examined the 
DSD discussion document (2007) 85-87, and it was concluded that “a mechanism allowing 
individuals to create an entitlement to subsidised post-retirement contributions, based on their 
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• long-term care insurance to cover long-term care in a nursing home;138 
• a national health system, combining the public and private health care 
sectors. 
Whilst recognising that each country’s health care system must be adapted to the 
circumstances prevalent and the resources available in that country, it may be 
helpful to determine whether the health care measures and laws adopted in other 
countries are suitable in the South African context.139 
 
6.4 THE INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY VERSUS 
‘INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY’ DEBATE 
 
6.4.1 Recognition of role of older persons 
 
It is truly unfortunate that many older persons are abused and subjected to the 
indignity of poverty140, as they include the people who have contributed to socio-
economic development and the fruits thereof being enjoyed by younger 
generations.  There is therefore a moral obligation to improve the circumstances 
under which so many older persons have to live. 
 
Older persons as a group have also shown willingness to improve their own 
circumstances and develop their communities when given the opportunity to do 
                                                                                                             
years of contributing to a medical scheme” should be established as part of the proposed national 
social security system (at 96). 
138 The different methods of financing and providing long-term care in the USA is outlined at 7.3.5 
below. 
139 See chapter 7 below for a comparative overview of measures to provide care and support for 
older persons, including health care for older persons, as applied in selected countries. 
140 See above at 3.2.5 and below at 6.4.2. 
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so.  This is evidenced by the high number of older persons involved in caring for 
AIDS orphans, many of whom are not direct family members.141  
 
Older persons should not be rejected but rather respected for having as valid a 
social place as any other person.  Their self-esteem and sense of self-reliance 
can be enhanced by involving them more in community development 
programmes.142  
 
The role that older persons can play in their communities is recognised in the 
preamble to the OPA which envisages changes to existing laws on older persons 
“in order to … empower older persons to continue to live meaningfully and 
constructively in a society that recognises them as important sources of 
knowledge, wisdom and expertise”.  The OPA, therefore, aims to contribute to a 
new vision of the role of older persons in their communities. 
 
The ability of older persons to access opportunities to participate in community 
activities is deemed important enough to warrant the special protection awarded 
by section 7 of the OPA.  Section 7 prohibits discrimination against older persons 
and enumerates the particular instances where discrimination against older 
persons is barred.143  The aim of the section is clearly to ensure that older 
persons are not denied access to existing programmes and activities.   
 
                                     
141 National Report (2002) 47. 
142 National Report (2002) 53. 
143 The provisions of s 7 are outlined above at 3.3.4.5.2. 
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Section 7 must be read in the context of the prohibition of discrimination in terms 
of section 9 of the Constitution, the relevant provisions of the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (“the Equality Act”)144 and 
the preamble to the OPA.145  
 
In terms of section 9, the equality clause of the Constitution, discrimination 
against any older person on the grounds of age would be regarded as unfair 
discrimination, unless the respondent can show that it is fair.146   Discrimination 
against any older person on other prohibited grounds such as race or gender147 
would also constitute unfair discrimination unless the contrary is proven.  Section 
7 of the OPA gives effect to section 9 of the Constitution by listing specific 
instances of prohibited discrimination against older persons.   
 
The Equality Act provides protection against unfair discrimination in general by 
the state or any other person, and prohibits unfair discrimination by any person 
against any other person on the grounds of race, gender and disability in 
particular.148  Section 25 of the Equality Act establishes a link between that Act 
and the OPA by imposing a duty on the state to enact further legislation that 
                                     
144 Act 4 of 2000. 
145 The preamble to the OPA requires the State to “create an enabling environment in which the 
rights in the Bill of Rights must be respected, protected and fulfilled”.  The provisions of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 are also applicable to the extent that older persons are 
“employed”, which may include community service. 
146 Section 9(5) read with s 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution. 
147 The prohibited grounds for discrimination are listed in s 9(3) of the Constitution. 
148 Sections 6-9 of the Equality Act.  Sections 10-12 also prohibit hate speech, harassment and 
the dissemination and publication of information that unfairly discriminates against any person. 
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seeks to promote equality.149  Section 7 of the OPA can be regarded as such 
“further legislation” promoting equality, therefore giving effect to section 9 of the 
Constitution.  Therefore, it is suggested that section 7 of the OPA must be seen 
as implementing section 9 of the Constitution by laying down specific protection 
against unfair discrimination for older persons, supplemented by the provisions of 
the Equality Act where section 7 is silent. 
 
Any service provider that wishes to qualify for financial awards in terms of section 
9 of the OPA has to comply with the statutory guidelines for the provision of 
services that are aimed at providing an enabling environment for older persons.  
Service providers must give recognition to the social, cultural and economic 
contribution of older persons,150 including the role of older persons as caregivers, 
particularly of AIDS orphans.151  In addition, service providers are required to 
create an environment that promotes the participation of older persons in 
“decision-making processes at all levels”.152  The above-mentioned sections of 
the OPA are clear examples of how the moral obligation to respect the role of 
older persons in society can be translated into a legal obligation to assist older 
persons to continue to fulfil this role. 
 
                                     
149 Section 25(1)(c)(ii). 
150 Section 9(a) of the OPA. 
151 Memorandum on the Objects of the Older Persons Bill, 2003. 
152 Section 9(b) of the OPA.  The participation of older persons in decision-making processes “at 
all levels” presumably applies to inter alia the running of residential facilities and of caregiving 
structures for older persons.  Unfortunately the requirement of utilising “the accumulated wisdom 
of older persons” to promote the participation of older persons in decision-making processes that 
was included in s 9(b) of the Older Persons Bill 68D of 2003 was not included in s 9(b) of the Act. 
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The difference between providing care and support for older persons and for 
children lies in the contributions of older persons and society’s debt to them. 
This, in addition to their willingness to participate in development programmes, is 
the basis for intergenerational solidarity, which, as has been stated repeatedly 
throughout this thesis, should be one of the main guidelines for social security 
spending. 
 
As a society we must guard against looking exclusively at the economic aspects 
of ageing, as the focus on expenditure on older persons makes it hard to avoid 
thinking of choices in terms of their cost-effectiveness and thereby downgrading 
the value of older persons.  The positive role of older persons in our society must 
be emphasised, as is done in the sections of the OPA referred to above, in order 
to counter the view that older persons are not productive and are a drain on the 
fiscus.153  In the absence of such express emphasis on the positive role of older 
persons, the possibility exists that the question of “inter-generational equity” may 
acquire prominence.154 
 
                                     
153 National Report (2002) 49. 
154 As has occurred periodically in the USA.  The “intergenerational equity” argument sees 
spending on older persons as a drain on the fiscus to the detriment of younger generations, 
particularly children.  See below at 6.4.4 for more on the influence of “intergenerational equity” on 
provision for older persons in South Africa, and 7.3.5.5 for the influence of the (perceived) 
competing interests between older persons and children on social security law and policy in the 
USA. 
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6.4.2 The need to treat older persons with respect and dignity 
 
Promoting the interests of older persons in South Africa is complicated by the 
cultural diversity and, in particular, the differences in the economic status of older 
persons throughout the country.  Older persons are not a homogenous group 
and therefore legislation intended to provide support and care for older persons 
must take the difference between rural and urban older persons, and between 
older men and women,155 in addition to ethnic, cultural and religious differences, 
into account.  However, according to the National Report on the Status of Older 
Persons156 the one common denominator for older persons is “the need to be 
treated with respect and dignity and to be in control of their own lives.”  Then 
again, older persons constitute a vulnerable group due to declining health and 
increased dependence on others.  In the words of Myers and Agree:157  
Although older persons are thought to be highly vulnerable to the need for 
support, we must be careful to avoid the myth that they are a homogenous group 
demanding care.  At the same time, it must be recognized that physical 
limitations are strongly associated with increasing age. 
 
Since 1999, which was designated the International Year of Older Persons by the 
United Nations General Assembly,158 a number of initiatives were undertaken 
locally and internationally to promote respect for and dignity of older persons.159 
                                     
155 Older women may require additional support due to their role as primary caregivers, whereas 
older men may have experienced the loss of status as breadwinner of the family (National Report 
(2002) 54). 
156 National Report(2002) 49. 
157 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 
21 (1) Aging International 16. 
158 UN General Assembly Resolution 47/5, 16 October 1992 http://www.un.org/ageing/iyop.html 
(accessed 06/07/2009). 
159 See below at 7.2.3.1 for a summary of the articles of Res 47/5 most relevant to 
intergenerational solidarity and the care and support of older persons. 
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The South African government launched Operation Dignity in 1999 as its 
contribution to the International Year of Older Persons.   Operation Dignity was 
broadly aimed at raising awareness of the rights of older persons, promoting a 
positive image of older persons and sensitising government officials and 
communities to the needs of older persons.  Operation Dignity centred on the 
theme of older persons being “valuable and irreplaceable assets” who deserve to 
be treated with dignity and respect.160 
 
In addition to Operation Dignity, other steps were also taken to bring across the 
message that older persons are valuable to society and need to be treated with 
care and dignity.  The Minister of Social Development met with communities 
between June 2000 and March 2001161 to observe the problems with service 
delivery, particularly those at pension pay points and homes for older persons.  
This experience was valuable as the Minister could get first-hand accounts of the 
concerns of older persons, especially those in rural areas.  The information 
gathered from these visits to communities has formed part of the design for the 
improved social security programme and many of the concerns raised by older 
persons were addressed by the OPA. 
 
                                     
160 National Report (2002) 49. 
161 For  more on the Minister of Social Development’s “road-show” to seven provinces in 2000 
see the Ministry of Social Development Media Briefing of 14 September 2000  
http://www.archive.pmg.org.za/briefings/000914socialdevelopment.htm (accessed 06/07/2009). 
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All the abovementioned programmes and legislative measures have to be viewed 
in the context of the constitutional obligation to respect the dignity of older 
persons.162  The preamble to the OPA refers to the need to respect and protect 
the inherent dignity of older persons and to implement changes to the law to that 
effect.  Section 9(g) of the OPA limits financial awards by the state to service 
organisations that create an environment that “promotes the respect and dignity 
of older persons”.163  The express reference to the protection of the dignity of 
older persons in the OPA is a vital step towards the promotion of the inherent 
dignity of older persons as required by the Constitution. 
 
6.4.3 Protection against abuse and neglect 
 
In addition to the abovementioned sections that expressly address the protection 
of older persons’ dignity, the  OPAalso addresses this issue indirectly in the 
sections that deal with the protection of older persons against abuse and neglect.  
As was stated above,164 the provisions of chapter 5 of the OPAare a vast 
improvement on previous legislation on the protection of older persons against 
neglect and abuse. 
 
                                     
162 Section 10 of the Constitution, 1996. 
163 See above at 6.3.3.3 for a discussion of state support to community-based organisations. 
164 The provisions of the OPA dealing with the protection of older persons against abuse and 
neglect were outlined above at 3.2.4.5.6. 
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The Mothers and Fathers of the Nation Report165 exposed various violations of 
older persons’ human rights in residential facilities, but also in their family homes.  
In the context of the policy and legislative shift towards increased family care and 
support of older persons,166 the protection of older persons against abuse in the 
family home increases in importance.  For example, recipients of the older 
person’s grant are not necessarily guaranteed the use of the grant as they may 
give up (or be coerced to hand over) the grant to more powerful (younger) 
members of the household to secure some degree of care from their families.167 
This state of affairs runs contrary to the intergenerational solidarity at the core of 
the provision of the grant, but fortunately the OPA provides older persons in this 
position with a measure of protection. 
 
When it is reported to a social worker that an older person’s grant is taken 
against his or her wishes, the matter must be investigated.168  If, after the 
investigation, the older person is deemed to be in need of care and protection169 
the social worker may take the prescribed steps “to ensure adequate provision 
for the basic needs and protection of the older person concerned”170 or to assist 
the older person in laying a criminal complaint against the person who has taken 
his or her grant.171. 
                                     
165 Report of the Ministerial Committee on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-treatment of Older Persons 
(2001). 
166 See above at 6.2. 
167 Hassim “Gender, Welfare and the Developmental State in South Africa” (2005) 24. 
168 Section 25(2) read with 25(3) of the OPA. 
169 Section 25(5)(a) OPA. 
170 Section 25(4)(c). 
171 Section 25(4)(d). 
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Allegations of abuse of an older person in the family home could lead to the 
alleged offender being removed from the family home and/or barred from having 
any contact with the older person.172  However, the alleged offender may still be 
required to maintain his or her family during the period that he or she is barred 
from the family home.173  If a magistrate determines that the allegation of abuse 
is correct, and the abuser is allowed to return to the family home, conditions for 
the further accommodation and care of the older person by the offender may be 
set.174 
 
Although the ultimate goal of keeping older persons in their homes as long as 
possible and having them being taken care of by their families and communities 
is laudable, it is suggested that the conditions in existing residential facilities 
should not be overlooked.  Residents of old age homes have a right to dignity, in 
addition to their other constitutional and statutory rights in terms of the OPA.175  
The OPA makes provision for the monitoring of compliance with standards of 
care and for steps to be taken upon allegations of abuse and neglect of older 
persons in residential care.176 Consequently national and provincial government 
                                     
172 Section 27(1) and (6).  See above at 3.3.4.5.6 for a summary of the procedures followed when 
an allegation of abuse of an older person is made. 
173 Section 27(6)(c).  This means that the older person’s fear of being left destitute if the alleged 
offender, who may also be the breadwinner of the family, is removed from the family home, is 
addressed. 
174 Section 29(10). 
175Sections 7 and 16 of the OPA – see above at 3.3.4.5.2. 
176 See above at 3.3.4.5.5 and 3.3.4.5.6. 
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should provide in their budgets for measures to ensure that older persons can 
reside in homes where they are safe and their dignity intact. 
 
Given that the social assistance function has been shifted to SASSA,177 the 
Department of Social Development should prioritise capacity-building in order to 
monitor the situation in residential homes, particularly the training and 
employment of more social workers in order to improve monitoring of residential 
facilities.178 
 
6.4.4 Intergenerational equity 
 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis179 it was explained that intergenerational solidarity180 is 
not considered by all to be the preferred basis of law and policy on 
intergenerational issues affecting older persons. Significant support for the 
concept of ‘intergenerational equity’ has developed internationally in the last 
three decades.181 
 
                                     
177 See above at 3.3.1.1. 
178 Steps are currently being taken to deal with the exodus of trained social workers and R210m 
was budgeted for social work bursaries in 2009.  See the Budget Speech 2009 by Minister of 
Finance, T Manuel http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07022115261001.htm (accessed 
02/04/2009). 
179 See 2.3 above. 
180 Intergenerational solidarity is based on a long-term contract between the working-age 
population and older persons and implies that members of the working-age generation are 
prepared to meet the claims of older persons for pensions and services in the understanding that 
similar benefits will be available to them when they become part of the older generation.  
181 See, for example, Holzmann et al (eds) New ideas about old age security (2001) and the 
attempts at legislative amendments in countries such as the USA, where the debate on 
intergenerational equity has been particularly robust (see below at 7.3.5.5). 
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The ’intergenerational equity’ view can be defined as the notion that a country is 
“squandering its wealth in entitlements to the elderly while children remain 
impoverished”.182  This view focuses on the impact of social security law and 
policy on one generation only, i.e. children, whereas intergenerational solidarity 
implies lifelong social protection. 
 
The ‘intergenerational equity’ argument relies on the notion that older persons 
are a financial burden on the younger generation; a notion that can be dispelled 
by emphasising the positive role played by older persons in society.183 
 
The notion that the younger generation has to bear the pension burden is central 
to the arguments for ‘intergenerational equity’.  It is submitted that this view does 
not necessarily mean that the concept ‘intergenerational equity’ is to be found at 
the opposite side of the spectrum from intergenerational solidarity.  The whole 
notion of an ‘intergenerational war’ is disingenuous.184  It is true that the costs of 
social security for older persons and, therefore, the financial ‘burden’ on younger 
                                     
182 See Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) 
International Journal of Health Services 637. 
183 See above at 6.4.1 for more on the recognition of the role that older persons fulfil in society, 
particularly the provisions of the OPA regarding the positive contribution of older persons to 
society. 
184 Binney and Estes “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: the 
intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational Journal of Health Services 83 postulate that 
“the ‘intergenerational war’ has been socially constructed by those who wish to deflect and direct 
the attention of the public and policymakers toward fighting false conflicts between the 
generations in order to divert members of all generations from uniting and joining forces to 
demand from the state universal lifecourse entitlement for basic human needs”. 
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generation are inherent in intergenerational solidarity.185  It is, however, equally 
implicit in intergenerational solidarity that the younger generation are entitled to 
receive similar benefits to those they have funded for older persons when they 
become the older generation.   Hence, their financial ‘burden’ is not without 
recompense.  It is submitted that as long as the support of the older generation 
poses no threat to the retirement benefits of the younger generation, they can be 
expected to bear the pension burden.  Intergenerational solidarity and 
‘intergenerational equity‘ therefore, should not be regarded as opposing 
concepts, as any temporary generational inequity implied by intergenerational 
solidarity will be redressed at a later stage as the generations age. 
 
In any case, older persons and the costs related to them should not be seen as a 
burden on the younger generation, as generations are, and have always been, 
socially and economically interdependent.  It is incorrect to assume that money 
spent on improving the lives of older persons necessarily leads to the “declining 
economic security of children”.186  As was stated above187 in the context of the 
important role of older persons in communities and families, many older persons 
support or assist their children and grandchildren.  Consequently, money spent 
on benefits to older persons may improve the economic security of children, 
contrary to the ‘intergenerational equity’ argument. 
                                     
185 Binney and Estes “The intergenerational war” (1988) 94 suggest that taking care of dependent 
children and older persons should not be regarded as a ‘burden’, but rather as a part of “mutually 
interdependent actions and activities”,   
186 Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) International 
Journal of Health Services 645. 
187 At 6.4.1. 
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The question, therefore, is whether a system based on intergenerational 
solidarity that seemingly differentiates between generations violates the younger 
generation’s rights in terms of section 9 read with section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.  The Constitution is not about formal but about substantive equality, 
that is, equal enjoyment of rights.  The point of a system based on 
intergenerational solidarity is that every generation is secure in the knowledge 
that they will receive guaranteed retirement benefits from the system when they 
retire.  The younger generation contributing to the system are not excluded from 
benefits; they merely have to wait until they reach retirement age when their   
guaranteed benefits would be due.  It is submitted that it is actually the concept 
of ‘intergenerational equity’ that runs into danger of unfairly discriminating against 
older generations, by its central notion that the state can arbitrarily change its 
spending on generations as priorities change. 
 
Of course the proponents of ‘intergenerational equity’ emphasise the potential of 
increased benefits were the younger generations allowed to save for their own 
retirement rather than being ‘burdened’ with providing benefits to the retired 
generation.  Even if the point made above that a system based on 
intergenerational solidarity does not discriminate against the younger generation 
were to be disproved, it is argued that any differentiation between generations 
inherent in such a system can be regarded as reasonable and justifiable in terms 
of section 36(1) of the Constitution.  The importance of cross-subsidisation of 
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retirement benefits to ensure that persons who do not have the opportunity to 
build up adequate benefits for retirement during their working lives are not 
marginalised was established above.188  The ‘intergenerational equity’ view is 
that the younger generation’s opportunity to receive increased benefits upon 
retirement through contributing toward their own retirement benefits is limited by 
a solidarity-based system that requires them to contribute to current retirement 
benefits.  It is submitted that the view that the younger generation’s rights are 
significantly limited by a solidarity-based system is at best speculative as it is 
based on assumptions regarding the comparative advantage of investing 
contributions toward retirement benefits on the open market rather than receiving 
a guaranteed benefit.  The current downturn in the global economy rather 
disproves the argument that guaranteed solidarity-based benefits constitute a 
substantial limitation of rights.  In any event, the younger generation will not be 
denied the opportunity to make provision for their own retirement over and above 
the solidarity-based pillar, as they will be able to contribute to the additional 
retirement savings pillars of the proposed system.  It is therefore suggested that 
any limitation on the younger generation’s rights by compelling them to contribute 
to a solidarity-based system is reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 
36(1). 
 
In any case, the assumption that younger generation not prepared to contribute 
to system providing for older generation is not sound, as there is no empirical 
                                     
188 At 5.3.5. 
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evidence in South African of such resistance against support for the older 
generation. 
 
Proponents of ‘intergenerational equity’ warn of the “risk of polarisation”189 by 
pitting older persons against children as groups deserving of assistance.  
However, it can be argued that all redistributive policies run the risk of 
polarisation and that this is precisely why laws are required to shape solidarity 
with other persons.  A prime example is the OPA which, whilst acknowledging 
the potential for “competing social and economic needs”, still requires the state to 
take reasonable steps to care for, support and protect older persons and, to that 
end, to make the necessary resource available.190 
 
The more inclusive the system, the less risk of polarisation.  The younger 
generation, therefore, need to be secure in the knowledge that their (and their 
children’s) sacrifice will bear fruit at a later stage.  Thus it is imperative that 
legislative measures be introduced to entrench intergenerational solidarity.   
 
Currently the older person’s grant and financial support by the state for the 
provision of care and support services in terms of the OPA are expressions of 
intergenerational solidarity.  Intergenerational solidarity is, however, largely 
absent from the occupational retirement fund system, due to the fact that so 
many funds are fully-funded rather than PAYG.  It is submitted that the current 
                                     
189 Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) Retirement-income reforms in the context of OECD 
work on ageing 12. 
190 Section 3(2) OPA. 
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pension reform process is the ideal opportunity to evaluate the role of 
intergenerational solidarity in the proposed multi-pillar system and to incorporate 
and entrench intergenerational solidarity in the founding legislation of the new 
system.  It may prove necessary to retain fully-funded pillars in the national social 
security system, but only to complement the solidarity-based pillars. 
 
6.5  CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis it was stated that one of the aims of this research is to 
critically examine the division of responsibility for the care of older persons 
between the state, family members and the community.   
 
Despite all the arguments why the state cannot bear the burden of caring for 
older persons on its own, the state is still required to take a proactive role in 
ensuring that everyone has access to social security.191  Thus, even if it were 
accepted that the state’s role in the provision of care and support for older 
persons is only of a “subsidiary nature”,192  national government can still be   
required to create an appropriate legislative framework for the care and support 
of older persons and introduce appropriate control and supportive 
mechanisms.193  The needs of a vulnerable group such as older persons whose 
families and communities are not in a position to provide care and support must 
                                     
191 Section 27(1)(c) read with s 27(2) of the Bill of Rights. 
192 See Dekker and Olivier “Informal forms of social security and informal sector social security” in 
Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 93. 
193 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) para 40. 
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not be ignored in the interests of government policy focused on the long-term 
objective of family or community-based care for older persons.194 
  
If government is serious about the notion that communities should bear more of 
the burden of supporting older persons, more should be done to assist 
community organisations in providing care to older persons.  Currently not 
enough resources are made available for community support programmes, as 
social development and social services budgets are consumed by grants for 
older persons and subsidies for residential homes.195 What is needed is 
increased priority given to community support programmes in the Department of 
Social Development budget,196 which is only likely to happen once the 
regulations in terms of the Older Persons Act are finalised and implemented.  
The promotion of community involvement in social services ought not, however, 
to serve as a smokescreen for the state not fulfilling its obligations in terms of 
section 27 of the Constitution, nor should the state be allowed to relegate the 
duty to provide for older persons to “the private market, the individual, the family, 
women and impoverished communities”.197 
 
                                     
194 See Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 66. 
195 In the 2009 national budget, social assistance made up 93% of the social development 
buedget (Budget Speech 2009 http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/budget/speech2009.pdf 
(accessed 02/04/2009)). See also National Report (2002) 55; IOL “Older persons bill is ‘pretty 
pathetic’” http://www.iol.co.za (accessed on 08/10/2009). 
196 The exact percentage of the department’s budget to be allocated to care and support for older 
persons is for national government to decide.  Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 66. 
197 Patel (1992) Restructuring Social Welfare: Options for South Africa 109. 
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Some of the discussion documents on the social security reforms currently under 
way have made reference to a pillar dedicated to community and state non-cash 
support to enhance the well-being of older persons, including housing and 
medical care, within the proposed multi-pillar system.198  It is imperative that the 
reformed retirement system includes measures of solidarity with older persons 
who have experienced breakdowns in family support or who lack resources to 
pay for the additional medical and care costs that are associated with ageing.  It 
is submitted that a system that integrates financial and non-cash support to older 
persons may be the best expression of intergenerational solidarity.  As will be 
seen from the overview of the system in the United Kingdom,199 an integrated 
system has the added advantage of enabling the state to use the national 
pension system to easily identify the older persons most in need of additional 
assistance. 
 
The discussion of some of the key issues regarding financial and non-cash 
support for older persons above thus gives rise to a number of unanswered 
questions.  South African law currently lacks provision for matters such as 
financial assistance to family members caring for older persons, retirement 
insurance for workers in the informal sector or retirement insurance for family 
caregivers.  A comparative overview of how these and other matters are dealt 
with in other jurisdictions will therefore be beneficial and follows below.200 
                                     
198 See above at 6.3.3.3. 
199 See below at 7.3.4. 
200 See Chapter 7 below. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The first aim of this chapter is to measure South African legislation and policies 
on providing care and support to older persons against the benchmarks set in 
international human rights and social security standards.    Hence, the current 
policy of regarding the family as the primary source of care for older persons will 
be measured against international standards.  The relative importance ascribed 
to solidarity as the basis for social security in international standards will also be 
examined. 
 
Secondly, the social security systems in selected countries, particularly provision 
in those countries for financial and non-cash support and care for older persons, 
will be analysed to determine the possibility of their adaptation to South African 
circumstances.  The comparative study also aims to determine the extent to 
which intergenerational solidarity plays a role in other countries’ social security 
legislation. 
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7.2 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
7.2.1  Importance of international standards 
 
“Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere.”1 
 
In this age of globalisation no country can claim that the social obstacles faced by 
its citizens are to be regarded as an internal matter only, as can be seen from the 
quotation above.  All countries should, therefore, strive to attain the standards set 
by the relevant international institutions.2 
 
In South Africa an international treaty signed by the executive becomes legally 
binding only once it is ratified by Parliament and enacted into law by national 
legislation.3  Even in the absence of ratification, however, international standards 
can play an important role.  The South African Constitution requires any court, 
tribunal or forum to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.4  When courts are interpreting any other legislation, a reasonable 
interpretation that is in line with international law must receive preference over 
                                     
1 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 (Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the 
International Labour Organisation) Art I(c). 
2 Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier “International standards” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) 
Introduction to social security 164. 
3 Section 231(1), (2) and (4) of the Constitution, 1996.  The exceptions to this rule are mentioned 
in s 231(3) and (4). 
4 Section 39(1)(b). See Prince v The President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and 
Others 1998 8 BCLR 976 (C) 985.  I.t.o. s 232 of the Constitution, customary international law 
e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is automatically binding law in South Africa, 
“unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament”. International law can be 
used to determine whether a limitation of a right is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society” as required by s 36(1) of the Constitution (Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier 
“International standards” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social security 164). 
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alternative interpretations that are inconsistent with international law.5  Even non-
binding international law must also be considered,6 although no corresponding 
obligation to apply said international law exists.7 
The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to 
be attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary.  
However, where the relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it 
may be directly applicable.8 
 
The role of international human rights instruments, therefore, is to act as an 
“interpretive aide” for national judiciaries in “formulating any decisions relating to 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights”.9  Domestic courts must 
therefore ensure that their decisions cannot be regarded as officially sanctioning 
violations of the international obligations of the state related to socio-economic 
rights.10 
 
South Africa has direct international law obligations to give effect to the right to 
social security in terms of ratified instruments such as the Convention for the 
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women,11 a number of International Labour Organisation 
Conventions,12 and the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.13  
                                     
5 Section 233. 
6 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 413-414, para 35; Prince v The President of 
the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 8 BCLR 976 (C) 989. 
7 Rautenbach and Malherbe (2009) Constitutional law 45. 
8 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) 1185 para 26; S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 415, para 39. 
9 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997), clause 24. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See 7.2.2.3 below. 
12 South Africa has ratified the Unemployment Convention 2 of 1919; Equality of Treatment 
(Accident Compensation) Convention 19 of 1925; Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational 
Diseases) Convention (Revised) 42 of 1934; Occupational Safety and Health Convention 155 of 
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7.2.2 United Nations Instruments 
 
7.2.2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
In terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),14 every person 
has the right to  
• “social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and 
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”;15 
• “a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control”.16 
 
These two clauses, read together, demonstrate the international community’s 
view on some of the key issues highlighted in the previous chapters, such as  
• the importance of social security rights in protecting older persons’ dignity; 
• the fact that social insurance alone is not sufficient to achieve an 
adequate standard of living, but that older persons may also require the 
provision of food, housing, medical care and social services. 
 
                                                                                                             
1981; and Safety and Health in Mines Convention 176 of 1995, but has not ratified any of the 
core social security conventions (see below at 7.2.4).  
13 Discussed below at 7.2.5.1. 
14 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
15 Art 22.  
16 Art 25(1). 
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Even though the UDHR is a non-binding declaration, it still has great significance 
in the context of social security reforms since it serves as inspiration for the 
interpretation of international and African human rights standards.17  
  
7.2.2.2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)18 
provides for “the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance”.19  
In addition to the right to social security, provision is also made for 
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.  The States parties will take appropriate steps 
to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free consent. 
 
Like most other international human rights instruments20, it regards the family as 
the fundamental group unit of society21 and, therefore, affords particular 
protection to families. 
                                     
17 The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (see below at 7.2.5.1) recognises 
the UDHR as one of the international human rights standards that may serve as guidelines for the 
interpretation of the Charter (Art 60).  According to Malan and Jansen van Rensburg “Social 
security as a human right and the exclusion of marginalized groups: An international perspective” 
in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of social security protection in South Africa 98 it is 
generally accepted that the UDHR has attained the status of customary international law with the 
result that its provisions have been invoked by “judicial authorities in the domestic arena as well 
as legislative drafters in the evolution of authoritative legal norms”. 
18 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  South Africa became a signatory to the ICESCR in 1994, but it has 
not been ratified yet. By signing the ICESCR South Africa has undertaken to refrain from steps 
designed to be in breach of the ICESCR. 
19 Art 9.  This formulation differs from that in the South African Bill of Rights in that it guarantees 
the right to social security, as opposed to the right of access to social security afforded by s 
27(1)(c) of the Constitution (see above at 3.2.2.1).  Therefore, the extent to which the ICESCR 
can be used as an interpretive guide will be affected by the differences in the wording of the 
relevant clauses. 
20 See e.g. CEDAW (7.2.2.3 below) and the African (Banjul) Charter (7.2.5.1 below). 
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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) has a 
supervisory role which entails monitoring compliance by State parties with their 
obligations in terms of the ICESCR.  To assess the degree to which State parties 
comply with their duties under the ICESCR, reports that outline legislative and 
other measures taken to ensure the fulfillment of the rights in the ICESCR have 
to be submitted to the UNCESCR.22  The UNCESCR’s role with regard to older 
persons is particularly important, as there is no international convention 
dedicated to the rights of older persons equivalent to the conventions specific to 
the rights of children and women.23 
 
As part of their duty to clarify the content of the rights contained in the ICESCR, 
the UNCESCR has produced General Comments24 that, together with the 
Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights25 and the Maastricht Guidelines on 
                                                                                                             
21 Art 10, ICESCR. 
22 For more on the role of the UNCESCR, see Jansen van Rensburg “The role of supervisory 
bodies in enforcing social security rights” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of social 
security protection in South Africa 125-130. 
23 UNCESCR General Comment 6 (1995) The economic, social and cultural rights of older 
persons para 13. 
24 Eg General Comment 6 (1995) which deals with the economic, social and cultural rights of 
older persons and General Comment 19 (2008) dealing with social security rights.  See below at 
7.2.2.2.1 for an overview of the interpretation of older persons’ social security rights in the 
General Comments. 
25 For example, one of the most important principles garnered from the Limburg Principles of 
1986 (UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex) is that even though improved laws are required for the 
implementation of State parties’ obligations i.t.o. the ICESCR, this in itself would not suffice and 
“administrative, judicial, economic, social and educational measures, consistent with the nature of 
the rights” will also have to be taken by States parties (principle 17); Malan and Jansen van 
Rensburg “Social security as a human right and the exclusion of marginalized groups: An 
international perspective” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of social security protection in 
South Africa 102.  The worth of this principle lies in the guidance it provides regarding the state’s 
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Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1997, have become 
authoritative guidelines on the scope and content of socio-economic rights. The 
interpretation of older person’s social security rights in the General Comments is 
considered below. 
  
7.2.2.2.1 The interpretation of older persons’ social security rights in the 
UNCESCR General Comments 
 
Older persons “feature prominently among the most vulnerable, marginal and 
unprotected groups.  In times of recession and of restructuring the economy, 
older persons are particularly at risk.”26  Read with paragraph 12 of General 
Comment 3 that obliges States parties to protect vulnerable members of society 
even when facing resource constraints, it means that older persons are entitled to 
protection by the state even when resources are limited.27 
 
In order to promote the right to social security, States parties are required to 
“institute non-contributory old-age benefits or other assistance for all persons, 
regardless of their sex, who find themselves without resources on attaining an 
age specified in national legislation”.28  These measures are particularly aimed at 
giving the required attention to the often dire situation of older women whose 
                                                                                                             
constitutional duty to take “legislative or other measures” to fulfil the right of access to social 
security (s 27(2) of the Constitution, 1996). 
26 General Comment 6 (1995) para 17.  Older persons are also included in the list in Art 20 of the 
Maastricht guidelines of groups that are disproportionately victims of violations of socio-economic 
rights. 
27 See also paras 31 and 51 of General Comment 19 (2008). 
28 General Comment 6 (1995) para 21.  See also para 30. 
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caregiving responsibilities had kept them from engaging in remunerated activity 
that would have enabled them to receive retirement benefits.29  South Africa has 
an older person’s grant system that is unequalled in other developing countries,30 
with the result that the general requirement of statutory social assistance for older 
persons expressed in the General Comments is easily met.  Whether South 
Africa meets the requirement of giving additional attention to social assistance 
needs of older women can be questioned.  Before 2008, the Social Assistance 
Act31 set the pensionable age for social assistance for women at 60 and men at 
65.  It is suggested that the amendment of the Social Assistance Act in 200832 in 
order to equalise the pensionable age for men and women at 60 years, done in 
the name of elimination of unfair discrimination, may be contrary to the guidelines 
set in paragraph 20 of General Comment 6.  Paragraph 20 interprets the right of 
women and men to equal enjoyment of socio-economic rights in the context of 
States parties’ obligation to “pay particular attention to older women who, 
because they have spent all or part of their lives caring for their families without 
engaging in a remunerated activity entitling them to an old-age pension, and who 
are also not entitled to a widow's pension, are often in critical situations”. 
 
                                     
29 General Comment 6 (1995) para 20.  The “disproportionate burden of reproductive and 
caregiving work performed by women” was also regarded as one of the main barriers to women 
gaining access to social security by the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, 
Expert Group Meeting (1997) Promoting women’s enjoyment of their economic and social rights 
arts 18 and 48. 
30 See above at 4.3.1.1. 
31 Act 13 of 2004, s 10. 
32 Social Assistance Amendment Act 6 of 2008. 
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The meaning of “social security” for the purposes of article 9 of the ICESCR is 
clarified to cover “all the risks involved in the loss of means of subsistence for 
reasons beyond a person’s control”.33  As a result, the additional costs faced by 
older persons due to deteriorating health and a need for care are regarded as 
social security. 
 
States parties are required to “take appropriate measures to establish general 
regimes of compulsory old-age insurance”.34  The trend toward privatisation of 
old-age insurance schemes in many countries raises serious concerns regarding 
the enjoyment of article 9 rights.35   The voluntary nature of the current South 
African retirement funding system may also be one of the reasons why South 
Africa has not yet ratified the ICESCR.36  However, the proposals for the reform 
of the retirement funding system all make provision for a compulsory retirement 
insurance pillar,37 thereby showing intent to dispose of this obstacle to complying 
with article 9 of the ICESCR. 
 
In addition to social security, older persons should also have access to “adequate 
food, water, shelter, clothing and health care through the provision of income, 
family and community support and self-help” in order to give effect to their right to 
                                     
33 General Comment 6 para 26. 
34 General Comment 6 para 27. 
35 Malan and Jansen van Rensburg “Social security as a human right and the exclusion of 
marginalized groups: An international perspective” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of 
social security protection in South Africa 99.  See below at 7.3 for the attempts at privatisation of 
retirement benefits in Sweden, the United States and Chile. 
36 See above at 3.3.2 and 5.5 for more on the current voluntary retirement insurance system in 
South Africa. 
37 See above at 5.2, 5.5 and 5.8. 
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an adequate standards of living in terms of article 11 of the ICESCR.38  The 
UNCESCR, therefore, views measures to assist older persons in attaining an 
adequate standard of living as an obligation shared between the state, family, 
communities and the individual him- or herself. 
 
States parties are required to institute national policies in order to help older 
persons to continue to live in their own homes as long as possible.39  In South 
Africa, the Older Persons Act (OPA)40 aims to enable older persons to live at 
home and/or in their communities as long as possible and meets the standard set 
by General Comment 6 in this respect. 
 
Health care policies should take a comprehensive view in realising the right of 
older persons to the enjoyment of a satisfactory standard of physical and mental 
health,41 making provision for health care services ranging from prevention and 
rehabilitation to the care of terminally ill older persons.42  The current health care 
laws and policies fall short of this benchmark as the maternal and child health 
care are prioritised, thereby marginalising older persons’ health care needs.43 
 
                                     
38 UN General Assembly Resolution 24/92 of 16 December 1991 Implementation of the 
International Plan of Action on Ageing and related activities A/RES/46/91 Annex, principle 1; 
General Comment 6 (1995) para 32. 
39 General Comment 6 (1995) para 33. 
40 Act 13 of 2006. 
41 I.t.o. Art 12 of the ICESCR. 
42 General Comment 6 para 34. 
43 See above at 6.3.4. 
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General Comment 1944 defines the right to social security in terms of article 9 of 
the ICESCR as  
the right to access and maintain benefits, whether in cash or in kind, without 
discrimination in order to secure protection, inter alia, from (a) lack of work-
related income caused by sickness, disability, maternity, employment injury, 
unemployment, old age, or death of a family member; (b) unaffordable access to 
health care; (c) insufficient family support, particularly for children and adult 
dependents. 
 
Social security programmes for the purposes of General Comment 19 include 
social insurance and social assistance schemes,45 as well as community-based 
schemes.46   
 
States parties are obliged to adopt legislative measures, national strategies and 
plans of action to realise the right to social security.47  It does not matter whether 
States parties have single social security systems or a variety of systems to 
provide for various contingencies, as long as public authorities “take 
responsibility for the effective administration or supervision of the system”.48  
More importantly for present purposes, the emphasis in the General Comment on 
sustainability of the social security system “in order to ensure that the right can 
                                     
44 “The right to social security (art.9)” E/C.12/GC/19, para 2. 
45 Para 4.  See above at 2.2 for the difference between social insurance and social assistance 
schemes. 
46 Para 5. 
47 Paras 67 and 68. 
48 Para 11, and 46 where it is stated: “Where social security schemes … are operated or 
controlled by third parties, States parties retain the responsibility of administering the national 
social security system and ensuring that private actors do not compromise equal, adequate, 
affordable, and accessible social security.” The state is responsible for ensuring that qualifying 
conditions for benefits are reasonable and transparent and that the withdrawal, reduction or 
suspensions of benefits are kept to the minimum (para 24).  It is also the state’s duty to ensure 
that social security beneficiaries have physical access to benefits, particularly those beneficiaries 
living in remote areas (para 27). 
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be realized for present and future generations”49 is in accordance with the notion 
of intergenerational solidarity. Whatever social security model a State party 
decides on must be implemented in a manner that takes all generations into 
account. 
 
It is also clear from General Comment 19 that the UNCESCR does not regard 
social assistance as the only form of non-contributory social security.  States 
parties are also required to provide “social services and other assistance” to older 
persons with no other resources.50  Where family members care for adult 
dependants, including older persons, General Comment 19 states the view of the 
UNCESCR that they should then be entitled to support from the state in the form 
of family benefits.51  In addition, States parties are required to take factors such 
as family obligations that prevent women from making equal contributions to 
retirement schemes into account and to consider periods of child-rearing or care 
for adult dependants for pension entitlements.52 
 
Because of strong similarity in the wording of many of the provisions of the 
ICESCR and the South African Bill of Rights, the ICESCR and General 
Comments are useful as a guide to the interpretation of local constitutional 
                                     
49 Para 11. 
50 Para 15 and 28. 
51 Para 18.  I.t.o. para 18 the family benefits should include cash benefits and social services to 
the family where the older person is being cared for, similar to benefits payable to families to 
maintain children. 
52 Para 32. 
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provisions.53  Although the legislative framework for meeting the obligations 
stated in the ICESCR has been created by the Social Assistance Act (SAA)54 and 
the OPA, a number of shortcomings have been listed above and, it is therefore 
imperative that these are addressed as a matter of urgency so that South Africa 
can ratify the ICESCR. 
 
7.2.2.2.2 Interpretive guidance provided by the General Comments: 
Conclusion 
 
Apart from the ICESCR being “the most authoritative international standard” for 
socio-economic rights,55 it is also important in the context of one of the research 
questions  asked  in  this  thesis;  that  is,  with  whom  the  ultimate  obligation  to 
support and care for older persons lays.  The interpretation of the ICESCR in the 
General Comments provides guidance on this issue by emphasising that older 
persons are a vulnerable group entitled to preferential protection like other 
vulnerable groups; recognising that social services and care for older persons 
constitute social security for which the state is responsible;56 and, finally, stating 
that where family members care for older persons they are entitled to support 
from the state in the form of family benefits or other support. 
                                     
53 Brand and Bekker “Hard cases: A review of cases and international developments” (1998) 1 (3) 
ESR Review 16. 
54 Act 13 of 2004. 
55 Chapman “Monitoring socio-economic rights: A ‘violations approach’” (1998) 1 (3) ESR Review 
2. 
56 General Comment 19, read with principle 17 of the Limburg Principles, which requires the state 
to take “administrative, judicial, economic, social and educational measures” in addition to 
legislative measures to implement its obligations (see fn 25 above), therefore suggests that it is 
the state’s responsibility i.t.o. the ICESCR to ensure that adequate social services and care is 
provided to older persons. 
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7.2.2.3 South Africa’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)57 was adopted in 1979 and ratified by South Africa in 1995. CEDAW 
inter alia makes provision for gender equality in social security benefits. 
 
Article 11 of CEDAW refers to the elimination of discrimination in the field of 
employment.  It makes provision for equal social security rights, “particularly in 
cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other 
incapacity to work”.58  To protect women’s right to work they are to be protected 
against loss of benefits due to marriage or pregnancy.  Of particular interest to 
women raising children is the requirement that States parties should implement 
measures “to encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social 
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work 
responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the 
establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities”.59 
 
As far as women in rural areas are concerned, CEDAW makes specific reference 
to their contribution to the economic survival of their families and requires States 
                                     
57 G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981. 
58 Art 11(1)(e) CEDAW. 
59 Art 11(2)(c) CEDAW.  Art 13(a) makes provision for measures to ensure the right to family 
benefits for women. 
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parties to provide for measures that give rural women direct access to social 
security benefits.60 
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 
Committee) is responsible for supervising States parties’ obligations under 
CEDAW.  It has the power to consider reports submitted to it and make 
recommendations to the State party concerned.61  A State party is obliged to 
submit a report on legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures that have 
been adopted to give effect to CEDAW to the CEDAW Committee within one 
year after entry of force of CEDAW in that country, and thereafter at least every 
four years.62   
 
South Africa submitted a first report in 1997 that noted a number of deficiencies 
in the social assistance system.63  Measured against the CEDAW requirements, 
South African provision for the social security rights of women falls short by a 
good measure.  As was illustrated above,64 working women who choose to take 
time off work to raise their children or care for older family members do so in the 
knowledge that they have to sacrifice a significant portion of their income as well 
as social insurance benefits.  Far from making special provision for rural women 
                                     
60 Art 14. 
61 Art 21. 
62 Art 18(1). 
63 CEDAW (1998) Initial report of States parties: South Africa CEDAW/C/ZAF/1 90-92. 
64 At 5.6.2 and 6.2.4.2. 
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as required by article 14 of CEDAW, the current social security system relegates 
them to beneficiaries of state grants.65   
 
7.2.3 United Nations initiatives on ageing  
 
7.2.3.1 Summary of United Nations initiatives on ageing 
 
The first World Assembly on Ageing was held in Vienna in 1982 and resulted in 
the Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing.  The Vienna Plan of Action on 
Ageing is part of the international framework of strategies developed by the 
international community and is to be read in the context of international human 
rights standards.66 
 
In 1991 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on the 
Implementation of the International Plan of Action on Ageing and related 
activities, that included the United Nations Principles for Older Persons giving 
effect to the Vienna Plan of Action on Ageing.67  The principles include the 
promotion of independence of older persons through “access to adequate food, 
water, shelter, clothing and health care through the provision of income, family 
                                     
65 See CEDAW (1998) Initial report of States parties: South Africa CEDAW/C/ZAF/1 99. 
66 Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), foreword. 
67 UN General Assembly, Res 46/91, 16 December 1991 Implementation of the International Plan 
of Action on Ageing and related activies A/RES/46/91, annex (United Nations Principles for Older 
Persons). 
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and community support and self-help”,68 provision of care to older persons69 and 
the protection of the dignity of older persons.70  
 
The UN General Assembly designated 1999 the International Year of Older 
Persons by means of Resolution 47/5 of 16 October 1992.71  The General 
Assembly used this opportunity to urge that national initiatives on ageing, aimed 
at supporting and expanding policies which enhance the role of the state, 
voluntary sector and private groups, be supported by the international 
community.72  It also declared its support for national initiatives ensuring that 
“older persons are viewed as contributors to their societies and not as a 
burden”.73  The importance of intergenerational programmes wherein “old and 
young generations cooperate in creating a balance between tradition and 
innovation in economic, social and cultural development” was also stressed.74  
The need for support of national initiatives in encouraging families to provide care 
and support to older family members and, more importantly, supporting families 
in providing such care, was emphasised.75 
 
Although Resolution 47/5 merely illustrated the resolve of the international 
community to support programmes aimed at emphasising the positive role that 
                                     
68 United Nations Principles for Older Persons (1991), para 1. 
69 United Nations Principles for Older Persons (1991), paras 10-14. 
70 By protecting them against abuse and unfair discrimination (paras 17-18). 
71 UN General Assembly Proclamation on ageing Res 47/5. 
72 Res 47/5, Art 2(b). 
73 Res 47/5, Art 2(d). 
74 Res 47/5, Art 2(f). 
75 Res 47/5, Art 2(k). 
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older persons play in society and improving the lives of older persons, it was the 
impetus for many of the initiatives in South Africa for promoting the dignity of and 
respect for older persons.76 
 
On the occasion of the Second World Assembly on Ageing held in 2002 in 
Madrid, Spain, the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (the Madrid 
Plan) was adopted.77  The intention of the Madrid Plan is that it should serve as a 
“practical tool to assist policy makers to focus on the key priorities associated 
with individual and population ageing”.78 
 
The Madrid Plan states that the primary responsibility for implementing the 
recommendations of the plan rests on governments, but that they may do so in 
partnership with civil society, the private sector and older persons themselves.79 
 
                                     
76 See above at 6.4.2. 
77 United Nations (2002) Report on the Second World Assembly on Ageing Madrid 8-12 April 
2002 A/CONF.197/9. 
78 Madrid Plan (2002), para 10.  The key issues addressed in the Madrid Plan are listed in para 
12 and are, inter alia: 
• The realisation of human rights (and particularly socio-economic rights) of all older 
persons; 
• The eradication of poverty in old age; 
• Gender equality among older persons; 
• Recognition by the international community of the “crucial importance of families, 
intergenerational interdependence, solidarity and reciprocity” for social development; 
• Provision of health care to older persons. 
79 Madrid Plan (2002), paras 12(i) and 116; UN Report on the Second World Assembly on 
Ageing, Madrid A/CONF.197/9 (2002) Annex 1, Political Declaration, Art 17.  Each country is 
required to create a Country Strategy for Action on Ageing.  According to the South African 
Deputy Minister of Social Development in her 2009 Budget Speech, the department will during 
the 2009-2010 budget year “operationalise the country Plan of Action on Ageing to give effect to 
the Madrid Plan of Action commitments”.  See South African Government Information “Budget 
speech by Ms Bathabile Dlamini, Deputy Minister of Social Development to the National 
Assembly”, 3 July 2009; National Report (2002) 56-57. 
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The abovementioned declarations and plans of action are not binding 
international law instruments, but serve to illustrate the position of the 
international community on various key issues being examined in this thesis, 
such as the interaction between family- and community care for older persons 
and institutional care, the level of support family caregivers can expect from the 
state and the crucial issue of the relevance of intergenerational solidarity in 
providing for older persons. 
 
7.2.3.2 The United Nations position on the interaction between family and 
community care and institutional care 
 
The United Nations’ position is that home care for older persons should be 
promoted, as the ideal position is that older persons should remain at home in 
their communities as long as possible.80  It is therefore of the view that “children 
should be encouraged to support their parents”.81  Where institutional care is 
required, it should always be “appropriate to the needs of the elderly”.82  
Provision should also be made for the protection of older persons’ rights while in 
                                     
80 Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), recommendation 13.  Hence, national 
governments should take the housing needs of older persons into account when adopting 
housing policies (recommendation 21).  See also Madrid Plan (2002), paras 98 and 105(b). 
81 Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), recommendation 28.  The Madrid Plan (2002), 
para 43, also emphasised the importance of attempting to strengthen family intergenerational 
ties, but recognised that not all older persons prefer to live with the younger generation. 
82 Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), recommendation 10.  See also recommendation 
34 on the quality of institutional care; UN Principles for Older Persons, United Nations General 
Assembly, Res 46/91, 16 December 1991 Implementation of the International Plan of Action on 
Ageing and related activities A/RES/46/91 annex (hereafter “UN Principles for Older Persons 
(1991)”) para 13.  States should takes legislative measures to set standards for residential care 
(Madrid Plan (2002), para 105(g)). 
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institutional care.83  Community-based care and institutional care for older 
persons should be seen as complementary services and older persons should be 
entitled to the type of care most appropriate to their needs at a particular time.84 
 
In cases where the older person wishes to live in the family home, the UN 
advocates an “age/family-integrated approach” to development taking into 
account the special needs of older persons and their families.85  To this end,  
governments and non-governmental bodies should be encouraged to establish 
social services to support the whole family when there are elderly people at home 
and to implement measures especially for low-income families who wish to keep 
elderly people at home.86 
 
Older persons are hence entitled to “benefit from family and community care and 
protection in accordance with each society’s system of cultural values”.87  States 
should take steps to provide economic and legislative support to family 
caregivers, particularly community-based support.88 
 
                                     
83 UN Principles for Older Persons (1991), para 14. 
84 That residential care may in some cases be the better option is explained as follows in the 
Madrid Plan (2002), para 104: “In the last two decades, community care and ageing in place have 
become the policy objective of many Governments.  Sometimes the underlying rationale has 
been financial, because, based on the assumption that families will supply the bulk of care, 
community care is expected to cost less than residential care.  Without adequate assistance, 
family caregivers can be overburdened. In addition, formal community care systems, even where 
they exist, often lack sufficient capacity because they are poorly resourced and coordinated. As a 
result, residential care may be the preferred option of either the frail older person or the caregiver. 
In view of this range of issues, a continuum of affordable care options, from family to institutional, 
is desirable.  Ultimately, the participation of older persons in assessing their own needs and 
monitoring service delivery is crucial to the choice of the most effective option.”  
85 Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), recommendation 28.  It recommends that the 
diminishing traditional support of older persons in developing countries be taken into account 
when the needs of older persons are evaluated (recommendation 26). 
86 Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), recommendation 29. 
87 UN Principles for Older Persons, para 10.  See also Vienna International Plan on Ageing, 
recommendation 25.  This principle has been echoed in s 10(c) OPA. 
88 Madrid Plan (2002), para 105 (a) and (c). 
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7.2.3.3 The United Nations view on family versus state responsibility for 
older persons 
 
At the Second World Assembly on Ageing a “Political declaration” was issued 
which stressed that, in the UN’s view, governments are regarded as having the 
primary responsibility for “promoting, providing and ensuring access to basic 
social services to older persons”.89  The role of families, volunteers and 
communities in providing support and care to older persons in addition to 
services provided by Governments was recognised.90  In addition, the Madrid 
Plan requires States to develop measures to support families in taking care of 
older family members.91  Thus, where families are providing care for older family 
members, they should be entitled to state support.  Family care in itself “does not 
absolve society of its responsibility for high-quality care” for older persons.92 
 
In terms of the Madrid Plan, it was resolved that older persons who are not in 
receipt of the informal family or community care mentioned above are entitled to 
support from the state.93  In particular, actions by States to improve the lives of 
older persons in rural areas who have to live without the traditional family support 
                                     
89 UN Report on the Second World Assembly on Ageing, Madrid A/CONF.197/9 (2002) Annex 1, 
Political Declaration, Art 13. 
90 UN Report on the Second World Assembly on Ageing, Madrid A/CONF.197/9 (2002) Annex 1, 
Political Declaration, Art 15. 
91 Madrid Plan (2002), para 105(h).  The Vienna International Plan on Ageing (1982), 
recommendation 36 stated that if some states find it difficult to meet the primary goal of universal 
social security coverage for all older persons, they should aim to provide benefits in kind and 
financial assistance to families or community organisations.  
92 United Nations (1991) Overview of recent research findings on population aging and the family 
Report to the United Nations International Conference on Aging Populations in the Context of the 
Family, Kitakyushu, Japan, as quoted by Hoskins “Combining work and care for the elderly: An 
overview of the issues” (1993) 132 International Labour Review 348. 
93 Madrid Plan (2002), para 105(d). 
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as a result of the “exodus” of younger adults to the urban areas are given careful 
consideration.94 
 
7.2.3.4 The United Nations position on family caregivers 
 
 
 
The Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing recognised that the ideal 
situation in most countries would be that older persons age in their own 
communities, but acknowledged that the situation becomes less ideal when 
family care is expected without any compensation to the caregiver.  It also 
acknowledged that family caregiving leads to a financial penalty to female 
caregivers in most instances as they work fewer hours in formal employment due 
to their caregiving responsibilities and consequently make lower pension 
contributions.95  The Madrid Plan makes a general suggestion that special 
provision be made for the generation of people that have to care for parents as 
well as their children.96  Older women should also be supported in their role as 
caregivers97 by measures designed to: 
“(a)  Encourage the provision of social support, including respite services, 
advice and information for both older caregivers and the families under 
their care; 
(b)  Identify how to assist older persons, in particular older women, in 
caregiving and address their specific social, economic and psychological 
needs; 
(c)  Reinforce the positive role of grandparents in raising grandchildren; 
(d)  Take account of the growing numbers of older caregivers in service 
provision plans.”98 
                                     
94 Madrid Plan (2002), paras 29-34. 
95 Madrid Plan (2002), para 102.  The Madrid Plan does not seem to address the position of the 
very many women outside formal employment who care for older persons. 
96 Madrid Plan (2002), para 44(e).  
97 Madrid Plan (2002), para 103. 
98 Madrid Plan (2002), para 106. 
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7.2.3.5 The United Nations view on intergenerational solidarity 
 
 
One of the most significant statements made in the “Political Declaration” of the 
Second World Assembly on Ageing in Madrid in 2002 was the recognition of  
the need to strengthen solidarity among generations and intergenerational 
partnerships, keeping in mind the particular needs of both older and younger 
ones, and to encourage mutually responsive relationships between generations. 
 
 
The Madrid Plan99 reiterates the importance of nurturing “the reciprocal 
relationship between and among generations”.  It is stated that 
[s]olidarity between generations at all levels, in families, communities and 
nations, is fundamental for the achievement of a society for all ages. Solidarity is 
also a major prerequisite for social cohesion and a foundation of formal public 
welfare and informal care systems. Changing demographic, social and economic 
circumstances require the adjustment of pension, social security, health and 
longterm care systems to sustain economic growth and development and to 
ensure adequate and effective income maintenance and service provision.100 
 
One of the objectives of the Madrid Plan is the “strengthening of solidarity 
through equity and reciprocity between generations,” and States are required to 
review existing policies in order to foster intergenerational solidarity.101 
 
Related to the promotion of intergenerational solidarity is the UN’s view that 
States should ensure that older persons are treated fairly and with dignity,102 and 
                                     
99 Madrid Plan (2002), para 13. 
100 Madrid Plan (2002), para 42. 
101 Madrid Plan (2002), para 44(b) and (f). 
102 Madrid Plan (2002), para 21 (g) and (h).  In particular, the Madrid Plan advocates the 
implementation of human rights instruments to ensure older persons’ full enjoyment of human 
rights  (para 21(a)) and the enactment of legislation with the objective of the elimination of all 
forms of abuse and neglect of older persons (para 110(c)).   
 
 
 
 
473 
 
that the role of older persons in their families and communities must be given 
formal recognition and support by the state.103 
 
7.2.3.6 The United Nations position on reducing poverty among older 
persons 
 
One of the objectives of the Madrid Plan is to reduce poverty among older 
persons through the promotion of access to social protection to all older persons 
in order to provide “adequate economic and social protection” during 
retirement.104 States are in particular called upon to ensure the “sustainability, 
solvency and transparency” of retirement funding schemes.105  The emphasis on 
sustainability of schemes relates to the importance attributed to intergenerational 
solidarity and reciprocity in retirement schemes by the Madrid Plan.106  States are 
required to ensure “minimum income” for older persons not covered by the 
aforementioned retirement schemes and who have no other means of support.107 
 
                                     
103 See Madrid Plan (2002), paras 19, 21(b) and 113, calling for the “enhancement of public 
recognition of the authority, wisdom, productivity and other important contributions of older 
persons”. 
104 Madrid Plan (2002), para 52(a).  States are called upon to “ensure, where appropriate, that 
social protection / social  security  systems  cover  an  increasing  proportion  of  the  formal  and 
informal working population” (para 52(f)). 
105 Madrid Plan (2002) para 52 (f). 
106 See above at 7.2.3.5.  The ageing of the global population (see above at 1.1) has also raised 
the profile of sustainability of national retirement fund schemes as a major concern for policy and 
lawmakers. 
107 Madrid Plan (2002), para 53 (b). 
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7.2.3.7 The United Nations and intergenerational solidarity: Conclusion 
 
The UN declarations and plans of action for ageing that were referred to in the 
paragraphs above support the main arguments of this thesis, which are that 
intergenerational solidarity should form the backbone of the social security 
provision for older persons and that, while it is recognised that families and 
communities are the primary source of non-cash support and care for older 
persons, the state has a fundamental responsibility towards older persons and 
their families. 
 
The Madrid Plan, in particular, has had a significant impact on South African 
legislation as many of the provisions of the plan are included in the OPA.  For 
example, the guiding principles for the provision of services to older persons in 
the OPA include the recognition of the social, cultural and economic contribution 
of older persons108 and the participation of older persons in decision-making 
processes at all levels.109 
 
7.2.4 International Labour Organisation Conventions 
 
International social security standards can fulfil a twofold purpose: 
• International standards on social security can serve as guidelines for 
legislation and social security reforms of member States; 
                                     
108 Section 9(a) OPA and Madrid Plan, para 21. 
109 Section 9(b) OPA and Madrid Plan, para 22. 
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• Once international standards are ratified they should act as guarantees 
against regression in the protection offered by social security legislation.110 
  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has, since its creation in 1919 as an 
organisation dealing mainly with international labour standards, also developed a 
number of social security standards. 
 
ILO Conventions are adopted by the International Labour Conference of the 
ILO.111  Member States then have to bring the Conventions to the notice of their 
legislative authorities.  Once a member State ratifies a Convention, national 
legislation must be enacted to give effect to the Convention.  The influence of the 
ILO in setting standards can be seen even where a State following a particular 
Convention does not end up formally ratifying the Convention.112  
 
ILO Recommendations are detailed international standards that are not subject to 
ratification and are not binding, but merely have a persuasive and explanatory 
effect.113 A Convention’s accompanying Recommendation usually contains 
stricter and more detailed requirements than the Convention.114 
 
                                     
110 Otting “International labour standards: A framework for social security” (1993) 132 
International Labour Review 163. 
111 For more on the history, structure and functions of the ILO, see ILO (1984) Introduction to 
social security 163 – 175. 
112 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 8.  See S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 3 SA CC 
para 35 where reference is made to the interpretative guidance that ILO instruments can provide 
in appropriate cases. 
113 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 164.   
114 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 8. 
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ILO Conventions and Recommendations are relevant as they provide 
benchmarks against which the current system and social security reforms can be 
evaluated.  The ILO has an important role to play, particularly in providing 
guidance in respect of pension reforms, due to its “decades of experience in the 
field of planning, implementing and monitoring social security schemes in all the 
continents”.115  
 
7.2.4.1 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention  
 
The aim of the landmark Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 
1952 (“Convention 102’) is the establishment of a basic level of social security to 
be accomplished internationally, whatever the state of economic development in 
a given country.116  The Convention “brought together in one comprehensive 
document the policies to which the then member States were prepared to 
subscribe, and defined the range of benefits which form the core of social 
security”.117 
 
The Convention lists nine branches of social security benefits: medical care; 
sickness benefit; unemployment benefit; old-age benefit; employment injury 
benefit; family benefit; maternity benefit; invalidity benefit; and survivors’ 
                                     
115 Gruat (1997) Adequacy and social security principles in pension reform 13.  See also Fenwick, 
Kalula and Landau (2007) Labour law: A Southern African perspective 7. 
116 Otting “International labour standards” (1993) 132 International Labour Review 166; Malan and 
Jansen van Rensburg “Social security as a human right and the exclusion of marginalized 
groups: An international perspective” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of social security 
protection in South Africa 95. 
117 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 8. 
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benefit.118 A State party that has ratified the Convention must comply with at least 
three of the branches.119   
 
The Convention differs from the UN instruments discussed above in that it 
focuses on the provision of social security benefits in general.  Of the nine 
branches of social security it refers to, all but medical care consist mainly of the 
payment of cash benefits.120  Old age is included as one of the social risks that 
could lead to loss of income or additional expenses.121 
 
The Convention requires ratifying States to protect a specified percentage of the 
population through social security measures.122  However, Article 3(1) allows a 
State with an “insufficiently developed” economy and medical facilities to be 
temporarily exempt from reaching the coverage targets set by the Convention.  
While it may seem that the provision stating the minimum percentage of the 
population to be covered by social security violates the right to equality by merely 
providing for social security for a percentage of the population, thereby excluding 
the remainder of the potential beneficiaries, it is important to note that the 
Convention merely aims to set minimum standards and therefore allows for 
                                     
118 Listed as parts II to X of the Convention. 
119 Art 2(a)(ii). 
120 Two of the branches, employment injury benefits and maternity benefits, also include a 
measure of medical care, and family benefits may “comprise a variety of components” (ILO 
(1984) Introduction to social security 177). 
121 Part V of the Convention.   The contingency covered in the case of old-age benefits is “survival 
beyond a prescribed age” (Art 26(1)).   
122 In terms of Art 27 of the Convention persons protected by old-age benefits must comprise 
certain minimum percentages of all employees or of the active population. 
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progressive realisation of the right of access to social security123 and must be 
understood in that context.   
 
The Convention sets minimum requirements for the level of retirement benefits 
and requires that after 30 years of coverage the retirement pension should not 
represent less than 40% of previous earnings.124 
 
The flexibility written into the Convention enables member States to comply with 
the minimum standards set by it, as “it is left to each State to build up its own 
programme according to its own needs and its stage of development”.125 One 
example of this flexibility, and of great importance for old-age benefits, is the 
various options offered to ratifying States when determining the value of cash 
benefits.  The options to calculate the level of old-age benefits are: 
• taking a percentage of the previous earnings of the beneficiary into 
account;126 
• basing the benefit on the average minimum wage;127 or 
• paying a flat -rate means-tested benefit.128 
 
                                     
123 As will be seen below at 7.2.4.2, Convention 102 is supplemented by Convention 128 and 
Recommendation 131 which lay down progressively increasing benchmarks for percentage of 
economically active population protected by retirement benefits and the minimum benefit rates. 
124 Art 29, read with Arts 65 and 66 and the schedule to the Convention. 
125 ILO (1984) Introduction to social security 165.  Convention 102, therefore, does not attempt to 
set a theoretical benchmark which some countries will never be able to reach, but rather attempts 
to set standards in line with a given country’s ability to reach those standards (Malherbe “The co-
ordination of social security rights in Southern Africa: Comparisons with (and possible lessons to 
be learnt from) the European experience” (2004)1 LDD 78). 
126 Art 65 of Convention 102. 
127 Art 66. 
128 Art 67. 
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The levels of old-age benefits must be regularly reviewed “following substantial 
changes in the general level of earnings where these result from substantial 
changes in the cost of living”.129 
 
South Africa has not ratified this Convention and it is recommended that steps be 
taken to effect ratification as soon as possible.  The flexibility inherent in 
Convention 102 suggests that the social security reform process currently under 
way should be informed by the standards for the minimum level of retirement 
benefits set in the Convention as outlined above so that the reforms result in a 
system that will comply with the benchmarks set in the convention. 
 
7.2.4.2 Branch-specific conventions 
 
The Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 has been 
supplemented by other conventions setting out more precise provisions with 
wider coverage than Convention 102.  The most important of these conventions 
in the context of social security for older persons is the Invalidity, Old-age and 
Survivors’ Benefits Convention 128 of 1967 (“Convention 128”).130 
 
                                     
129 Art 65, para 10 and Art 66, para 8.  Given the flexible approach taken in Convention 102, 
ratification levels, particularly in Southern Africa, are surprisingly low (Ben-Israel “Social security 
in the Year 2000: Potentialities and problems” ISLLSS XIVth World Congress 1994, 13). 
130 It is not necessary to discuss this convention in detail, as it follows the same pattern as 
Convention 102.  Only the provisions of Convention 128 that provide for higher standards than 
Convention 102 will be highlighted below. 
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The majority of the provisions of Convention 128 correspond to the minimum 
requirements for old-age benefits set by Convention 102.131  However, 
Convention 128 extends the scope of application of retirement benefits to all 
employees, even apprentices, and raises the percentage of the economically 
active population protected by retirement benefits.132  The percentage of previous 
earnings that constitutes a minimum benefit is also higher in Convention 128.133 
 
The Convention has been supplemented by the Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ 
Benefits Recommendation 131 of 1967 (“Recommendation 131”), which aims at 
the progressive extension of the scope of legislation on old-age benefits to 
include casual employees and “all economically active persons”.134  It also 
recommends reduced qualifying periods,135 increased minimum benefit rates,136 
cost of living adjustments137 and that minimum benefits be fixed by legislation “so 
as to ensure a minimum standard of living”.138 
 
The most significant measure in Recommendation 131 for the purposes of this 
thesis is that it is suggests that Member states enact legislation creating, and 
                                     
131 Art 15 regarding the contingency covered corresponds to Art 26, Convention 102; Art 17 to Art 
28, Convention 102; Art 18 to Art 29, Convention 102 and Art 19 to Art 30, Convention 102. 
132 Art 16 of Convention 128 extends the coverage of retirement benefits to a minimum of 75% of 
the economically active population, which is an increase on the 50% of the economically active 
population detailed in Art 27 of Convention 102. 
133 The Schedule to Convention 128 provides for a minimum benefit of 45% of previous earnings 
after 30 years of coverage compared to the 40% minimum of Convention 102. 
134 Recommendation 131, Art 2. 
135 Art 16. 
136 Art 22.  
137 Art 24. 
138 Art 23. 
 
 
 
 
481 
 
stating conditions for, supplementary or special benefits for pensioners who 
require “the constant help or attendance of another person”.139 
 
The Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 156 of 1981 (“Convention 
156”) recognises that “the problems of workers with family responsibilities are 
aspects of wider issues regarding the family and society which should be taken 
into account in national policies” and that “many of the problems facing all 
workers are aggravated in the case of workers with family responsibilities”.140  
This Convention provides the international standard-setting backdrop for national 
legislation to support workers with the responsibility to care for family members.  
Although the Convention is aimed at the full scope of family responsibilities, 
including child care, it is worded in such as way as to indirectly include workers 
with responsibilities for the care of the frail and dependent older persons.141  In 
terms of the Convention, the social security needs of workers with family 
responsibilities must be addressed and measures should be taken to develop 
community services to assist such workers, such as family services and 
facilities.142 
 
                                     
139 Art 25. 
140 Convention 156, preamble. 
141 Convention 156 applies to all workers with responsibilities to family members “who clearly 
need their care or support” and where such family responsibilities “restrict their possibilities of 
preparing for, entering, participating in or advancing in economic activity” (Art 1.2).  See Hoskins 
“Combining work and care for the elderly: An overview of the issues” (1993) 132 International 
Labour Review 348. 
142 Convention 156, para 4 and 5. 
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Convention 156 is supplemented by the Workers with Family Responsibilities 
Recommendation 165 of 1981 (“Recommendation 165”) which provides that “it 
should be possible for a worker with family responsibilities to obtain leave of 
absence in the case of illness of another member of the worker’s immediate 
family who needs that worker’s care or support”.143  It also provides that, where 
necessary, provision should be made for access to social security benefits for 
workers with family responsibilities.144  In addition, all possible public and private 
measures needed to lighten the burden of workers’ family responsibilities should 
be taken, including the development of home-care services to provide workers 
with family responsibilities with “qualified assistance at a reasonable charge in 
accordance with their ability to pay”.145  Recommendation 165 therefore 
addresses the problems associated with family caregiving and, even though it is 
not binding, serves as a helpful guideline for the development of measures 
intended to alleviate the burden of workers with family responsibilities. 
 
7.2.4.3 Evaluation of South African social security law in terms of ILO 
conventions 
 
The ILO Conventions discussed above require a measure of “risk-pooling” - for 
example, the requirement of the provision of minimum benefits by national social 
                                     
143 Recommendation 165, para 23(2).  “Social security benefits” are the benefits listed in 
Convention 102 (see above at 7.2.4.1). 
144 Para 27(1). 
145 Para 32. 
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security schemes.146  These measures ensure “solidarity between those affected 
by a contingency and those not affected” without which “the aims of the 
Conventions cannot be fully achieved”.147  For the ILO, solidarity is “a central 
value implying that income security in old age is not an individual task but 
requires a generational contract”.148  Most importantly, accordingly to Maier-
Rigaud,149 the ILO “explicitly refutes laissez-faire philosophy, where the state has 
no responsibility for the retirement income”.  The influence of the 
abovementioned ILO standards and views on the South African retirement 
insurance reform process is apparent from the Department of Social 
Development’s stated preference for a redistributive and solidarity-based system 
over systems that lack solidarity but that may serve other goals such as 
increasing the national savings rate.150 
 
When evaluating the current South African social security law and the proposed 
social security reforms against the requirements of the Conventions above, the 
following points of concern regarding the South African system arise: 
• The legislation allowing for the lump sum benefits paid by provident funds 
in South Africa151 does not comply with the provisions of Convention 128, 
which requires that retirement benefits be periodical payments paid 
“throughout the contingency”, therefore lifelong benefits.152 
                                     
146 Art 66 and 67, read with the Schedule of Convention 102; Art 26, read with the Schedule of 
Convention 128. 
147 Otting “International labour standards: A framework for social security” (1993) 132 
International Labour Review 171. 
148 Maier-Rigaud (1995) “Implications of pension ideas for organised labour” 19. 
149 Maier-Rigaud (1995) “Implications of pension ideas for organised labour” 20. 
150 DSD Discussion document (2007) 94 and 107. 
153 See 2.5 (for definition of provident funds), 3.3.2.1 (for legislation on provident funds) and 5.3.2. 
152 Art 17, read with Art 19. 
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• In terms of article 72 of Convention 102 and article 35 of Convention 128, 
the state has the general responsibility for the provision of, implementation 
of, and proper administration of retirement benefits.  The current 
retirement funding system in South Africa does not conform to these 
requirements to the extent that the abovementioned functions are fulfilled 
by occupational funds and the state merely regulates the pension fund 
industry.153 
• South African labour law154 currently only makes provision for family 
responsibility leave in the case of illness of the employee’s child, and not 
for illness of other family members, including dependent older persons as 
provided for in Convention 156.155 
 
 
Social protection for older persons will have to become a national spending 
priority before the branch-specific conventions containing provisions regarding 
retirement benefits and assistance to workers with family responsibilities can be 
ratified.  There is no such impediment to ratifying Convention 102, as the 
flexibility inherent in the convention allows the state to adapt social security 
system to the economic and social conditions prevailing in South Africa and it 
should be ratified as soon as possible.156  In the interim, the benchmarks set by 
these instruments serve as helpful guidelines for the social security reform 
process and the resultant legislation.  It is recommended that the emphasis on 
solidarity and risk-pooling in the ILO standards be set as a statutory norm in 
future social security legislation in South Africa. 
                                     
153 See 3.3.2 above for a description of the current South African retirement funding system and 
legislation. 
154 Section 27 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
155 As well as Recommendation 165. 
156 Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier “International and supra-national law” in Olivier (eds) (2003) 
Social security: A legal analysis 646. 
 
 
 
 
485 
 
 
7.2.5 Regional standards 
 
7.2.5.1 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights157 
 
7.2.5.1.1 Introduction 
 
The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter) 
is unique among human rights standards in a number of respects.  Firstly, while 
reference is made to other human rights instruments, the African Charter aims to 
be a truly African instrument.  In the preamble to the Charter, States parties are 
required to “take into consideration the virtues of their historical traditions and 
values of African civilization which should inspire and characterise their reflection 
on the concept of human and peoples’ rights”. 
 
Secondly, the Charter includes socio-economic rights and civil and political rights 
in one instrument with the same enforcement methods158 for both types of 
rights.159 
                                     
157 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), entered into force 1986.  The African Charter has 
been ratified by South Africa and all other SADC countries. 
158 Enforcement measures i.t.o. the Charter include: a bi-annual report on the implementation of 
the Charter (Art 62); complaints by States parties regarding violations of the Charter by other 
States parties (Art 47-54); and individual complaints (“other communications” i.t.o. Art 55-58).  A 
detailed analysis of the measures to enforce the African Charter falls outside the scope of this 
thesis.  For more on ways of enforcing the Charter and the interpretation of the Charter, see De 
Vos “A new beginning? The enforcement of social, economic and cultural rights under the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2004) 1 LDD 1-24. 
159 The preamble to the African Charter states that “civil and political rights cannot be dissociated 
from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the 
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7.2.5.1.2 The African Charter and older persons’ rights 
 
The African Charter contains various provisions on socio-economic rights, but 
makes no explicit reference to social security rights.160  However, it contains 
rights that are indirectly linked to social security, such as the right of every 
individual to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions161 and the right to 
enjoy the best attainable state of health.162  
 
Even though the African Charter does not directly provide for a right to social 
security, it is still of significance to South African social security measures aimed 
at improving the lives of older persons, as it emphasises the importance of the 
family as the natural unit of society to be protected by the State.163  In terms of 
Article 18, the state has the duty to assist the family.164  This is in line with policy 
developments in South Africa, for instance the White Paper for Social Welfare165 
which regards the family as the main support system for older persons in South 
Africa.  It is submitted that the particular function of the family should be 
recognised in the current reforms of the South African social security system and 
that cognisance be taken of the duty of every individual “to preserve the 
                                                                                                             
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights”. 
160 Oloka-Onyanga “Beyond the rhetoric: Reinvigorating the struggle for economic and social 
rights in Africa (1995) 26 (1) California Western International Law Journal 77 criticises the Charter 
for the absence of many of the socio-economic rights guaranteed in the ICESCR, including the 
right to social security. 
161 Art 15. 
162 Art 16. 
163 Art 18(1). 
164 Art 18(2). 
165 GN 1108 in GG 18166 of 8 August 1997. See above at 4.2 and 6.2.1. 
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harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect 
of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of 
need”.166  However, the individual duty to maintain older family members must be 
read in the context of Article 18 requiring the state to provide protection and 
assistance to families. 
 
In addition, older persons are guaranteed “the right to special measures of 
protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs”. 
 
It is of great significance for the promotion of older persons’ rights and the 
concept of intergenerational solidarity in South Africa that the African Charter 
recognises socio-economic rights “within the context of group solidarity”.167  It is, 
therefore, clear from the African Charter that the provision of social protection to 
older persons is not the duty of the state alone, but that families and communities 
share the duty to improve the welfare of their respective members with the 
state.168 
 
De Vos disagrees with commentators who consider the individual duties imposed 
by the Charter, such as the duty towards the family, as “too onerous”.  He 
argues: 
                                     
166 Art 29(1).  In terms of Art 27(1) “every individual shall have duties towards his family and 
society”.  The inclusion of a set of individual duties is one of the unique aspects of the African 
Charter. 
167 Jansen  van  Rensburg  and  Olivier  “International  Standards”  in  Olivier  et  al  eds)  (2004)  
Introduction to social security 169. 
168 Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier (2004) 170. 
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While there has been little action undertaken to test this aspect of the Charter, it 
is quite clear that the concept of duties is not necessarily antithetical to the 
respect of human rights.  What is clear is that the overall observation and 
protection of individual rights is not undermined by an undue emphasis on duties.  
This is especially true of the aspect of the Charter dealing with economic, social 
and cultural rights and their connection to the pursuit of sustainable human 
development. 169  
 
The duty of individuals to respect their parents and maintain them in the case of 
need as established by Roman-Dutch principles170 has been confirmed as part of 
South African law as a result of the ratification of the Charter.  Legislation is 
required to shape this duty,171 for example to require families who are able to do 
so to care for older family members. 
 
Bearing in mind the state’s duty to assist the family in terms of Article 18 of the 
African Charter, the proposed legislation should also provide for financial and 
other support for families complying with the duty to care for their parents.   
 
It is submitted that the emphasis in the African Charter on the individual’s duty to 
his or her family should not be interpreted so as to absolve the state of its duty 
toward older persons.  The ILO instruments discussed above stress the need for 
the state to take steps to create a solidarity-based social security system.  Similar 
provisions are found in the UN Madrid Plan of Action and in the General 
Comments on the interpretation of the ICESCR.  The African Charter’s focus on 
                                     
169 De Vos “A new beginning? The enforcement of social, economic and cultural rights under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2004)1 LDD 7. 
170 See above at 3.3.4.2 and 6.2.1. 
171 To improve on the existing common law filial responsibility and customary law duty to support 
older family members. See above at 6.2.1 - 6.2.3 for reasons why the existing position is not ideal 
and why legislation to enforce the duty of families to support and care for older family members is 
required. 
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the family and individual family members’ duty to provide support to older 
persons is in contrast with the other instruments discussed above that provide for 
direct state support to older persons.  However, what all of these instruments 
have in common is the provision that where the family is in fact providing care 
and support to older family members, the state has the duty to provide 
assistance. 
 
7.2.5.1.3 Specific protection for women 
 
In the context of the duty of families to support and care for older family members 
and the resultant obstacle female caregivers may face in providing for their own 
old age, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa172 is significant as it contains various provisions 
which require States parties to take cognisance of women’s role as caregivers 
and to enact specific social security measures to assist women in recognition of 
the value of their work in the home.  
 
The African Women’s Protocol requires that the state takes action to ensure that 
substantive equality is reached between men and women.173 Article 13 
specifically requires State parties to enact “legislative and other measures to 
guarantee women equal opportunities in work, career advancement and other 
                                     
172 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, in Maputo, Mozambique 
on 11 July 2003. Hereafter referred to as the “African Women’s Protocol”.   South Africa has 
ratified the African Women’s Protocol on 17 December 2004. 
173 Art 2(1)(d)  requires State Parties to “take corrective and positive action in those areas where 
discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist.” 
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economic opportunities”.  States are required to, amongst others, “establish a 
system of protection and social insurance for women in the informal sector”;174 
and, to “take the necessary measures to recognise the economic value of the 
work of women in the home”.175 
 
Article 13 deals with the situation where women are capable of working (in terms 
of age) but, at the same time, are not capable of working because of various 
social factors, one being their caregiving role. Article 22, on the other hand, is 
dedicated to the ‘special protection of elderly women’.  In terms of this Article 
States parties undertake to “provide protection to elderly women and take 
specific measures commensurate with their physical, economic and social needs 
as well as their access to employment and professional training”.176  States 
parties are thus required to take specific measures to protect older women, 
especially with regard to their economic and social needs.  
 
7.2.5.2 The Treaty of the South African Development Community 
 
The objectives of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are 
listed in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty.177  The priority of social protection from a 
SADC perspective can be seen from the first objective on the list, which is 
regional integration in order to 
                                     
174 Art 13(f). 
175 Art 13(h). 
176 Art 22(a). 
177 The Treaty of the South African Development Community, as amended (2001) 
http://www.sadc.int (accessed 07/07/2009). 
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support sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its 
eradication, enhance the standards and quality of life of the people of Southern 
Africa and support the socially disadvantaged.178 
 
SADC member States have undertaken to cooperate in the areas of social and 
human development and social welfare.179 
 
Although the SADC treaty makes no express mention of social protection for 
older persons, this is implied by efforts to support the “socially disadvantaged” in 
terms of Article 5. 
 
7.2.5.3 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
 
A vital step in meeting the objectives of SADC as set out in article 5 of the SADC 
Treaty was the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights.180  Article 2 
sets out the objectives of the Charter that include the promotion of establishment 
and harmonisation of social security schemes.181  The Charter provides for 
adequate social insurance or social assistance, depending upon circumstances, 
for every worker in the SADC region.182 
 
                                     
178 Art 5(1)(a).   
179 Art 21(3)(d) and (g).  See Malherbe “The co-ordination of social security rights in Southern 
Africa” 2004(1) LDD 59-84 for more on social security co-ordination in the SADC region. 
180 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC (2003) http://www.sadc.int (accessed 
07/07/2009). 
181 Art 2(e). 
182 Art 10. 
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Older persons are singled out in the Charter as a group worthy of protection.  
Article 8 makes provision for retirement insurance schemes that would afford 
every worker in the SADC region “a decent standard of living” upon retirement.  
In addition, it makes provision for adequate social assistance for older persons, 
catering for basic needs such as medical care.183 
 
Read with the requirement that member States “take appropriate action to ratify 
and implement relevant ILO instruments”,184 the abovementioned provisions of 
the Charter signify that SADC member States are motivated to improve social 
security provision to older persons.  However, the practical implementation of the 
provisions in a coordinated fashion may prove difficult due to the different 
administrative, political, socio-economic (particularly social security) structures 
and legislative frameworks in the SADC member States.185 
 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
 
The ultimate influence of international standards on South African social security 
was highlighted by Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier where they stated that “on 
account of the human rights and constitutional dimensions of social security, the 
                                     
183 Art 8(a) and (b). 
184 Art 5(b). 
185 Taylor Committee Report No.14: Social security within a regional context (2001) 566. 
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state cannot escape responsibility for the good functioning of the system, 
whether private or public”.186 
 
In terms of CEDAW the state must make special provision for support to women 
with caregiving responsibilities and for direct access to social security for rural 
women.187 
 
The ICESCR requires the state to take a central role in realising the right to social 
security, which according to General Comments 6 and 19 includes the 
implementation of a solidarity-based retirement funding system, including both 
social assistance and social insurance measures.188  The UN’s view as 
expressed in the Madrid Plan is that the state is obliged to take positive steps to 
foster intergenerational solidarity as the backbone of programmes to provide 
economic security for older persons.  The ILO standards discussed above focus 
on the social security rights of employed persons and state a clear preference for 
solidarity-based national social security schemes. 
 
The ICESCR, the relevant UN declarations and the abovementioned ILO 
standards require the state to create the legal framework granting older persons 
the right to social security measures relevant to their needs, protection by the 
state and family support.  In addition, these standards together with the SADC 
                                     
186 Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier “International standards” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) 
Introduction to social security 165. 
187 See above at 7.2.2.3. 
188 See above at 7.2.2.2.1. 
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Charter of Fundamental Social Rights require the state to implement measures 
aimed at assisting older persons in realising their rights.189 
 
The African Charter makes no reference of social security rights and national 
social security schemes, but focuses instead on the importance of the family as 
the main support system for older persons.  In terms of the Charter the state has 
the duty to assist the family.  The emphasis in the African Charter is on the duty 
of individual family members and of the family as a group to provide support to 
older persons.  While the ILO and the UN instruments and plans of action 
discussed above all recognise the important role of the family in the provision of 
care and support to older persons, they all require programmes to provide state 
support to families that are supporting older persons.  Although the African 
Charter reflects a different view of the balance between the state and the family’s 
role in supporting older persons from that expressed in the other instruments 
discussed above, all the instruments share the view that families that are 
providing care and support to older persons are entitled to state support and 
protection. 
  
A positive step toward realising the social security rights of older persons in 
South Africa would thus be to align South African social security legislation and 
other legislation on older persons with international standards.  In some respects 
this has already occurred, for instance, legislation such as the SAA gives effect to 
                                     
189 See Malan and Jansen van Rensburg “Social security as a human right and the exclusion of 
marginalized groups: An international perspective” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of 
social security protection in South Africa 76. 
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the right of access to social security as expressed in the international standards 
discussed above.  The influence of the UN Principles for Older Persons and the 
Madrid Plan is evident in the language adopted in the OPA, particularly with 
regard to the importance of state support for family and community care for older 
persons.190  However, the current fragmented legislative framework for the 
provision of financial and non-cash support to older persons does not conform to 
international standards and, in particular, lacks a solidarity-based retirement 
funding scheme.  The aim is to create an integrated legal framework to protect 
older persons’ rights that meets international standards whilst still taking the 
uniquely South Africa circumstances into account. 
 
7.3 COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
AND PROVISION FOR OLDER PERSONS 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Substantial reform of pension systems worldwide, mainly to meet challenges 
posed by demographic ageing and concerns regarding sustainability and 
affordability of existing systems, has occurred over the last three decades.  The 
aim of the comparative portion of this thesis is to determine whether potential 
solutions to the problems with the current South African social security system 
and legislation highlighted in chapters 4 to 6 above have been found in other 
                                     
190 See e.g. s 10 OPA that echoes para 10 of the UN Principles for Older Persons. 
 
 
 
 
496 
 
jurisdictions.  However, any comparative study of other countries’ systems must 
always be carried out subject to the proviso that all countries face unique 
challenges in providing for older persons and that no country has a perfect 
system.191  The comparative portion of this thesis therefore aims to determine to 
what extent the solutions found in other countries could be suitable and viable in 
the South African context. 
 
As far as statutory reform of the South African retirement funding system is 
concerned, it has to be borne in mind that South Africa’s starting position is 
significantly different from that of most other countries that have recently 
completed pension reforms.  South Africa currently has a “private” occupational 
system and aims to move to a compulsory system with increased state 
involvement.192  Most other countries with significant pension reforms had a 
compulsory state-run system and sought to change to a system with increased 
private market participation.  Thus, “while international experience carries 
important lessons, South Africa’s social security reform challenge is unusual in 
several respects”193 and the reform process and resultant legislation will have to 
reflect the uniqueness of the South African situation.194 
 
                                     
191 Cameron “SA’s new retirement structure takes shape” Personal Finance 20 January 2008 
http://www.persfin.co.za (accessed 05/02/2009). 
192 See above at 3.3.2 for a description of the SA occupational retirement funding system and at 
5.2 for an overview of the current pension reform process. 
193 National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 110. 
194 DSD discussion document (2007) 16 explains the difference between reforms in other 
countries and the SA reforms as follows:  “Whereas most developed and developing countries 
want to shift from single- to multi-pillar retirement systems, South Africa sits at the opposite 
extreme with almost no social security elements apart from social assistance.” 
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The South African reform process may also differ from similar processes in other 
countries due to the constitutional imperative195 to ensure that reforms provide for 
progressive realisation of social security rights and that they do not deny 
individuals access to social security. 
 
Even though socio-economic conditions in South Africa are not very similar to 
those in developed countries, a comparative overview of legislation and policy196 
in countries such as Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America is not completely irrelevant,197 as measures should be taken in the 
reform process at least to ensure that South Africa does not repeat the mistakes 
made in these countries in developing and reforming their retirement benefit 
systems.  Then again, there are parallels between the socio-economic 
circumstances in South Africa and Chile and therefore a comparison between the 
South African and Chilean systems may point to defects in the South African 
system and serve as advance warning of possible pitfalls in the South African 
pension reform process.198 
 
Internationally, increasing attention is being paid to the question of how to 
balance the growing needs of older persons between their families and the state.  
                                     
195 Sections 27(2) and 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1996. 
196 Due to length constraints analysis of the case law in the countries selected for the comparative 
study falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
197 See Fenwick and Kalula “Law and labour market regulation in East Asia and Southern Africa: 
Comparative perspectives” (2005) 2 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 198 - 204 for an analysis of the different views on “transplanting” labour laws 
from one jurisdiction to another. 
198 See above at 1.5 for the rationale behind the selection of these four countries for a 
comparative study. 
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In industrialised countries the concern is for the sustainability of existing public 
care systems, whereas the need to allocate “already limited resources” toward 
new programmes providing state support to older persons is the main concern in 
developing countries.199 
 
Because women fulfil a multitude of caregiving roles, the global rise in 
employment of women has given rise to conflicts between their multiple roles.200  
Attention is being given worldwide to steps to assist women in balancing their 
caregiving and income generating roles.  Increasingly, credits for years spent 
caregiving are being introduced into pension systems to accommodate 
caregivers.201  The statutory provisions for caregiving credits are usually couched 
in gender-neutral terms to accommodate male caregivers and avoid trespassing 
on the right to equality, but it is largely women who benefit from these provisions.  
 
7.3.2 The World Bank “multipillar” model 
 
What has become known as the ‘World Bank model’ is a list of criteria set by the 
World Bank before it is prepared to support pension reform in any given country.  
.The ‘World Bank model’ is not intended as a universal “blueprint” and is only 
                                     
199 Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 
21 (1) Aging International 11. 
200 Myers and Agree (1994) 21 (1) Aging International 15. 
201 See 7.3.3.5, 7.3.4.4, 7.3.5.7 and 7.3.6.4 below for measures to provide care and support to 
older persons and assistance to caregivers in the countries selected for the comparative 
overview. 
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supposed to serve as a point of reference taking into account country-specific 
circumstances.202 
 
The World Bank model originally consisted of three ‘pillars ‘of retirement funding, 
based on the idea that “several distinct pillars diversify risk”:203 
 
• Pillar one consists of a universal public benefit programme funded from 
general government revenue that aims to prevent poverty in old age. 
• The second pillar is made up of a typically privately managed, fully or 
partially funded, mandatory scheme that gives an individual the 
opportunity to save for his or her own retirement. 
• Voluntary savings for retirement on a fully funded basis204 constitute the 
third pillar. 
This three-pillar model does not allow for a traditional earnings-related PAYG 
social insurance scheme.205 
 
In South Africa the older person’s grant206 is a means tested non-contributory 
source of income for men and women over 60207 with low or no income, 
                                     
202 Holzmann et al “Comments on rethinking pension reform” in Holzmann and Stiglitz (eds) 
(2001) New ideas about old age security 61; Holzmann and Hinz (2005) Old-age income support 
in the 21st century 53 and 63; Maier-Rigaud (2005) “Implications of pension ideas for organized 
labour” 11. 
203 Maier-Rigaud (2005) “Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” 10. 
204 See above at 2.7 for the distinction between fully funded and PAYG retirement funds. 
205 Maier-Rigaud (2005) “Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” 10; National 
Treasury (2004) Retirement fund reform: a discussion paper (hereafter “National Treasury (2004) 
Discussion paper) 11.  See World Bank (1994) Averting the old age crisis: policies to protect the 
old and promote growth for a discussion of the original three-pillared retirement funding model. 
206 Currently a maximum payment of R1010 per month. 
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constitutes the first pillar of the system providing income in retirement.  The 
second pillar is made up of voluntary, occupational retirement funds that can be 
either pension or provident funds.208  The third pillar consists of voluntary savings 
vehicles for retirement for self-employed persons who are excluded from 
occupational retirement funds and is also used by members of occupational 
retirement funds who wish to supplement their retirement income.209  The current 
South African pension system thus also consists of three ’pillars’, corresponding 
to a great extent with the World Bank’s ‘three pillar’ approach, except that the 
second pillar is not mandatory as prescribed by the World Bank. 
 
The World Bank’s three-pillared pension model influenced pension reforms in 
many countries, most notably in Chile, where the public pension system was 
privatised in the 1980s to conform to the World Bank model’s second pillar.210  
However, the World Bank’s original three pillared’ approach has evolved into a 
“multi-pillared” system in recognition of the diversity of methods to secure income 
for retirement.211  The original first pillar, made up of social assistance benefits, is 
now renamed the “zero pillar”.  An earnings-related contributory scheme now 
constitutes the new pillar 1.  Pillars 2 and 3 remain basically the same. Informal 
family and community support has been added as the final pillar.212 
                                                                                                             
207 See above at 2.8 for the past differentiation in pensionable age between men and women 
which is set to be phased out by 2010. 
208 South African occupational funds and the relevant legislation is discussed above at 3.3.2. 
209 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 11-12. 
210 See below at 7.3.3.2 for an overview of the Chilean pension system. 
211 Holzmann and Hinz (2005) Old-age income support in the 21st century 1; Maier-Rigaud (2005) 
“Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” 10. 
212 Holzmann and Hinz (2005) Old-age income support in the 21st century 2; Maier-Rigaud (2005) 
“Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” 10. 
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The revised multi-pillared approach has been adopted in some Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to include the 
following measures: 
• Poverty prevention to low-income older persons; 
• A compulsory national contributory system; 
• Occupational pension plans with tax incentives; 
• Voluntary individual retirement savings accounts; 
• Private savings; 
• Health and long-term care programmes; and 
• Informal transfers of resources within families.213 
 
In many OECD countries several items on this list are normally not regarded as 
retirement income pillars, particularly health and long-term care programmes and 
transfers within families.  Despite this, these measures have increased in 
importance as the recognition of the interrelatedness of various methods of 
ensuring financial security during retirement years has grown.214 
 
The World Bank model’s original emphasis on funding and individual accounts215 
must be viewed in the context of the World Bank’s aim of utilising pension 
                                     
213 Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) Retirement-income reforms in the context of OECD 
work on ageing 13. 
214 “There would be merit in giving fuller recognition to the diversity of pillars that exist, in a better 
understanding of their interactions and in assessing the policy implications of changes in both the 
number of pillars and their weight.” (Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) Retirement-income 
reforms 13). 
215 Two of the three original ‘pillars’ were based on individual accounts that were fully funded. 
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systems to stimulate economic growth.216  The significance of the original ’three 
pillar’ model lies in its reliance on the market instead of the state to provide 
retirement income and its shift from an intergenerational solidarity approach to 
individual responsibility to secure retirement income.217  It therefore serves as a 
counterpoint to the view that pension systems should be based on 
intergenerational solidarity,218  specifically as it regards the state’s role in pension 
provision as merely “residual”.219   
 
Before the adoption of the “multi-pillar’ model, the World Bank attached great 
importance to the financial sustainability of a pension system.  According to 
Maier-Rigaud it claimed that “the solidarity of social insurance is flawed because 
it is not sustainable”.220  Basing its argument on ‘intergenerational equity’, it 
claimed that systems based on solidarity will require increased contributions by 
future generations to meet their pension liabilities and that, therefore, pension 
reforms are vital to ensure that future generations will not be burdened 
excessively.221  It is submitted that the inclusion by the World Bank of an 
earnings-related national contributory scheme as ‘pillar 1’ of its new multi-pillar 
                                     
216 As can be seen from the 1994 report titled Averting the old age crisis: policies to protect the 
old and promote growth (my emphasis). 
217 Maier-Rigaud (2005) “Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” 10. 
218 According to Maier-Rigaud “Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” (2005) 2, the 
World Bank’s pension model must be understood in the context of the “powerful neoliberal 
paradigm” behind the pension model, as opposed to the human rights based approach of the ILO.  
See 7.2.4 above for more on the ILO’s approach to retirement funding). 
219 Maier-Rigaud “Implications of pension ideas for organized labour” (2005) 11.  Cf the African 
Charter’s emphasis on the family’s duty to support older persons, with the state’s role merely 
residual (see above at 7.2.5.1). 
220 “Implications of pension ideas for organised labour” (2005) 12. 
221 See above at 6.4.4 for a discussion of the “intergenerational equity” point of view. 
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model is a significant move toward acknowledgement of the importance of 
solidarity by an organisation that has traditionally been mistrustful of it. 
 
Given that the World Bank’s pension models were initially built on a paradigm of 
‘intergenerational equity’ and ‘neo-liberalism’, any attempt by South African law- 
or policymakers to adopt the World Bank model without addressing the problem 
of the fundamental differences in approach between the World Bank and 
international standard-setting organisations may be doomed from the start.  The 
new pension system will have to be introduced and regulated by legislation that, 
in turn, has to be constitutional and comply with international law.  Adopting parts 
of the World Bank model and adapting it to South African circumstances without 
considering the impact on intergenerational solidarity would lead to a system that 
is inherently contradictory.   
 
It is therefore submitted that the approach of both the National Treasury and the 
Department of Social Development in their policy documents is quite heartening: 
the notion of a multiplicity of pillars is taken from the World Bank model, but the 
reform proposals are built on principles that are in line with the guidelines set by 
international standards, such as pooling of risks, mandatory participation, 
administrative efficiency and solidarity.222 
 
                                     
222 National Treasury (2007) Social security and retirement reform: second discussion paper 
(hereafter “2nd discussion paper” 6-7; National Treasury (2007) Budget Review 2007 110.  See 
also DSD discussion document (2007) 92-93.  See above at 7.2 for the guidelines set by 
international standards. 
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7.3.3 Chile 
 
7.3.3.1 Introduction 
  
The Chilean social insurance system is interesting from a comparative 
perspective as Chile’s compulsory private funded schemes are often cited as an 
example of multi-pillar system well worth copying.223  In particular, the major 
changes made to pension provisions by the military dictatorship in the early 
1980s resulted in a reformed pension system that became a point of reference 
for many other pension reforms.224  In the words of Ben Braham:  “While each 
reform should be analyzed with the specifities of each country, the Chilean 
experience provides a good benchmark, at least to avoid its mistakes.”225 
 
In addition, the high level of inequality in Chilean society is comparable to that of 
inequality in South Africa226 and the steps taken by law and policy makers in 
Chile since the change to democracy to address the situation of indigent older 
persons makes the Chilean system valuable from a comparative point of view.227 
                                     
223 Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 4.  
224 Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999) Taking stock of pension reforms around the world 6; 
Diamond (1993) Privatization of social security: lessons from Chile 26 
225 (2007) Structural pension reform: The Chilean experience 19. 
226 South Africa’s gini coefficient has risen from 0,593 in 1998 to 0,666 for 2008 (The Presidency 
(2009) Development Indicators 2009), compared to 0,571 for Chile in 2003 (Earth Trends (2003) 
“Economic Indicators: Chile” 2).  More recent indicators are not available for Chile.  A country’s 
gini coefficient is stated as a number between 0 and 1, with 0 reflecting the lowest and 1 the 
highest levels of inequality.  See Agostini and Brown (2007) Local distributional effects of 
government cash transfers in Chile 11 and 17; Galasso (2006) “With their effort and one 
opportunity” Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile 2. 
227See Palma and Urzúa (2005) Anti-poverty policies and citizenry: The “Chile Solidario” 
experience 8.  
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Before 1981, the public pension system in Chile was defined-benefit PAYG.228  
Salaried employees in private employment had a separate pension scheme from 
wage earners and the self-employed. Benefits were based on wages during the 
final years of working multiplied by the number of years worked.  Separate 
schemes also existed for railroad employees, public employees and the armed 
forces.229  This system was replaced by a defined contributions funded system 
with individual accounts for members during the 1980 pension reforms.   
 
7.3.3.2 Pension privatisation in Chile 
 
Chile introduced compulsory private funded schemes in 1980 as a result of the 
reform process referred to above.230  One of the reasons why reform was 
required in Chile, in other countries in Latin America and other developed 
countries was that publicly funded social security benefits offered high pensions 
in relation to pre-retirement income.  Due to the ageing of population and other 
factors231 the number of people working and therefore contributing was declining 
relative to people retiring.  Consequently, an onerous tax burden on the working 
population was expected if the system was not reformed.  The idea was that 
                                     
228 In PAYG systems current contributions are utilised for the system’s current pension liabilities.  
See 2.7 above for a distinction between PAYG and fully funded systems. 
229 Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International 
Labour Review 391; Rosenfeld and Marre (1997) “Chile’s rich” NACLA Report on the Americas  
http://www.hartfords-hwp.com/archives/42a/100.html (accessed 29/06/2009); Diamond (1993) 
Privatization of social security: lessons from Chile 3. 
230 Decree No. 3,500 of 1980. 
231 E.g. legislation that provided for better benefits for members of the armed forces and public 
functionaries.  See Rosenfeld and Marre (1997) “Chile’s rich” NACLA Report on the Americas  
http://www.hartfords-hwp.com/archives/42a/100.html (accessed 29/06/2009). 
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employees would become less reliant on the public scheme as the private 
scheme developed.232 
 
One of the most important aspects of the privatised system is that each member 
contributes to an individual account managed by one of a number of individual 
pension fund management companies.233  The involvement of private asset 
management funds in many cases entails that the government’s role is restricted 
to regulation and supervision of the funds234 by setting prudent investment 
ceilings, prosecuting fraud and regulating business practices.235  This situation is 
quite similar to the current occupational retirement fund system in South Africa. 
 
Members’ pensions are determined by the amount that they are able to 
accumulate in their individual accounts during their working years.236  The post-
1980 private retirement insurance system in Chile is, therefore, similar to defined 
contribution funds in South Africa237 as the insured person receives his or her 
own contribution plus accrued interest and investment returns, less administrative 
                                     
232 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 18; Rodriguez “Chile’s Hot Pensions” The Cato 
Institute Daily Commentary 30 October 1999 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4951 
(accessed 30/10/2008).  In 2006 the pension system’s coverage of the labour force was 
approximately 61% (Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 
147(4) International Labour Review 388). 
233 Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) are private profit-orientated entities focusing 
exclusively on running and paying benefits for the private retirement insurance system (Mesa-
Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International Labour 
Review 387. 
234 Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 7. 
235 Piñera (2004) “Empowering workers in Chile” http://www.josepinera.com/pag/ 
pag_tex_empowering.htm (accessed 10/07/2009)  
236 ISSA (2007) “Chile: Scheme description” http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-
Profiles/Regions/Americas/Chile# (accessed 30/06/2009).  Retirement age for men is 65 and 
women can receive benefits from age 60. 
237 See above at 2.6 for a description of defined contribution funds and how benefits in terms of 
these funds are calculated. 
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fees.  However, there are some important points of difference from the South 
African system; for example, that employers do not contribute to the private 
system and each member is required to contribute at least 10% of his or her 
wage or salary towards the pension system.238  In South Africa, defined 
contribution benefits are determined by taking into account the member’s and the 
employer’s contributions plus investment returns on the contributions. 
 
In addition, the non-contributory social assistance scheme that existed before the 
reforms continues to pay benefits to pensioners who meet the income 
requirements.239  Recipients of social assistance pensions also automatically 
have access to public health services.240 
 
Self-employed persons may participate voluntarily, with the result that some 
informal workers who previously were excluded now have the opportunity to save 
for their retirement.241 
                                     
238 Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International 
Labour Review 391; Diamond (1993) Privatization of social security: lessons from Chile 4.  The 
lack of employer contributions is contrary to art 71(2) of the ILO Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention 102 of 1952 in terms of which “the total of the insurance contributions 
borne by the employees protected shall not exceed 50 per cent of the total of the financial 
resources allocated to the protection of employees and their wives and children”. 
239 Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International 
Labour Review 387-388. 
240 Agostini and Brown (2007) Local distributional effects of government cash transfers in Chile 9. 
241 However, Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) 
International Labour Review 389, points out that despite the fact that self-employed persons have 
the option to join the scheme, “only a small percentage of the self-employed are affiliated and 
contribute, mainly professionals on relatively high incomes”.  
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7.3.3.3 Evaluation of Chile’s private pension scheme post-1980 
 
Advocates of the pension privatisation implemented in Chile hailed it as one of 
the most significant breakthroughs in the evolution of social security schemes.242  
Some of the perceived positive aspects of the privatised system are: 
• Privatisation and the individual account system have provided many 
Chilean workers with the opportunity to accumulate wealth.243   
• The growth of the Chilean economy and of efficient finance markets and 
institutions has been attributed to pension privatisation.244 
• One of the main reasons for privatisation was the demographical problems 
posed by the pre-reform PAYG system.  Under the reformed system there 
is less scope for intergenerational conflict as the working population is not 
paying for the retired population, but rather saving for their own 
retirement.245 
• Privatisation has been equated with depolitisation of the pension system 
and the fact that the government and other special interest groups are 
seen to have limited influence over the determination of benefits paid, is 
regarded as a major advantage.246 
 
                                     
242 See Ben Braham (2007) Structural pension reform: The Chilean experience 4, 
243 Piñera (2004) “Empowering workers in Chile” http://www.josepinera.com/pag/ 
pag_tex_empowering.htm (accessed 10/07/2009). 
244 Ibid. 
245 See Malherbe “Inter-generational solidarity and caring for the aged” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) 
The extension of social security protection in South Africa – a legal inquiry 189. 
246 Diamond (1993) Privatization of social security: lessons from Chile 3 and 19. 
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Despite the optimism regarding the privatisation of pensions in Chile,247 a number 
of problems have arisen, many of which may serve as a warning to other 
countries not to follow the Chilean example. 
 
Individual account management by specialised fund management companies 
proved to be expensive. The idea initially was that the pension fund management 
companies should be competitive and profit-oriented.  Competition between the 
different pension management companies was therefore held up as an 
advantage over public managed funds.  In reality, the competition between the 
pension management companies proved to be costly as it led to “excessive 
switching of accounts”248 as workers seek out the pension fund management 
company with the lowest administrative costs.249 
 
From the outset, the pension management firms were intended to be profit-
making concerns, leading to a number of unforeseen problems.  In countries that 
have adopted schemes ran by pension management companies, the 
management companies have created hidden marketing and management costs 
for the pension schemes.250  As a result, high costs and the particular pension 
                                     
247 See Schwarz and Demirquc-Kunt (1999) Taking stock of pension reforms around the world 6. 
248 Blommestein, Hicks and Vanston (1997) Retirement-income reforms in the context of OECD 
work on ageing 17. 
249 See Diamond (1993) Privatization of social security: lessons from Chile 5. 
250 The high administrative costs paid by workers include commissions and premiums charged by 
the pension fund management companies.  See Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms 
to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International Labour Review 391; Ben Braham (2007) Structural 
pension reform: The Chilean experience 13.  Contra Rodriguez “Chile’s Hot Pensions” The Cato 
Institute Daily Commentary 30 October 1999 http://www.cato.org (accessed 28/06/2009), in 
whose view administrative costs in Chile are on par with other PAYG public pension systems 
such as the USA. 
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management firm’s investment strategy may lead to significantly lower than 
expected rate of return on an individual’s contributions. The reasons for low 
returns may also include possible fraud, poor quality of investment managers or 
an  inappropriate  portfolio  mix,  all  of  which  could  be  minimised by  adequate 
government regulation.251  Finally, because the pension management companies 
aim to make a profit they set stringent eligibility requirements.  Workers who 
cannot meet these requirements have no access to pensions and end up relying 
on the state for social assistance.252 
 
It is also incorrect to assume that the change from a former PAYG system to a 
fully funded one meant a saving for the state, as the costs of transition253 had to 
be paid entirely by the state.254 
 
A guaranteed minimum pension was also introduced by the reforms in the 
1980s.255  However, many of the members of the private retirement system were 
not able to meet the 20 year contribution requirement to receive the minimum 
                                     
251 Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension reform initiatives 9.  Contra Rodriguez “Chile’s Hot 
Pensions” The Cato Institute Daily Commentary 30 October 1999 http://www.cato.org (accessed 
28/06/2009), who regards the excessive government regulation of e.g. commissions paid to fund 
managers as the single largest problem facing the Chilean pension system.  See also Schwarz 
and Demirguc-Kunt (1999) Taking stock of pension reforms around the world 11. 
252 According to the World Bank (2001) World development Report 2000/2001 154, more than 
40% of the poorest workers in Chile have not been able to participate in the private pension 
system. 
253 Particularly the pensions of members of the old PAYG system. 
254 Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International 
Labour Review 391; Diamond (1993) Privatisation of social security: lessons from Chile 15-17. 
255 Ståhlberg et al (2008) Retirement income security for men and women 16. 
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pension, which left them dependent on the social assistance payment by the 
state.256 
 
In the final analysis, the greatest problem associated with the privatised pension 
system in Chile after the 1980 reforms has been the lack of solidarity in the 
private system.257  Each member’s contribution is intended for his or her own 
retirement only and no provision is made for redistribution to the retired 
population.258  Hence the state has had to finance the minimum pensions as well 
as the non-contributory social assistance for persons not eligible to become 
members of the private system.  
 
The inequalities in funding and lack of solidarity in the private pension system 
described above, as well as increasing costs borne by the state to assist 
excluded and marginalised workers, meant that the private pension system did 
not live up to the promises made when it was established.259  Furthermore, it did 
not meet the requirements of the Chilean constitution regarding the right to social 
security which provides: “The action of the State shall be intended to guarantee 
access of all inhabitants to uniform basic benefits whether granted by public or 
                                     
256 Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” 147(4) International Labour 
Review (2008) 391 estimates that at least half of the persons insured by the private system 
cannot meet the 20 years contribution requirement.  See also James. Edwards and Wong (2003) 
The gender impact of pension reform: a cross-country analysis 22. 
257 Borzutsky “Anti-poverty policies in Chile: a preliminary assessment of the Chile Solidario 
program” (2009) 1 (1) Poverty & Public Policy 1. 
258 Barreto (2009) 4 summarises the problem with the privatised system as follows: “In reality the 
answer to the problem is not only to generate wealth, but to redistribute it with some sense of 
fairness.” 
259 Barreto (2009) “A report on the status of older rights in Latin America” 10 is of the view that the 
1980 reforms “did not resolve the problem but on the contrary created more instability”. 
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private institutions. … The State shall supervise the adequate exercise of the 
right to social security.”260 
 
7.3.3.4 2008 Law on Pension Reform 
 
Despite resistance from the pension fund management companies, the failings of 
the private pension system during the recent decade became too obvious to 
ignore and in 2006 President Bachelet appointed an Advisory Council on pension 
reforms.261   
 
The Advisory Council consulted with a number of organisations, including the 
ILO.  The ILO suggested that a redesigned pension system be built on “a strong 
central image of solidarity based on this component as the foundation and 
cornerstone for all others”.262  The Advisory Council proposed a three-pillar 
pension system composed of a solidarity pillar, a contributory pillar263 and a 
voluntary pillar.  The aim was that the combination of three pillars would enable 
older persons to live with dignity.264 
 
                                     
260 Art 19(18) Chile Constitution, Decree No. 1,150 of 1980. 
261 I.t.o. Supreme Decree No.336 of 17 March 2006. 
262 ISSA “Creation of the Presidential Advisory Council for Pension Fund Reform (2006) 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Americas/Chile# (accessed 
30/06/2009). 
263 The privatised system would live on as the contributory pillar to the reformed system. 
264 ISSA “Proposed reform of the Chilean pension system” (2006) 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Americas/Chile# (accessed 
30/06/2009). 
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The Law on Pension Reform265 was passed in March 2008 and came into force 
in July 2008.  The major point of reform was the new emphasis on solidarity, best 
illustrated by the creation of a basic, non-contributory old age pension,266 
financed by the state, in place of the social assistance pension.  The basic 
solidarity pension is paid to persons with no self-financed pensions.267  In 
addition, the previous minimum pension guarantee has been implicitly replaced 
by a solidarity-based top-up benefit that is intended to “supplement the 
contributory pension of persons aged over 65 whose income is low, regardless of 
their contribution record”.268 
 
The inability of many women to build up sufficient income for retirement in their 
pension accounts as a result of breaks in their career due to child-rearing is 
addressed by the creation of a universal maternity grant credited to a mother’s 
pension account on the child’s date of birth.  It is effectively a special bonus of 
contributions paid by the state on a mother’s behalf for every child born.  The 
                                     
265 Law on Pension Reform 20,255 of 2008. 
266 The pensión básica solidaria (PBS).  See Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to 
improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International Labour Review 392.  The PBS is similar to the South 
African older person’s grant but operates as part of the retirement funding system, rather than a 
separate social assistance scheme, as is the case in South Africa. 
267 It is targeted at the poorest 40% of the population, to be extended to 60% of the poorest 
households by 2012.  Retirement age is equalised at 65 for men and women.  See Ben Braham 
(2007) Structural pension reform: The Chilean experience 18; ISSA (2008) “Proposed reform of 
the Chilean pension system” (2006); “Creation of a basic old-age pension” 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Americas/Chile# (accessed 
30/06/2009). 
268 Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) International 
Labour Review 393. 
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amount of the grant, plus interest thereon, is added to the woman’s pension at 
age 65.269 
 
Self-employed persons are encouraged to join the reformed system and 
coverage of self-employed persons will become mandatory from 2012.270 
 
To reduce administrative costs, the fixed commissions paid to the pension 
management companies have been replaced by a tendering process taking place 
every 18 months whereby new members can join the pension management 
company charging the lowest commission.271 
 
It is submitted that the major improvements brought about by the 2008 Law on 
Pension Reform are the universality of protection to the poor and low-income 
groups by the basic non-contributory pension and the emphasis on solidarity-
based benefits such as the “top-up” benefit that replaced the minimum pension 
guarantee.  Hence, the 2008 Law on Pension Reform has been described as a 
“counter-reform”272 to reintroduce solidarity into social security.273 
 
                                     
269 ISSA “Creation of a basic old-age pension” (2008) 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Americas/Chile# (accessed 
30/06/2009); Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) 
International Labour Review 394. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Existing members of the winning pension management company also benefit as they pay the 
same commission as the new members.  ISSA “Creation of a basic old-age pension” (2008) 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Americas/Chile# (accessed  
30/06/2009); Mesa-Lago “Social protection in Chile: Reforms to improve equity” (2008) 147 (4) 
International Labour Review 395. 
272 I.e. a reversal of the measures introduced in 1980. 
273 Barreto (2009) “A report on the status of older people’s rights in Latin America” 10. 
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7.3.3.5 Provision of care and support to older persons 
 
To address the marginalisation of older persons in Chilean society, Act 19,828 
creating the National Service for Older Persons274 was passed in 2002.  The 
function of the National Service for Older Persons is to propose policies targeted 
at the attainment of effective family and social integration of older persons.  It 
also acts as an advisory body on policies to protect older persons from neglect 
and poverty and to ensure that older persons can exercise their rights in terms of 
the Chilean Constitution.275 
 
The Chilean Constitution276  declares the family as “the basic core of society”.  
However, the Constitution also creates an obligation for the state to   
contribute to the creation of the social conditions which permit each and every 
one of the members of the national community to achieve the greatest possible 
spiritual and material fulfillment with full respect for the rights and guarantees 
established in this Constitution.277 
 
The International Year of Older Persons in 1999 was the stimulus for increased 
attention being paid to ageing in Latin America.278  In the same vein, the UN 
Principles of Older Persons279 and the Madrid Plan of Action on Ageing280 have 
                                     
274 Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor. 
275 UN General Assembly (2006) Follow-up to the Second World Assembly on Ageing, para 18.  
276 Decree No.1,150 of 1980, art 1. 
277 Ibid.  
278 Barreto (2009) “A report on the status of older people’s rights in Latin America” 4.  See above 
at 7.2.3.1 for the significance of the International Year of the Older Persons for the promotion of 
older persons’ rights internationally. 
279 See above at 7.2.3 for a summary of the UN Principles of Older Persons. 
280 See above at 7.2.3 for the provisions of the Madrid Plan. 
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served as a framework for the formulation of laws on older persons in Latin 
America.281   
 
An occupation-based family allowance is paid to employed persons with one or 
more eligible dependents, which could include a disabled or elderly parent.282 
 
In 2002, Chile Solidario, a programme targeted at the very poor in Chile was 
introduced.283  The main aim of the programme was to enable indigent families to 
develop their ability to access benefits, subsidies and services that they were not 
able to access before.284  Participation is needs-based and targeting is done 
through a poverty score to ensure that the poorest families gain access to the 
programme.  Chile Solidario provides assistance through training and provision of 
identity cards in addition to a number of small subsidies, all of which aim to assist 
families to exit poverty.285  A conditional cash transfer programme makes 
provision for payments to families with older family members.286  This subsidy is 
paid in addition to the social assistance pension paid to older persons over 65.287 
 
                                     
281 Barreto (2009) “A report on the status of older people’s rights in Latin America” 6. 
282 Law 150 of 1981 as amended by Law 20, 172 of 2007. 
283 It became law by way of Law 19,949 of 2004. 
284 Borzutsky “Anti-poverty policies in Chile: a preliminary assessment of the Chile Solidario 
program” (2009) 1 (1) Poverty & Public Policy 4; Palma and Urzúa (2005) Anti-poverty policies 
and citizenry: The “Chile Solidario” experience 8 and 18.  Chile Solidario targets indigent families 
and is provided to households rather than individuals (Agostini and Brown (2007) Local 
distributional effects of government cash transfers in Chile 9). 
285 Borzutsky “Anti-poverty policies in Chile: a preliminary assessment of the Chile Solidario 
program” (2009) 1 (1) Poverty & Public Policy 4. 
286 Barreto (2009) “A report on the status of older people’s rights in Latin America” 9. 
287 Borzutsky “Anti-poverty policies in Chile: a preliminary assessment of the Chile Solidario 
program” (2009) 1 (1) Poverty & Public Policy 5. 
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Two characteristics of Chile Solidario stand out as potential models for South 
African care and support systems.  Firstly, participation in Chile Solidario is only 
temporary and no family can be in the intensive programme for more than two 
years.288  The second aspect is that it is a conditional programme and families 
have to agree to meet a list of 53 conditions that will help them to overcome 
poverty.289  The participating families, therefore, agree to use the opportunities 
offered by the programme to overcome poverty and the state agrees to supply 
them with the necessary support services and resources.290 
 
7.3.3.6 Chilean reforms: lessons for South Africa 
 
The well-developed social insurance scheme in Chile has reduced the poverty 
rates among older persons as a group.291  Unfortunately, high levels of inequality 
still persist and this was one of the reasons for the reform of the Chilean pension 
system in 2008. 
 
The Chilean private pension system that operated from 1980 to 2008 is similar to 
South African defined contribution schemes.292  The reasons why the Chilean 
                                     
288 Although families have preferential access to available assistance and cash benefits for three 
years after the initial two-year period.  See Galasso (2006) “With their effort and one opportunity”: 
Alleviating extreme poverty in Chile 3. 
289 Borzutsky “Anti-poverty policies in Chile: a preliminary assessment of the Chile Solidario 
program” (2009) 1 (1) Poverty & Public Policy 6; Palma and Urzúa (2005) Anti-poverty policies 
and citizenry: The “Chile Solidario” experience 6. 
290 Palma and Urzúa (2005) Anti-poverty policies and citizenry: The “Chile Solidario” experience 
21. 
291 Agostini and Brown (2007) Local distributional effects of government cash transfers in Chile 
16. 
292 Apart from the guaranteed minimum pension that was payable in Chile.  See above at 7.3.3.3. 
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government felt compelled to reform the pension system in 2008 can prove 
helpful as comparative pointers on why reform is required in South Africa and 
which pitfalls to avoid in the reform of the South African system.  Consequently, 
the 2008 reforms in Chile may be helpful from a comparative perspective for the 
South African reforms, as a privately managed system was substituted by a 
multi-pillar system with increased state participation in Chile and similar reforms 
are underway in South Africa. 
 
The recent reforms of the Chilean system are particularly significant to South 
African social security reforms for four reasons.  Firstly, both South Africa and 
Chile are young democracies and are counted among the countries with the 
highest levels of inequality in the world.293  The adoption in South Africa of a 
system with a substantial solidarity-based pillar, in addition to social assistance to 
older persons, such as the recently reformed Chilean system, may go a long way 
in ensuring that a larger number of people, as well as a wider range of people, 
benefit from retirement insurance.294  It is submitted that such a reform can be 
regarded as the state taking a reasonable measure to ensure progressive 
realisation of the right of access to social security. 
 
Secondly, the prominence of solidarity-based measures as replacements for 
private measures in the newly reformed Chilean system corresponds with the 
importance of intergenerational solidarity and state participation in pension 
                                     
293.See fn 226 above. 
294 The Department of Social Development strongly supports the inclusion of a redistributional 
pillar in the reformed pension scheme – see above at 5.3.5. 
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schemes in international social security standards and international plans of 
action on ageing.295  The Chilean reforms of 2008 signal a legislative move from 
‘neo-liberal’ notions of using social security to increase national economic growth 
and individual savings rates to providing access to pensions for increased 
numbers of older persons through solidarity-based state measures. 
 
Thirdly, the high administrative costs and extensive government regulation that 
are part and parcel of privately managed funds in Chile and South Africa alike 
serve as warnings against generalisations about the dangers of public retirement 
funds.  Public governance of pension schemes “could be both cheaper to 
administer and safer for retirement funds than private funds”.296 
 
Finally, the Chilean government has not completely done away with the private 
pension system and the pension fund management companies as a pillar of the 
reformed system, thereby allaying the fears of too much political influence over 
the running of pension plans.  All the proposals for reform of the South African 
pension system foresee a continued role for (some of the) current occupational 
funds, not as the primary source of retirement funding but as sources of 
additional funding. 
 
In the context of care and support of older persons, the Chile Solidario 
programme and legislation are in line with the Chilean constitutional principle that 
                                     
295 See above at 7.2.4 and 7.2.3 respectively. 
296 DSD discussion document (2007) 24 and 30. 
 
 
 
 
520 
 
policies should be family centered.  Chile Solidario provides state assistance to 
families with live-in older members.  It requires families to improve their own 
situation, but with assistance from the state, and takes an integrated approach to 
families in extreme poverty by providing cash benefits as well as skills 
development. 
 
A programme like Chile Solidario improves access to existing social assistance to 
participating families.  A similar programme in South Africa, improving access to 
social security will meet the requirements of section 27(1)(c) and (2) of the South 
African Constitution requiring the state to take reasonable measures within 
available resources to progressively provide access to social security. 
 
7.3.4 The United Kingdom 
 
7.3.4.1 Introduction 
 
The statutory provisions made in the United Kingdom (UK) for pensions, as well 
as care and support for older persons are important from a comparative 
perspective as the systems in the UK and South Africa have much in common.  
Many of the South African social security systems have their roots in British 
systems that were implemented under British colonial rule.297  Law and policies 
                                     
297 Dekker (2005) Informal social security: A legal analysis (UNISA LLD thesis) 22.  See also 
Fenwick and Kalula “Law and labour market regulation in East Asia and Southern Africa: 
Comparative perspectives” (2005) 2 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
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on social security and the balance between state and family care and support for 
older persons in both the UK and South Africa originated from, amongst others, 
the Poor Law of 1601298 and the Beveridge Report of 1942.299   
 
The pension system in the UK “is traditionally seen as offering a good example to 
other countries, having features such as low social security pension expenditures 
as well as a high coverage of well-financed voluntary private schemes”.300  For 
these reasons, it may be helpful to examine the UK pension system, particularly 
to  determine  the  adequacies  of  the  system  and  whether  the  recent   
reforms discussed below have improved benefit structures and coverage of 
previously excluded persons.  The UK efforts to ensure the sustainability of the 
pension system whilst still ensuring that redistribution of income to vulnerable 
older persons continues may offer some comparative pointers.  In particular, UK 
laws regarding assistance to family caregivers will be illustrative.   
 
However, the major difference between the two legal systems - that is, the fact 
that the English legal system is based on the idea of parliamentary sovereignty 
whereas the Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa - must be taken into 
account.  A comparative study must always be undertaken subject to the proviso 
                                                                                                             
Industrial Relations 193 – 226 on the different views on “transplanting” laws from colonising 
states to colonies and the contradictions inherent in that. 
298 See below at 7.3.4.4.1. 
299 See Olivier “The concept of social security” in Olivier et al (eds) (2004) Introduction to social 
security 18 for more on the Beveridge approach to social security.  The influence of the Beveridge 
Report on the pre-2007 UK pensions system is most clearly evidenced by the lack of attention to 
the position of women and caregivers, as the system in place before the 2007 reform was “rooted 
in the society of the 1940s” (Department of Works and Pensions (hereafter “DWP) (2006) 
Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary 12). 
300 Davis (2004) Is there a pensions crisis in the UK? 2. 
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that legislation in South Africa must be interpreted in such a manner as to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.301  There are also 
differences in the international and regional standards applicable in the UK and 
South Africa.302 
 
7.3.4.2 The UK pension system and recent reforms 
 
The UK boasts an advanced pension system and legislation and many of its 
characteristics have been adopted by other countries.  Nevertheless, a new 
round of pension reforms culminated in legislation enacted in 2007-2008 in 
reaction to a number of factors that were perceived as threatening the status quo. 
 
Firstly, social and demographic changes such as the ‘ageing’ of society have 
played a major role in the perceived need for pension reform, just as they have 
done in the rest of the world.303  The second reason for the reforms was to 
                                     
301 Low v BP Southern Africa Pension Fund & BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd PFA/WE/9/98 33. 
302 The UK has ratified the ICESCR, although it has limited impact in UK domestic law as human 
rights treaties only gain legal force in the UK when incorporated into UK law.  The extent to which 
socio-economic rights i.t.o. the ICESCR are to be protected by UK legislation is, therefore, 
“determined by Parliament and the Executive” (Joint Committee on Human Rights (2004) Twenty-
first Report http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jrights/183/18305.htm 
(accessed 27/06/2009)).  The UK has also ratified ILO Convention 102 of 1952 (see above at 
7.2.4.1 for the relevant provisions of Convention 102).  Obviously, different regional standards 
apply, e.g. the UK has ratified the European Charter (Ministry of Justice (2007) International 
Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights Fifth Periodic Report from the United Kingdom, the 
Crown Dependencies, the British Overseas Territories http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
publications/docs/ICESCR-whole-report.pdf (accessed 26/06/2008)). 
303 See Turner and Hughes (2008) Large declines in defined benefit plans are not inevitable: The 
experience of Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States 5-8; DWP (2006) 
Security in retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive summary, Foreword v.  
According to DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save, the pressures of ageing society 
mean that without an increase in private saving, future generations may be worse off than the 
current, “and poorer than they expect to be” (at 17). 
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address a general lack of or under-saving for retirement.304  Thirdly, reforms were 
required to simplify the UK pensions system.305  Finally, the major role that the 
state was playing in the provision of retirement income was perceived to be 
unsustainable in the long run and, therefore, reforms were required to strike “a 
new balance … between State, employers and individuals to save and provide 
for the future” and thereby to secure the sustainability of the pensions system.306 
 
The UK pensions system integrates aspects of social assistance and social 
insurance in one system.307  Employees contribute to a national retirement 
insurance scheme (social insurance), which also pays some means-tested 
benefits or “credits” (usually associated with social assistance).308   Whereas 
employees and employers contribute towards the contributory pension scheme, 
the state is responsible for paying the means-tested and contributory benefits309 
 
All employees with weekly earnings ranging from minimum to maximum bands 
specified in legislation are required to contribute to a national old-age, disability 
                                     
304 DWP (2006) Security in retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary 11. 
305 According to the DWP White Paper (2006) Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions 
system Executive Summary 12, “a long-standing feature of the UK pensions system has been its 
complexity, which can confuse both employers and individuals trying to make the best financial 
decisions for the long term.”  The high levels of under-saving can also partly be ascribed to the 
complexity of the pensions system (at 11).  
306DWP (2006) Security in retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive summary, 
Foreword v. 
307 Unlike in South Africa, where the older person’s grant is a social assistance scheme 
separately administered and regulated from the occupational retirement funds. 
308 See the description of the Pension Credit system below. 
309 The state is also responsible for shortfalls in the national contributory pension scheme.  ISSA 
(2008) “Old age, disability and survivors: financing” http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-
Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 26/06/2009) 
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and survivor insurance system.310  Self-employed persons with earnings in a 
specified range may participate voluntarily.311  Pensioners312 with the minimum 
qualifying years of contributions313 will receive a full weekly Basic State Pension 
(BSP), whereas pensions of employees with a shorter contribution period would 
be proportionally reduced.   
 
Employees are rewarded for extending the savings period, as those who choose 
to defer payment of their pension until they turn 70 will receive a larger weekly 
BSP.314  Once pensioners reach the age of 80 they are entitled to an increase in 
pension.315 
 
In addition, a non-contributory means-tested benefit named the “Over 80 
Pension” is paid to persons aged 80 or older with little or no BSP.316  To receive 
this social assistance type benefit, older persons must have resided in the UK for 
at least 10 years after they turned 60.317 
 
                                     
310 Employers also pay a specified percentage of their employees’ earnings as a contribution. 
311 ISSA (2008) “Old age, disability and survivors: coverage: United Kingdom” 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 
26/06/2009). 
312 Currently men aged 65 and women aged 60, but to be gradually equalised from 2010 – 2020, 
and thereafter to be gradually increased for both men and women to 68 by 2046 (Schedule 3 to 
the Pensions Act 2007). 
313 The minimum qualifying years of contributions are set in legislation.  The Pensions Act 2007 
reduced the qualifying years of contributions to 30 years for men and women (from April 2010).  
See below for the reforms introduced by the Pensions Act 2007. 
314 DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 19. 
315 Section 79 of Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (c. 4) 
316 As the benefit is means tested, the amount of BSP received will affect the level of the Over 80 
Pension. 
317 The Pension Service (2009) “Over 80 Pension” http://www.thepensionservice.gov.uk/state-
pension/over-80-pension.asp (accessed 26/06/2008) 
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The national scheme also offers an additional earnings-related pension called the 
State Second Pension (S2P), a PAYG social security scheme, for employees 
with low to moderate earnings who fall within a band of indexed earnings set by 
legislation.318  As the S2P is earnings-related, the employee’s retirement benefit 
will depend on his or her work history.  All employees who qualify according to 
their earnings and their employers must contribute unless they are contracted out 
of S2P through  
• occupational pensions being either defined benefit or defined contribution 
plans319 provided by their employer.320  Employees may choose to make 
additional contributions over and above the minimum contributions 
determined by the rules of their occupational pension funds.321 
• appropriate personal pension plans in the form of defined contribution 
plans offered by financial institutions such as banks, unit trust groups, 
insurance companies and friendly societies322; and 
                                     
318 The S2P was introduced by part II, chapter I of the Child Support, Pensions and Social 
Security Act 2000 (Chapter 19) 
319 In terms of the Pensions Act 2007 the option of defined contribution opting-out arrangements 
will be phased out from April 2012. 
320 Membership of occupational pension plans is voluntary and may not be made a condition of 
employment.  Hence, employees must always be given the option to participate in S2P instead 
(ISSA (2008) “Plan profile: UK” http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-
Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 26/06/2009)).  All occupational pension 
plans must register with the Pensions Regulator (tPR), a supervisory authority created i.t.o. s 1 of 
the Pensions Act 2004 (c. 35) to protect members’ benefits and to ensure compliance with the 
relevant legislation.   
321 Tax relief on contributions made is limited to a specified “Annual Allowance” amount (HM 
Revenue & Customs “Tax relief on pension contributions” 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/relief-pension.htm (accessed 24/06/2009)). 
322 ISSA (2008) “Plan profile – Types of plans”; “Institutional framework” 
http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 
26/06/2009).  Financial institutions that are pension plan providers are regulated i.t.o. the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Chapter 8) which created the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA).  The main disadvantage of personal pension plans is that no matching 
contribution is payable by the employer (DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 
Foreword 5). 
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• stakeholder pensions.323 Employers that do not provide occupational 
pension plans must offer access to stakeholder plans to employees with 
earnings in a specified earnings band.324 
 
Employees who contract out of the S2P, relinquish S2P benefits in return for 
contribution rebates.325  Whatever the form of the alternative pension 
arrangement, it must meet a minimum standard and at least ensure that the 
employee  is  not  worse  off  for  contracting  out  of  the  S2P.326  Ultimately,  all 
employees with earnings above a certain level must be covered by the S2P or 
alternatives such as occupational pension plans or personal pension plans.327 
 
A means-tested pension credit328 was introduced in 2002 and can take the form 
of either a “guarantee credit” or a “savings credit”.329  Low-income pensioners are 
guaranteed  a  minimum  pension  amount,  which  includes  the  BSP,  through a 
                                     
323 Stakeholder pensions are private pension plans that employees can gain access to through 
their employers.  Stakeholder persons were introduced by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 
1999 (c. 30). 
324 Although stakeholder plans are available to everybody who wish to participate.  The idea with 
the creation of stakeholder persons was to provide “access to good value and flexible personal 
pensions” (DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 18). 
325 The rebates are to be used to finance benefits from contracted out occupational pension 
plans.  In the case of personal pension plans the rebate is paid directly into the individual’s 
pension account.  ISSA (2008) “Other sources of funds” http://www.issa.int/ 
aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 26/06/2009). 
326 ISSA (2008) “Plan profile – types of plans” http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-
Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 26/06/2009). 
327 The benefit structure of defined benefit occupational pension plans corresponds with South 
African pension funds in that only a percentage (25% in the case of UK occupational pension 
plans) of the benefit may be taken as a lump sum and the rest paid as a pension.  Personal 
pension plans are similar to South African retirement annuity funds, with maximum 25% of the 
benefit being paid as a lump sum and the rest used to purchase an annuity. HM Revenue & 
Customs “Tax relief on pension contributions” http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/relief-
pension.htm (accessed 24/06/2009).  See above at 3.3.3.1 for the rules regarding the benefit 
structure of South African pension funds and retirement annuity funds.  
328 Hereafter “the Pension Credit”. 
329 Introduced by the State Pension Credit Act 2002 (c. 16). 
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“guarantee credit”.  The “guarantee credit” can be increased where the pensioner 
has greater needs, such as being a carer, but decreases proportionately to other 
retirement income received.  Pensioners over the age of 65 who have made 
some provision for their own retirement330 qualify for a cash reward in the form of 
a “savings credit”.331  An older person is entitled to the Pension Credit even if he 
or she lives with his or her family.  The Pension Credit gives an older person 
access to other benefits such as a housing benefit, Cold Weather Payment, 
Winter Fuel Payment and a community care grant.332 
 
To address the problem of under-saving for retirement, the Pensions Act 2008333 
introduced a system of defined contribution personal accounts which gives 
people who have not been able to save for their retirement “a straight-forward 
opportunity to contribute to a high-quality low-cost savings vehicle”.334  As of 
2012, employers are required to auto-enrol all jobholders335 into either the 
personal accounts system or into other qualifying schemes.336  Allowing 
                                     
330 E.g. BSP, S2P, savings or non-state pension (Directgov (2009) “Income, benefits and Pension 
Credit” http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Pensionsand retirementplanning/PensionCredit/ DG_180168 
(accessed 29/06/2009)). 
331 ISSA (2002) “Pension credit proposed” http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-
Profiles/Regions/Europe/United-Kingdom (accessed 26/06/2009). 
332 See below at 7.3.4.3 for an overview of additional benefits payable to older persons in the UK. 
333 Pensions Act 2008 (c. 30). 
334 DWP (2006) Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary 15.  
According to DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 12, many individuals currently 
are unable to save for their retirement as it is not “economic for providers to sell individual 
personal pensions to consumers on low and moderate incomes”. 
335 Workers in Great Britain between the ages of 16 and 75 and whose earnings fall between 
approximately £5,000 and £33,500 are “jobholders” for the purposes of the Pensions Act 2008, s 
1 read with ss 13 and 14.   
336 Section 3 Pensions Act 2008.  Occupational pension schemes i.t.o. the Pension Schemes Act 
1993 and personal pension schemes are regarded as “qualifying schemes” for the purposes of 
auto-enrolment (s 16(1) read with ss18 and 19).  Only jobholders of 22 years of age and older are 
required to be auto-enrolled (s 3(2)).  Auto-enrolment is required to force employers to participate 
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employers to continue enrolling employees into qualifying schemes other than 
personal accounts is in line with the view that “personal accounts should 
complement, rather than compete with, existing good-quality pension 
provision”.337  Jobholders are entitled to opt out of the personal accounts 
scheme,338 making it their personal responsibility if they choose not to make use 
of this low-cost savings opportunity.339 
 
Jobholders have to contribute 4% of their qualifying earnings, to be matched by a 
3% minimum contribution by employers340 and 1% tax relief. 
 
The personal accounts system is intended to operate as a “large, multi-employer 
occupational scheme”.341  The Pension Commission, just like the Chilean 
government in the 1980s342 and the South African government currently,343 
grappled with the choice between a model based on a single organisation, the 
                                                                                                             
as “[e]mployers’ willingness voluntarily to provide pensions is falling and initiatives to stimulate 
personal pension saving have not worked”. (Turner (2005) A new settlement for the Twenty-first 
century – The Second Report of the Pensions Commission Vol 1 Executive Summary 2).  See 
also DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 34; Bridgen and Meyer (2005) Towards 
a ‘balanced’ approach to pensions reform? Individuals, the state and employers in the 
restructuring of post-retirement income in the UK 13.  Employers who fail to auto-enrol jobholders 
commit an offence (s 45 of Pensions Act 2008).  Likewise, employers contravene the provisions 
of the Pensions Act when they induce workers to give up scheme membership or opt out without 
becoming members of other qualifying schemes (s 54(1)). 
337 DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 38. 
338 Section 8, Pensions Act 2008. 
339 DWP (2006) Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary16.  
The objects of the personal accounts system were summarised in the “Foreword” to the DWP 
White Paper Personal accounts: a new way to save as follows: “Combined with mandatory 
matching employer contributions, tax relief and automatic enrolment, the new personal accounts 
will radically improve access for many on moderate to low incomes who do not currently save in a 
private pension.” 
340 Sections 20 and 26 Pensions Act 2008. 
341 DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 21. 
342 See above at 7.3.3.2 and 7.3.3.4 for the two major pension reforms in Chile.  
343 See above at 5.2 for an overview of the current South African pension reform process. 
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National Pension Savings Scheme (NPSS), and one where consumers can 
choose between a number of providers.344  Based on the experience in other 
countries345 it was proposed that the NPSS be created as the default provider, 
provided that a choice of funds is made available for those employees who want 
it.  One large-scale scheme was deemed to be simpler and more cost-
effective.346  It is submitted that, in light of the experience of high administrative 
costs in the Chilean private pension management system that necessitated 
reforms,347 entrusting the personal account system to one organisation may 
prove to have been a wise choice. 
 
Steps have been taken to protect jobholders against failure of the personal 
accounts system.  The Personal Accounts Delivery Authority (PADA) has been 
created  to  design  and  introduce  the  infrastructure  for  the  personal accounts 
scheme.348  Once the personal accounts system is operational, PADA will be 
                                     
344 DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 22. 
345 E.g. the Thrift Savings Plan in the USA which has demonstrated that limited choice may lead 
to lower costs (see below at 7.3.5.2) and the Swedish PPM system which illustrates that “pension 
schemes on this scale can be implemented successfully” (DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new 
way to save 24).  See below at 7.3.6.2.2 for a description of the Swedish PPM system. 
346 DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 23-24.  It is therefore envisaged that 
“personal accounts will be delivered by a modern type of organisation: managed independently 
and for its members, though within a framework set by the Government; not delivered by the 
State, but by the private sector” (DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 41). 
347 See above at 7.3.3.3 - 7.3.3.4 for an outline of the Chilean privatised pension system and the 
problems inherent to multiple pension fund management firms that created a need for reform of 
that system. 
348 PADA was created i.t.o. s 79 of the Pensions Act 2008.  The principles that PADA have to take 
into account in carrying out its functions are listed in s 80(2) as: 
(a) participation in qualifying schemes should be encouraged and facilitated; 
(b) the burdens imposed on employers as a result of this Part should be minimised;  
(c) any adverse effects on qualifying schemes, and members and future members of those 
schemes … of this Part should be minimised;  
(d) the cost of membership of a scheme … should be minimised;  
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replaced by the Personal Accounts Board which will be responsible for “oversight 
and prudent management of the scheme” and ensuring that the scheme operates 
efficiently and within the set legislative framework.349  Jobholders will in addition 
be able to rely on the protection afforded by the Pensions Regulator.350  
 
Another significant reform of the pensions system is the recognition given to 
carers’351 contributions to society “while retaining the link between rights and 
responsibilities”.352  In terms of the Pensions Act 2007 carers receive weekly 
credits on their State Pension contributions353 to compensate for their shorter 
contribution periods.  The contribution credits replace the Home Responsibilities 
Protection for carers with no or little income as a result of their caregiving 
responsibilities.354 
 
                                                                                                             
(e) the preferences of members and future members should, so far as 
practicable, be taken into account in making any provision about investment 
choice in such a scheme; and  
(f) diversity among members and future members of such a scheme should be 
respected. 
See also DWP (2008) Royal Assent – Workplace pension reform – 15 key facts 
http://dwp.gov.uk/docs/key-facts-royal-assent.pdf (accessed 22/06/2009). 
349 DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 26.   
350 See n 320 above. 
351 The term “carers” used in the UK includes both “caregivers” as used in the other chapters of 
this thesis and persons who care for children. 
352 DWP (2006) Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary 17. 
353 Section 3(1) Pensions Act 2007 adds s 23A to Schedule 3 of the Social Security Contributions 
and Benefits Act 1992, chapter 4.  To qualify as a “carer” for the contribution credit, a person has 
to care for a child, foster child or “be engaged in caring, within the meaning given by regulations” 
(which includes caring for an older person) (s 23A3(c)). 
354 Directgov (2009) “Carer’s allowance” http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxandBenefits/ 
BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOtherSupport/Caringforsomeone/DG_10018705 (accessed 20/06/2009). 
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From April 2010 the minimum qualifying years of contributions to receive a full 
State Pension will be 30 years for men and women.355 
 
7.3.4.3 Additional benefits 
 
Apart from the Over 80 Pension, which is a non-contributory benefit,356 and the 
pension credit assisting low-income persons to gain access to the BSP, there are 
a number of other benefits paid to older persons in the UK. 
 
The attendance allowance is a non-contributory tax-free benefit paid to an older 
person aged 65 or older who resides in the UK and who is so severely physically 
or mentally disabled that he or she needs attention, supervision or other care 
from another person.357  The allowance is paid for as long as the disability 
continues.358  The attendance allowance corresponds to the grant-in-aid payable 
in South Africa to older persons who need regular care,359 but is paid at a much 
higher level than its South African equivalent.360  Recipients of the attendance 
                                     
355 Section 1(3) Pensions Act 2007 amended the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 
1992 by adding s 5A. 
356 See above at 7.3.4.2. 
357 Section 64 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 distinguishes between 
older persons needing assistance for a “day attendance condition” and a “night attendance 
condition”  The level of the allowance is determined by the older person’s care needs. 
358 Section 65 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. 
359 See above at 3.3.1.2. 
360 The amount payable i.t.o. the attendance allowance ranges from £47.10 to £70.35 (Directgov 
“Attendance allowance” http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/DisabledPeople/FinancialSupport/ 
DG_10012425 (accessed 11/11/2009)). 
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allowance may also receive an increased pension credit,361 housing benefit and 
council tax benefit.362 
 
The Winter Fuel Payment is an automatic annual tax-free payment to older 
persons who are receiving a state pension or other benefits.363  In addition, a 
Cold Weather Payment is available to recipients of Pension Credit for every week 
of very cold weather.364  A Christmas bonus is also paid in the first week of 
December to persons receiving the State Pension or Pension Credit.365 
 
In addition, older persons with low incomes or older persons in receipt of a 
Pension Credit may apply to the local authority for assistance with their council 
tax bill.366 
 
Older persons who are already in receipt of a Pension Credit, or are likely to start 
receiving it within a six-week period, and who require assistance to enable them 
to stay at home and not go into a care home, or who are moving out of residential 
care to live independently, may apply for a community care grant.  The level of 
                                     
361 See above at 7.3.4.2 for a description of the Pension Credit. 
362 Directgov (2009) “Attendance allowance” http://www.directgov.uk/en/MoneyTaxandBenefits 
BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOtherSupport/Disabledpeople/DG-10018710 (accessed 29/05/2009). 
363 The amount payable depends on the older person’s circumstances at the time of the payment, 
e.g. the person’s age, whether he or she receives a Pension Credit and whether he or she lives 
alone.  See Directgov (2009) “Winter Fuel Payment” http://www.direct.gov.ul/en/Pensions and 
retirementplanning/BenefitsInRetirement/DG_10018657 (accessed 21/06/2009). 
364 Directgov (2009) “Cold Weather Payment” http://www.directgov.uk/ 
en/Pensionsandretirementplanning/Benefits/ConcessionsAndOtherHelp/DG_10018668 
(accessed 21/06/2009). 
365 The Pension Service (2009) “Christmas Bonus” http://www.thepensionservice.gov.uk  
(accessed 21/06/2009). 
366 The Pension Service (2009) “Council Tax Benefit” http://www.thepensionservice.gov.uk 
(accessed 21/06/2009). 
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the community care grant will depend on the amount of the older person’s 
savings.  The community care grant may not be utilised for domestic help or 
respite care, medical items or services, or daily living expenses.367  
  
7.3.4.4 Care and support for older persons 
 
7.3.4.4.1 Introduction 
 
In the UK there is no general familial responsibility to support older persons.368  In 
terms of the Poor Law of 1601 a responsibility to support kin, including older 
persons existed.  Indigent older persons did not have a direct claim on their 
families but had to rely on local authorities for support.  The local authority could 
then claim a contribution from the family for the support given to the older 
person.369  The Health and Social Care Act 2008370 abolished the maintenance 
liability of relatives and, therefore, relatives cease to be liable to the relevant local 
authority for the cost of assistance to older persons. 
 
                                     
367 Directgov (2009) “Community care grants” http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxandBenefits/ 
BenefitsTaxCredits andOtherSupport/Caring for someone/DG_10018921 (accessed 21/06/2009). 
368 Twigg and Grand “Contrasting legal conceptions of family obligation and financial reciprocity in 
the support of older people: France and England” (1998) 18 Aging and Society 131. 
369 Twigg and Grand (1998) 18 Aging and Society 138.  For the text of the 1601 Act for the Relief 
of the Poor, see Higginbotham (2008) “The Workhouse - The 1601 Act for the Relief of the Poor” 
http://www.workhouses.org/poorlaws.shtml (accessed 12/04/2009). 
370 Section 147, Health and Social Care Act 2008 (c.14). 
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A number of services related to the care and support of older persons are 
provided, some of them government-funded, but most require some payment by 
the older person concerned. 
 
7.3.4.4.2 Care homes 
 
Like South Africa,371 the UK has comprehensive legislation in place regarding 
placement in and standards of services in care homes.372 
 
Local authorities may, and in some cases are obliged to, arrange residential 
accommodation for older persons who “are in need of care and attention which is 
not otherwise available to them”.373  An older person’s stay in a care home can 
be long-term or permanent, or sometimes only short-term; for instance, care 
during a short illness or when the older person is released from hospital but has 
not recovered sufficiently to go home.374  Care homes with nursing care are 
available for older persons who need nursing care on a regular basis.  Older 
persons gain access to care homes through their local authorities, regardless of 
                                     
371 See above at 3.3.4.5 for a discussion of the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006. 
372 Care homes are facilities that provide accommodation, nursing or personal care to, amongst 
others, ill persons, persons with mental disorders and persons who are disabled for infirm (s 3 
Care Standards Act 2000).  Thus, care homes are the UK equivalent of residential facilities in 
South Africa. 
373 Section 21(1) National Assistance Act 1948 (c. 29) as amended. 
374 Directgov   (2009)   “Support   services” www.direct,gov.uk/en/CaringForSomeone/ 
CaringAndSupportServices/DG_4000178 (accessed 21/06/2009). 
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whether the care home is actually run by the local authority or by voluntary 
organisations or private companies.375 
 
As far as standards for care in care homes is concerned, the Health and Social 
Care Act 2008 established the Care Quality Commission (the Commission)376 as 
an independent body to “protect and promote the health, safety and welfare of 
people who use health and social care services”.377  All social care service 
providers must register with the Commission.378  The Commission may carry out 
inspections of care homes379 and take steps to have the care home’s registration 
suspended or cancelled if it does not meet the standards set by the Commission. 
 
Older persons who choose to live independently but need help during 
emergencies may contact their local authority to determine whether there are any 
sheltered housing options available and whether they meet the eligibility criteria 
set by the local authority.  With sheltered housing the older person lives on his or 
her own, but a scheme manager or warden can be contacted through an alarm 
system in case of an emergency.  Care and support is not generally provided, 
                                     
375 Ibid. 
376 Section 1 Health and Social Care Act 2008..   
377 Section 3(1) read with schedule 7, s 1, Health and Social Care Act.  Its main functions are to 
register social care providers and to review and investigate their actions (s 2).  While performing 
its functions it must have regard to the need to protect and promote the rights of the recipients 
social care services (s 4(d)). 
378 Section 10.  “Social care” for older persons i.t.o. the Act is “all forms of personal care and other 
practical assistance for individuals who by reason of age … are in need of such care or other 
assistance” (s 9(3)). 
379 Sections 60-65. 
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except in extra care housing for people who still want to live or their own, but are 
in need of care and support as they may not be able to manage on their own.380 
 
Some older persons may find it difficult to pay the cost of care homes.  When an 
older person applies for placement in a care home, a health and social care 
assessment as well as a financial assessment of the older person must be done 
by the relevant local authority.381  Local authorities may charge for 
accommodation provided to older persons, but may reduce the amount payable 
by the older person if they are satisfied that the older person cannot pay the 
standard rate.382  Older persons who have the means to do so may opt for more 
expensive accommodation but will then be required to make additional 
payments.383  When an older person has been allocated a place in a care home 
and opts to go to a more expensive home, a third party, for instance a family 
member, will have to pay the “top-up” fee.384  The older person cannot be held 
liable for fees in excess of what the financial assessment determined would be 
affordable to the older person.385  The extent to which relatives of the older 
person can be held liable for the costs is also limited, since the Health and Social 
                                     
380 Directgov (2009) “Guide to supported housing schemes for over 50s” 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Pensionsandretirementplanning/HomeAndCommunity/SupportedHou
singAndCareHomes/DG_10028146 (accessed 21/06/2009). 
381 The financial assessment is based on capital and income and, therefore, all benefits such as 
the State Pension, Pension Credit and allowances are taken into account as the benefits will form 
part of the fees paid by the older person.  DirectGov (2009) “Paying your care home fees” 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/HealthAndWellBeing/HealthServices/CareHomes/DG_10031525  
(accessed 21/06/2009)). 
382 Section 22 National Assistance Act 1948 as amended by s 44 National Health Service and 
Community Care Act 1990 (c.19).  
383 Section 54 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001 (c.15). 
384 Help the Aged (2008) Care homes and long-term care needs: Policy statement 3. 
385 DirectGov (2009) “Paying your care home fees” http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/ 
HealthAndWellBeing/HealthServices/CareHomes/DG_10031525  (accessed 21/06/2009). 
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Care Act 2008 has abolished the liability of relatives for costs of assistance.  The 
local authority will be liable for the payment to the care home, and its only 
recourse may be to reassess the older person for the purpose of placement in 
more affordable care. 
 
When an older person resides in a care home offering nursing services, the 
National Health Service normally contributes towards the fees for the nursing 
element.386 
 
It is clear from the above that local authorities in the UK play a significant role in 
placing older persons in and assisting with the funding of stays in care homes.  
The direct role that the state plays in placement in and funding of care homes 
allows it to determine and enforce priorities for placement in residential care.  
Although, as is stated below387 it may presently not be feasible to adopt a similar 
system administered by local authorities in South Africa, the UK system offers 
valuable guidance on potential methods to ensure that the most vulnerable older 
persons receive the care they need. 
 
7.3.4.4.3 Support services for older persons living at home 
 
A variety of support services are available to older persons who still live at home 
but need support and care, and/or their carers. 
                                     
386 Ibid  
387 At 7.3.4.5. 
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When an older person approaches a local authority for community care services, 
the local authority is obliged to assess the older person’s health and social care 
needs.  The local authority will determine on the basis of the care assessment 
whether or not, and which, care services are required and then arrange for the 
relevant services to be provided.388  The local authority’s resources are a factor in 
determining which services are to be provided, but once a service is provided to 
an older person and the local authority’s resources decrease thereafter, it may 
not withdraw the services being delivered to the older person.389   
 
In some instances, older persons who have been assessed as needing 
community care services may be entitled to direct payments from a local 
authority.  Direct payments enable older persons to buy in care services rather 
than making use of services provided or arranged by the local authority.390  The 
older person may choose which services he or she needs provided the local 
authority is satisfied that the agreed support arrangements are being complied 
with.391  Other benefits are not affected by direct payments.392   
 
                                     
388 Section 47(1) National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 (c.19). 
389 R v Sefton MBC ex parte Help the Aged & Others CA [1997] 4 All ER 532. 
390 Section 57 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001 (c.15) and extended by s 146 of the Health 
and Social Care 2008 (c.14). 
391 The older person may not use the direct payment to pay his or her spouse or family member 
for care or to pay for nursing care by a registered nurse.  I.t.o. s 49 of the Health and Social Care 
Act 2001, nursing care at home by a registered nurse does not qualify as a community care 
service. 
392 Directgov (2009) “Direct payments – arranging your own care and services” 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/DisabledPeople/FinancialSupport/Introductiontofinancialsupport/DG_
10016128  (accessed 21/06/2009).   
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A “domiciliary care agency” is an undertaking that arranges or provides personal 
care in the own homes of older persons who are unable to care for themselves 
without assistance.393  Domiciliary care agencies are responsible for much of the 
care provided to older persons at home.  Other support services offered include 
respite care394 and day care centres395 to alleviate the burden on family carers. 
 
It is submitted that the array of services for older persons living at home provided 
for in the legislation discussed above supports the ideal that older persons should 
live at home for as long as possible. 
 
7.3.4.4.4 Legal protection of and provision for carers 
 
The recent reforms of the pensions system providing carers with State Pension 
credits396 reflect the recognition in the UK of the value of carers to society and of 
the need to improve their circumstances.397 
 
                                     
393 Section 4(3) Care Standards Act 2000. 
394 Respite care is the provision of temporary care and relief in order that the family caregiver can 
take care of his or her other responsibilities. 
395 Day care centres are defined by s 55(5) of the Care Standards Act 2000 as a place where 
nursing or personal care is provided but not accommodation. 
396 See above at 7.3.4.2. 
397 DWP (2006) Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary 7.  
For more general information on the initiatives to improve carers’ circumstances see Department 
of Health (1999) Caring for carers: a national strategy for carers 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/D
H_4006522 (accessed 22/04/2009); Department of Health (2008) Carers at the heart of 21st 
century families and communities: a caring system on your side, a life of your own 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/D
H-085345 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/D
H_085345 (accessed 22/04/2009). 
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A carer who provides or intends to provide a “substantial amount of care on a 
regular basis” to an older person may request the local authority carrying out the 
assessment of the older person’s community care needs to assess the carer’s 
needs as well before they make a decision on the services to provide to the older 
person.398  In fact, the local authority has the duty to inform the carer that he or 
she has the right to have his or her needs assessed before a decision on 
appropriate services is made.399  For instance, the availability of services such as 
respite care would play a role in the local authority’s decision on which services 
are appropriate. 
 
A carer’s allowance is payable to a carer over the age of 16 who is “regularly and 
substantially engaged in caring”400 for a severely disabled relative who qualifies 
for an attendance allowance.401  The allowance is reduced by the amount of 
other benefits and may affect other benefits.402 
 
The abovementioned statutory provisions indicate that family carers in the UK 
can rely on the state for recognition for, as well as assistance in, their caregiving 
tasks. 
                                     
398 Section 1(1) Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995 (c.12). 
399 Section 1 Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995 (c.12), as amended by the Carers 
(Equal Opportunities) Act 2004 (c.15). 
400 Section 70(1)(a) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.  The Act referred 
to an “invalid care allowance”, but it was renamed the “carer’s allowance” by the Regulatory 
Reform (Carer’s Allowance) Order 2002.  A carer who is a full-time student or who earns GBP 95 
a week or more after deductions is disqualified from receiving the allowance (Directgov (2009) 
“Carer’s allowance” http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxandBenefits/BenefitsTax 
CreditsAndOtherSupport/Caringforsomeone/DG_10018705 (accessed 20/06/2009). 
401 Section 70 (1)(c) and (2).  See above at 7.3.4.3 for a description of the attendance allowance. 
402 Such as the Home Responsibilities Protection that is being replaced by State Pension credits 
from April 2010.  See above at 7.3.4.2. 
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7.3.4.5 Lessons for South Africa 
 
The overall impression given by the UK’s pension system is that of a solidarity-
based system.  The prominence of personal responsibility in the recent personal 
accounts scheme legislation in the UK should not be regarded as the re-
emergence of ‘neo-liberal’ policies with an emphasis on the individual’s own 
choices and responsibilities.  The option to opt out of the personal accounts 
system may mean that some individuals may be worse off in retirement for 
choosing not to make use of the personal accounts savings option.  However, the 
choice to opt out of the scheme is not its basis; auto-enrolment, an inclusive and 
solidarity-based measure, is the basis.  The individual’s personal responsibility to 
save for retirement is supported by increased contributions by employers and 
increased spending by the state, in search of “a fair balance between the 
responsibilities of the state, employer and individual”.403  All employees are 
afforded access to this retirement savings vehicle which, it is submitted, would be 
sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of providing “access to” social 
security if a similar scheme is adopted in South Africa.404   
 
It is submitted that the inclusion of the option of auto-enrolment into a personal 
accounts scheme with the choice to opt out is worthwhile exploring in South 
                                     
403 As advocated by Bridgen and Meyer (2005) Towards a ‘balanced’ approach to pensions 
reform? Individuals, the state and employers in the restructuring of post-retirement income in the 
UK 14-15.DWP (2006) Personal accounts: a new way to save 34. 
404 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1996. 
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Africa.  The pitfalls of the current voluntary occupational fund system have been 
described above.405  A statutory obligation on employers to auto-enrol employees 
in a personal accounts scheme406 would simultaneously address employees’ 
disinclination to save for retirement, as well as employers’ reluctance to 
participate in retirement funding schemes.407  In the South African context, 
provision should also be made for compulsory consumer education programmes 
explaining the consequences of “opting out” of the national personal accounts 
scheme408 as well as the option to join the scheme at a later stage. 
 
The variety of non-contributory benefits and allowances payable to older persons 
in the UK shows a commitment to promoting the dignity of older persons and 
improving their standard of living.  Due to fiscal constraints the South African 
state may not be able to afford payment of a similar range of benefits.  However, 
alternative measures could be undertaken to demonstrate a similar dedication to 
improving the conditions of older persons.  For example, measures to provide 
older persons with access to cheaper or free electricity may bring relief 
comparable to the Winter Fuel Payment in the UK. 
 
                                     
405 At 5.5. 
406 Unless the employer can provide access to an occupational plan. 
407 Compelling employers to participate in social security programmes is nothing new in South 
African legislation.  Employers are not afforded a choice on whether they wish to participate in the 
statutory social insurance schemes created by the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act 130 of 1993 and the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001.  
408 The effect of high levels of debt or low earnings on employees’ retirement savings decisions 
were outlined above at 5.4.   
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The UK has an interesting model with a range of care and support services for 
older persons provided or arranged by local authorities, ranging from care homes 
to community care and support for older persons living in their own homes.  It is 
submitted that, although a need for similar state-supported services exists in 
South Africa,409 provisions that require action by local authorities will prove 
problematic as many local authorities do not have the infrastructure or 
competence to deliver such services.  Under these circumstances delivery of 
state-supported care and support services may be better suited to local offices of 
the Department of Social Development.410 
 
South Africa currently lacks the coherence of the UK legislation on older persons.  
The UK pension and benefit system and care and support services are 
interrelated, ensuring that older persons receive the appropriate benefits in cash 
as well as non-cash support.411  It is submitted that the future adoption of 
legislation linking the reformed retirement income system in South Africa to the 
provision of care and support services to older persons is required to ensure that 
these services are allocated in an equitable manner and in line with the state’s 
priorities for the provision of services.  This implies that the feasibility of the 
                                     
409 The community-based services in South Africa are run and funded by non-governmental and 
religious organisations.  These services are regulated but not coordinated by the state and 
receive limited financial awards from the state.  See above at 3.3.4 for an overview of community 
based care and support to older persons in South Africa and the relevant legislation. 
410 Under the supervision of the provincial department.  The DSD is already tasked with the 
provision of social services to older persons, although at a far more limited scale than in the UK. 
411 For example, an older person’s State Pension, Pension Credit and other benefits are taken 
into account in the assessment of the older person’s financial situation and ability to pay for 
services.  See above at 7.3.4.4.2.  Although many South African non-governmental organisations 
providing care and support services link their services to the older person’s grant, they are not 
obliged by legislation to do so. 
 
 
 
 
544 
 
inclusion of care and support services for older persons as a “pillar” of the 
reformed pension system should be examined. 
 
Finally, UK pensions legislation now incorporating the personal accounts system 
and contribution credits for women and carers clearly reflects the fact that fears 
for the financial sustainability of the pension system have not reduced the 
importance of intergenerational solidarity in that system.  Instead, a balance 
between intergenerational solidarity and fairness toward the contributing 
generation has been found, as is evident from the following quote from the 
Department of Works; White Paper Security in Retirement: Towards a new 
pensions system: 412 
We are also setting a fair and lasting balance between the generations. Current 
workers must both pay for provision for today’s pensioners (through National 
Insurance) and save more for their own future. We have had to strike a balance 
between what it is right and reasonable for them to provide in order to improve 
the situation for those retiring in the next decades, the rate at which we can afford 
to uprate the basic State Pension, and the expectation on today’s and tomorrow’s 
workers to save more for themselves. 
 
 
7.3.5 United States of America 
 
7.3.5.1 Introduction 
 
A comparison between the social security systems and care and support 
structures for older persons in the United States of America (USA) and South 
Africa may be worthwhile from a comparative perspective for a number of 
                                     
412 DWP (2006) Security in Retirement: Towards a new pensions system Executive Summary 23. 
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reasons.  Firstly, the future of the national old-age insurance and health care 
systems in the USA has been the focus of constant debate over the last two 
decades and in some instances even featured in presidential election 
campaigns.413  Although the debates on social security reform are mainly based 
on technical points, such as increases in payroll taxes, their value for this thesis 
lies in the underlying views and concepts, particularly the balance between 
intergenerational solidarity and ‘intergenerational equity’.414  
 
Secondly, the Medicaid programmes offering older persons means-tested 
protection against long-term care costs are worth examining as examples of a 
large-scale solidarity-based care and support measure. 
 
Finally, the filial responsibility laws in a number of the states in the USA are 
interesting from a comparative perspective, particularly to determine the extent to 
which such laws are enforceable and the relationship between the filial 
responsibility laws and the Medicaid programmes.  
 
The US constitution serves as its supreme law, similar to South Africa, although 
the US Constitution does not expressly include socio-economic rights.  Indirect 
                                     
413 Kollmann and Nuschler (2002) “Social Security Reform” http://www.policyalmanac.org/ 
social_welfare/archive/crs_social_security_reform.shtml (accessed 02/05/2009). 
414 For the distinction between intergenerational solidarity and ‘intergenerational equity’ see 2.3  
and 6.4.4 above. 
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protection of socio-economic rights has developed through the interpretation of 
the law, particularly equality jurisprudence.415 
 
7.3.5.2 ‘Social Security’ 
 
The Social Security Act416 was signed into law by President Roosevelt in 1935 in 
reaction to the economic hardship caused by the Great Depression.417  It created 
a federal contributory old age, survivors’ and disability insurance system (OASDI) 
for employees in the USA.  The belief that “U.S. citizens would readily approve of 
giving benefits to those who had earned them through contributions into the 
system” led to a preference of payroll taxes over funding based on general 
revenues.418  Hence, ‘Social Security’ in this form reflects intergenerational 
solidarity among participants.. 
 
The basic purposes of the programmes created by the Social Security Act, as 
amended, and related legislation include the provision for “the material needs of 
individuals and families” and the protection of older persons and persons with 
                                     
415Malan and Jansen van Rensburg “Social security as a human right and the exclusion of 
marginalised groups: An international perspective” in Olivier et al (eds) (2001) The extension of 
social security protection in South Africa 112-113.  See also Aka “Analyzing U.S. commitments to 
socio-economic human rights” (2006) 39 (2) Akron Law Review 417-463. 
416 Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620; 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1399 (2008).  The Act has been 
amended a number of times – see below at 7.3.5.5. 
417 Kaufmann “An introduction to Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and Supplemental 
Security Income” in National Center on Poverty Law Poverty law manual for the new lawyer 
(2002) 92. 
418 Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) International 
Journal of Health Services 632.  The idea behind the intial legislation creating Social Security was 
not so much to provide for the poor but rather to provide “wage stabilisation to the working and 
middle class” (at 642).  Provision for the poor came later with the creation of the Supplemental 
Security Income system – see below at 7.3.5.6. 
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disabilities against “the expenses of illnesses that may otherwise use up their 
savings”.419   
 
Most employees or self-employed individuals420 working in the USA or for a US 
employer in another country are covered by the OASDI programme.421  An 
individual’s eligibility is determined by his or her contributions to OASDI422 and 
not by his or her income or resources.  “Fully insured” individuals423 may be 
eligible for old age insurance benefits from age 62.424  However, full retirement 
benefits are only payable from age 67.425  The old age retirement benefit is based 
on the primary insurance amount426 and takes into account retirement age, other 
                                     
419 Social Security Administration (hereafter “SSA”) (2009) Social Security Handbook §100.1.  
See below at 7.3.5.4 for a description of the Medicare system providing health insurance to older 
persons.  
420 Since 1954, self-employed individuals have paid a social security and hospital insurance tax 
on income derived from any “trade or business” carried on by the individual and are covered by 
Social Security (42 U,S.C. 411 read with the Self-Employment Contributions Act of 1954, 26 
U.S.C. 1401). 
421 Except for state or local government employees who participate in their employers’ pension 
plan and who are not covered by a voluntary federal/state social security agreement for coverage 
of state or local government employees in the federal programme; as well as certain agricultural 
and domestic workers (42 U.S.C. 410(a)(C)(7) read with 418). 
422 Amounts equivalent to the contributions paid to OASDI are paid into the Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund (Social Security 
Administration (2006) Social Security Handbook § 141). 
423 A person’s insured status is determined by the number of credits (the term used in the Social 
Security Act is “quarter of coverage” (42 U.S.C.  413) built up doing his or her working career.  
The minimum number of credits required to be “fully insured” are 6 (the maximum is 40).  Being 
“fully insured” is not the same as full retirement, and “fully insured” individuals may receive less 
benefits than persons who wait until age 67 to draw benefits.  See SSA (2006) Social Security 
Handbook §203.4; SSA “Quarter of coverage” http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/QC.html (last 
modified 16/10/2008); Kaufmann (2002) “An introduction to Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance and Supplemental Security Income” in National Center on Poverty Law Poverty law 
manual for the new lawyer 95. 
424 42 U.S.C. 402. 
425 The full retirement age is being gradually increased from 65 to 67 (42 U.S.C. 416).  For a chart 
depicting the increase in retirement age, see Social Security Administration “Age to receive full 
Social Security benefits” http://www.ssa.gov/mystatement/retchart.htm (last modified 01/04/2009). 
426 42 U.S.C. 415. 
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sources of income and dependents eligible for benefits.427  Provision is also 
made for cost-of-living adjustments in benefits.428  
 
7.3.5.3 Additional saving for retirement 
 
Employees and self-employed persons have access to retirement plans 
operating similarly to South African occupational funds in addition to their 
participation in OASDI.429  All retirement plans are either defined contribution430 
or defined benefit plans431 and correspond closely to South African defined 
contribution and defined benefit funds.   
 
 
A 401(k) plan432 is an “individual account” plan into which the employer pays 
money in lieu of the cash that would have been paid to the employee.  The 
                                     
427 The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 402 makes provision for payments to the eligible, 
dependent members of the insured person’s family.  These payments do not affect the insured 
person’s benefits, but there is a maximum benefit payable per family (SSA (2006) Social Security 
Handbook §730.1; Kaufmann “An introduction to Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and 
Supplemental Security Income” in National Center on Poverty Law (2002) Poverty law manual for 
the new lawyer 96.  
428 42 U.S.C. 415(i). 
429 An exhaustive analysis of the types of retirement plans available in the USA, as well as the 
relevant legislation and the substantial body of case law on retirement plans falls outside the 
scope of this work.  The following paragraphs only serve as an introductory overview of the 
aspects of US retirement plans most relevant to this thesis and to provide the context for later 
paragraphs on US pension reform attempts and the notion of ‘intergenerational equity’ – see 
below at 7.3.5.5. 
430 26 U.S.C. (the Internal Revenue Code) 414(i). 
431 I.t.o. 26 U.S.C. 414(j) all retirement plans that are not defined contribution plans are regarded 
as defined benefit plans for tax purposes. 
432 Created i.t.o. Internal Revenue Code s 401(k), hence “401(k)” plans.  It operates similarly to 
deferred compensation schemes in South Africa – se 3.3.3.2 above. 
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employee is responsible for deciding in which of a “menu of investment options” 
the balance in his or her account is to be invested.433 
  
Cash balance plans are defined benefit plans designed to look like defined 
contribution funds.  The benefits payable in terms of cash balance plans are 
based on notional account balances in hypothetical accounts.434  Cash balance 
plans are usually more to the advantage of younger employees changing jobs 
frequently.435 
 
Employers are not obliged to create retirement plans for their employees, but 
once they provide retirement funding options to their employees, they must meet 
the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA).436  ERISA is federal legislation that aims to “protect the interests of 
                                     
433 Congressional Research Service (2008) Summary of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) 6.   The federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) is a defined contribution 
retirement plan for federal workers.  Although the TSP is a “unique arrangement that cannot fairly 
be compared with or duplicated by” private sector 401(k) plans, one of the reasons for the 
relatively lower administrative costs of the TSP is that it offers a limited number of investment 
options as compared to 401(k) plans (Investment Company Institute (2008) “The federal Thrift 
Savings Plan: A model for the private sector” 3 (available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_tsp.pdf)). 
434 Moukawsher & Walsh, LLC (2000) Cash balance plans: Terminology, advantages and 
disadvantages to employers and employees 3.  Cash balance plans are similar to the Swedish 
notional defined benefit income pension (see below at 7.3.6.2.1), as no real accounts exist and 
contributions are used to pay benefits to current retirees.  “Cash balance” refers to the entitlement 
to benefits that the member builds by contributing to the plan. 
435 According to Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 167, “cash balance plans may 
erode the value of defined-benefit promises for many older workers”. For the disadvantages of 
cash balance plans for older and longer serving employees, see also AARP Press Center (2005) 
“Hybrid (cash balance) pension plans” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Retirement 
Security and Aging http://www.aarp.org/aarp/presscenter/testimony/articles/cash_balance.html 
(accessed 22/05/2009).  
436 The provisions of ERISA are split between the Labor Code 29 U.S.C. 1001-1453 and the 
Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. 401-415. 
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participants and beneficiaries in private-sector employee benefit plans”.437  Only 
employer-sponsored plans are covered by ERISA and, therefore, private 
retirement vehicles such as individual retirement accounts (IRAs)438 are excluded 
from its scope of application. 
 
The following measures in ERISA designed to protect employees’ interests stand 
out: 
• ERISA prohibits plan amendments that eliminate or reduce existing rights 
of participants in a retirement plan;439 and  
• Title II of ERISA440 contains, inter alia, rules to prevent plans from 
favouring higher-earning employees over lower-earning employees.441 
ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) within the 
Department of Labor to protect defined benefit plan participants against risks 
such as fund failures.442  The PBGC ensures that private sector funded defined 
                                     
437 Congressional Research Service (2008) Summary of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) 1.  See 29 U.S.C. 1001 for the Congressional findings and policy 
declaration with regard to ERISA.  ERISA supersedes “any and all state laws insofar as they may 
… relate to any employee benefit plan” (s 514 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1144). 
438 An individual retirement savings vehicle with tax benefits.  See Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts 
and controversies 168. 
439 29 U.S.C. 1054(g), also known as the “anti-cutback rule”.  See Congressional Research 
Service (2008) Summary of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 13.  In South 
Africa a similar “cutback” may potentially constitute a violation of the employee’s right of access to 
social security, as well as of the employee’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his or her 
property – see above at 3.2.4 for a discussion of pension benefits and the Bill of Rights.  
440 Title II of ERISA is codified in the pension related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
441 Retirement plans have to meet the “non-discrimination” test found in 26 U.S.C. 410(b).  See 
3.3.2.3.2 for the position regarding discriminatory occupational fund rules in South African law. 
442 The PBGC was created i.t.o. 29 U.S.C. 1302(a) – 
“to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit 
of their participants; 
to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and 
beneficiaries under plans to which [subchapter III] applies, and 
to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 1306 of this title at the lowest 
level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this subchapter.” 
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benefit plans can meet their liabilities.  The pension plans are required to pay an 
insurance premium per participant insuring against the risk of a plan defaulting on 
pension payments.443   
 
7.3.5.4 Medicare  
 
The Social Security Act was amended in 1965 to add title XVIII on Medicare and 
title XIX on Medicaid.  Medicare and Medicaid are two different programmes.  
Medicare is a federal health insurance programme for persons aged 65 years or 
older,444 whereas Medicaid is state-run and provides for means-tested hospital 
and medical coverage of low-income older persons.445 
 
Medicare is divided into four parts.  The first, part A, is hospital insurance 
available to Social Security recipients aged 65 and over446 at no monthly 
premium.447   Medicare medical insurance for older persons (Part B) is a  
                                                                                                             
The PBGC is primarily funded by premiums paid by employers who run defined benefit plans 
443 29 U.S.C. 1306.  S 8101 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 P.L. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (Feb. 
8, 2006) addressed the looming deficit in the PBGC. See Heller (1998) Rethinking public pension 
reform initiatives 15-16.  According to the South African National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion 
paper 29, “further investigation is required on the viability and suitability of such a scheme in the 
South African context” and therefore other means of ensuring the protection of benefits have 
been prioritised. 
444 A portion of the payroll taxes paid by employees and their employers towards Social Security 
is used to finance Medicare (Social Security Administration (2009) “Medicare” 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.html (accessed 01/09/2009)). 
445The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is in charge of the Medicare programme. 
Social Security Administration (2009) “Medicare” http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.html (accessed 
01/09/2009).  
446 42. U.S.C. 426.  Social Security beneficiaries are automatically enrolled for hospital insurance.  
Other persons may sign up for Medicare hospital insurance for a monthly premium (42 U.S.C. 
1395i-2). 
447 Hospital insurance helps pay for the costs of hospital care, related post-hospital care (in skilled 
nursing homes), home health care and hospice care (42 U.S.C. 1395c and 1395d).  Payments to 
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voluntary insurance program to provide medical insurance benefits … for aged 
and disabled individuals who elect to enroll under such program, to be financed 
from premium payments by enrollees together with contributions from funds 
appropriated by the Federal Government.448 
 
 
Medicare medical insurance benefits cover physician services, outpatient hospital 
services and physical therapy, other medical services, as well as supplies and 
equipment not covered by hospital insurance.449  In terms of Medicare Advantage 
Plans (Part C), older persons who are eligible for Part A and Part B benefits can 
choose to have their health care delivered by private companies that are 
contracted with Medicare to provide health services.450 
 
The fourth and final part of Medicare is the Prescription Drug Benefit (Part D) that 
assists older persons and persons with disabilities to pay for their prescription 
drugs.451 
 
Although Medicare has undoubtedly assisted countless older persons in 
accessing health care that they otherwise would not have been able to get, 452  it 
                                                                                                             
service providers are made from the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (42 U.S.C. 1395g 
read with 1395i). 
448 42 U.S.C. 1395j.  Medicare Part B costs are partly paid from the Federal Support Medical 
Insurance Trust Fund (42 U.S.C 1395l) and partly by the insured individual (see Social Security 
Administration (2006) Social Security handbook §138).  Premiums for Medicare Part B are 
deducted from Social Security benefits (42 U.S.C. 1395s). 
449 42 U.S.C. 1395k.  See also Social Security Administration (2006) Social Security handbook § 
127.1.  Nothing prevents an individual to take out other health insurance (42 U.S.C. 1395b). 
450 42 U.S.C. 1395w-21 read with 1395w-27. 
451 42 U.S.C. 1395w-101 and 1395w-102. 
452 Medicare currently assists 43 million beneficiaries to deal with health care costs (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (2009) “Medicare coverage – general information” 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CoverageGenInfo (accessed 01/08/2009)). 
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has to be said that, just like Social Security,453 the Medicare programme has 
become a victim of its own success and is currently experiencing severe financial 
difficulties.  Growing numbers of beneficiaries in addition to increases in health 
care costs have led to a deficit in Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and 
an increased burden on general revenue.454  The reform of Medicare and the 
health care system in general consequently has become one of President 
Obama’s legislative priorities455 and it remains to be seen whether Medicare will 
survive in its current form. 
 
In addition to Medicare, the Social Security Act also makes provision for 
Medicaid, a programme intended to enable states to as far as possible furnish  
(1) medical assistance on behalf of aged … individuals, whose income and 
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical 
services, and 
(2) rehabilitation and other services to help such … individuals attain or 
retain capability for independence or self-care.456 
 
Medicaid therefore is a state-run programme, with federal assistance, providing 
medical assistance to low-income older persons with insufficient resources to 
meet their anticipated medical expenses.457  Each state has its own plan for 
medical assistance to older persons, but Medicaid services usually include 
hospital stays, nursing facility services, visits to doctors and dentists, home 
                                     
453 See below at 7.3.5.5. 
454 It is estimated that the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund will be exhausted by 2017 if its financial 
difficulties are not addressed.  See Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees (2009) A 
summary of the 2009 annual reports http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (accessed 
19/09/2009). 
455 See The New York Times 23 February 2009 “Democrats resisting Obama on Social Security” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/us/politics/23social.html (accessed 21/06/2009). 
456 42 U.S.C. 1396. 
457 42 U.S.C. 1396d; Social Security Administration (2009) “Medicare” http://www.ssa.gov/ 
pubs/10043.html (accessed 01/09/2009). 
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health care services, private nursing care, prescription drugs, hospice care, home 
and community care for functionally disabled older persons,458 community-
supported living arrangement services, and personal care services if authorised 
by the older person’s doctor.459 
 
7.3.5.5 Social Security reforms and intergenerational equity 
 
The Social Security Act has been amended on numerous occasions.  In 1972, 
cost-of-living-adjustments (COLAs) were introduced to ensure that the value of 
older persons’ benefits were not eroded by inflation.460  Ten years later, in 1982, 
the Social Security system was in deficit and had to borrow money to pay 
benefits.461  As a result the 1983 Social Security Amendments introduced the 
taxation of Social Security benefits, Social Security tax rate increases and the 
gradual increase in the retirement age.462  
 
                                     
458 “Home  and  community  care  services”  for  the  purposes  of  Medicaid  include  homemaker 
services; chore services; personal care services; nursing care services; respite care; training for 
family members on providing care to the older person; adult day care; and day treatment for 
mental illness (24 U.S.C. 1396t).  The home and community care services offered by Medicaid 
correspond to the examples of home-based care programmes listed in s 11(3) of the Older 
Persons Act 13 of 2006 in South Africa.  See above at 3.3.4.5.4. 
459 42 U.S.C. 1396d. 
460 Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) International 
Journal of Health Services 633.  42 U.S.C. § 415(i) makes provision for cost-of-living increases in 
benefits. 
461 Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) International 
Journal of Health Services 634. 
462 Social Security Amendment P.L. 98-21 (1983).  See also Quadagno Generational equity and 
the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) International Journal of Health Service 635.  She is 
of the opinion that lack of public information on how OASDI operated, contributed to the decrease 
in confidence during the 1980s by the public in Social Security’s ability to pay their benefits when 
they retire (at 636). 
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Although Social Security is currently in relatively good shape financially,463 it is 
facing serious long-term financial difficulties.  The annual surpluses in the Old-
Age and Survivors and Disability Insurance Trust Fund are likely to turn into 
deficits in 2016 when the baby boom generation464 retires and the government 
needs to rely on the Trust Fund for funds to pay benefits.  The PAYG nature of 
Social Security means that a deficit will be inevitable as the payroll taxes will be 
insufficient to cover the benefits for so many retirees.  The Trust Fund is 
projected to be exhausted by 2037.  Unpopular changes such as increases in the 
Social Security payroll tax or reduction in benefits may be required to ensure the 
solvency of the Social Security system.465 
 
Various social security reform plans have been put forward by politicians and 
academics alike.466  The most notable attempt at reforming Social Security was 
the attempt at partial privatisation of Social Security by former President Bush in 
2005.  His reform proposal was based on funded private accounts in which 
participants could invest some of their payroll taxes.  The reform proposal was 
targeted mostly at younger persons to whom the funded nature of the proposed 
system would seem more attractive than the notion of paying for current retirees’ 
benefits in the hope that similar benefits would be available to them when they 
                                     
463 According to the Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees (2009) A summary of the 
2009 annual reports http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (accessed 18/09/2009), the 
old age insurance programme passes their “short-range test of financial adequacy”. 
464 Described as the cohort of people born between 1946 and 1964.  The “baby boom” was the 
massive increase in births following World War II (“Baby Boom Generation” http://www.u-s-
history.com/pages/h2061.html (accessed 02/05/2009)). 
465 Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees (2009) A summary of the 2009 annual report 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (accessed 18/09/2009). 
466 See Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 235-237 for a summary of plans for 
Social Security reforms that included privatisation to some degree. 
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retire, which may or may not be the case, given the financial difficulties faced by 
Social Security.467  Large-scale opposition meant the end of President Bush’s 
attempt to change the solidarity-based nature of Social Security.468 
 
Even though Social Security has had its ups and downs it still seems to have 
considerable support in the USA.469  President Obama is already facing 
opposition to his attempts to address the looming deficit in Social Security.470 
 
The various social security reform plans that have been put forward by lobbyists 
and academics in the USA fall outside the scope of this work.  However, the 
underlying difference of opinion (whether a public pension scheme should be 
PAYG, and therefore based on intergenerational solidarity, or fully funded and 
hence satisfy the notion of “intergenerational equity”) as it has played out in the 
USA, is of significance.471 
 
                                     
467 See the testimony by James B Lockhart III, Deputy Commissioner, SSA, Hearing before 
Senate Committee on Aging, “Strengthening Social Security: ‘Can we learn from other nations?’” 
18 May 2004 http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_051804.html (accessed 19/05/2009). 
468 The New York Times 23 February 2009 “Democrats resisting Obama on Social Security” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/us/politics/23social.html (accessed 21/06/2009). 
469 In 1990 Quadagno “Generational equity and the politics of the welfare state” (1990) 20 (4) 
International Journal of Health Services 641 wrote that “despite the proliferation of the 
generational equity theme, public support for entitlements remains high”.  According to The 
Gallup Poll (2007) 72, Social Security was regarded as a public concern by only 5% of persons 
polled in 2005.  See also Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts & controversies 178, 191 and 231-232. 
470 With Republicans being opposed to increased payroll taxes and Democrats opposed to 
reductions in benefits.  The New York Times 23 February 2009 “Democrats resisting Obama on 
Social Security” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/us/politics/23social.html (accessed 
21/06/2009). 
471 See above at 2.3 (descriptions of the concepts), and 6.4.4 for an analysis of the significance of 
these concepts in the South African context. 
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Moody describes the intergenerational equity debate in the USA as “basically a 
controversy about whether older adults are receiving an excessive share of 
limited government resources in comparison with other age groups”.472  The 
questions raised by proponents of intergenerational equity are: 
• Are too many resources allocated to older persons compared to children? 
• What is being done about the effect of payments to older persons on 
deficits in public programmes? 
• Is the current PAYG nature of Social Security fair to younger persons? 
• Will there be any resources left when the younger persons currently 
financing the system retire?473 
 
The abovementioned concerns can be answered by shifting the focus to the 
interdependence between generations and the reciprocity involved in 
intergenerational transfers.474  Social Security should not be regarded as a one-
way flow of resources that could have been used for children towards older 
persons.475  Minckler476 cautions against the “new victim blaming” inherent in the 
arguments by proponents of ‘intergenerational equity’, that the growing numbers 
of older persons are receiving a disproportionate part of public funding. 
                                     
472 Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 185. 
473 Ibid.  See also Kingson, Cornman and Hirschorn “Ties that bind” in Moody (2000) Aging: 
Concepts and controversies 199. 
474 Kingson, Cornman and Hirschorn “Ties that bind” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and 
controversies 199 summarise the interdependence and reciprocity between generations as 
follows: “For any society to progress and prosper, each generation must provide assistance to, 
and receive assistance from, those that follow”.  They also state (at 202) that “by framing policy 
issues in terms of competition and conflict between generations, the intergenerational inequity 
perspective implies that public benefits to the elderly are a one-way flow from young to old and 
that there is no reciprocity between generations.  This simply is not the case.” 
475 Kingson, Cornman and Hirschorn “Ties that bind” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and 
controversies 205. 
476 Minckler “’Generational equity’ and the new victim blaming” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts 
and controversies 213. 
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Proponents of ‘intergenerational equity’ are said to take a “canes versus kids” 
approach to intergenerational transfers.  Such an approach ignores the fact that 
Social Security payments to older persons relieve their adult children from having 
to support their parents financially477 and, in doing so, ensure that they have 
more money to spend on their own children.478 
 
The continued support for Social Security by older and younger Americans alike 
belies the “conflict” that proponents of intergenerational equity warn against.479  It 
is submitted that any future attempts at Social Security reforms will have to take 
account of the support for the intergenerational solidarity basis of the system. 
 
7.3.5.6 Supplemental Security Income 
 
The Supplemental Security Income programme (SSI)480 provides for cash 
assistance to older persons481 with limited income and resources.482  It operates 
                                     
477 See below at 7.3.5.7.3 for a discussion of the filial obligation laws in the USA. 
478 Minckler “’Generational equity’ and the new victim blaming” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts 
and controversies 209. 
479 Minckler “’Generational equity’ and the new victim blaming” 210-211; Moody (2000) Aging: 
concepts and controversies 191.  As Burtless puts it: “If Social Security enjoys broad political 
support today, when comparatively few voters draw benefits, it is hard to believe the popularity of 
the program will disappear when a sharply higher percentage of voters reaches retirement age, 
beginning around 2010.” (Burtless “Private accounts – putting retirement at risk” in Moody (2000) 
Aging: concepts and controversies 243). 
480 Title XVI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1381 – 1383f). 
481 Aged 65 years and older, who are US citizens or qualifying aliens and who reside in the USA 
(42 U.S.C. 1382c). 
482 Benefits are also provided for blind or disabled persons. 
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similarly to the South African older person’s grant and is also means tested.483  
Once an older person meets the eligibility requirements on the basis of income 
and resources, he or she is entitled to SSI benefits.484 
 
A person who otherwise would have been eligible for SSI benefits and who 
disposes of resources for less than the fair market value or within 36 months 
before claiming benefits is penalised by ineligibility for benefits for a period of 
time.485  The penalty is intended to ensure that claimants do not deliberately 
impoverish themselves in order to receive benefits.486 
 
As with most means-tested benefits,487 older persons whose income and 
resources are too high for them to be eligible for SSI benefits, but who are not 
well off economically, are vulnerable to risks such as rent increases or long-term 
illnesses.488  Many of these older persons who are ineligible for SSI benefits have 
to rely on their families to support them.  The next paragraph deals with family 
                                     
483 42 U.S.C. 1382.  See above at 3.3.1.1 for a description of the South African older person’s 
grant. 
484 42 U.S.C. 1381a.  Income for the purposes of the means test includes earned income, 
unearned income (e.g. Social Security benefits) and in-kind income (42 U.S.C 1382a(2)(B)).  
Similar to the South African position (see above at 3.3.1.1), residents of state institutions and 
correctional facilities are ineligible for benefits (42 U.S.C. 1382(e)).  Persons who are fleeing from 
the law and parole violators are also ineligible for benefits (42 U.S.C. 1382(e)(4)). 
485 42 U.S.C. 1382b(c)(1)(A).  The period of ineligibility for benefits differs depending on the value 
of the assets disposed of relative to the benefit amount, but will not exceed 36 months.  In South 
Africa, reg 19(5) GN R 898 in GG 31356 of 22 August 2008 does not provide for similar penalties, 
but provides that the assets the applicant disposed of in order to impoverish himself or herself 
would be taken into account for the means test. 
486 42 U.S.C. 1382b(c)(1)(C)(iii) and (iv) describe the circumstances under which a disposal of 
resources would not be penalised. 
487 See above at 4.3.2 for the problems associated with means tested benefits. 
488 Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 187 refers to the economically insecure 
lower-middle-class older persons who face this dilemma as the “tweeners”, as they fall above the 
poverty level but are not financially secure. 
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caregiving and support for older persons as well as the legal provisions related to 
care and support services to older persons. 
 
7.3.5.7 Caring for older persons 
 
7.3.5.7.1 Introduction 
 
Older persons in the USA are economically vulnerable mainly because of the 
rising costs of health care.  In particular, they experience greater health costs 
increases as a result of the increase in chronic diseases among older persons.489   
 
7.3.5.7.2 Long-term care: Medicare and Medicaid 
 
The ageing of the American population has led to an increased need for long-
term care for older persons.  “Long-term care” is a generic term for the variety of 
services, including medical and non-medical care, delivered to persons with 
chronic illnesses or disabilities.  Long-term care may address older persons’ 
health needs, such as nursing home care or home health care,490 or take the 
form of “custodial care”491 to help in the home with daily activities such as 
dressing and bathing.  Long-term care may also be provided by community 
                                     
489 Binney and Estes “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: the 
intergenerational war” (1998) 18 (1) International Journal of Health Services 87. 
490 Home health care is the skilled nursing care provided by professional nurses or other health 
services at the older person’s home.  It includes intermittent (not on a full-time basis) skilled 
nursing care or physical therapy (About.com: Senior Health “What is home health care” 
http://seniorhealth.about.com/library/eldercare/blhomecare.htm (accessed 20/05/2009)). 
491 Also called “domiciliary care” (see above at 2.8).   
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programmes, such as adult day care, or assisted living services such as meals 
and health monitoring.492  
 
Only a small percentage 493 of older persons in need of long-term care live in 
nursing homes while the rest depend on assisted living and their families for care.  
Although many older persons prefer to live at home, the high cost of nursing 
home care is a major reason for the decline in the number of nursing home 
residents.494  As was seen above,495 Medicare does not cover general long-term 
nursing care; it only covers post-hospital care in skilled nursing homes.  As a 
result many low-income older persons have to rely on Medicaid to assist with the 
cost of nursing home care.496  Medicaid covers a range of home care services 
and has “become the primary mechanism to pay for long-term care for the 
elderly”.497 
 
However, Medicaid is a means tested benefit and applicants for Medicaid have to 
show  that  their  “income  and  resources  are  insufficient  to  meet  the  costs  of 
                                     
492 Medicare (2009) “Long-term care” http://www.medicare.gov/longTermCare/static/home.asp 
(accessed 02/07/2009).  In South Africa, adult day care and assisted living programmes are 
included among the community-based and home-based programmes regulated i.t.o. the OPA (s 
11). 
493 In 2007 only about 7,4% of Americans aged 75 and older resided in nursing homes (about 1,8 
million people).  USA Today “Fewer seniors live in nursing homes” 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/2007-09-27-nursing-homes_N.htm (last updated 
27/09/2007). 
494 The approximate annual cost of nursing home care was $67,000 in 2007 - USA Today “Fewer 
seniors live in nursing homes” http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/2007-09-27-nursing-
homes_N.htm (last updated 27/09/2007).  
495 See 7.3.5.4. 
496 According to Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 70, nearly 40% of Medicaid 
benefits are paid for older persons, chiefly for their nursing home care.  See also Strauss and 
Lederman (1996) Medicaid and long-term care” in Moody (2000) Aging: concepts and 
controversies 73-74. 
497 Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 69. 
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necessary medical services”.498  Many older persons pay for care until their 
money runs out, but just as many have strategies to “spend down” in order to 
meet the strict eligibility criteria for Medicaid.499 
 
7.3.5.7.3 Filial responsibility laws 
 
The situation of older persons who do not qualify for Medicaid benefits is the 
point where public funding for long-term care and filial responsibility intersect 
and, depending on which state the older person resides in, their families may be 
held liable for their long-term care cost. 
 
Many states in the USA have filial responsibility laws that hold the adult children 
of indigent older persons responsible for the care of their parents.500  Filial 
responsibility statutes are based on the Elizabethan Poor Laws of England501 and 
share the same goal as the Poor Laws in aiming to protect public funds from 
liability for older persons with family who can provide them with care and 
                                     
498 42 U.S.C. 1396.  This is just the general rule.  States have different eligibility criteria. 
499 “Spending down” consists of a number of strategies to legally diminish assets and income in 
order to comply with the means test for Medicaid.  See Strauss and Lederman “Medicaid and 
long-term care” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 73-75; Bates “Middle-class 
Medicaid” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 76-78. 
500 For a map showing the states with filial support laws, see AARP Bulletin Today “Paying for 
Mom: Little-known laws for families to fund parents’ care” http://bulletin.aarp.org/ 
yourworld/family/articles/paying_for_momlittle_known_laws_force_families_to_fund_parents_care
_.html (accessed 30/08/2009). 
501 I.t.o. the 1601 Act for the Relief of the Poor, VII, family members and “children of every poor, 
old blind, lame and impotent Persons or other poor Person not able to work, being of a sufficient 
Ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and maintain every such poor Person” (Higginbotham 
(2008) “The Workhouse - The 1601 Act for the Relief of the Poor” http://www.workhouses.org/ 
poorlaws.shtml (accessed 12/04/2009)). 
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support.502  Where older persons receive public assistance, filial responsibility 
statutes may require the older person’s family to reimburse the relevant public 
fund. 503 
 
The filial responsibility statutes vary to a great extent on issues such as the 
definition of “indigent” older persons, whether only adult children have a filial 
responsibility or whether it is extended to all family members, the nature of the 
support arising from the filial responsibility, who is entitled to claim for parental 
support504 and enforcement measures.505   
 
Many of the statutes make provision for nursing homes or other providers of care 
to sue adult children for the costs of care.  The introduction of the Medicaid 
programme has led to a decline in the use of filial responsibility laws.506  
However, in some states (such as Pennsylvania) filial responsibility laws are still 
used by nursing homes to pressure families to foot nursing home bills or to avoid 
the consequences of filial responsibility laws by becoming more involved in 
securing Medicaid cover for older family members.507  
 
                                     
502 De Giacomo (2008) “A comparative analysis of filial responsibility: Italy and United States” 
International Society of Family Law World Conference Vienna 8. 
503 De Giacomo (2008) “A comparative analysis of filial responsibility” 9. 
504 Ross “Taking care of our caretakers: using filial responsibility laws to support the elderly 
beyond the government’s assistance” (2008) 16 U. Illinois Elder Care Journal 171. 
505 “Filial responsibility laws” (2009) http://family.jrank.org/pages/636/Filial-Responsibility.html 
(accessed 05/09/2009). 
506 De Giacomo (2008) “A comparative analysis of filial responsibility 9. 
507 AARP Bulletin Today “Paying for Mom: Little-known laws for families to fund parents’ care” 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/family/articles/paying_for_momlittle_known_laws_force_families
_to_fund_parents_care_.html (accessed 30/08/2009). 
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The Pennsylvania statute508 provides that  
[t]he husband, wife, child, father and mother of every indigent person, whether a 
public charge or not, shall, if of financial ability, care for and maintain, or 
financially assist, such indigent person at such rate as the court of the county, 
where such indigent person resides shall order or direct. 
 
 
According to the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), filial support 
laws  
raise provocative questions about who should be responsible for costly eldercare.  
Families?  Societies at large?  What about the individual’s own role in planning 
for long-term care needs?  The growing numbers of older people, their increased 
longevity and increasing care costs continue to make those questions that more 
pressing.509 
 
Laws on filial obligations are seldom applied,510 partly because of “deeply 
conflicting public attitudes toward filial responsibility”.511  Attempts to place focus 
on filial responsibility have been described as “not consistent with a historical 
perspective, or with long-term trends in public policy concerned with the welfare 
of the elderly”.512 
 
                                     
508 62 P.S. 1973.  The example of the Pennsylvania statute is used as an example of a filial 
responsibility statute that is actively enforced. 
509 AARP Bulletin Today “Paying for Mom: Little-known laws for families to fund parents’ care” 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/family/articles/paying_for_momlittle_known_laws_force_families
_to_fund_parents_care_.hrml (accessed 30/08/2009). 
510 When filial support laws are enforced, it is usually only done when an older person who is 
eligible for Medicaid is not receiving it and therefore cannot afford nursing home costs. See AARP 
Bulletin Today “Paying for Mom: Little-known laws for families to fund parents’ care” 
http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourworld/family/articles/paying_for_momlittle_known_laws_force_families
_to_fund_parents_care_.hrml (accessed 30/08/2009).  According to Myers and Agree “The world 
ages, the family changes – a demographic perspective” (1994) 21 (1) Aging International 16, the 
weak enforcement of filial responsibility laws is linked to the global trend to more state 
responsibility toward older persons independent of children and other relatives. 
511 Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 68.   
512 Bulcroft et al “Filial responsibility laws: issues and state statutes” (1989) 2 (3) Research on 
aging 391 as quoted by Myers and Agree “The world ages, the family changes – a demographic 
perspective” (1994) 21 (1) Aging International 17. 
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It is submitted that De Giacomo is correct in her view that, even where states 
face difficulties in enforcing filial responsibility laws or where there are no such 
laws, it is possible that adult children will still provide care for relatives out of a 
sense of moral obligation.513  They may be even more inclined to do so if they 
receive benefits, protection and support from the state in return for family 
caregiving.514 
 
7.3.5.7.4 Assistance to family caregivers 
 
Apart from Medicaid, the Older Americans Act515 also makes provision for 
supportive services for older persons wishing to live at home.  Federal grants are 
available for a number of support services including, but not limited to, services 
“designed to assist older individuals in avoiding institutionalization and to assist 
individuals in long-term care institutions who are able to return to their 
communities”.516  Services for which grants can be made available also include 
assessment of an older individual in order to ensure that he or she receives the 
appropriate services.517  Provision is made for “supportive activities to meet the 
special needs of caregivers, including caretakers who provide in-home services 
                                     
513 See also Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 69 where the view is expressed 
that filial responsibility continues to be practiced in the USA “not as a matter of law but as a 
matter of ethics or custom”. 
514 De Giacomo (2008) “A comparative analysis of filial responsibility: Italy and United States” 
International Society of Family Law World Conference Vienna 13. 
515 42 U.S.C. 3030d. 
516 42 U.S.C. 3030d (a)(5). 
517 42 U.S.C. 3030d (a)(5)(B). 
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to frail older individuals”.  Grants are also available for home health services, 
homemaker services and assistance with shopping.518 
 
The abovementioned provisions of the Older Americans Act facilitating grant 
payments to states for supportive services mean that older persons in states 
where such supportive services are provided have the option to remain in their 
own homes.  For this reason, the Older Americans Act is described as “the major 
vehicle for promoting the delivery of social services to the aging population”.519 
 
Family caregivers to older persons may also be in need of support, particularly in 
the form of respite care,520 allowing them to take occasional breaks from their 
caregiving duties.  The Older Americans Act makes provision for grants for 
services “designed to support family members and other persons providing 
voluntary care to older individuals that need long-term care services”.521  This is 
achieved through the National Family Caregiver Support Program in terms of 
which grants are made available to states based on their plans for the provision 
of respite care to temporarily relieve caregivers from their responsibilities.522 
                                     
518 42 U.S.C. 3030d (a)(5)(C). 
519 O’Shaugnessy (2008) The basics: Older Americans Act of 1965 1. 
520 Similar to respite care made available to carers in the UK.  See fn 394 above. 
521 42 U.S.C. 3030d (a)(19). 
522 42 U.S.C. 3030s-1(b)(4). 
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7.3.5.7.5 Working caregivers 
 
In the USA, caregivers (more often than not women) are often forced by 
circumstances to resign or cut back on work in order to give care to family 
members.523  To address this problem, the Family Medical Leave Act524 aims  
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to 
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national 
interests in preserving family integrity;  
(2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the 
birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has 
a serious health condition. 
 
The Family Medical Leave Act entitles a family caregiver to 12 weeks per year 
leave with job security and the continuation of full social security benefits to care 
for a seriously ill parent.525  This provision is generous compared to the South 
African Basic Conditions of Employment Act526 which does not make any 
provision for leave for caregiving responsibilities and allows employees only three 
days paid family responsibility leave for limited events.527 
                                     
523 See above at 5.6.2 for a discussion of the impact that caregiving responsibilities have on the 
caregiver’s employment. 
524 29 U.S.C.2601. 
525 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(C). The Act provides for the restoration of an employee to his or her 
position or equivalent position upon return from family medical leave (29 U.S.C. 2614). 
526 Act 75 of 1997, s 27. 
527 See above at 6.2.4.3.4. 
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7.3.5.7.6 Long-term care insurance 
 
Finally, individuals can plan ahead and take out private long-term care insurance 
for long-term nursing home care.  The costs of the long-term care insurance vary, 
depending on the coverage chosen and the age when the policy is first 
purchased, with the result that a policy purchased at an advanced age can be 
very expensive.  Eligibility requirements also differ between policies and most 
insurance companies exclude persons with pre-existing health conditions.528  
Nonetheless, the absence of a universal public insurance programme for long-
term care coupled with the stringent requirements for Medicaid force many 
individuals to rely on long-term care insurance.  
 
7.3.5.7.7 Long-term care for older persons: conclusion 
 
The abovementioned provisions of the Social Security Act and the Older 
Americans Act show a significant legislative commitment to public provision of 
care and support to older persons.  Filial support laws, based on the notion of 
families’ care responsibility towards older relatives, are hardly ever enforced. 
Legislation enables older persons who can meet the strict requirements to 
access programmes such as Medicaid to pay for nursing home costs, should this 
                                     
528 Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts and controversies 70 and 88-89. 
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be the best option for them.  Where older persons wish to live independently at 
home, they can access services funded by grants to States. 
 
7.3.5.8 Lessons from the USA 
 
The Social Security scheme in the USA is an example of a national pension 
system run on the basis of intergenerational solidarity.  A PAYG system of the 
magnitude of Social Security is vulnerable to demographic changes and 
economic fluctuation, as illustrated above.  In South Africa, additional factors 
such as the high level of unemployment and the effects of HIV/AIDS negatively 
affect the tax base529 and compound the problems associated with a PAYG 
system.  It is submitted that the reformed pension system will have to incorporate 
some funded components as protection against demographic shocks and 
financial problems similar to those that Social Security is currently experiencing.  
The added advantage of incorporating funded “pillars” in the system is that 
younger generations can also have a stake in the pension system.   
 
The failed reform attempts in the USA illustrate how jealously Americans guard 
the solidarity aspect of their social security system, and it may become 
progressively more difficult to change.530  The commitment to intergenerational 
                                     
529 See above at 4.3.1.5. 
530 In 1999 Burtless predicted that “if Social Security enjoys broad political support today, when 
comparatively few voters draw benefits, it is hard to believe the popularity of the program will 
disappear when a sharply higher percentage of voters reaches retirement age, beginning around 
2010”.  Burtless “Private accounts: putting retirement at risk” in Moody (2000) Aging: Concepts 
and controversies 243. 
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solidarity in the face of problems with the PAYG scheme and the failure of 
attempts to steer it in a ‘neo-liberal’ direction serve as a warning that a solidarity-
based system is not a short-term undertaking that can be easily amended. 
 
It is suggested that research should be done to determine the viability of 
introducing programmes similar to the grants and non-financial assistance 
provided to family caregivers of older persons in the USA in South Africa.   
 
South Africa has no national health insurance programme in general or a health 
insurance system catering specifically for older persons such as Medicare.  The 
need for post-retirement medical cover in South Africa was recognised by the 
Department of Social Development in its 2007 discussion document531 where it is 
concluded that 
[t]o best eliminate the social security gaps that have arisen in relation to medical 
scheme cover, it is recommended that a system that integrates a number of 
social security entities be implemented.  The purpose of this integration would be 
to establish a mechanism allowing individuals to create an entitlement to 
subsidised post-retirement contributions, based on their years of contributing to a 
medical scheme. 
 
It recommends that a portion of the contributions made by and on behalf of each 
member of a medical scheme be paid to the proposed national pension fund.532  
It therefore envisages a relationship between post-retirement benefits and the 
mandatory pillar of the reformed national pension system similar to the 
relationship between Medicare and Social Security in the USA. 
 
                                     
531 DSD discussion document (2007) 96. 
532 DSD discussion document (2007) 97. 
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7.3.6 Sweden 
 
7.3.6.1 Introduction 
 
Sweden was one of the first countries to introduce individual accounts into public 
and occupational pension schemes.533  In 1998, pension reforms took place “in 
order to meet the demands of an aging society”534 and the consequent pressure 
placed on the previous pension system.   
 
Current social insurance benefits in terms of the Social Insurance Act535 can 
either  be  social  insurance  available  to  all  residents,  such  as  the ”guarantee 
pension” and allowances,536 or occupation-based benefits intended to 
compensate workers for loss of income.537  The Social Insurance Act sets down 
the qualifying requirements for social insurance. 
 
In the context of the question of the locus of the responsibility to provide care and 
support to older persons, the current Swedish model is worth examining as it is a 
                                     
533 Sundén (2004) How do individual accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 1.  The 
current system has been in operation from 2001.  For transitional arrangements see Sundén 
(2000) How will Sweden’s new pension system work? 11-12; Försäkringskassan (2008) Income 
pension and supplementary pension 1 and 3; Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2000) Old age 
pensions in Sweden 1. 
534 Sundén (2004) How do individual accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 1.  In 2007, 
persons older than 65 constituted over 17% of the Swedish population and are considered to be 
the fastest growing part of the population (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Facts about 
elderly in Sweden 1). 
535 Act 1999:799. 
536 See below at 7.3.6.2.3. 
537 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Social insurance in Sweden 1. 
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prime example of a system where it mainly falls on the state to care for and 
support older persons.538 
 
The following is an overview of the Swedish pension system and provision for 
care and support for older persons. 
 
7.3.6.2 The Swedish pension system 
 
The Swedish state pension is made up of three parts or “pillars”: a PAYG defined 
contribution  system  with  notional  accounts  (the  “income pension”),  a  system 
based on individual accounts (the “premium pension”), and a “guarantee 
pension”.539  The two former systems are earnings-related and based on an 
overall contribution of 18,5% of an employee’s gross earnings shared by the 
employee and his or her employer.540  In addition, the state benefits discussed 
below are supplemented by contractual pensions, occupational pensions and 
personal savings.541  Most occupational pension plans were established as a 
                                     
538 See below at 7.3.6.4 for an overview of Swedish legislation on the provision of care to older 
persons. 
539 The terminology in the translated versions of Swedish legislation is used in this chapter. 
540 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Social insurance in Sweden 2; Sundén (2004) How 
do individual accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 1.  The National Social Insurance 
Board and the Premium Pension Authority are tasked with overseeing the state pension system 
i.t.o. Ch1, s 3 of the Social Insurance Act 1999:799. 
541 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2000) Old age pensions in Sweden 1; Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs (2007) Social insurance in Sweden 2. 
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result of collective bargaining between employee and employer 
representatives.542 
 
7.3.6.2.1 The income pension 
 
The income pension is a defined contribution PAYG system with notional 
accounts based on a contribution of 16% of earnings.543  The benefit is calculated 
on ‘lifetime income’.544  Employees build up pension entitlements based on their 
contributions.545  The amount of pension entitlements an individual has earned is 
recorded in his or her pension account.546  The total value of the individual’s 
pensions entitlements, plus interest earned on the account over the years, 
constitute a person’s ‘pension balance’.547  Pension rights are indexed by linking 
them to economic growth in Sweden.548  Upon retirement, the pension balance is 
converted into an annuity by dividing the pension balance by a life expectancy 
denominator.  The life expectancy denominator differs for every cohort and 
“mainly reflects the statistically expected remaining length of life when starting to 
draw pension”.549  Hence, the dangers of demographic changes for the PAYG 
system are addressed by shifting the consequences of being in a cohort where 
                                     
542 For a description of the various types of occupational plans, see ISSA (2008) “Pension plans 
(voluntary): Plan profile” http://www.issa.int/aiss/Observatory/Country-Profiles/Regions/ 
Europe/Sweden (accessed 01/07/2009). 
543 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Social insurance in Sweden 2 
544 The income earned throughout the employee’s career. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
(2000) Old age pensions in Sweden 2. 
545 Although pension entitlements can be built up in other ways, e.g. caregiving and studying – 
see below at 7.3.6.4 for measures to assist caregivers. 
546 Försäkringskassan (2008) Income pension and supplementary pension 1. 
547 Ibid. 
548 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2000) Old age pensions in Sweden 1. 
549 Försäkringskassan (2008) Income pension and supplementary pension 2. 
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people live longer, and consequently cost the pension system more, to individual 
members.  Effectively the annual pension received by members of a longer living 
cohort will be a relatively reduced amount paid over more years compared to that 
received by members of a cohort with a shorter living expectancy. 
 
The term ‘notional accounts’ is used in connection with the income pension as an 
individual’s retirement income depends on his or her pension entitlements and 
not on the amount in the ‘account’.550  In any given year, the amount in the 
employees’ ‘accounts’ is actually being spent on a PAYG basis on current 
retirees.551 
 
7.3.6.2.2 The premium pension 
 
The premium pension is a mandatory funded system with privately managed 
individual accounts.  Contributions of 2.5% of earnings are credited to this 
system.552  The body tasked with administering, regulating and acting as a 
clearing house for individual accounts is the Premium Pension Agency (PPM),553 
hence the name “premium pension system”. 
 
                                     
550 The “notional accounts” correspond with the “cash balance” plans in the USA (see above at 
7.3.5.3) 
551 See above at 2.7 for an explanation of PAYG systems. 
552 Sundén (2004) How do individual accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 1. 
553 Premiepensionsmyndigheten (PPM). 
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By having a central agency in control of the system, administration costs can be 
kept down by “drawing on economies of scale in administration”.554  Participants 
are free to choose their own investment funds.555  Investment elections are held 
where investment funds are chosen.  Only funds that have concluded 
agreements with the PPM stipulating the reporting requirements and the fee 
structure may participate in the system.556 
 
In addition to private accounts, the government has established two additional 
funds: the one serving as a default fund for participants who do not wish to make 
or are unsure about an investment choice and the other for participants who 
prefer government involvement in the management of the fund.557  Participants 
are not bound by their investment decisions and can change their fund 
allocations on a daily basis.558 
 
Pension credits are provided for raising small children, but it is not required that 
the parent has to stop working due to child-rearing in order to get the credits.559  
Credits are also provided for serving in the military and studying.560 
                                     
554 Sundén (2004) How do individual accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 2. 
555 Similar to personal pension plans in the UK.  See below at 7.3.4.2. 
556 As the PPM itself handles the administration of the accounts, it ensures that fees charged by 
investment funds are kept down (Sundén (2004) How do individual accounts work in the Swedish 
pension system? 2). 
557 Sundén (2004) How do individual accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 2-3. 
558 Sundén (2004) 3. 
559 Ståhlberg, Birman, Kruse and Sundén (2008) Retirement income security for men and women 
16. 
560 Ch 3, s 14 Social Insurance Act 1999:799. 
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7.3.6.2.3 The “guarantee pension” 
 
The third pillar is made up of the guarantee pension paid from general tax 
revenues, which provides basic income security for people with low or no pension 
income.561  The guarantee pension is pension-tested562 and pays 40% of an 
average industrial worker’s wage.563  The pensionable age for men and women is 
65.564  Only persons who have been resident in Sweden for at least 40 years are 
entitled to the guarantee pension.565 
 
7.3.6.3 Additional benefits 
 
A housing supplement is provided to older persons with low or no income who 
are in receipt of a guarantee pension.566 
 
Older persons who receive little or no pension may apply for social assistance in 
the form of maintenance support.567  In terms of the Maintenance Support for the 
                                     
561 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2000) Old age pensions in Sweden 2. 
562 Income from other pensions may reduce the amount payable, as opposed to means tested 
benefits where all income is taken into account.  
563 Ståhlberg, Birman, Kruse and Sundén (2008) Retirement income security for men and women 
11. 
564 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2000) Old age pensions in Sweden 2. 
565 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2000) Old age pensions in Sweden 2.  See below at 
7.3.6.3 for the support provided to older persons who cannot meet the 40 year residence 
requirement. 
566 The housing supplement pays over 90% of the older person’s housing costs (up to a maximum 
amount) (s 9 Housing Supplements for Pensioners Act 2001:761). 
567 Äldreförsörjningsstöd. 
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Elderly Act568 persons who are 65 years or older and cannot meet the condition 
of 40 years’ residence in Sweden are entitled to maintenance support.569  The 
aim of maintenance support is to guarantee a “reasonable standard of living” to 
all older persons living in Sweden.570  Maintenance Support is the Swedish 
equivalent of Supplemental Security Income in the USA571 and the South African 
older person’s grant.572 
 
In terms of the Social Services Act 2001, “[p]ersons unable to provide for their 
needs or to obtain provision for them in any other way are entitled to assistance 
from the social welfare committee towards their livelihood (livelihood support) and 
for their living in general”.573  Livelihood support covers “reasonable expenditure” 
on items required to enable the person to live independently.574  A person in 
receipt of maintenance support can therefore receive additional livelihood support 
to pay for the listed items. 
 
                                     
568 SFS 2001:85. 
569 S 2 Maintenance Support for the Elderly Act 2001:85; Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 
Sweden Host country report EU Peer Review of “Freedom of choice and dignity for the elderly” 8. 
570 Försäkringskassen Social Insurance in 10 minutes” http://www.forsakringskassan.se/ 
irj/go/km/docs/fk_publishing/Dokument/Publikationer/Faktablad/Andra%20spr%C3%A5k/Engelsk
a/socfors_10min_eng.pdf (accessed 15/06/2009).  
571 See 7.3.5.6 above. 
572 Discussed at 3.3.1.1 above. 
573 Ch 4, s 1.  The functions of the social welfare committees are described below at 7.3.6.4. 
574 Ch 4, s 3 read with ch 4, s 1.  The items covered by livelihood support include: “food, clothing 
and footwear, play and leisure, disposable articles, health and hygiene, a daily newspaper, a 
telephone and a television license fee, housing, domestic electricity supply, … household 
insurance” as well as a number of other items aimed at working age rather than older persons.  
“Reasonable expenditure” for the purpose of this section is based on a national norm set by the 
government. 
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Older persons receiving care from family members may apply for a family carer 
grant to pay the family member for care.575  This is similar to the attendance 
allowance paid in the UK and the South African grant-in-aid576 but the level of the 
Swedish grant far exceeds the South African grant. 
 
7.3.6.4 Care and support for older persons 
 
In addition to the benefits paid by the advanced pension system, Swedish older 
persons’ care needs are covered by a comprehensive social services system.  
The basis of the Swedish social services system is “democracy and solidarity” 
and its objectives are to improve people’s socio-economic circumstances, 
promote “equality of living conditions” and allow people to actively participate in 
community life.577  In addition, the national policy with regard to older persons 
aims to ensure that older persons retain their independence and are treated with 
respect.578  Steps to achieve the objectives of social services must be taken “with 
due consideration for the responsibility of the individual for his own social 
situation and that of others”.579  Hence, solidarity with older persons needing care 
and support is entrenched by legislation as a core value in the provision of social 
services. 
 
                                     
575 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 4.  See below at 
7.3.6.4 for other services linked to family members providing care and support to older persons. 
576 See above at 3.3.1.2. 
577 Ch 1, s 1 Social Services Act 2001:453. 
578 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 1. 
579 Ch 1, s 1 Social Services Act 2001:453 (my emphasis). 
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Although much of the actual care of older persons in Sweden is provided by 
family members, overall responsibility for care of older persons rests with the 
state and, therefore, care for older persons is financed mainly from tax 
revenue.580  The delivery of good quality social services to older persons by 
suitably trained and experienced staff is guaranteed by the state.581 
 
The Social Services Act582 and the Health and Medical Services Act583 form the 
legislative framework for social and nursing care services to older persons in 
Sweden.  Social services are run by the municipalities,584 whereas health care is 
run on a regional level by county councils.585  Each municipality has a social 
welfare committee which is inter alia responsible for “the provision of care and 
service, information, counselling, support and care, financial assistance and other 
assistance for families and individuals in need of the same”.586  Each social 
welfare committee is free to organise services and to levy taxes according to its 
own priorities, provided its functions conform to national legislation.587  The 
                                     
580 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 1. 
581 Ch 3, s 3 of the Social Services Act 2001:453 
582 SFS 2001: 453. 
583 SFS 1982:763.  The Act has the provision of a high standard of health care to all members of 
society on equal terms as its main objective.  I.t.o. the Act, health care must be financed on the 
basis of solidarity.  Apart from the instances where nursing care is combined with social care, the 
Swedish health care system falls outside the scope of this thesis.  See Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs (2007) Health and medical care in Sweden for an overview of the Swedish health 
care system. 
584 Ch 2, ss 1 and 2 Social Services Act 2001:453. 
585 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 1.  In Sweden, 
county councils are the regional governments and municipalities the local governments. 
586 Ch 3, s 1 Social Services Act 2001:453. 
587 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 1 
 
 
 
 
580 
 
system aims to provide each older person with social services tailor-made for his 
or her care needs and based on a needs assessment.588 
 
As in South Africa, the UK and the USA, enabling older persons to continue living 
independently in their own homes for as long as possible is a priority function of 
the social welfare committees.589  Social welfare committees are therefore 
required to provide support and assistance to older persons still living at home.590  
Home-care services providing assistance with day-to-day tasks are the most 
important services provided to older persons living at home and who are unable 
to cope on their own.591 
 
Older persons who have special needs and can no longer live in their own homes 
are entitled to alternative forms of housing provided by the municipalities.592  
Social welfare committees of municipalities must place older persons who need 
care and accommodation in either their own family home or a care home and 
ensure that they are properly cared for where they are placed.593 
 
                                     
588 Ibid. 
589 Ch 5, s 4 of the Social Services Act 2001:453; Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) 
Care of the elderly in Sweden 1 and 3. 
590 Ch 5, s 5. 
591 Home care services include help with shopping, cleaning, washing, cooking and personal care 
and can be combined with other more specialised services such as meals services and adult day 
care (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 3).  The number 
of older persons receiving home care services has increased in recent years relative to the 
number of older persons placed in special housing (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) 
Facts about elderly in Sweden 2).  Home care services are similar to the support services for 
older persons living at home in the UK (see 7.3.4.4.3) and the home care services covered by 
Medicaid in the USA (see 7.3.5.7.2). 
592 Ch 5, s 5.   
593 Ch 6, s 1.  Ensuring the availability of alternative accommodation for older persons is also the 
responsibility of the social welfare committees (ch 6, s 2). 
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The private sector may also provide care and support services, particularly 
residential care, to older persons provided the permission of the relevant county 
administration board of the county where the care is to be provided is 
obtained.594  The required permission will only be granted to service providers 
that meet quality and safety standards.595  The social welfare committee remains 
responsible to ensure that services provided by the private sector are of a high 
standard.596 
 
In terms of the Social Services Act, social welfare committees are obliged to 
develop support and relief services to assist family caregivers of older persons.597  
The various assistance options available include  
• financial compensation paid directly to the caregiving family member;598 
• employment of the family caregiver by the municipality to care for the older 
person; and 
• a family carer grant which is awarded to the older person to pay family 
members for caregiving.599 
 
                                     
594 Ch 7, s 1.  The county administration boards are the regional bodies responsible to supervise 
services provided by the municipalities in the county (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) 
Care of the elderly in Sweden 2). 
595 Ch 7, s 2. 
596 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 5. 
597 Ch 5, s 10. 
598 Similar to the conditional cash transfer paid by the Chile Solidario programme (see above at 
7.3.3.5) and the carer’s allowance in the UK (see above at 7.3.4.4.4). 
599 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 4.  The family carer 
grant corresponds with the attendance allowance paid in the UK (see above at 7.3.4.3) and the 
South African grant-in-aid (see above at 3.3.1.2). 
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Municipalities may charge reasonable fees for services.600  The basis for charges 
for home-help services, daytime activities and residence in special types of 
accommodation is indicated in the Social Services Act.601  The charges must 
leave the older person with “sufficient money … to cover his or her personal 
needs and other living expenses (reserve sum)”.602  As long as the charges 
levied are within the framework of the rules set in the Act to protect the individual 
against high charges, a municipality may decide how much to charge for 
services.603 
 
7.3.6.5 Lessons for South Africa 
 
Many of the measures to provide for older persons in place in Sweden are not 
financially viable in South Africa.604  For instance, most of the items provided for 
as livelihood support605 would be regarded as unaffordable in the South African 
context, where financial support and basic care services are clearly a priority.  
The extensive financial resources that would be required to provide for older 
persons’ care needs on the same scale as Sweden are also not available.  The 
significance of the Swedish system from a comparative point of view does not lie 
in the detailed provisions of the Social Services Act itself but in the core principle 
                                     
600 Except for “measures of support and assistance of a therapeutic nature” (ch 8, ss 1 and 2). 
601 Ch 8, s 5. 
602 Ch 8, s 6.  See ch 8, s 7 for the basis of calculating an individual’s “reserve sum”. 
603Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2007) Care of the elderly in Sweden 1.  An older person 
has the right to appeal to an administrative court against high charges for services (ch 16, s 13).  
604 This is also true for the measures in place in the UK and the USA, but more so for the Swedish 
system. 
605 See above at 7.3.6.3. 
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of the Act: solidarity with older persons and the resultant obligation on the state to 
provide for their care needs.  At the very least, the range of measures to assist 
families caring for older relatives in Sweden serves to illustrate that various 
options for state assistance to families exist. 
 
Although the Swedish pension system is definitely innovative, it is also quite 
complicated and, particularly where the notional accounts in the income pension 
are concerned, “most individuals are only vaguely aware of the monetary 
equivalent of their acquired rights”.606  Experience in Sweden and in South Africa 
has shown that fund members without “appropriate expertise” tend to err on the 
conservative side when they are offered a variety of investment choices that they 
do not necessarily understand.607  
 
7.3.7 Comparative overview: Conclusion 
 
As far as provision of care and support to older persons is concerned, an 
important question posed by this thesis is to what extent the state should provide 
these systems, and families are responsible for caring for older relatives.  All four 
countries discussed above have state-sponsored measures to provide care and 
support for older persons, but the measures themselves have different 
                                     
606 Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999) Taking stock of pension reforms around the world 13.  
See also the testimony by James B Lockhart III, Deputy Commissioner, SSA, Hearing before 
Senate Committee on Aging, “Strengthening Social Security: ‘Can we learn from other nations?’” 
18 May 2004 http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_051804.html (accessed 19/05/2009). 
607 National Treasury discussion paper (2004) 64.  See also Sundén (2004) How do individual 
accounts work in the Swedish pension system? 3-6 for an analysis of the preference of 
participants in the Swedish premium pension system for the default fund. 
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conceptual and constitutional bases.  The result is a whole gamut of 
combinations, ranging from legislation creating mainly state-provided benefits at 
the one end of the spectrum to laws and policies highlighting family responsibility 
for care and support of older persons at the other end.  The fiscal resources at a 
country’s disposal also play an important role, as “family care” will of necessity 
increase in importance in a country where the state cannot afford to provide for 
older persons directly. 
 
In Sweden, older persons are entitled by law to state assistance in securing 
accommodation, long-term care and financial assistance.  Swedish legislation 
attempts to balance service-orientated plans with cash-based solutions for older 
persons’ care needs.  The Swedish Social Services Act is based on social 
solidarity with older persons.  Where families do provide care and support to 
older persons, they have access to financial assistance in doing so.  At the other 
end of the spectrum, the Chilean constitution regards families as the basic core 
of society and hence as the main source of support for older persons.  Through 
the Chile Solidario programme families can gain access to a state assistance 
programme and thereby access to a temporary cash subsidy if they are caring for 
older family members. 
 
In the UK, there are no filial support laws compelling families to support older 
persons.  However, the support offered by local authorities to families who do 
provide care and support for older relatives is more advanced and 
 
 
 
 
585 
 
comprehensive compared to the other systems in this study, barring Sweden.  
Pension legislation also credits family caregivers for time spent caring for older 
persons.  In addition, pension legislation and legislation dealing with support 
services for older persons provide for a vast range of benefits and services to 
older persons who cannot rely on family support.  The system therefore operates 
on the principle of shared responsibility between families (although there is no 
express statutory caregiving obligation for families) and the state.  It is submitted 
that the holistic approach to legislation regarding older persons evidenced by the 
links between legislation providing for pensions and for care and support services 
is one of the main success factors in the UK system.  
 
The US care and support system also operates on the basis of the shared 
responsibility between families and the state to provide care and support to older 
persons.  Indigent older persons in the USA can rely on the state for long-term 
care and for support services should they prefer to live at home.  Although filial 
support legislation exists in some states, these laws are not often enforced and 
the system rather relies on support to family caregivers to encourage increased 
family care and support to older persons. 
 
The four countries in this comparative study have one important aspect of care 
and support legislation in common: where the need for increased family care and 
support of older persons is identified, legislation does not shift the burden to 
families without making additional resources available to assist families.  This is a 
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valuable lesson in the context of the South African policy preference for family 
care of older persons. 
 
In the context of retirement income legislation, the research question is whether 
South African legislation should continue on the path of regulating voluntary 
retirement savings provided exclusively by the private market or introduce a 
system underpinned by intergenerational solidarity. 
 
In Sweden, the USA and the UK, legislation provides for mandatory contributions 
to a national pension system which is mainly PAYG in nature. In all three 
countries varying degrees of steps have also been taken to improve access by 
those whose employment income is modest or irregular to cost-effective 
retirement savings mechanisms.  Although Sweden and the UK have introduced 
funded elements to their national pension systems in order to encourage savings, 
it can be said that the national pension systems in all three countries are based 
on intergenerational solidarity. 
 
The advantage of pooled social security funds, managed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis as in Sweden, the UK and the USA, is that it can finance benefits for those 
whose lifetime contributions are inadequate, subject to the extent of cross-
subsidisation that the system can handle before discontent sets in.608  The 
relative disadvantages of pay-as-you-go financing of a national pension scheme 
                                     
608 National Treasury (2004) Discussion paper 6. 
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are the inherent fiscal and financial risks and the need to occasionally raise social 
security taxes.609 
 
The enduring popularity of the Social Security system in the USA and the steps 
taken in Sweden and UK to address imbalances show that a system based on 
intergenerational solidarity can work, particularly in a multi-pillared system with 
other pillars that provide privately managed funded savings.  As far as the initially 
lauded Chilean experiment with a privatised system is concerned, the privatised 
system perpetuated the high levels of inequality in Chile and excluded many 
vulnerable individuals from its scope of application.  The problems of the 
privatised system led to the reintroduction of solidarity aspects to the Chilean 
system. 
 
It would therefore be reasonable to conclude that in jurisdictions such as 
Sweden, the USA, the UK, and even Chile, there is ample evidence of the 
advantages of intergenerational solidarity in the national pension system and 
illustrations of how it can operate in practice. 
 
Unfortunately, no easy solution for uniquely South African problems can be found 
in  a  comparison  with  other  countries,610  particularly  because  of  the  different 
socio-economic circumstances prevailing in South Africa as compared with more 
                                     
609 Ibid. 
610 Mouton Committee Report (1992) par 2.2. 
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industrialised countries.611  It is therefore imperative that a model and legal 
framework for the provision of retirement income, as well as care and support to 
older persons, be developed that is responsive to South Africa’s unique needs.  
The development of such a legal framework for the provision of financial and 
non-cash support to older persons is addressed in the final chapter. 
 
                                     
611 Patel (1992) Restructuring Social Welfare 81. 
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8.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Intergenerational solidarity is based on the “mutual dependencies and 
responsibilities between the different age groups of which society is comprised”.1  
The central research question addressed by this thesis is whether 
intergenerational solidarity should form the basis of South African legislation on 
the provision of income during retirement, and if so, whether it in fact does.  If the 
answer to the latter part of the question is in the negative, a further question is 
whether the current process to reform the retirement income system can be 
utilised to strengthen intergenerational solidarity in South Africa. 
 
For many older persons whose retirement income is inadequate to provide the 
necessary living standards, the issue is not so much where their retirement 
income comes from but the standard of living it affords them.  Issues such as 
accommodation and care for older persons are of as much importance as 
retirement income.  Hence, an additional theme of this research has been the 
extent to which the duty to provide non-cash support and care to older persons 
rests with the state, with the older person’s family or with the community. 
                                     
1 Ben-Israel and Ben-Israel (2002) “Senior citizens: Social dignity, status and the rights to 
representative freedom of organization” 141 3) International Labour Review 3.  See 2.3 for a 
more detailed description of intergenerational solidarity. 
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8.2 THE POINT OF DEPARTURE 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis was that intergenerational solidarity is the most 
appropriate basis for legislation relating to older persons and retirement but that it 
is not necessarily present in current South African legislation.  To determine 
whether this view is correct, the concept of intergenerational solidarity and 
opposing concepts such as ‘neo-liberalism’ (in terms of which, in the context of 
provision for retirement, each individual is responsible for his or her own 
retirement income) and ‘intergenerational equity’ (which questions whether 
‘disproportionate’ public spending on older persons is fair to younger 
generations) were examined.2  An overview followed of the current law on 
retirement income and care and support for older persons.3  Attention was then 
given to those aspects of South African legislation and policy on social security 
for older persons that may affect intergenerational solidarity directly or indirectly, 
such as the availability of resources to fund social assistance,4 fraud and 
maladministration of state grants5, the voluntary nature of occupational 
retirement fund membership6 and the recognition of the role of older persons in 
society.7  The role of families and communities in providing care and support to 
                                     
2 See above at 2.3.  
3 Chapter 3 above. 
4 See above at 4.3.1. 
5 See 4.3.3 above. 
6 See above at 5.5. 
7 See above at 6.4.1. 
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older persons was also discussed.8  To determine whether the importance 
attributed to intergenerational solidarity as an inherent value in social security 
legislation is in fact warranted, international standards relevant to older persons 
and their rights were examined to determine the extent to which intergenerational 
solidarity plays a role in international law.9  Finally, a comparative overview of 
legislation on benefits and support for older persons was undertaken to 
determine whether it is in fact possible to incorporate and entrench 
intergenerational solidarity in legislation.10 
 
8.3 INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND CURRENT SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW 
 
Currently, three main measures are available to provide for the needs of older 
persons:   
 
Firstly, a non-contributory means-tested older person’s grant is paid as a social 
assistance measure.11  Older persons in need of regular attendance by another 
person are entitled to grants-in-aid in addition to older person’s grants.12 
 
Secondly, occupational retirement funds pay benefits to members on retirement. 
Membership of these funds is voluntary and limited to individuals in formal 
                                     
8 See above at 6.2 and 6.3. 
9 See above at 7.2. 
10 See above at 7.3. 
11 The older person’s grant and its legislative framework is discussed above at 3.3.1.1. 
12 See above at 3.3.1.2. 
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employment.  The state only regulates and monitors the management of these 
funds.13  The South African retirement fund system differs from the systems 
found in most developed countries as South Africa does not have a national 
retirement insurance scheme.  In addition to the benefits paid by occupational 
retirement funds, employees who wish to supplement their retirement savings 
and self-employed persons have to make use of private retirement savings 
vehicles.14 
 
Finally, the state makes financial awards available to non-governmental and 
community organisations that provide care and support services to older 
persons.  It was argued that non-cash support to older persons in the form of 
care and support services form part of social security.15  However, the legislative 
framework for care and support services to older persons16 operates in isolation 
from that of retirement income provision.  The state itself provides little direct 
care and support17 and most care services to older persons are provided by the 
community18 and older persons’ families.  Current government policy treats the 
                                     
13 The occupational retirement fund system is described above at 3.3.2. 
14 See 3.3.3 for a brief overview of private retirement savings vehicles. 
15 See above at 2.2 for a description of the concept of social security and for arguments for 
viewing care and support services to older persons as social security measures.  See also 7.2 for 
examples of international standards that include care and support services under social security. 
16 The provisions of the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 are discussed above at 3.3.4.5. 
17 See 3.3.4 where the lack of state-run residential facilities for older persons is discussed. 
18 ‘Community’ support is provided by a number of institutions including private profit-making 
organisations, the welfare sector (NGOs, charities, religious organisations) and informal networks 
such as neighbours and friends. 
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family as the core support structure for older persons and regards the state’s role 
as merely residual.19   
 
It was also argued above20 that state measures to provide retirement income or 
support services to older persons in South Africa have to be evaluated against 
the backdrop of older persons’ constitutional rights.  Hence, the question of the 
need for intergenerational solidarity in social security measures cannot be 
addressed in isolation from older persons’ basic rights.  
 
Older persons have the right of access to social security including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance.21  In addition to social security rights, older persons also have the 
right to dignity22 and to equality.23  The state is required to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right of access to social security.24  The 
interpretation of phrases such as “reasonable measures” and “within available 
resources” is important in evaluating whether the state complies with its duty to 
realise social security rights.25   
                                     
19 Government policy on older persons and the responsibility to care for them is discussed above 
at 4.2. 
20 At 3.2. 
21 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1996. 
22 Section 10 of the Constitution. 
23 Section 9. 
24 Section 27(2) of the Constitution. 
25 See above at 3.2.2 for an overview of the interpretation of s 27 of the Constitution, particularly 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC).  The conclusions reached regarding the reasonableness of current social 
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The protection of the right of access to social security furthermore depends on 
the existence of an efficient social security administration that does not impede 
access of applicants and beneficiaries to benefits and is therefore linked to the 
right to just administrative action.26   
 
Proposals for reform of the current retirement income system also have to be 
evaluated against older persons’ constitutional rights.  Various policy statements 
and discussion documents have circulated over the last few years.  Although 
they differ on some technical points, all policy and discussion documents point to 
the future introduction of a multi-pillar retirement income scheme including a 
national pension scheme.27  The conclusions drawn in this chapter relate not only 
to the current social security system, but to the proposed reformed system as 
well.28 
 
8.3.1 The older person’s grant as an expression of solidarity 
 
Older persons are entitled to access social security, including social assistance if 
they are unable to support themselves and their dependants.29  The existing 
                                                                                                             
security measures is best discussed in the context of the relevant measures and are incorporated 
in the following paragraphs. 
26 See above at 4.3.4 for the administrative problems encountered by applicants for and 
beneficiaries of the older person’s grant. 
27 See above at 5.2 for the main reform proposals and 7.3.2 for a description of the World Bank’s 
multipillar model that the reforms proposals are based on. 
28 Unless stated otherwise. 
29 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
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social security measure intended to give effect to older persons’ right of access 
to social assistance is the means tested non-contributory older person’s grant.30   
The grant is well targeted and provides groups that face the gravest poverty, 
such as older women in the rural areas, with access to retirement income.  The 
grant is often used to support other household members.  The older person’s 
grant therefore plays an important role as a solidarity measure, redistributing 
income from taxpayers to older persons living in poverty as well as their 
families.31 
 
In the context of intergenerational solidarity, the means test that is currently 
imposed to determine eligibility for the older person’s grant is problematic.  In 
terms of intergenerational solidarity, benefits to older persons form part of the 
flow of resources from the working-age generation to older persons in return for 
older persons having contributed to the working-age group’s well-being when 
they were children.  The imposition of the means test excludes relatively better-
off older persons from receiving their due in terms of intergenerational solidarity.  
It is therefore recommended that the means test be abolished.32 
 
The older person’s grant is funded through taxes on a PAYG basis and is 
therefore dependant on a healthy tax base and a strong working-age generation.  
                                     
30 Payable i.t.o. the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and its regulations. 
31 See above at 4.4. 
32 See 4.3.2 above for other arguments against the imposition of a means test such as the high 
costs involved in administering the test.  The means test also creates a “poverty trap” by 
discouraging lower earning workers from saving for their retirement as the current means test 
takes all income, including retirement benefits, into account. 
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Factors such as HIV/AIDS-related deaths and the consequences of the current 
economic recession, such as retrenchments, reduce the economically active 
population and therefore the tax base, thus leaving the other generations, 
particularly older persons, more vulnerable.  As the state’s responsibilities in 
terms of social assistance payments are limited to its “available resources”, a 
decline in available resources may lead to difficult trade-offs in the relationship 
between different generations.  For this reason it is submitted that 
intergenerational solidarity must be entrenched in legislation to protect the 
interests of older persons from being outweighed by other short-term spending 
priorities.33   
 
In addition, the enforcement and proper implementation of the provisions of the 
Social Assistance Act related to the administration of grants is required to ensure 
continued intergenerational solidarity.  It has been argued that intergenerational 
solidarity with beneficiaries of the older person’s grant presupposes measures to 
ensure that persons other than the intended beneficiaries do not unlawfully 
benefit from the system.34  It is hoped that the Social Security Agency (SASSA)35 
will continue to improve the management of the grants system. 
 
It may be concluded that, with sufficient budgetary support, the older person’s 
grant can go a long way in alleviating poverty among older persons and their 
                                     
33 See 4.3.1 above for an analysis of the impact of high grant costs on intergenerational solidarity. 
34 See 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 above for a detailed description of measures that have been implemented 
to address these problems in the grants system. 
35 I.t.o. the South African Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004. 
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communities.  However, the older person’s grant is the only redistributive 
element in the current retirement income system.  It therefore is crucial that the 
redistributive elements of the reformed retirement system are not limited to the 
social assistance pillar and that a mandatory contributory public pension scheme 
operated on a PAYG basis be created as part of a multi-pillar system.36 
 
8.3.2 Toward a national retirement fund 
 
The current occupational retirement funds system37 in South Africa is not based 
on risk-pooling and solidarity.  It aims to encourage individuals to save for their 
own retirement but does not compel them to do so.  In effect, the voluntary 
nature of this aspect of the current retirement income system, coupled with the 
means test for the older person’s grant, may even serve to discourage individuals 
from saving for retirement.38 
 
As far as the constitutionality of the occupational retirement fund system is 
concerned, the state may delegate its obligations to realise social security rights 
to other parties as long as the measures put in place meet the test of 
“reasonableness” among others.39  The question in the case of occupational 
retirement funds is whether the current occupational retirement fund system can 
                                     
36 See below at 8.3.2 for an example of the possible combination of ‘pillars’ that could constitute a 
multi-pillar system in South Africa. 
37 The legal framework for the occupational retirement funds system is discussed above at 3.3.2. 
38 See above at 4.3.2. 
39 I.t.o. s 27 of the Constitution. 
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be regarded as “reasonable” in terms of section 27(2) of the Constitution.  On the 
basis of the test for the “reasonableness” of a programme developed in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others,40 the occupational fund system may have the institutional capacity 
required by the test41 but fails in terms of the other factors to be considered in the 
evaluation of a measure’s reasonableness.  The flexibility of the system can be 
questioned in the light of the lack of portability of benefits between funds.42  Only 
employees in the formal economy can participate as occupational funds are 
accessed through participating employers.  The result is that workers in the 
informal economy and self-employed individuals are excluded and consequently 
have to rely on the older person’s grant or, if they can afford to, private savings 
vehicles.  The excluded groups constitute a significant section of society.43  The 
voluntary nature of participation in the occupational retirement funds means that 
many cash-strapped employees may choose not to join a retirement fund.  The 
lack of compulsion therefore leads to a situation where the occupational fund 
system may not be providing benefits to the most vulnerable workers.44 The 
current occupational fund system, therefore, does not meet the other important 
                                     
40 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 43.  The Grootboom case and the interpretation therein of 
clauses in s 27(2) of the Constitution such as “reasonable measures” and “within available 
resources” were discussed above at 3.2.2.2. 
41 See National Treasury (2007) 2nd discussion paper 2. 
42 See 5.4 above for a discussion of leakage from the current retirement funding system due to 
low withdrawal benefits, the lack of compulsory preservation of funds and the issue of the pension 
rights of employees of a business that is transferred to a new employer as a going concern. 
43 See above at 5.6 for a discussion of the current exclusion of workers in the informal economy, 
the unemployed and family caregivers from the benefits of occupational fund membership. 
44 See 5.5 above for the problems created by the voluntary nature of the occupational fund 
system and for proposals on how to encourage (or compel) more employees to save for their 
retirement. 
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criterion in Grootboom as it does not make provision for the most vulnerable 
groups of workers. 
 
It is therefore clear that reform of the pension system and the corresponding 
legislative framework to incorporate a public contributory scheme in addition to 
the current voluntary schemes is vital from both a constitutional and an 
intergenerational solidarity point of view. 45  International standards such as ILO 
Conventions 102 and 128 place the general responsibility for the provision, 
implementation and administration of retirement benefits on the state;46 providing 
yet another reason for reform of the current retirement funding system. 
 
The extent to which the proposed national retirement fund would impact on 
intergenerational solidarity is uncertain at this stage and would depend on the 
design of the system and the legislative framework.47  However, the comparative 
overview in Chapter 7 above of the retirement funding systems in Sweden, the 
UK and the USA indicates that their PAYG schemes succeed in paying the 
promised retirement benefits48 and that the notion of intergenerational solidarity 
underpinning their pension systems is popular.49 
                                     
45 According to Diamond (1993) Privatization of social security: lessons from Chile 1, “the role of 
government in the provision of retirement income is important for the well-being of its people”.  
46 See 7.2.4 above for a discussion of the relevant ILO standards. 
47 See e.g. 5.3.2 above where it is argued that the proposed national retirement fund must be a 
pension fund, as the lump sums paid by provident funds amount to the abdication of the 
responsibility that the working-age generation has toward older persons once the lump sum is 
paid.  It is, of course, imperative that the proposed national retirement fund be run on a PAYG 
basis to ensure intergenerational solidarity and redistribution. 
48 Admittedly from a much higher employment and/or income base than is currently possible in 
South Africa.  Therefore, the recent pension reforms in Chile (a country with comparable socio-
economic indicators) that reintroduced a public solidarity-based minimum pension into the 
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The idea behind a contributory retirement income scheme is that an individual 
should attempt to secure income for his or her retirement during his or her 
working years by participating in a solidarity-based scheme offering risk-pooling 
and economies of cost.  It is submitted that the state’s responsibility to retirees 
does not only entail the provision of a retirement income system but also extends 
to ensuring that an individual who has saved for his or her retirement can be 
assured that the promised benefits will in fact be paid upon retirement.  The state 
therefore has an important role in the regulation of fund governance to ensure 
confidence in the long-term continuity of the national retirement scheme.50 
 
In the context of a retirement funding system, the mere presence of ‘neo-liberal’ 
aspects such as a voluntary fully funded pillar will not of necessity detract from 
the goal of social solidarity, but it is imperative that a careful balance is struck 
between the ‘neo-liberal’ and solidarity aspects.  For example, the combination of 
a mandatory PAYG national pension fund with a fully funded retirement savings 
                                                                                                             
previously privately managed pension system are also illustrative of the importance of a national 
pension scheme as part of a multi-pillar system.  See above at 7.3.3 for an overview of the 
Chilean pension system. 
49 Each of these countries have experienced some problems with the PAYG nature of their 
retirement systems and have introduced (or are planning to introduce) reforms in their national 
pension schemes.  However, these reforms were intended to strengthen intergenerational 
solidarity, not to replace the PAYG system with a funded scheme.  The national pension schemes 
in these countries have thus retained their PAYG nature despite the reforms. See above at 7.3.6 
(Sweden), 7.3.4 (UK) and 7.3.5 (USA) for an overview of the pension systems and reforms in 
these countries. 
50 See above at 5.7. 
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”pillar” may strike the required balance, depending on the provisions of the 
legislation creating the retirement funding system..51 
 
In South Africa, the balance and flexibility of a state programme are factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether the state is taking reasonable 
measures to achieve the realisation of social security rights.  Hence, it was 
argued that the answer lies in a multi-pillar system that balances a PAYG 
national pension pillar with funded retirement savings pillars.  It is suggested that 
the proposed national social security system should comprise the following 
pillars:52 
• A tax-financed older person’s grant, without a means test, providing a 
minimum income to all older persons; 
• A contributory defined-benefit national pension fund financed on a PAYG 
basis with compulsory membership for all employees and self-employed 
individuals, including measures such as wage subsidies to assist lower 
paid employees;53 
                                     
51 The aforementioned balance is of vital importance, as is illustrated by the system in the USA 
where the solidarity-based Social Security system has overshadowed the other pillars of 
retirement income with negative consequences for the long-term solvency of Social Security.  The 
projected long-term financial difficulties of Social Security and the attempts at Social Security 
reforms were outlined above at 7.3.5.5. 
52 The multi-pillar system proposed above is based on and adapted from the World Bank “multi-
pillar model” (see above at 7.3.2) and the models proposed by the Taylor Committee Report 
(2002), the DSD discussion document (2007) and the National Treasury discussion papers (2004 
and 2007).  The multi-pillar system envisaged in the various discussion documents is 
summarised above at 5.2.. 
53 See above at 5.5.3 where it is submitted that the increase of participants in a national 
retirement scheme as a result of the proposed wage subsidy for lower earning employees would 
have a positive effect on intergenerational solidarity, as an increase in fund members would 
subsequently increase the interest in maintaining the system until their retirement. 
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• Compulsory membership of defined contribution fully-funded occupational 
retirement funds or a national retirement saving fund for employees to 
supplement the retirement benefits from the solidarity-based national 
pension fund;54 
• Voluntary additional retirement saving e.g. retirement annuities or 
membership of occupational retirement funds; 
• The provision of care and support services to older persons.55 
 
It is submitted that the objective of adequate retirement income for all will require 
an improved interface between social assistance for older persons on the one 
hand and, on the other, benefits paid by retirement funds and private retirement 
savings vehicles.  The incorporation of social assistance measures for older 
persons and a national contributory pension scheme in a single coherent system 
through the proposed reforms would be indicative of a holistic approach to 
retirement funding that is currently lacking.56 
 
8.3.3 The provision of care and support services to older persons 
 
An additional aim of this thesis is to determine the boundary between the family’s 
obligation to care for older family members and the state’s obligation to take 
reasonable measures to provide appropriate care to older persons.   
                                     
54 See e.g. the discussion of the introduction in the UK of a system of defined contribution 
personal accounts, and of auto-enrolment of jobholders into these accounts, at 7.3.4.2 above. 
55 The inclusion of care and support services to older persons as a “pillar” of the proposed 
national social security system is explained below in 8.3.3. 
56  See 4.4 and 5.8 above. 
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In terms of African customary law, the extended family has a legal duty to 
support family members and therefore older relatives. Similarly, a Roman-Dutch 
common law filial duty to support indigent parents exists.  The difficulties posed 
by both the customary law and common law duties are discussed above57 and it 
is suggested that legislation be considered determining the filial obligation to 
support elderly parents in order to clearly outline the responsible parties and 
when an adult child is absolved from the duty to support.  The breakdown of the 
traditional system of support of older persons58 necessitates statutory 
intervention to ensure that older persons are supported by those family members 
who are able to do so.  It is submitted that the proposed legislation on family 
obligations will have to strike a balance between compensating for the 
breakdown of traditional family structures whilst still acknowledging and 
strengthening family support where it still exists.  The central aim of such 
legislation should not be to create a “stick” whereby adult children (or other family 
members) are compelled to support their elderly parents, as this would be difficult 
to enforce, but rather to determine the boundaries between the family’s obligation 
to support older persons and the state’s responsibilities to provide support to 
those older persons.59  It is submitted that the objective of the proposed 
                                     
57 See 6.2.1 above for an overview of the customary law duty to support older relatives and the 
common law filial support obligation. 
58 See 6.2.2 above. 
59 See above at 7.3.5.7 for a discussion of the filial obligation legislation in a number of states in 
the USA.  Although these laws have not often been enforced in the past, they are increasingly 
being used by care homes to compel the adult children of older persons who cannot pay for their 
care and who do not qualify for Medicaid benefits, to comply with their filial obligation by either 
paying for the older persons’ care or ensuring that they get access to Medicaid. 
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legislation would therefore be to determine the point where the family’s 
obligations to older persons end and the state’s liability begins. 
 
The aforementioned intersection between the family’s duty to support elderly 
family members and the state’s constitutional obligations to provide older 
persons with access to social security gains importance in the light of the stated 
government policy that families are the main support structure for older 
persons.60  Based on the breakdown of traditional support of older persons, 
government policy may be based on assumptions that no longer hold true.  The 
policy is in line with the provisions of the African Charter which also regards care 
and support of older persons as primarily the duty of the family as a group and of 
individual family members.  In terms of the African Charter the state has the duty 
to assist the family.61  However the African Charter should not be interpreted to 
undermine international standards that take a different stance on the respective 
roles of the state and the family in providing care and support for older persons.  
Whereas the ICESCR also regards the family as the fundamental group of 
society, the provisions of the ICESCR on social security rights have been 
interpreted as requiring the state to provide social services to older persons with 
no other resources.  Where family members are providing care and support to 
older persons, they should be entitled to state support.62 
 
                                     
60 White Paper for Social Welfare GN 1108 in GG1816 of August 1997 8.82. 
61 See above at 7.2.5.1.2. 
62 See above at 7.2.2.2 for a discussion of the relevant provisions of the ICESCR and the 
interpretations thereof in the General Comments of the UNCESCR. 
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The United Nations’ view on family versus state responsibility for older persons 
as expressed in the “Political declaration” of the Second World Assembly on 
Ageing is that the provision of care and support services is primarily that of the 
state.63   
 
What all the divergent points of view of international and regional instruments 
and declarations have in common is the view that where families provide care 
and support to older relatives they should be entitled to state support and 
assistance where needed.  It is submitted that the state should not shift the 
burden of taking care of older persons to families and communities without 
making additional funds and services available to family and community 
caregivers.64  A policy shift is required in South Africa from one that views 
families and communities as primary caregivers to one that reflects the shared 
responsibility for the care and support of older persons.  
 
 An analogy can be drawn with the situation of family obligations towards 
children.  In terms of section 28 of the Constitution, children have the right to 
family or parental care in the first place and the state is required to provide 
appropriate alternative care when the family cannot do so.  However, the state 
                                     
63 See above at 7.2.3.3.  The ILO Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 156 of 1981 
and Recommendation 165 of 1981 also require Member states to implement measures to 
address the needs of workers with family responsibilities such as caring for elderly parents (see 
7.2.4.2 above). 
64 See at 7.3.3.5 for the example of the Chile Solidario programme whereby families receive cash 
and other assistance from the state, including a cash transfer to families with elderly members. 
The provision of care and support services to older persons by the community is discussed above 
at 6.3.3. 
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makes grants available to families to assist them in raising children.65  An 
argument can be made that similar assistance to families taking care of older 
persons should be considered.66 
 
Another avenue of support could be cash payments to older persons in need of 
care.67  Currently only the grant-in-aid, an additional grant paid to recipients of 
the older person’s grant who need regular attendance by another person, is 
paid,68 but the level of the grant is negligible compared to the cost of care.  
Similar grants, albeit at a much higher level, are paid in the form of attendance 
allowances in the UK69 and the family carer grant in Sweden.70 
 
The Older Persons Act71 makes provision for assistance to family caregivers in 
the form of respite care allowing the caregiver some time off from his or her 
caregiving duties.72  It is submitted that the statutory support for respite care is 
another example of the state assistance to family caregivers that is required as 
the burden of care and support of older persons is shifted to families.  However, it 
is suggested that state assistance to families providing care and support to older 
                                     
65 The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 provides for the payment of means-tested child support 
grants to primary caregivers of children, care dependency grants to parents, foster parents or 
guardians of severely disable children in need of constant care, and foster child grants to foster 
parents. 
66 Cash benefits are made available to family caregivers by law in Sweden – see 7.3.6.4 above. 
67 Such as the “direct payment” option in the UK – see 7.3.4.4 above. 
68 See above at 3.3.1.2 and 6.2.4.3. 
69 See above at 7.3.4.3. 
70 See above at 7.3.6.3. 
71 Act 13 of 2006. 
72 Provision for respite care is also made in the UK (see 7.3.4.4.4 above) and the USA (see 
7.3.5.7.4 above). 
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persons should be expanded to reflect the state and families’ shared 
responsibility for care and support of older persons. 
 
It is therefore suggested that legislation giving effect to the shared responsibility 
of the state and older persons’ families and communities be enacted to 
determine the circumstance under which families and communities providing 
care and support to older persons would be entitled to support.73 
 
8.4 THE NEED FOR INTERSECTORAL COLLABORATION 
 
The resurgent ideologies of individualism, family and filial responsibility and free 
market competition, as manifested in the call for self-help and the return to the 
‘autonomous family’, have been employed to justify the retreat of the state from 
intergenerational responsibility.74 
 
The link between intergenerational solidarity and state support to family 
caregivers as argued for in this thesis and the quote above may have been 
unclear initially.  The prominence given to the provision of state support to 
families in this thesis may also have been questioned at first.  However, it is 
submitted that there is a link between these issues, but the fact that they are 
covered by completely different legislative frameworks and systems means that 
they are not generally regarded as related issues and that the link between them 
is obscured. 
                                     
73 The financial and non-cash support to family members caring for older persons being the 
“carrot” as opposed to the “stick” of filial support legislation without any benefit for the family of 
the older person. 
74 Binney and Estes “The retreat of the state and its transfer of responsibility: the 
intergenerational war” (1988) 18 (1) Intergenerational Journal of Health Services 85. 
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It is submitted that linkages between the legislation and programmes on 
retirement income and on care and support services for older persons 
respectively are needed to give greater effect to intergenerational solidarity and 
the current government policy that families are the main support structures of 
older persons.  Links between programmes providing retirement funding, and 
those providing care and support to older persons and their caregivers may 
provide the necessary incentive to family caregiving in cases where support of 
older relatives is currently absent. 
 
Support for the notion that state assistance in the form of cash benefits is not 
sufficient to address the plight of vulnerable older persons and that an 
intersectoral approach is required, can be found in the following statement of the 
World Bank: 
Addressing the needs of the elderly poor thus requires more than pensions…  
Different forms of direct and indirect support are needed for today’s elderly.  
Programs can provide assistance to families that care for live-in elderly…  And 
social assistance or social pensions should cover the poorest and very old 
(categories that often overlap) and those without family support.75 
 
The comparative overview of statutory provisions for older persons in the UK76 
revealed a system where programmes related to retirement, and older persons 
and their caregivers, are interlinked.  Provision is made for credits for family 
carers in the national pension scheme, thereby making their retirement income 
more secure.  In addition, the fact that the retirement income and care and 
                                     
75 World Bank (2001) World Development Report 2000/2001 154. 
76 See above at 7.3.4. 
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support systems are linked enables local authorities to assess older persons’ 
financial situations to allocate the best care, as public benefits can also be used 
to pay for care. 
 
The state currently regulates non-cash support to older persons in South Africa 
only through the Older Persons Act, but does not coordinate the available 
services.  A right of access to services is worth little if the older person is not 
advised of the available care options and which option is most suitable for his or 
her needs, and then assisted in obtaining the appropriate services.  The lack of 
state coordination of care and support for older persons may lead to situations 
where an older person may be indirectly denied the right to “live in an 
environment catering for his or her changing capacities” and “access 
opportunities that promote his or her optimal level of social, physical, mental and 
emotional well being”.77  The UK model of state-supported care and support 
services is an example worth taking note of, particularly the state’s statutory 
obligations to carry out needs and financial assessments of older persons to 
determine which services are most appropriate taking into account their particular 
needs and the affordability of the services.  It is suggested that in the South 
African context, even if the actual provision of services may still be left to 
community organisations, the state should assume responsibility to ensure that 
the older person has access to the services best suited to his or her needs.   
 
                                     
77 Section 7(e) and (f) Older Persons Act 13 of 2006. 
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It is submitted that that the introduction in South Africa of legislation requiring the 
state to conduct assessments of older persons to facilitate access to care and 
support services is not likely to create a significant additional financial burden for 
the state.  In point of fact, it will ensure fairness in access to services and 
complement the provisions of the Older Persons Act78 requiring the state to set 
priorities for services to older persons and to link the payment of financial awards 
to the set priorities.  Needs and financial assessments by the state before the 
allocation of services will ensure that  
• older persons have access to the appropriate services for their 
circumstances in compliance with section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution; 
• allocation of services is done in fair manner, in compliance with section 9 
of the Constitution and section 7 of the Older Persons Act; and 
• the state’s priorities for the provision of services in terms of section 8 of 
the Older Persons Act are implemented. 
 
It is recommended that additional research be done regarding the feasibility of  
• adapting the UK model of state assessments of older persons in order to 
allocate appropriate care and support services to South African 
circumstances; and 
• the adoption of legislation requiring the state to undertake such 
assessments and allocate appropriate care and support services to older 
persons. 
 
                                     
78 Section 8. 
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8.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to determine whether the hypothesis that 
intergenerational solidarity is the best basis for legislation on the provision of 
financial and non-cash support to older persons, as well as the extent to which 
intergenerational solidarity is present in South African social security legislation.  
Although the older person’s grant system is solidarity-based, the same cannot 
presently be said for the retirement funding system and the provision of care and 
support services to older persons.  The current reforms of the retirement funding 
system offer the ideal opportunity to incorporate and entrench intergenerational 
solidarity in South African legislation and to create an integrated multi-pillar 
system providing for older persons’ financial and non-cash needs.  It is submitted 
that this perspective provides the most appropriate answer to the challenge 
posed in the following quotation. 
Older persons are the custodians of our traditions, heritage and culture and they 
have made an invaluable contribution to the struggle for democracy and equality.  
The challenge now is to develop solidarity between young and old generations, 
so as to ensure alignment between our history, our roots and our ultimate vision 
for Africa in the 21st century.79 
 
                                     
79 National Report on the Status of Older Persons (2002) 57. 
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